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Abstract
In view of the utility and the erosion of biodiversity and traditional knowledge,
the new property regime initiated by the Convention on Biological Diversity
aims at conserving and providing access to these inputs of innovation so as
to ensure innovation in bio-industries for today and tomorrow. The objectives
of this dissertation are: (i) the identification and description of the solutions
that have been tested or discussed; (ii) an assessment of whether these
solutions fulfill (or are likely to fulfill) the objectives and an identification of their
limits (iii) an explanation of the causes of these limits, (iv) and suggestions
for possible solutions. To fulfill these objectives, I adopted a comparative
and theoretical approach and I examined whether the discussions on genetic
resources and traditional knowledge were examples of broader phenomena that
have already been observed and theorized. Because the solution considered by
the Convention on Biological Diversity consists of ...
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General Introduction
A. The Subject-matter
In this dissertatdon, I examine the property regime of genetic resources
and traditional knowledge established by the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD). I analyze how it ensures conservation of and access to
genedc resources and traditional knowledge (TK) and how it feeds
innovation in bio-industries today and tomorrow.
Notions of Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge
According to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the expression
"biological diversity" or "biodiversity" designates the variability
among living organisms and the complex ecologies of which they are a
part; this includes diversity within species (genetic diversity), between
species and of ecosystems. In this dissertation, biodiversity is regarded at
the level of genetic diversity. One important benefit provided by
biodiversity, and the one of most interest in this dissertation, lies in its
role as input into the research and development process (R&D) of
"bio-industries" (e.g. pharmaceutical and agricultural industries). Bio-
industries can be conceived of as defense systems or dynamic contests
between human societies and nature. These industries consist of
relentiess efforts to struggle against the erosion of human erected
defenses against a hostile biological world.' In agriculture, there is a
perpetual renewal of the defense system that guards our food crops
against constantiy evolving pests and predators. Similarly, in medicine,
there are efforts to defend human beings against direct aggressions. In
both sectors, our defense efforts are perpetually eroding and must be
constantly renewed.^ The same forces that are operating against the
human domain are also at work against other living organisms. Any life
form that survives has developed resistances that are successful in a
contested environment.^ It is for the retention of theseexisting resistance
strategies that human societies need biodiversity. Unfortunately, while
the development of biotechnologies increases the possibility of using
biodiversity, biodiversity is eroding, most notably because human
societies prefer to convert biodiversity intense land into more
immediately profitable uses.
' Timothy M. Swanson (1996), "The Reliance of Northern Economies on Southern
Biodiversity: Biodiversity as Information", 17 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 1, p. 2
2Ibidem, p. 13
3 Ibidem
As for traditional knowledge, the Convention on Biological Diversity-
uses this expression to designate '''innovations andpractices of indigenous and
local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use ofbiological diversity". Recently, traditional knowledge has also
been acknowledged as an important source of information for modern
science. Traditional knowledge is notably used to increase the probability
of identifying resistance strategies. Unfortunately, at the precise moment
where the contribution of TK to science is recognized, there is an
important erosion of this knowledge. The main threats to traditional
knowledge are the poor economic conditions of local and indigenous
communities and the erosion of biodiversity. Because TK holders live in
close connection with their environment and have developed knowledge
specific to their immediate environment, they are among the first victims
of their environmental degradation and TK is subject to the same threats
as biodiversity.
Therefore, we have to cope with a chain of innovation, originating
upstream with biodiversity (genetic resources) and sometimes traditional
knowledge, and ending downstream with a final product (e.g. a new plant
variety or a medicine)'*. All elements of this chain of innovation have a
common characteristic, they are knowledge goods.
Objectives of the Property Regime Created by the CBD
In view of both the usefulness and the erosion of biodiversity and
traditional imowledge, their property regimes must aim at one
general purpose: to ensure biotechnological innovations for today and
tomorrow. This general purpose can be divided in two objectives: (1)
downstream, favoring innovation and (2) upstream, ensuring the
conservation of and access to the inputs of innovation, i.e. genetic
resources and traditional knowledge.
In this dissertation, I focus mainly on the solutions that have been set up
to achieve the second objective, (conservation of and access to the
inputs of innovation)^ but I examine these solutions in light of the
general objective (innovation today and tomorrow).
Often the chain of innovation is not continuous and linear; where there is a final
product, such as a new plant variety or a medicine (downstream), biological resources
are almost always found at the upstream end.
5 Actually, I also pay much attention to the first objective (favoring innovation) in the
flrst part of this dissertation, though it is mainly as way to build an analytical framework
that enables me to better understand how to ensure the second objective {CJ. infra).
Objectives of this Dissertation
The objectives of this dissertation consists of (i) identifying and
describing the solutions that have been tested or discussed; (ii) examining
to what extent these solutions fulfill the objectives mentioned above and
therefore to identify their limits; (iii) attempting to explain the reasons of
these limits, and (iv) to some extent suggesting elements of solution.
Tested and Discussed Solutions
The solution considered by the Convention on Biological Diversity
consists of granting exclusive rights as an incentive to conserve
biodiversity and traditional knowledge.
In intergovernmental discussions, governments have come to this
solution by observing an asymmetry among countries. Schematically,
most remaining biodiversity and associated traditional knowledge lies in
tropical developing countries, while most technical capacities to use
biodiversity to develop new products lies in industrialized countries. For
a long time, genetic resources had been in open-access. When
industrialized countries decided to grant intellectual property rights
(IPRs) to "bio-inventions" or "worked genetic resources" in order to
enable bio-industries to capture the benefits of their research and
development, developing countries reacted by claiming national
sovereignty over their "raw genetic resources". Indeed, they did not want
to continue to provide their "raw genetic resources" for free while they
had to pay to obtain industrialized countries' "worked genetic
resources".
Academic circles came to the same conclusion through theoretical
reasoning. The theory of property rights developed by Ronald Coase'^
predicts that problems of externalities and public goods can be solved by
the creation of property rights when transaction costs are low. The
conservation of biodiversity and traditional knowledge appears to be a
public good or at least a source of positive externalities: biodiversity and
traditional knowledge (TI^ are not only useful for their holders but also
for the international community because they are useful sources of
information for bio-industry. If countries rich in biodiversity and TK
holders cannot captare the benefits of conserving biodiversity and
traditional knowledge, they will under-invest in conservation, and destroy
biodiversity by turning land where it lies to more immediately productive
'' Ronald Coase (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost", 3 JOURNAL OF LAW AND
ECONOiMICS 1
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uses. One possible solution lies in the creation of property rights that
enable holders of genetic resources and TK to internalize the benefits of
conservation.
As a result, the Convention on Biological Diversity confirms the
patentability of biotechnological innovations and invests states with
national sovereignty over their genetic resources and to some extent
invests local and indigenous communities with a property right to their
traditional knowledge. In so doing, the Convention encourages the
negotiation of bioprospecting contracts by which bio-industries could
obtain access to genetic resources and knowledge from biodiverse
countries and TK holders. In the situation where innovations were
developed or derived from these genetic resources or traditional
knowledge, the contracts woiild provide for the sharing of benefits. The
potential for such compensation is supposed to encourage biodiverse
countries and TK holders to conserve their biodiversity and knowledge.
Limits of These Solutions
To what extent do these solutions fulfill the objective to ensure the
conservation of and access to the inputs of innovation, i.e. genetic
resources and traditional knowledge?
Regarding genetic resources, the process of creating property rights is
well-launched. The Convention grants states national sovereignty over
their genetic resources and approximately fifty countries have enacted or
have considered enacting legislation that regulates access to their genetic
resources. Biodiverse countries and firms or research centers have signed
a certain number of "bioprospecting contracts". Even if it might be a bit
early to assess the solution proposed by the Convention, observers
already point to a series of problems. It seems that this mechanism
seriously hinders bio-industries' access to genetic resources. In addition,
it turns out that the creation of property rights has not generated
sufficient benefits to fund the conservation of biodiversity.
Concerning traditional knowledge, we are considering the same
solutions, but the process of creating property rights is less advanced.
The issue of protecting traditional knowledge has appeared more
recentiy on the international scene on the initiative of a series of NGOs
and representatives of indigenous peoples. NGOs and later academics
have also suggested resorting to property rights to foster the
conservation and use of traditional knowledge. The discussion has been
launched in the organs of the Convention of Biological Diversity, the
World Trade Organization and above all the World Intellectual Property
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Organization. However, after a few years of discussion, no clear idea of
the content of a property right to traditional knowledgehas emerged.
B. A Comparative and TheoreticalApproach
In order to contribute to this highly polarized debate, I have stepped
back and examined whether the discussions on genetic resources and
traditional knowledge are examples of broader phenomena that have
already been observed and theorized.
As a result, I start from the observation that genetic resources and
traditional knowledge are knowledge and I look at the branch of law that
usually deals with the production of knowledge, i.e. intellectual property
law, to build both a comparative and theoretical approach.
First, I believe it is useful to compate the discussions on the property
regime for genetic resources and traditional knowledge protection with
the ongoing transformation of the IPRs system. Many of the current
analyses of the wild genetic resources property regime, as well as the
current discussions on traditional knowledge protection tend to regard
these two issues as marginal or novel and, therefore, they fail to see any
similaritywith the current IPR system. On the contrary, I do not believe
that these two issues raised unprecedented questions for which a
different system of protection should be invented. This comparison first
reveals that the interrogations on the functioning of the IPRs system are
indeed pretty much the same. A second contribution of this comparative
approach consists of observing solutions that have already been tested in
the IPRs system and could, as such, inspire similar solutions for genetic
resources and TK. For these reasons, I have written the three parts of
the dissertation like three parallel histories. This enables me to point out
striking analogies between the evolution of the intellectual property
system, the evolution of the genetic resources property regime and the
discussions on traditional knowledge protection.
Second, if a close examination of the legal texts is necessary, it is not
sufficient to reach the goals of this dissertation. Therefore, I need to rely
on some theory to explain the evolution of the law and provide an
assessment. Among the different theories of governance, I chose to draw
on the law & economics literature (or economic analysis of law) because
this literature guided the drafting the Convention on Biological Diversity
and is still used in the search for efficient mechanisms to conserve and
use biodiversity. Law and economics is also the dominant theory used to
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explain and assess the functioning of intellectual property law. Due to
the fact that the law and economics of intellectual property are much
more complex and developed, its insights are worthwhile in an analysis
of genetic resource and traditional icnowledge property regimes. The
characteristic of law & economics consists of using economics both to
explain the evolution of the law and to suggest solutions. In this
dissertation, the economic analysis of law is helpful in its normative as
well as its positive aspects. The positive economic analysis of law
consists of attempting to explain legal rules as they are. Even if the
intellectual property system and the property regimes of genetic
resources and traditional knowledge are largely the result of historical
accretion developed without much scientific basis, I believe that an
economic analysis of these regimes can provide some rationalization for
how they function and some assessment of their achievements^. The
normative role of economic analysis of law designates the possibility of
providing an assessment of the law and to make recommendations for
change. The economist is not able to teU society what goals it should set
but the economist may be able to show whether or not the means by
which a society attempt to reach these goals are effective.
This comparative and theoretical approach enables me to reconsider
biological resources and traditional knowledge protection as emblematic
issues, rather than specific and marginal issues of the current IPR system.
This approach provides me with an analytical framework to give an
account and assessment of the evolution of the biological resources
property regime with regards to the objectives of the Convention on
Biological Diversity. Furthermore, using this approach permits me to
evaluate alternative proposals for protecting traditional knowledge.
C. Contribution ofthis Approach
Explanations of the Current Difficulties
In general, I believe that this comparative and theoretical approach
contributes to achieving clarity on an otherwise confusing topic. More
precisely, this approach enables me to identify explanations for the
difficulties involved in the progress on the discussions regarding genetic
resources and traditional knowledge. It seems to me that these
difficulties can be explained notably by (1) an illusion, and (2) an implicit
methodological choice in the design of property rights.
' However, going through the law and economics literature on intellectual property
reveals that many questions remain open, making the topic both interesting and lively.
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Discussions on the protection of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge are based on the illusion that once the state (the law) has
created property rights, the market alone will ensure an automatic and
efficient coordination of the exchange of rights to genetic resources and
traditional knowledge.
Attempts to create property rights to genetic resources, and above all
traditional knowledge, usually resort to justifications in terms of moral
rights, natural rights or human rights®. Although, those justifications
have an important rhetorical power, they offer littie guidance on the
design of well-defined and enforceable property rights. The difficulty is
that those justifications do no take into account the characteristics of
genetic resources and traditional knowledge, their usefulness and their
condition of use; also, they do not pay attention to the effect of the
creation of property rights.
Change of Perspective
In contrast, in accordance with the approach described here, I observe
that the market alone cannot always ensure the perfect coordination of
exchanges of rights to genetic resources and traditional knowledge. More
complex mechanisms of coordination, including state intervention or
forms of self-regulation by economic agents, or a combination of both,
prove to be necessary. vVn additional characteristic of these forms of self-
regulation is that they create some forms of intermediary property
regimes (common property) in addition to the two classical extremes;
individual property and open-access.
Regarding the design of property rights, I suggest using a utilitarian or
economic approach' to design property rights. This approach, which is
the dominant justification for intellectual property rights, is not
extensively used for designing property rights to genetic resources and is
totally absent in the discussions on traditional knowledge'". The
contribution of economics enables me to take into account the
characteristics of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, their
® These justifications are sometimes collectively designated as "rights-based"
justifications or "backward looking" justifications.
' This type of justification is sometimes also designated a "consequentialist"
justification or "forward looking" justification.
For an interesting exception see Padmashree Gehl Sampath (2005), Kegulating
Bioprospecting: Institutionsfor Drug-research, Access andBenefit SharingTokyo: United Nations
University Press.
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usefulness, the conditions in which they are used and the effect of the
creation of property rights.
D. Future Developments
This dissertation, like all research, is not a terminal process but rather a
call for further research. Therefore it might be worthwhile to indicate
where this dissertation stops and where further research may continue.
I believe the economic theory of intellectual property has made much
progress by placing the coordination of knowledge and IPRs exchanges
at the center of its research agenda and by integrating the lessons of the
enddement literature and new institutional economics. In parallel with
this theoretical evolution, I have described examples of self-regulation '^.
I stopped my research at the same stage as IPR theory and the practical
cases. However, a number of issues remain poorly understood.
Intellectual property theory still needs to suggest solutions for situations
where collective rights organizations or other forms of self-regulation
would otherwise be efficient but simply do not emerge. In other words,
we must still strive to understand when and how government (law) can
facilitate the emergence of these collective rights organizations. Another
unresolved issue concerns negative externalities, i.e. whether collective
rights organizations or other forms of self-regulation, which are efficient
for the members of particular social groups, are also efficient for society
as a whole.
Future works could include the identification and documentation of
practical examples of a more complex mix of self-regulation and
government intervention (law). Future works could also include
explorations into the lessons of the theoretical literature on regulation,
self-regulation and forms of "co-regulation" and their integration into
intellectual property scholarship.
" In this dissertation, self-regulation designates forms of coordinadon defined by the
following elements: (1) some degree of collective constraint, (2) other than that directly
emanating from government, (3) to engender outcomes which would not be reached by
individual market behavior alone. See Julia Black (1996) "Constimtionalising Self-
Regulation", 59 Modern Law Review, 24-55
15
Part One:
An History of the Evolution
of the System of Intellectual Property
and its Economic Theorization
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Introduction
The objective of the first part of this dissertation is to provide the
analytical framework necessary to characterize biological resources and
traditional iinowledge as part of a property regime. In doing so, I have
gathered the work of several scholars in order to present an historical
account of the evolution of the system of intellectual property, to
identify the economic rationale for the creation of rights to knowledge,
to feature the engines of changes in intellectual property law, and to
present the unanticipated problems and current attempts made to create
solutions to the existing dilemmas. In parallel, I attempt to show that
these developments and unexpected difficulties have led to a theoretical
evolution by scholars to integrate useful elements of existing theories
into the law and economics of intellectual property.
This historical and theoretical reconstruction can briefly be summarized
as follows. In the first chapter, I present the simple economics of
intellectual property that have long been regarded as sufficient to justify
intellectual property rights (IPRs). As we wUl see below, this "simple
economics" explains only some aspects of IPRs, yet much of the writing
on patent law refers solely to this model. According to this "simple
economics", IPRs are incentives to innovate, i.e. to produce new
knowledge. The creation of IPRs and their characteristics are related to
the nature of the good on which they apply —knowledge —, which
requires the search for delicate balances. Indeed, knowledge is a non
exclusive good which renders it difficult for the producer to prevent
third parties from using it, and in turn from appropriating the fruit of his
investment. The creation of IPRs can be explained by the need to
provide to knowledge producers with a means to exclude third parties
and to fix a price to access the knowledge. Nevertheless, knowledge is
also a non-rival good, which implies that it should be freely accessible to
aU. These properties of knowledge create a dilemma: only the ability to
generate a profit motivates inventors to invest in the production of
knowledge—however only free access can assure the efficient use of
knowledge.
To overcome this dilemma, governments resort to two second-best
solutions. In the first system, temporary exclusive rights (IPRs) to new
knowledge are granted to enable the inventor to fix a price for its use. In
the second system, society is responsible for covering the production
costs of knowledge. In exchange of public subsidy, knowledge producers
are denied exclusive rights.
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In the second chapter, I describe how intellectual property law and to
some extent social norms have originally set a two-part balance. Firsdy,
they draw a distinction between knowledge production that is best
provided by the market and IPRs (generally applied research,
downstream of the innovation chain) and knowledge production that is
best provided through public funding and placed in open access regime
(usually basic research, upstream of the innovation chain). Secondly,
within each mode of knowledge production, intellectual property law
and social norms attempt to identify the right level of protection so that
incentives to produce and share knowledge can be combined in the most
efficient way.
In chapter three, I examine how this two-part balance has been modified
and I hypothesize that changes in intellectual property law can be
explained by changes in innovation policy and in the innovative process.
In chapter four I observe that the evolution of intellectual property law
has not been perfectly efficient. I identify unexpected problems such as
the importance of IPR transferability in the context of collective and
cumulative innovation, as well as the role of social norms and other
forms of self-regulation in shaping knowledge exchanges. I then explain
how intellectual property scholarship wiU try to cope with these new
issues by integrating several bodies of existing theories into intellectaal
property theory.
To overcome these unexpected difficulties, two solutions are considered.
First in chapter five, I examine the entitiement literature, which suggests
that government can reduce transaction costs by modifying the
entitiements of inventors and move from property rules to a liability rule
or compulsory licensing regime. Finally, in chapter six, I observe the
creation of collective rights organizations that facilitate transactions
among holders of IPRS and/or create some form of common property
or limited space within which knowledge is shared. This second solution
is analyzed in light of "new institutional economics" (NIE) and to some
extent in light of the "law and norms" literature initiated by Robert
EUickson.
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1. Property Rights to Knowledge
In this first chapter, I present the economics of intellectual property
rights (IPRs) that have long been regarded as the basic justifications for
granting rights over intangibles. The economics of IPRs can be seen as
attempt to transpose the lessons from the economics of tangible
property to intangible property. Traditionally, the economics of
intellectual property have been limited to the identification of two
functions of property rights, (i) the role of coordination, and (ii) the role
of incentive, and their effect on the production and use of a specific
good, i.e. knowledge.
1.1 Property Rights...
From a legal perspective, property is a bundle of rights that describes
what the owner may do with the goods he owns, i.e. the extent to which
he may possess, use, develop, transform, rent, sell, mortgage, exclude
access to others from their owning, etc. The owner is free to exercise his
rights while others are forbidden to interfere with the exercise of his
rights.'^ In other words, propertyprovides the possibility to use a good,
to exclude others from using a good, and to transfer a good. While the
law of property supplies the legal framework for allocating resources and
distributing wealth, an economic theory of property tries to predict the
effects of alternative forms of ownership on efficiency and distribution
of resources. In this dissertation, I wiU focus on how alternative bundles
of rights to knowledge (IPRs) create incentives to use resources
efficiendy.
Economists draw a distinction between static and dynamic analysis, and
so they distinguish static and dynamic benefit of property rights. The
static benefit of property rights is best explained by example. Imagine
an open-access pasture; that is, no one has the right to exclude others
and hence no one can charge a price for the use of the pasture. Each
farmer has to decide how many cows he wiU bring to the pasture.
Pasturing an additional cow reduces the quantity of grass and hence
imposes a cost on all the farmers. This is because each cow will have to
graze more in order to eat the same quantity of grass, and in doing so
their weight will be reduced. Since none of the farmers pay for the use of
Economists have a larger definition of property in the sense that economic property
rights include not only legal property rights but also other forms of control that
produce the same effects of creating some degree of exclusiveness and transferability.
See Yoram Barzel (1997), The Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge University
Press, 2"'' ed. , p. 3
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the pasture, they are unlikely to take this cost into account, with the
result that more cows will be pastured than would be efficient. This loss,
called deadweight loss", can be solved if one farmer owns the pasture
and charges the other farmers for their use of his pasture. The charge to
the farmer will include the cost he imposes on other farmers because as
extra cows diminish the value of accessing the pasture, the charge
farmers are ready to pay to access the pasture is also reduced.''' Thus, a
property right is a kind of coordination mechanism that solves the
problem of collective action. The main alternative to property rights is
the regulatory power of the state, and in some circumstances customs or
social norms.
The dynamic benefit of property rights concerns investment. This can
also be illustrated using the example of the pasture. A farmer may
estimate that it would be more profitable for him to decide to use his
pasture as a wheat field rather than grazing for catde. The farmer wiU
plow the field, plant wheat and fertilize. In the absence of a property
right, when the wheat is ripe, the farmer may find his neighbors reaping
the wheat and have no remedy to stop them from doing so. If this
should happen, the farmer is likely to abandon his activity and move to
other activities that require less investment. Where the farmer is able to
exclude others from reaping the wheat he has sown, property rights
create an incentive for him to invest in the creation or improvement of a
resource in period one, as no one else can appropriate the resource in
period two. It enables the farmer/owner to coUect the fruit of his
investment. Without this prospect, people would have litde or no
incentive to invest. This dynamic benefit of property rights is the main
economic reason to create intellectual property rights.'^
1.2... to Knowledge
Intellectual property rights constitute a special category of property
rights that are applied to knowledge-related activities. These rights do
VVn individual self-interested opportunistic act creates deadweight loss whenever the
costs it inflicts on others exceed the individual's benefit from the act. Negative
externalities do not necessarily give rise to deadweight loss because the externality may
provide more benefits to its author than costs to affected parties.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner (2003), The Economic Structure of Intelkctual
Property The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London, England, p. 12, hereafter Landes and Posner (2003) The
Economic Structure ofIP Law (...)
15 Ibidem, p. 13
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not apply to the physical object in which the intellectual creation
(knowledge) may be embodied but rather to intellectual creations as
such. In other words, intellectual property rights apply to pieces of
knowledge or information '^' that belong to a special category of goods
called "public goods". Accordingly, the economic theory of intellectual
property rights must be customized to take into account public goods
characteristics.
1.2.1 Knowledge and Public Goods
According to the economist, knowledge is a particular type of good with
properties that differ from ordinary (or private) goods, and therefore
justify an adapted legal regime. These properties are ambivalent. On one
hand, knowledge production activities have a high social benefit that
makes it an important factor of growth; on the other hand, there are





Private goods Club goods
or Toll goods
Rival Non-rival
Knowledge is a non-excludable good. It is difficult and extremely
costiy to render this good exclusive, or to control its access. This
characteristic causes important externalities: knowledge benefits third
parties without compensation. In addition, knowledge is a non-rival
good". As a resource, it is inexhaustible. This non-rivalry includes two
dimensions. First, knowledge can be used repeatedly without additional
cost. Second, an endless number of people can use knowledge
simultaneously without depriving anyone else from using it. This
property of non-rivalry has an important consequence on the fixation of
In the context of this dissertation, when considered as goods, information and
knowledge are used interchangeably.
Dominique Foray (2000), L'e'conomie He la connaissance. La Decouverte, coll.
Reperes n°302, Paris, pp 59-66, hereafter Dominique Foray (2000), L'economie de la
connaissance
This characteristic is also referred as non-rivalrous consumption or non-
substractability
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costs and prices. Efficiency requires a price equal to marginal cost.
However, non-rivalry implies a zero marginal cost, which forbids the use
of marginal cost as criteria to fix prices. Without property rights, the use
of knowledge would be free'' and it would become impossible to
compensate production costs.
Finally, knowledge is a cumulative good. In science and technology,
knowledge is cumulative and progressive. Knowledge is the principal
source or input for the production of new knowledge. This means that a
non-rival good is not only an output (a poem, a piece of music, etc) but
is also potentially an input likely to be used an endless number of times
in the production of new knowledge.
The importance of the social benefit (externalities) of the R&D activities
has its origins in the above three properties of knowledge.
1.2.2 The Problem of Public Goods: What Can Be Privately
Owned?
When knowledge production generates a profit, the appropriation of its
entire value is nearly impossible because it is difficult to fully control
knowledge (non-excludable good). Part of the profits are externalized, or
in other words, captured by others. Where externalities exist, the
inventor must anticipate that he will receive less than the social benefit
of his invention. Insufficient levels of private investment are made where
there is a lack of incentive to innovate in the first place. This problem of
underinvestment is underscored by free riding. Free riders are actors
who take more than their fair share of the benefits or do not shoulder
their fair share of the costs of their use of a resource, involvement in a
project, etc. If an inventor asks contribution to provide a new product
that may benefit society, individuals expecting to benefit from it for free
—they cannot be excluded —will be reluctant to pay for the invention.
Public goods are important examples of market failure (or on other
words a problem of collective action) in which market-like behavior of
individual gain seeking does not produce efficient results. The fact that
knowledge is a public good implies that the market alone cannot provide
for its production in an efficient way.
There exists different types of interventions to provide for the efficient
production of knowledge— but they are all confronted with the same
dilemma. If one sees the issue from the utilization viewpoint, there is
" Apart from the cost of transmitting knowledge
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zero marginal cost; consequently, for maximum efficiency, there should
be no restriction on the use of knowledge and it should be available at
zero cost to users. Knowledge should be a "free good", as this is the
opdmal condition of use for a non-rival good. The issue appears
differendy from the production viewpoint. Producing knowledge is
cosdy; maximum efficiency in production implies that all production
costs are covered by the economic value of the created knowledge. This
assumes that producers can appropriate the benefits of knowledge by
restricting access and charging a positive price controlling access. The
knowledge dilemma can be summed up as such: only with the
expectation of being able to charge a users fee will producers of
knowledge invest in its production,; only where no cost to users exists
can the efficient use of knowledge be assured. . This dilemma is
reinforced by the cumulative characteristic of knowledge that makes it
both an output and aninput.^"
There are two principal incentive and coordination mechanisms '^ that
tackle the issues of knowledge externalities. The first system, which will
be referred to as "Technology" remedies the public good problem by
increasing the degree of appropriability.^^ Temporary exclusive rights
(IPRs) to the new knowledge are granted, which enables the inventor to
fix a price for their use '^'. Thus, the problem of collective action caused
by free riding is tackled by the creation of property rights that enable a
partial internalization of knowledge externalities. In this system, which is
employed for the majority of private enterprise R&D, the gain in
dynamic efficiency, as a result of the greater innovative activity, is
intended to balance out the losses from static inefficiency, i.e. the under-
utilization of the knowledge or the under production of the goods
protected by IPRs.
2" Dominique Foray (2000), Ukommie dela connaissance, p. 66
2' To a lesser extent public goods can also be produced by privilege or close-knit
groups; and non-individualism can somedmes overcome the free-riding problem (Cf.
infra)
Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David (1994), "Toward a New Economics of Science",
23 Research Policy 487, hereafter Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David (1994),
"Toward a New Economics of Science"
The idea of solving problems of externaliues and public good by the creation of
property rights is generally attributed to Ronald Coase in Ronald Coase (1960) "The
Problem of Social Cost" 3JOURNAL OFLAW AND ECONOMICS 1.
2'' Note however, that IPRs are not the only way to appropriate the benefit of an
invention, secret and technical advances play also an important role. To some extent, it
can be said that the main function of IPRs and secret is to provide lead time to the
knowledge producer (Cf.chapter!)
23
In the second system, referred to as "Science", society is responsible for
covering the production costs of knowledge, as private initiative is
substituted for public initiative. In this second system, two variants may
exist. In the first variant, government engages directiy in the production
of knowledge, finances the production costs from general taxation, and
allows the free use of its outputs.^^ The second possible variant occurs
where society encourages the private production of knowledge by
offering public subsidies for its production and relying upon general
taxation to finance these subsidies. In exchange for being the recipients
of public subsidies, producers are denied exclusive rights to the output
of their R&D activities. '^' Thus, in both variants of this second system,
the knowledge producer has no exclusive rights; the knowledge
produced belongs to the whole society. In this light, a general norm of
rapid communication and knowledge sharing predominates, thus
enabling the constitution of cooperation networks. In this scenario,
moving from unsuccessful voluntary provision to involuntary provision
of the public good solves the collective action problem: the state
imposes a tax on citizens to fund the provision of the public goods.
Thus, the distinction between Science and Technology refers to two sets
of socio-political arrangements and their respective reward mechanisms
affecting the allocation of resources for scientific research. What are
considered legitimate goals, reward systems, and the norms of the
disclosure of knowledge are distinct as between Science and
Technologies.^^ The goal assigned to the community of Science is to
increase the stock of public knowledge, whereas the objective of
Technology is to increase the stream of rents that may be derived from
possession of rights to use private knowledge. Each system has its own
internal coherence. The two systems have contradictory norms that
create some tensions at their boundaries but they are not mutually
exclusive. Rather, it is argued that to ensure an efficient allocation of
resources for the production of knowledge both systems and the
maintenance of a synergetic equilibrium are required.
Each system has its comparative advantages and disadvantages. One
evident advantage of Open-Science (public procurement) consists in
25 This was at the heart of Samuelson's analysis of the efficient production of public
goods, Samuelson (1954), "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure", 36 REVIEW OF
Economics and Statistics Noveniber 387-389.
Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David (1994), "Toward a New Economics of Science", p.
496
" Ibidem, p. 495
28 Ibidem, p. 498
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placing innovations in open-access regimes whicin enables the enjoyment
of the non-rivalrous nature of knowledge. However, this advantage must
be compared with possible principal-agent problems. Indeed, some
characteristics of research activities, such as the great specialization of
researchers, the elements of chance in the process of discovery, make it
very costly and difficult for the funding government (the principal) to
monitor scientists' works (agent) and to allocate funds between different
research projects. '^ Conversely, the advantage of IPRs is that the market
indicates the value of the innovation. Many inventors can obtain a patent
but only inventions that are valuable to the market produce profits and
income to inventors. IPRs, however, restrict access to non-rival
goods and lead to smaller quantities of a good being produced at a
higher cost than would be efficient.
Consequentiy, the knowledge dilemma requires the research of a double
balance. First, a balance is required between research entrusted to
Science (open research) and research entrusted to Technology (market
and IPRs). The second balance must exist within each type of research
(especially technology): the right level of protection must be found so
that incentives to produce and share knowledge are combined in the
most efficient way. Chapter two of this dissertation describes how this
double balance was originally set.
The Principal-Agent problem may also occur between the citizens and the
government because it is very difficult for citizens to monitor how the state allocates
funds for research.
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2. A First Equilibrium: a Two-Part Balance
In this chapter, I describe two balances: one in the distribution of
research activities between Technology (IPRs and the market) and
Science (public funding and open access) and a second in the
combination of incentives to produce and share Icnowledge within both
Technology and Science. For the sake of clarity, I start with Technology
and the definition of property rights to knowledge (section 2.1).
Afterwards, I examine the distribution of research activities between
Science and Technology and how knowledge is exchanged within
Science (section 2.2).
2.1 Inside Technology: DeGnition of Property Rights to
Knowledge
In analyzing the definition of IPRs inside Technology, I offer an initial
examination of how the issue is conceived from an economics
perspective, and then turn to consider how it is handled from a legal
point of view.
2.1.1 The Economic Question: Balancing Dynamic Efficiency
(incentive) and Static Efficiency (access)
As mentioned before, the public goods characteristic of knowledge
complicates the definition of efficient property rights. On principle,
(static) efficiency requires that price equals marginal cost. However, this
is not possible for knowledge goods because it would give a negative
profit to the knowledge producer. Indeed, knowledge creation is
characterized by increasing returns, i.e. high fix costs and low (or zero)
marginal cost. Fixing a price at marginal cost would not allow the
producer to recover its fixed costs and generate a profit. IPRs are
introduced for the precise reason that they enable the producer to fix a
price higher than marginal cost. This solution, unfortunately, is not
totally efficient. When price is above marginal cost, as permitted by
IPRs, deadweight loss results: people who would have been willing to
access the knowledge good at marginal cost are prevented from doing so
due to a higher price set by the IPR holder, which they cannot afford.
The problem of deadweight loss is illustrated by the following: On the
horizontal axis, aU potential users are arranged by their willingness to
pay. If the patent or copyright holder charges a single price (pi), then aU
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the potential users to the left, for whom the willingness to pay is higher
than the price, will buy the knowledge good. Each is getting some
surplus (CS) because each is willing to pay more than the price. The
users on the right are excluded, including those that are willing to pay
more than marginal cost (m.c. or p2) but less than pi. That is precisely











In the absence of perfect solution, the role of the economic analysis of
intellectual property has primarily consisted in cost-benefit analysis that
approximates the best trade-off between access (static efficiency) and
incentives (dynamic efficiency). In other words, economic analysis has
attempted to identify whether and when the granting of intellectual
property rights is justified. Similarly, the economic function of
inteUecmal property law is to minimize the deadweight loss caused by
IPRs: the conditions required for obtaining IPRs and the limited
duration of these rights are legal instruments to approximate the best
trade-off.
2.1.2 The Legal Answer; Patent requirements
In its early stage, intellectual property law consisted of two dominant
systems of protection '^: the patent system that grants a relatively short
Adapted from N. Gallini and S. Scotchmer (2002), "Intellectual Property: When is it
the best incentive system", in A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern (eds.) Innovation, Poligi and
theEconomy, Vol. 2, MIT Press, Massachusetts.
In this text, what I explain about IPRs only concerns patent, copyright and similar
rights that confer a temporary exclusiveright. Consequendy, I am not concerned with
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period of strongprotection to useful, novel and inventive (non-obvious)
inventions, and the copyright system that gives a relatively long and weak
protection against copying for original and creative works.^^ In addition,
trade secret laws create an intermediary zone between formal IPRs and
free competition. Trade secrets laws do not confer exclusive property
rights but they require would-be competitors to extract an inventor's
undisclosed know-how by "proper means". That is to say that would-be
competitors have only three options: (1) to reverse engineer the
technology from existing prototypes, (2) to create the product
independendy from scratch or (3) to acquire the unparented know-how
through licensing agreements with innovators. The main contribution of
trade secret laws is to provide small-scale innovators sufficient lead-time
to recover their R&D costs before their competitors enter the market.
In the case of patent law,^" the World Trade Organization's (WTO)
Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs),
and the European Patent Convention (EPC) both provide that in order
to obtain a patent, the applicant must demonstrate that his research
results consist of an invention that is capable of industrial application, is
trademark or geographical indications. Although trademarks and geographical
indications are legally a part of intellectual property law, the economist does not
perceive them as serving the same economic function as patents and copyrights.
According to economists, trademarksand geographical indicationsare primarily used to
indicate the quality of goods and services to the consumer. See William M. Landes. &
Richard A. Posner (2003), The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property luiw, chapter 7
"The Economics of Trademark Law" or a precedent article William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner (1987), "Trademark Law: an Economic Perspective", 30 JOURNAL
OF Law and Economics 265
32 Jerome H. Reichman (2003), "Savingthe Patent Law from Itself: Informal Remarks
Concerning the Systemic Problems Afflicting Developed Intellectual Property Regime"
in F. Scott Kieff (ed.). Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project, Elsevier
Academic Press, p. 293, hereafterJerome H. Reichman (2003), "Savingthe Patent Law
from Itself..."
SeeJerome H. Reichman (1994), "Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms", 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432), hereafter Jerome H. Reichman (1994), "Legal
Hybrids ..."
3'' Similarreasoning exists for copyright about the idea- expression dichotomy and the
function of the originality requirement. See e.g. Landes & Posner (2003), TheEconomic
structure ofIP law (...), or Jerome H. Reichman (1994), "Legal Hybrids ..." or Jerome
H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir (2003), "A Contractually Reconstructed Research
Commons for Scientific Data in a highly protectionist intellectual property
environment", 66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 315 hereafter Jerome H.
Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir (2003), "A Contractually Reconstructed Research
Commons..." , or Paul A. David, "A tragedy of the Public Knowledge 'Commons'?
Global Science, Intellectual Property and the Digital Technological Boomerang",
MERIT Infonomics Research Memorandum Series
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novel and involves an inventive step.^^ In the United States Patent Act,
the conditions are roughly equivalent, even if they are phrased in a
different terminology: the invention must be useful, novel and non-
obvious.^''
The function of these requirements for patentability is to identify
intellectual achievement for which the benefits of the incentive effect (a
temporary right to exclude others from practicing the invention) wiU
exceed the costs (society is prevented from practicing the invention and
using it as input to future discoveries without permission from the
inventor).
The most basic limitation on access to the patent system is that one may
only patent something that is new. If this were not the case, the patent
system would effectively restrict access to protected technologies
(deadweight loss) without the countervailing benefits of increasing
existing Imowledge and promoting the development of welfare-
enhancing technologies.^^
The distinction between an invention and a discovery, the requirement
of industrial applicability in European patent law, and the role of the
utility requirement in American patent law all play a major role in
drawing the boundary between basic research and applied research. I will
turn to discuss their role in the next section of this dissertation, which is
devoted to the articulation between public science and IPRs protected
R&D.
The inventive step or non-obviousness requirement is the most
important criteria in identifying those inventions for which the benefits
of the incentive effects of a property right exceed the costs of their
underuse.
According to Article 56 of the EPC, an invention contains an inventive
step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person
skilled in the art. To decide whether an inventive step is present, the
'5 European Patent Convention (EPC) article 52(1), Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPs) of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
article 27
A footnote in the article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement regards the American and
European terminology as equivalent.
I do not dwell here on the deflnition of prior art and the difference between
European and American law. I will come to that point when I tackle traditional
knowledge in the third part of this dissertation.
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European Patent Office (EPO) almost always applies the "problem-
solution approach". The approach consists in: (1) identifying the closest
prior art; (2) determining the objective technical problem, i.e.
determining, in the view of the closest prior art, the technical problem
which the claimed invention addresses and successfully solves; and (3)
examiningwhether or not the claimed solution to the objective technical
problem is obvious for the sldlled person in viewof the state of the art in
general.^® Inventions with minor improvements from the state of the art
are often submitted for patentability. . This is common, for instance,
when a new material is discovered; loads of patent claims are likely to
surge for the making of weU-known objects from the new material. The
patent system requires the presence of an inventive step in order to
exclude these claims from patentability. '^
In the American patent system, the non-obviousness standard plays a
similar role. The history of American patent law reveals that both
Congress and the Courts were very aware of the function of this
requirement. The first Patent Act enacted in 1790 included only two
requirements: novelty and utility.'"' However, it was quickly
acknowledged that patents ought not to be granted for trivial advances.
In 1851, the Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of invention as a
third requirement for patentability. The Court distinguished minor
improvements reflecting "the work ofthe skilful mechanic, which does not
deserve patent protection, from substantial improvements reflecting "[the
work] of the inventor'''For the next hundreds years, the Courts struggled
to quantify the advance necessary to qualify as an invention or as an
inventive work. Despite a series of Supreme Court decisions'*^ refining
the doctrine, much legal uncertainty remained regarding its exact
content.''^ In 1952, Congress formally incorporated this third
requirement and attempted to clarify its content into Section 103 of the
The "problem-solution approach" was first developed by the EPO in decision
T 24/81 EPO O.J. 1983, 133
William Cornish & David Llewellyn (2003), Intellectual Proper^: Patents, Copyrights,
TradeMarks and Allied Rights, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, Fifth Edition, London, p.
191-192, hereafter William Cornish & David Llewellyn (2003), Intellectual Property (...)
"0Patent Act of 1790, §1,1 Stat. 109
Hotchkiss V. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851), at 267
See Rubber-Tip Pencil Company v. Howard 87 U.S (20 Wall.) 498 (1874); CunoEngineering
Corp. V. Automatic devices Corp. 314 U.S. 84 (1941); GreatA. <& P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp. 340 U.S. 147 (1950)
''3 See for instance Harries v. Air King Prods., 183 F.2d 158(2d Cir. 1950) where Judge
Learned Hand complained the concept of invention was "as fugitive, impalpable,
wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts."
(at. 162)
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patent statute.'*'* Section 103 describes the necessary advance in terms of
whether the claimed subject matter "would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art", rather than in
terms of whether the advance constituted an "invention" or the worii of
an "inventor".
Changing the name of the requirement from "inventions" to
"nonobviousness" did not put an end to the legal uncertainty. There has
been much discussion on whether the enactment of Section 103 was
intended to lower the requirement or was merely a codification of
judicial precedent."^ In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court
interpreted that Congress had not intended to lower the prerequisite of
patentability.'"' Accordingly, the court opined that obviousness is to be
determined against (1) a background of the prior art, (2) the differences
between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and (3) the
ordinary level of skill in the art. The court also added that secondary
considerations such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
and failure of others, may have relevancy as indicia of nonobviousness.
In addition, the Court explicitly affirmed the economic rationale of
patent requirements providing that patent should be reserved for "those
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a
patenff^ For obvious or small-scale innovations the social cost of
granting a patent is presumed to exceed the benefits of its incentive
effect.
Last, the limited duration of patent and the disclosure obligations can
also be analyzed as an attempt to find the best trade off between access
and incitement.
This classical description of patent law fits well into what Merges and
Nelson call the "discrete innovation model". It assumes that an invention is
discrete and well defined, and is created through the inventor's insight and hard work.
Two features characterize this type of invention one of which has to do
35 U.S.C. § 103
''5 See e.g. Giles S. Rich (1963), "Congressional Intent - Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act
of 1952", in Patent Vrocurement and Exploitation reprinted in John F. Witherspoon (ed.)
(1980) Nonobviousness —The Ultimate Condition ofPatentabili^
"6 Graham v. John Deere Co. (1966), 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459. However, the Court
acknowledged that by the last sentence of section 103 providing that "patentabili^shall
not benegatived by the manner in which the invention wasmade". Congress intended to abolish
the "flash of genus" test announced by the Court in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic
devices Corp. The Cuno decision had indeed triggered waves of negative commentary,
blaming the court for pushing the invention standard to high.
Grahamv. John Deere Co. (1966), 383 U.S. 1,148 USPQ 459, at 11
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with inventive inputs and the other which has to do with inventive
outputs. As to inputs, discrete inventions do not typicallj incorporate a large number
ofinterrelated components; thg stand more or less alone. On the output side, the
products ofdiscrete technology industries tend not to comprise integral components of
some largerproduct orsystem; thej therefore do not enable the development ofa wide
array ofancillaryproducts. Examples of this typeof inventions are Gillette's
safety razor, the ballpoint pen, and some pharmaceuticals. For such
inventions, a patent can indeed offer high and broad control of a
particular invention in addition to providing a descent profit to the
inventing firm. In some situations these patents do not act as serious
restrictions to foUow-on inventive work undertaken by other firms.''^
However, as we wiU see below, this "discrete innovation model"
concerns only one segment of inventive activity. This is despite the fact
that much of the writing on patent law only refers to this model.
In this section, I have reported how intellectual property laws, in
particular patentability requirements, have traditionally attempted to
foster the production of knowledge by identifying those inventions for
which the benefits of the incentive effects of a property right exceed the
costs of underuse. However, this is only one branch of the balance. IPRs
and the market only provide one fraction of knowledge production, an
additional research effort is provided by public funds.
2.2 The Distribution of Research Activities between
Open Science and Proprietary Technology
In this section, I examine how economics suggest distributing research
activities between Technology and Science. Then I turn to discuss how
intellectual property law attempts to organize the distribution of research
activities. Finally, I look at the organization of knowledge exchanges
within Science.
2.1.1 The Economic Frontier: Upstream
Even if innovation is not a linear activity, schematically, it can be seen as
a chain that starts upstream with fundamental discoveries made by basic
research, and continuing downstream with applied research exploring
possible applications of those discoveries, ending with the introduction
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson (1990), «On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope », 90 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 839, p. 880
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of discovery-incorporating products in the market"". Economist Paul
David likens basic researchers to "providers ofmaps toguide mission-oriented
researchers, directing explorers on the applied sciencefrontier to the morefrui^ul areas,
and sparing them the wastage of time and resources in searching barren regions or
trying to cross unbridgeable chasms"?^
Traditionally, the upstream part of the innovation chain (basic research
or "science") is associated with (i) public funding and (ii) open
dissemination. These two attributes are closely related but not totally
coextensive. There exists some publicly funded research that is not
published (military research) and some privately executed research that is











From the point of view of funding, the production of knowledge will
be funded by the private sector as long as a minimal rate of return can be
expected (boxes A and B on the table). Commercial expectations, fixed
costs and the ability to make knowledge exclusive are the main variables
of private benefit. The public sector finances research where the
expected social benefit is high and the private benefit low (box D). Box
C depicts research with small expectations of both private and social
benefit; these activities are unlikely to be financed as long as the benefits
Actually, the relationship between basic research and applied research is somewhat
circular in the sense that applied knowledge is also a source of inspiration for pure
knowledge, which in turn is a source for additional applied knowledge and so forth. See
Nathan Rosemberg (1976), Perspective on Technologf, Cambridge; Cambridge University
Press
5° Paul A. David (1993), "Knowledge, Property and the System Dynamics of
Technological Change" in L. Summers and S. Shah (eds.) Proceedings of the World Bank
Annual Conf. onDevelopment Economics: 1992, Washington D.C., World Bank Press, p. 230
5' Adapted from Brown K.M. (1998), Downsisgng Science, The AEI Press, Washington
D.C., by Dominique Foray (2000), L'e'conomie dela connaissance, p. 78
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expected stay at this low level. For the most part, basic research
corresponds to Box
The expected private benefit from basic research is low for different
reasons identified by the economics of science." First, the economic
value of basic research is difficult to forecast and even to assess
retrospectively. As basic research occurs at the limits of knowledge, its
outcome is highly uncertain. Second, the difficulty in establishing and
defending property rights in the discoveries of basic research often
impedes the realization of economic rent.
The boundary between Science and Technology is neither immutable
nor perfectly precise. The frontier between boxes B and D can move
downwards for instance if the exclusivity of certain goods is
strengthened; it can move upwards if commercial expectations disappear.
This frontier is not well defined and the zone around often depicts a type
of research that departs from the pure basic research with an applied
direction. '^' For this type of research, the institutional arrangements are
less stable; they can vary according to technological change or national
cultures. In the United States, this type of research is mainly done by
private research centers while in some European countries it is realized
by the government or public organizations. {Cf. Infra)
From the viewpoint of dissemination, there are some situations where
the benefits derived from new knowledge should not be appropriated by
a private entity: this knowledge (on the table: extreme right of box B) is
so fundamental and is the source of so many socially useful applications
that it would be dangerous to leave its potential to a private agent.^^
Typically, basic research findings (upstream) are the source of a
multitude of useful inventions (downstream), which is why it is
traditionally thought that they be freely available.
2.2.2 The Legal Frontier: Upstream
Traditionally, patent law doctrine has attempted to distinguish upstream
and downstream elements of the innovation chain by confining the reach
52 Dominique Foray (2000), h'econom'e dela connaissance, pp. 78-79
53 Paul A. David, D.C. Mowery & W.E. Steinmueller (1992), "Analyzing the Economic
Payoffs from Basic research", 2 ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND NEW
Technology 73-90.
S'' Dominique Foray. (2000),Ueconomie dela connaissance, p.79
55 Ibidem
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of patent protection to inventions of applied technology, as distinguished
from those of basic research.
In American law, the frontier derives from ,the Constitution. It
authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and arts by
securing for authors and inventors, for a limited time, the exclusive
rights to their respective wridngs and discoveries. This consdtutional
provision is usually read distributively: '^' the function of patent law is to
promote the progress of "useful arts" (i.e. applied technology) by
securing for "inventors" exclusive rights to their "discoveries";^^ the
function of the copyright law is to promote the progress of "Science"
(i.e. knowledge in general) by securing for "authors" exclusive rights to
their "writings".^" Under this reading, the American Constitution only
authorizes Congress to extend patent protection to inventions in applied
technology.
Accordingly, Congress has defined patentable subject matter so as to
limit patent protection to applied technology. The patent statute defines
as patentable; '''Any new and usefulprocess, machine, manufacture or composition
ofmatter, orany new and useful improvement thereof" Among the conditions
for patentability, the "utility requirement" plays a crucial role in
mediating the boundary between academic science and applied
commercially valuable technology.'" In application of this requirement,
the case law has denied protection to theoretical and abstract
discoveries,*^^ laws of nature, products of nature,"^^ principles, abstracts
ideas, mathematical formulae, and algorithms.'^ ^ Patents are granted only
Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1987), "Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research", THE Yale LAW JOURNAL, vol. 97, n°2 (December) p. 185,
hereafter Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1987), "Proprietary Rights and..."
The use of the term « discoveries » in this context does not have the same meaning as
in European law where "discoveries" are opposed to "inventions" and are not
patentable.
See, e.g. Diamond v. Chakrabar^, 447 U.S.303 (1980): "The constitutionally-stated
purpose of granting patent rights to inventors for their discoveries is the promotion of
progress in "useful Arts", rather than in science(...) the present day equivalent of the
term "useful Arts" employed by the Founding Father is "technological arts"
55 35 U.S.C. § 101
Robert P. Merges(1996), « Property Rights Theory and Tlie Commons : The Case of
Scientific research", in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, JR., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.)
Scientific Innovation, Philosophy, and Publicpolig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
p. 165, hereafter Robert P. Merges (1996),«Property Rights Theory and The
Commons..."
•i' Mackay Radio & Tel. Co v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1938)
" Funk Bross. Seed Co v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)
« Gottshalk V. Benson, 409, U.S. 63 (1972);Parker v. Flook,437 U.S. 584 (1978)
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for the discovery of new means to achieve useful results. To the extent
that basic research consists of explanations for existing means of
achieving useful results, or principles that are only put into use later by
works of others, it may not be patented.'^ '' Thus, using Professor
Eisenberg's expression, the "utility requirement" can be seen as "a timing
device helping to identify when an invention is ripeforpatentprotection"!"^
This view is expressed by the last Supreme Court case addressing the
utility requirement, Brenner v. Mansoti'^ .
The facts: On October 13, 1959 Howard Ringold and George
Rosenkrantz obtained a patent on a novel process for making a known
steroid. Their patent described the useful effect that the products of their
invention had for the treatment of some ailment. Three months later,
Andrew Manson filed a patent application for the same process in order
to win a patent and to invalidate the Ringold Patent. To do so, Manson
needed to prove that he had created the process and established a utility
prior to the date on which Ringold and Rosenkrantz filed their first
patent application (December 17, 1956).
The decisions: (1) The patent examiner rejected Hanson's application on
the ground that he had failed to show that he knew the utility of the
steroid product at that date. Manson tried to overcome the obstacle
referring to an article anterior to the first patent application revealing
that a number of compounds, including the relevant steroid, were being
tested for possible tumor inhibiting effect and that a compound closely
related to Manson's steroid had proven effective. (2) Despite this piece
of evidence, the Patent Office's Board of Appeal upheld the rejection of
Manson application, stating that: is in our view that the statutory
requirement ofusefulness ofaproduct cannot bepresumed merely because it happens to
be closely related to another compound which is known to be useful". (3) The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed the decision and
affirmed that "where a claimprocessproduces a knownproduct it is notnecessary to
Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1987), "Proprietary Rights and..." p. 186
Rebecca S. Eisenberg (2000),« Analyze this ...", p. 2087
See also William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (2003), The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Proper^ Law (...), stating that: "The requirement ofutility can be understood to have
three economicpurposes. One is to rule outpatents onbasic research, and another is to delay thepoint
in the development ofa newproduct orprocess at which apatentmay be obtained (...) The thirdis to
reduce the cost ofpatent searches bj screening out useless inventions by cranks or amateurs, or ly
inventors hoping to blanket an area ofresearch with patents in the hope offorcing researchers who come
up mth useful invention within thearea toseek licensesfrom them. In other words, therequirement if
utility serves to limitstrategicpatenting" (p. 302)





show utility for the product as long as the product "is not alleged to be
detrimental to the public interest". (4) The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the CCPA, reaffirming the importance of the utility
requirement. In addition, this case is very interesting to the extent that
the Court perfectiy described what is at stake in a possible upstream shift
in patenting:
'T.t is true, of course, that on of the purpose of the patent system is to encourage
dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions. And it may be
that inability topatent a process to some extentdiscourages disclosure and leads to a
greater secrecy that muld otherwise be the case. The inventor of theprocess, or the
coporate organi^tion by which he is employed, has some incentive to keep the
invention secret while usesfor theproducts are searched out. However, in lightof the
highly developed art of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful
information aspossible —while broadening thescope of theclaim as widely aspossible
—the argument based upon the virtue of the disclosure must be warily evaluated.
Moreover, the pressurefor secrey is easily exaggerated, for if the inventor ofaprocess
cannot himself ascertain a "use" for that which his process yields, he has every
incentive to make his invention known to those able to do so. Finally, how likely is a
disclosure of a patentedprocess to spur research by others into the uses to which the
product may be puf? To the extent that the patentee haspower to enforce hispatent,
there is littleincentivefor others to undertake a searchfor uses;
Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging disclosure and of inhibiting
secrety, we believe a more compelling consideration is that a process patent in the
chemicalfield, which has not been developed andpointedout to the degree of specific
utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly
commanded ly thestatute. Until theprocess claim has been reduced toproduction ofa
product shown to be useful: the metes and bound of that monopoly are not capable of
precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, andperhaps unknowable area.
Such patent conferpower to block offwhole areas of scientific development, ivithout
compensating benefitfor thepublic. (...)"
After this very up-to-date analysis of what is at stake in determining the
appropriate level of development required prior to granting a patent to
an invention, the Court annunciated a rigorous test requiring
"substantial utility" —a specific benefit must exist and be available when
the application is filled— and the Court affirmed its rejection of
upstream patents.
"That is not to say that we mean to disparage the importance of
contributions to the fund of scientific information short of the invention
of something "useful", or that we are blind to the prospect that what
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now seems without "use" may tomorrow command the grateful
attention of the public. But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a
reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.
"A patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than
to the realm of philosophy..
This decision, however, was not unanimous and it is likely that the
dissenting opinion advances arguments that will reappear in future
litigation. {Cf. infra).
***
In Europe, the situation is roughly similar, even though the criteria for
patent protection are phrased in different terms. Article 52 (1) of the
Munich European Patent Convention (EPC) lists the four criteria for
patent protection: "Europeanpatents shallbe pantedfor any inventions which are
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve inventive
step."''^ The European Patent Office (EPO) guidelines add two further
requirements that are implicitly contained within the EPC. First, "the
invention must be such that it can be carried out bj a person skilled in the art." '^'
Second, "the invention must be of 'technical character' to the extent that it must
relate to a technicalfield, mustbe concerned with a technicalproblem, and must have
technicalfeatures in terms ofwhich the matterfor which protection is sought can be
defined in theclaim"
In European law, both the distinction between "discovery" and
"invention" and, to some extent the condition of "industrial
applicability" assume roughly the same boundary function^^ as the
"utility requirement" in American law. The EPC gives no definition of
"invention" but Article 52 (2) contains a non-exhaustive list of elements
which are not regarded as inventions: a) discoveries, scientific theories
and mathematical methods; b) aesthetic creations; c) schemes, rules and
'5'My emphasis
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement includes a foomote indicating that the terms
"capable of industrial application" and "involve and inventive step" may be deemed by
a member to be synonymous with the terms "useful" and "non-obvious", respectively.
This condition comes from the disclosure requirement.
EPO, Examination Guidelines, part C, Chapter 4, available at www.european-patent-
office.org .Actually, this is more in line with the definition of invention than with the
definition of discovery, rather than a separate and additional criterion.
See notably Michel Vivant (ed.) (2003), Vroteger les innovations de demain. Biotechnologies,
logiciels et methodes d'affaire, Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle, coll. « Propriete
intellectuelle », Paris, La Documentation Fran^aise, p. 43 , hereafter Michel Vivant (ed.)
(2003), Proteger les innovations dedemain (...), or Bernard Bergmans (1991), Protection des
Innovations Biologiques. Une etude dedroitcompare, Larcier, Bruxelles, p. 224
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methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business,
and program for computers; d) presentations of information. The EPO
guidelines observe that the items on this non-exhaustive list of things
which are not regarded as invention are all either abstract and/or non
technical. Therefore, the EPO deduces that by contrast an invention
must be of both a concrete and technical character. The invention is
opposed to the "discovery" that consists of observing something already
existing but not yet observed: for instance, a new physical principle, an
unknown property of a substance, etc.^^ Consequendy, discovering a new
property of a material (Science) cannot be patented but applying this
property in a practical goal (Technology) can.
Article 57 of the Munich Convention defines the condition of industrial
application in the following terms: "An invention shall be considered as
susceptible of industrialapplication if it can be made or use in any kind of industry,
including agriculture" The EPO Guidelines indicate that the term
"industry" should be understood in a broad sense including any physical
activity of a technical character. This criterion implies that the invention
has to have a practical application. There is litde case law on this issue
likely because this condition poses litde difficulty and is somewhat
similar to the invention-discovery distinction, which is setded in the law.
Indeed, the EPO views this criterion as redundant, considering that
those inventions it would exclude from patentability are already excluded
by the Article 52 (2) Ust."
2.2.3 Within Science: the Norms of Science
After analyzing how research activities are distributed between (publicly
funded) Science and (IPR protected) Technology, it is worth examining
how knowledge is diffused and shared within Science. Indeed,
knowledge, or research results obtained by scientists are not
automatically publicly available. Public funding of basic research, patent
law and the prevailing wisdom that private ownership of inventions
EPO, Examination Guidelines, part C, Chapter 4, available at wwrw.european-pfltent-
ot'fice.org
According to the EPO Guidelines (following the unpublished decision T 541/96),
one further class of invention which would be excluded would be articles or processes
alleged to operate in a manner clearly contrary to well-established physical laws e.g. a
perpetual motion machine, EPO Guidelines C IV 4.1. The requirement of industrial
application also excludes methods that fall endrely within the private or personal sphere
of a human being; see T 0074/93, "British Technology Group/Contraceptive Method",
decision ofTechnical Board of Appeal 3.3.1, 9 November 1994, OJ EPO, 1995, 712.
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made through public funding was contrary to public interest, have long
disinclined basic research scientists to secure patents. But this
disinclination also had a normative component; claiming exclusive rights
on research discoveries was considered as contrary to scientific norms.
Sociologists of science have described the norms and incentives that
guide the behavior of scientists. Robert Merton identified the goal of
science as "the expansion of certified knowledge", and the methodology
to reach that goal as empirical research. Then, he describes four "norms
of science" that are derived from this goal and this methodology: (i)
universalism, (ii) communism or communalism, (iii) disinterestedness
and (iv) organized skepticism. In short, "universalism" means that
impersonal criteria, independent of the identity and characteristics of the
scientist who executed the research, are used to assess the validity of the
scientific work; "communism" or "communalism" means that scientific
findings are a common heritage, in the sense that they are a product of
social collaboration. The communal dimension of science also includes
recognition by scientists of their dependence on a cumulative common
heritage. All discoveries are built on what was learned before and
contribute to what may be learned in the future. Accordingly, they are
made open to all. According to Merton, claiming property rights or
keeping secrets are often seen as immoral in the scientific community.
The individual scientist's intellectual property is limited to recognition
and esteem. "Disinterestedness" means that scientists seek truth rather
than self-interest, that they ideally are indifferent to the success of an
experiment or the reception of research finding; "organized skepticism"
means that the scientific community rigorously tests research findings
before accepting them as true. '^' Obviously, these norms are not a perfect
description of how scientists actually do behave; rather, they are socially
inculcated beliefs among scientists about how they should behave.
Deviations from these norms are not uncommon.
Finally, Merton describes a scientific reward system that fortifies these
norms. Indeed, the knowledge produced in research activities is not
inherendy public; there is the potential for it to remain secret if a
researcher is concerned about the theft of his ideas. According to
Merton, it is the reward system that determines which information is
fuUy disclosed, partiy disclosed, or kept secret. The reward system rests
Robert K. Merton (1973), Sociology of Science, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, especially the chapter on "The Normative Structure of Science", for a brief
summary see Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1987), "Proprietary Rights and...", p. 182-3 or
Robert P. Merges (1996), « Property Rights Theory and The Commons...", p. 148, or
Arti K. Rai (1999) "Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science" 94 NORTH WESTERN LAW REVIEW 77, pp. 89-92, hereafter Arti K.
Rai (1999) "Regulating Scientific Research..."
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on the "rule of priority" of discovery. The rule of priority identifies the
author of a discovery only once he publishes his findings. . This rule
creates a kind of "moral property" that is the basis for the accumulation
of 'reputation capital' that plays a decisive role in the attribution of
research funding and ultimately a scientist's career. Thus, the rule of
priority serves two purposes: (i) hastening discoveries and (ii) hastening
their disclosure. First, combining rewards with priority sets up a race for
scientific discoveries. Second, the rule of priority elicits public disclosure
of new findings. Consequentiy, the rule of priority is an interesting
answer to the knowledge dilemma; it creates privately owned assets from
the act of relinquishing exclusive possession of the new knowledge.
In this chapter, I have described a two-part balance, first in the
distribution of research activities between Technology and Science, and
second in the combination of incentives to produce and share
knowledge within both Technology and Science. In the following
chapter, I examine how this two-part balance has been modified.
'5 Partha Dasgupta & P. A. David (1994), "Toward a New Economics of Science", pp.
499-500
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3. A Two-Part Transformation
In the previous chapter I described the equilibrium historically created
by the norms of science and intellectual property law's two-part balance:
(i) the distribution of research activities between Technology (IPRs and
the market) and Science (public funding and open access), and (ii) the
combination of incentives to produce and share knowledge within both
Technology and Science. In this chapter, I examine how this two-part
balance has been modified and I hypothesize that changes in intellectual
property law can be explained by changes in innovation policy as well as
innovative process.
3.1 Sources ofChanges
In this dissertation, I adopt a utilitarian or instrumental approach,
according to which IPRs are not regarded as non-modifiable natural
rights. Rather, I consider IPRs as instruments of innovation policy.
Therefore, intellectual property law may always be amended according to
the evolving objectives of governments' innovation policy. Change in
innovation policy is a primary source of legal change. The Bayh-Dole
Act and similar legislation that encourage public research organizations
to patent publicly funded inventions is an example of such change {Cf.
section 3.2.2}
Change in innovation process constitutes a second source of change to
intellectual property laws. Property rights can solve problems of
collective action by reducing the risk of overuse (a minor issue for
knowledge goods) and inducing investment in costiy activities (a major
issue). However, creating a property rights system is costiy for society,
and the enforcement of property rights is costiy both for society and
individual economic actors. With specific regard to patent law, the
creation of a patent system is costiy for society because it reduces access
to knowledge (deadweight loss) and because it requires the creation and
the maintenance of an administrative and judicial system. From the
standpoint of individual economic agents, getting a patent and enforcing
it against infringers is also costiy. Consequentiy, a trade-off must be
made between the costs and benefits of creating a property regime and
enforcing the property rights created by such a regime.
Changes in the innovation process modify these costs and benefits.
Technological changes can increase the benefits of creating and
enforcing property rights (e.g. the emergence of a new promising
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technology and the need to invest in its development). Similarly, the
costs of creating and enforcing property rights can also be reduced by
technological change (e.g. anti-copy devices) or organizational progress
(e.g. the Creadon of European or internadonal patent application
processes). After such change, a rational society is likely to adapt its
property regime. As the costs of creating and enforcing property rights
evolve and as scarcity of resources and need for investment increase, a
property regime must be modified in order to remain efficient. This is
the central argument made by Harold Demsetz in its article "Towards a
Theory of Property Rights"^*^.
Demsetz's theory is sometimes referred as the "naive theory of property
rights"^^ as it suggests that changes in the definition of property rights
are automatic and always efficient. Historical records tend to show that
these changes are neither automatic nor complete. What Demsetz
omitted is politics; governments (or courts) are the main creators of
property rights. Accordingly, Demsetz's hypothesis has been qualified to
account for the persistence of inefficient property rights. As an
illustration, the economic historian and Nobel Prize winner, Douglass
North also considers that economic agents (organizations) respond to
changing perceived costs and benefits either directly, by devoting resources to
new profitable opportunities or indirectly [-..Jby estimating the costs and benefits of
devoting resources to altering therules or enforcement oftherulesHe nevertheless
accounts for inefficient property rights and suggests that the definition
of efficient property rights is hampered by the inefficiencies of the
political market, i.e. differences in bargaining power among different
constituencies, and limited information available to governments. '^
Despite these qualifications, it remains fairly true that the pattern by
which property rights emerge and grow is related to their cost-benefit
ratio. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that it is not only society
that has to consider the costs and benefits of creating and enforcing
property rights but individuals must do so as well. For instance, if the
law grants patents for inventions, then the inventor has to decide
whether it is worthwhile to apply for a patent and whether it is
worthwhile to enforce the patent if it should become infringed.
Harold Demsetz (1967) in "Towards a Theory of Property Rights" 57 AMERICAN
Economic Review 347
Thrainn Eggertsson (1990) Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge University
Press, p. 271
Douglas C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, p.87
" Ibidem, p. 52
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In the next section of this Chapter I will identify some changes in
innovation policy and innovation processes. I will further examine how
these changes have affected intellectual property law first within the
realm of Technologyand then within in the realm of Science.
3.2 Inside Proprietary Technology
3.2.1 Changes in the Innovation Process
During the twentieth century and particularly in the last several decades,
one can observe important changes in the innovation process. In place
of breakthrough or "pioneer" inventions that characterized the industrial
revolution, it is increasingly the "routine engineers" cumulative and
sequential work, emerging from shared technical trajectories, that drives
today's economy in Silicon Valley. It is argued that this transformation
consists of three related dimensions: (i) innovation is increasingly
cumulative, (ii) an increasing number of inventions are smaU-scale, and
(iii) it is increasingly easy to copy inventions.
First, the innovation process is decreasingly made up of discrete and
weU-defined inventions, created through the inventor's insight and hard
work. Rather, a major part of today's technical advances are regarded as
cumulative or collective. That is to say that today's advances build on and
interact with many other features of existing technology/ (...) In any case, the
technology in question defines a complex system with many cofnponents,
subcomponents andparts, and technical advance mayproceed ona number ofdifferent
fronts at once. In these industries, inventions may enhance some features of a prior
"dominant design", or th^ may be incorporated into subsequent inventions or both.
There are different forms of sequential links between cumulative
innovations; an invention can increase the quality of an existing product,
reduce the production costs of an existing product, consist of a "new
use" of an exiting product, and can be a research tool for further
inventions. The cumulative and sequential character of innovation is not
something new. When George Selden obtained a patent in 1895 for the
first vehicle moved by an internal combustion engine, he launched an
innovation chain that exists today in our motor vehicles, and continues
to evolve. Nevertheless, one can observe the increasing cumulative
character of innovation namely in the software industry and in
''"Jerome H. Reichman (2000), "Of Green Tulips and legal Kudzu: Repacking Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation", 53 VANDERBILTL. REV. 1743 p. 1750, hereafter Jerome H.
Reichman (2000), "Of Green Tulips..."
8' Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson (1990), "On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope" (...) p. 882
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biotechnology.®^. Software source codes are made up of programming
elementary "bricks" that can be used in different programs. Moreover,
they are written in programming languages that are themselves
innovations. In the field of biotechnology, the cumulative dimension of
innovation stems from the importance of research tools, which emerge
from fundamental research.
Second, an increasing part of the output of R&D activity is incremental.
It is made up of small-scale (or sub-patentable) inventions that do not
meet the traditional "inventive step" or "non-obviousness" thresholds.
Actually, an important part of what engineers produce today is rather
smaU-scale technical know-how— a store of information about methods
or processes of production that confers some commercial advantages on
their possessors.®^ For example, gene sequencing in biotechnological
research proceeds automatically from systematic analysis carried out by a
computer through a routine operation.
Third, an increasing part of the output of R&D activity is costly to
develop but vulnerable to rapid and cheap duplication. As Professor
Reichman®'* points out, this problem first arised at the end of the
nineteenth century in the realm of industrial design. Industrial designs
are functional or aesthetic features incorporated into mass-produced
products that aim to enhance the product's consumer desirability.®^
Innovative industrial designs generally consist of small variations on or
new combinations of pre-existing elements, established themes, or style
trends. These variations cannot be protected by patent as they usually do
not meet the "inventive step" or "non-obviousness" standard. Moreover,
because the designer's innovative know-how or innovation is in its
nature embodied in the end product, the designer is deprived from actual
or legal secret protection. Consequendy, designers lack sufficient market
lead-time during which they may recover their investment.
"2 See e.g. Walter W. Powell (2001), "Networks of Learning in Biotechnology:
Opportunities and Constraints associated with Relation Contracting in a Knowledge-
Intensive Field", in Rochelle Dreyfus et al. (eds.). Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual
Proper^: Innovation Policyfor the Knowledge Socie^, Oxford University Press, New York, pp.
251-266
Jerome H. Reichman (2000), "Of Green Tulips ..." p. 1750. See also Fran9ois
Magnin (1974) Knom-Hoiv et Propriete industrielk, or Mireille Buydens (1993), Protection
delaQuasi-creation, Larcier-Bruylant-FEC, Bruxelles
8''Jerome H. Reichman (1994) "LegalHybrids..." p. 2512
William Cornish & David Llewellyn (2003), Intelkctual Property: Patents, Copyrights,
TradeMarks andAllied VJghts, .... p..535
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In the nineteenth century and in the first part of the twentieth century,
this problem was relatively limited as most innovadve works, other than
industrial design, could benefit from patent, copyright or trade secret
protection.®' Since the middle of the twentieth century, like industrial
design, innovations increasingly became relatively cheap and easy to
copy. The most obvious examples of this trend are the semiconductor
chip, plant breeding, and more recentiy software. Conventionally, a
manufacturer can sell a machine without transferring the know-how
involved in manufacturing the machine; whereas anyone who comes into
possession of a new plant variety seed or a computer program also gains
possession of the manufacturing know-how required to reproduce
identical seeds or computer programs. Recendy, the importance of this
phenomenon of duplication vulnerability has increased, notably with the
development of digital technologies.**^ This phenomenon not only
destroys the potential for protection through secrecy, but also increases
the cost of monitoring and sanctioning violations of IPRs. Indeed, the
easier it is to copy, the more difficult it is to identify copiers and to
enforce the property right.
In sum, an evolution in the innovation process is clearly observed. This
transformation lies notably in the fact that innovation is increasingly
cumulative, collective, incremental andvulnerable to duplication.®" In the
next subsection I wiU briefly analyze how the law has adapted to this
evolution.
3.2.2 Changes in Intellectual Property Law
In accordance with Demsetz's and its successors' hypothesis, intellectual
property law has adapted to these technological changes. Out of the
three changes identified, two seems to have played a major role in legal
change: (i) incremental innovations and (ii) innovations that are
vulnerable to duplication.
Professor Reichman identifies two reactions in the intellectual property
legal system. Governments or courts tend to respond by either
extending patent and copyright laws to protect subject matter for which
those laws were not intended, or by implementing hybrid legal regimes
Jerome H. Reichman (1994) "Legal Hybrids..." p. 2512
Actually, digitalization not only makes copying easy but it also makes copying a sine
qua non condition of transmission, storage and even reading of digitalmaterial.
Professor Reichman summarizes these evolutions by the expression "Incremental
innovation bearing know-how on its face".
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that grant exclusive property rights to new objects of protection that fall
outside the classical legal framework."'
3.2.2.1 The First "Strategy"
The first strategy consists in lowering the inventiveness or non-
obviousness standard in patent law, and expanding the copyright
paradigm previously intended for artistic work to include industrial
and/or functional works as well. As for patent law, this evolution is
difficult to document, as it has been rather implicit. Part of this evolution
has occurred without change in statute law; moreover neither patent
offices nor courts mention intent to lower the patentability requirements.
In a study entitied "The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy
Innovation and the Innovation Process,"'" Adam B.Jaffe notes that with
respect to anygiven patent, there are often disagreements as to whether the "inventive
step" embodied in thepatent is large enough tojustify afinding that the invention is
not obvious and hence is entitled to apatent In recentjears, however, there has been a
widespread sense that thepatent office isgranting large numbers ofpatents on trivial
inventions. Jaffe adds: I am not aivare ofany attempt to document thisphenomenon
systematically; indeed, it is not clear to me how it could be done. Even if this
lowering of the non-obviousness requirement is not fully documented,
one can point out two sets of doctrinal changes in patent case law,
especially by the Federal Circuit" that contribute to this demise of the
non-obviousness requirement.
The first set of doctrinal changes concerns the "suggestion tests" used in
the appreciation of the difference between the claimed invention and the
prior art. One can identify two evolutions in the use of suggestion tests,
one concerns all inventions, and the other applies to "combination
patents". Until a few decades ago, the accepted suggestion test to assess
obviousness was "obvious to try". Courts found inventions obvious and
therefore non-patentable when given the prior art it was obvious to try
the research approach followed by the inventor. As an illustration, courts
Jerome H. Reichman (1994) "Legal Hybrids..." p. 2444, citation omitted. See also
Jerome H. Reichman (2003), "Saving the Patent Law from Itself...", and Jerome H.
Reichman (2000), "Of Green Tulips..."
'"Adam B. Jaffe (2000), "The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and
the Innovation Process", 29 RESEARCH POLICY531, at 549
" The Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 to hear all patent appeals. Its creation was driven by
Congress's desire to unify and strengthen patent law. It is generally believed to have a
strong pro-patent stance.
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held that inventions were obvious because "'certainly, it would be obvious to
try it and mere proof that it worked would not make itpatentable'^ ^ or because
given the prior art "it is not surprising to that the inventors would begin
experimenting with various substance, including the claimed compound".Yet since
the 1960s, the "obvious to try" standard has been progressively replaced
by the "reasonable expectadon of success" standard. This new standard
adds a second condition to reject a patent claim for obviousness. Prior
art must not only suggest a research approach but also that the approach
would be successful.'"*
In addition, the Federal Circuit also modified the suggestion test used
specifically for "combination" patents. This is very relevant in a context
of collective and cumulative innovation. For the assessment of the non-
obviousness of a claimed invention consisting of a combination of
elements already found separately in the prior art, the Supreme Court
had suggested in several decisions a "synergism requirement": We cannot
agree that the combination oftheses oldelements [...] canproperly be characterised as
synergistic, that is "result(in^ in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects
taken separately". Vuither, this patent simp^ arranges old elements with each
performing the same function it had been known to perform, although perhaps
producing a more striking result than inprevious combinations. Such combinations
are not patentable under standards appropriate for a combination patent^
Consequentiy, the Supreme Court has tended to presume that patents
based on combinations of priorart elements areobvious.""
However, since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has refused to
apply the "synergistic requirement", holding that there is no statutory
basis for identifying "combination" patents and has applied a more
stringent obviousness test to such patents.'^ Considering that "virtually all
92 In re Ri<sce/ta, 255 F.2d 687, 692,118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 101 (1958)
" MandelBros. v. Wallace, 335 U.S. 291, 295 (1948)
In re Tomlison, 363 F.2d 928, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623 (C.C.P.A. 1966) and In re Fine,
837 F.2d 1071, 1075, 5 U.S.P.Q. 2D 1596 (Fed. Circuit 1988). For a descripdon of the
test by the court, see \ironm Williamson Tobacco Corp. v; Philip Morris. Inc., 229 F.3d
1120,1124-1125, 56 U.S.P.Q. 2D (BNA) 1456 (Fed. Circuit 2000)
'5 Sakraida v. AG ProInc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976), the last Supreme Court decision on
the substance of the nonobviousness requirement. The "synergistic requirement" had
been first formulated before the enactment of Section 103 of the Patent Act in GreatA.
<& P. TeaCo. V. Supermarket Corp. 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950) and reaffirmed in Anderson's
Black Rock, Inc. v. PavementSalvageCo., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969)
See GrahamV.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 34-37 (1966)
Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
48
inventions are combinations and viriuallj all are combinations ofoldelements, the
Federal Circuit asserted that an invention combining elements from
different prior art references will be deemed obvious, i.e. non-patentable,
if the prior art contains some suggestion to combine the elements in the
same way.®' As observed by Professor Lunney, "the Federal Circuit's test
essentially reverses the presumption in these cases. Where all of the elements were
known, the Supreme Courtpresumed that anygiven combination wasobvious, unless
there was some reason that suggested otherwise. The Federal Circuit, on the other
hand, presumes that any gven combination is nonobvious, unless there is some
suggestion in theprior art othenvise.One can wonder whether in using
such a suggestion test, the Federal Circuit is not reducing the non-
obviousness requirement to an equivalent of novelty. The Supreme
Court win soon have an opportunity to pronounce on this doctrinal
change."" Indeed, after a similar decision of the Federal Circuit,'"^, KSR
who had unsuccessfully attempted to challenge the validity of patent has
peutioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The petition is
supported by three amicus briefs written respectively by five large
corporations including Microsoft, Cisco and Hallmark, twenty-four law
professors and the Progress and Freedom Foundation, asserting that the
Federal Circuit's test for "nonobviousness" represents a departure from
earlier Supreme Court precedents and results in too many patents that
claim obvious inventions. The Court has not yet granted certiorari, but
its invitation to the Office of the Solicitor General to express views of
the US government suggests that it might.
The second set of doctrinal changes and probably the most important
lies in the elevation of secondary considerations such as "commercial
success", "long felt but unsolved needs" and "failure of others" to a
central position in the obviousness enquiry.'"^ Whereas the Supreme
Environmental Designs v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert, denied,
464U.S. 1043 (1984)
See Kobotic Vision Systems, Inc. v. ViewEng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
stating that the party seeking a holding of invalidity based on a combination of two or
more prior art teachings must show some motivation or suggestion to combine the
teachings. See also Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., Inc., 103 F.3d 1538, 1546
(Fed. Cir.1997); In re l^skowski, 871 F.2d 115, 117 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Oetiker, 977
F.2d 1443, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Winner Int'lRejaltji Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d. 1340. 1348
rped. Cir.. 2000;^
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. (2001), "E-Obviousness" 7 MiCH.TelecOMM. Tech. L. Rev.
363, p. 379, hereafter Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. (2001), "E-Obviousness"
^"^KSK International v. Telejlex (On Petition for Certiorari)
Tel^ex Inc. v. KSR Intern. Co., 119 Fed.Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(Schall, J.)(non-
precedential)
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. (2001), "E-Obviousness", p. 375
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Court'"'' and the various circuits had relegated secondary considerations
to a subsidiary role, the Federal Circuit holds that secondary
considerations, or "objecdve indicia" as they are occasionally referred,
are often ''the most probative and cogent evidence of the record."'"^ The Federal
Circuit suggests that economic motivations such as secondary evidence
are more susceptible to judicial treatment than highly technical facts. In
addition, the Federal Circuit does not require evidence that commercial
success is due to the nonobviousness nature of the invention rather than
other factors such as marketing or market power. The Federal Circuit
has also considered additional secondary factors such as skepticism or
disbelief'"^, copying,'"® praise, unexpected results, and industry
acceptance'"' as indicators of the non-obviousness of a claimed
invention. Conversely, the Federal Circuit has been reluctant to use
secondary considerations to establish the obviousness of an invention
and deny patent protection"".
The growing importance given to secondary factors has been very
effective in lowering the role of the non-obviousness requirement —at
least for litigated patents. As anticipated by Professor Kitch, the practical
effect of this doctrinal change is that most litigated patents are held to be
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) where the Supreme court
coined the term "secondary considerations" to designate commercial success, long-felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc. and suggested that they "might be utilized"
and "may have relevancy" to the obviousness inquiry. See also Stevenson v. Grentec, Inc.,
652 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir. 1981); or Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n, 553 F.2d
740, 748-4-9 (2d Cir. 1977); or Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976); or
Medicalluib. Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc., 670 F.2d 671, 675 (7th Cir. 1981).
ICS stratojkx, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) compare with
Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) saying; "It is,
however, fervently argued that the combination filled a long felt want and has enjoyed commercial
success. But those matters "mthout invention will notmakepatentability"
IOC Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies Inc., 802 F. 2d 1367, 231 U.S.Q. 81 (Fed Circ.
1986). For a critic, see the dissenting opinion ofJudge Rich or Robert P. Merges (1988),
"Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation", 76
Calif. L. Rev. 805
Environmental Desims. Ltd. v. {Jnion Oil Co. of CaL 713 F.2d 693, 697-98, 218 USPO
865, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
'"8 Divemtech Corh. u. Centmy SteDs. Inc.. 850 F.2d 675, 679, 7 USPQ2d 1315, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)
Allen Archen. Inc. v. BrowninQ Mjb. Co.. 819 F.2d 1087, 1092, 2 USPQ2d 1490, 1493
(Fed. Cir. 1987)
See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. ]^eiy-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
holding that absence of commercial development or other secondary considerations is
not evidence of obviousness, but only "a neutral factor" (at 960); or Environmental
Designs Ltd. v. Union OilCo., 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983),ruling diat evidence of near-
simultaneous invention by others does not evidence of obviousness (at 698)
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valid. Indeed, it is unlikely that patents that are not commercially
successful wiU be brought to litigation. As a result, to the extent that
commercial success becomes an important factor in determining a
patent's validity, or in other words, the very fact that the patent is worth
litigating seems to establish its validity.'"
In summary, the combination of these two sets of doctrinal changes has
led to a demise of the nonobviousness requirement or at least an
important lowering of the threshold of inventiveness required. This
conclusion is confirmed by an empirical survey of all appellate decisions
arising from patent infringement litigation over the last fifty years
undertaken by Professor Clunney. This survey first demonstrates that the
percentage of patents held to be invalid decreased drastically from forty-
five to sixty-five percent in the period before 1980 to twenty-five percent
in the 1990s. Second, this survey reveals that for the number of patents
held invalid, those that were held invalid on non-obviousness grounds
decreased even more sharply from sixty-five to eighty percent in the
period before 1980 to twenty percent in the 1990s."^
Although it is difficult to document it seems that the trend of lowering
the inventive step requirement is also present in European patent law.
However, the European Patent Office (EPO) and some national courts
have been slightiy more reticent vis-a-vis this evolution.
As for a suggestion test, the EPO also moved from "obvious to try" to
"reasonable expectations of success" as the standard to assess
obviousness. In the early 1980s, several decisions of the EPO seemed to
equate "obvious to try" with obvious, holding that "7/ ispart ofthe normal
activities of the person skilled in the art to select the most appropriate ofa group of
materials known assuitablefor aparticularpurpose."^ However, more recent
cases emphasi2e that the proper obviousness test is whether the
inventor's approach would "obviously succeed", not whether it was
Edmund Kitch (1966), "Graham v. John Deere Co. : New Standards for Patents"
Supreme Court Rev. 293
"2 See detailed figures in Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. (2001), "E-Obviousness"
113 "T 21/81 Electromagnetically Operated Switchl Allen-Brady (Sept. 10, 1982) OJ EPO,
1983, 15; see also T 67/83 (Aug. 1, 1984), unpubHshed; and T 235/85 Fibre
ManufactureI Akv^o, (Feb. 10,1987) OJ EPO, 1987,198
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obvious to try.''"' And the EPO added that "a reasonable expectation ofsuccess
should not be confused with the understandable 'hope to succeed'; it implied the ability
ofthe skilledperson to predict rationally, on the basis ofthe knowledge existing before
a research project was started, the successful conclusion of the said project within
acceptable time limits"
As to combination patents, contrary to the American Federal Circuit, the
EPO continues to apply the "synergistic requirement". It distinguishes a
mere aggregation or juxtaposition of features that are not patentable
from a combination invention that "requires that the relationship between the
features or group offeatures be one offunctional reciprocity or that they show a
combinative effect beyond the sum oftheir individual effect"^^^. However, in the
application of the suggestion test, the EPO's approach parallels that of
American Courts. An invention combining elements from different prior
art references will be deemed obvious only if the prior art was such as to
suggest precisely the combination of features claimed.'"
The treatment of secondary considerations by the EPO and European
Courts is similar to the one applied in the United States but slightly less
receptive. The EPO acknowledges that evidence of commercial success
is useful to appreciate the inventive activity,"® but it is more demanding
than its American counterpart in verifying that commercial success is due
to technical factors rather than other business factors."' The EPO and
Courts have been more receptive to evidence that the invention met a
long-felt need.'^ ° In some cases, namely those before British Courts, it is
the combination of long-felt need and commercial success that is
appreciated as evidence of an inventive activity.'^ ' The EPO has also
T 247/87 Cracking CompositionI milips Vetroleum, (Apr. 28, 1988) OJ EPO, 1989, 207.
see also T 249/88 Milk 'Production!Monsanto, (Feb. 14, 1989), unpublished
"5 T 694/92, OJ 1997,408. Seealso T 187/93 or T 923/92 (OJ 1996,564)all quoted in
the EPO (2001) Case law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, available at
http:/ /\vu'\v.european-patent-ofFice.ory
116 EPO (2001) Case lawoftheBoards ofAppeal ofthe EPO, p. 119
See EPO (2001) Case law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, p. 119-120 quoting
numerous decisions in this sense. See also a decision of a French Court, Lyon, October
6, 1981, Annales, 1982, 225
118 -p 92/86 Air Doling Apparatus! Crass-Hair Holding, unpublished; BASF! Tria^les
Derivatives, OJ EPO 1989, 74 See also decisions T 611!9\, T 626/96 quoted in EPO
(2001) Case lawofthe Boards ofAppealofthe EPO, pp. 136-137. See also a decision of the
Brisrish Chamber of Lord, Southco Incv Dr^us FastenerEuropeLtd [1990J RPC 587 at 619
I" T 270/84 Production ofExplosive FusecordHCl, (Sept. 1, 1987) OJ EPO 1987, 357. See
also T 478/91
'20 T 106/84 Packing Machine (Feb. 25, 1985), OJ EPO, 1985, 132 ; T 09/82, OJ 1984,
473; T 555/91 andT699/91 unpublished
•2' Longbottom v. Shaw[1981] 8 RPC 333, at 336
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considered novelty/^^ unexpected results,and surprising or
advantageous effect'^ '* as evidence of an inventive step. These lastindices
seem to characterize research results rather than research approaches.
Some critics suggest that in so doing the EPO tends to reduce the
inventive step requirement to novelty, whereas it should rather be an
additional, more demanding condition.'^ ^ At the very least, one can
observe that in some decisions the EPO examines the requirement of
inventive step with much indulgence.
3.2.2.2 The Second "Strategy"
The second strategy to adapt intellectual property law to technological
change consists in enacting sui generis regimes such as utility models,'^ '
registered design protection laws,'^ ® unregistered designs,'^ ' plant
The EPO considered inventive, new expression plasmids containing marker genes
able to identify genetically modified micro-organisms, T 264/87 Yeast
Tranformant!Anvar, unpublished; See also T162/86 VlasmidpSGllHoechstAG, OJ EPO
1988, 452 and T 0301/87 Alpha Interferons/Biogen, OJ EPO, 1990,356
'23 1" 249/88 Milk Vroduciion! Monsanlo (Feb. 14, 1989), unpublished, holding that an
unexpected result can establish inventive step.
I" T 0301/87 Alpha Intetferonsjhiogen, OJ EPO, 1990,335
'25 See Christine Noiville (1997), Kessources Gemtiqmset Droit. Essai sur ks regimesJuridiques
des ressources genetiques marines», Institut du Droit Economique de la Mer, Pedone, Paris,
pp. 124-131 or H.-R. Jaenichen (1993), The European latent Office Case lam on the
patentability of Biotechnology Inventions, Carl Heymans Verlag, Cologne, p. 121 See also
EPO case T130/90, §5.4 (where the EPO explicitly confused novelty with inventive
step considering that the absence of a correct divulgation of the invention in the prior
art as an evidence of an inventive step), and case T 261/89, Human hepatise A
virus/Merck, §3.3.2 (March 9, 1990;
'Michel Vivant (2003), Proteger ks inventions dedemain (.p. 118
™ The prototypical regime was the German Utility Model Act of June 1, 1891 which
remained largely unchanged until the Bundesgesetzbladtt Act to Amend the Utility
Model Act, 1986 I, 1446. Originally, utility patent laws protected the external product
configuration or that enhanced the technical proficiency of the tool, they did not
protect the underlying idea or process. In 1990 Germany enacted reforms that
permitted protection of electronic circuit designs, chemical substances, foodstuff, drugs
and immovable. Eligible innovations obtain patent-like protection for a shorter period
(from 6 to 10 years) without substantive examination. Whenever the protection is
contested in courts, the latter generally apply a weaker standard than non-obviousness
and usually take into account factors like commercial success. The scope of protection
is narrower than in patent law. Similar laws have long existed in Japan (1905) and Italy
(1940), they have a growing success among developing countries and the European
Commission is willing to generalize them in all European Union countries: see Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal
Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by UtilityModel.
'28 After a few attempts to apply the full patent paradigm (U.S. Design Patent Law of
1842) or to protect industrial design by copyright law (several European countries), a sui
generis regime has been adopted by members of the Paris Convention that was amended
in 1958 to require some protection or industrial designs. These design laws protect
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breeder's rights,"" integrated circuit protection,"' and databases
protection"^ to deal with technology-specific applications of know-how.
Actually, the objective of this second "strategy" is similar. Faced with
large economic sectors producing small-scale and easy to copy
innovations, governments enacted sector specific legislation. These sui
generis rights share several characteristics: they consist of exclusive
property rights, they mix some modified elements of patent and
copyright, and the requirements for protection are much lower than in
patentlaw."^
The danger with both these strategies is that they modify the trade-off
between innovation incitement and access to these innovations, usually
to the detriment of the latter. In addition, they do not take into account
the cumulative and collective dimensions of innovation, which generate
unexpected problems that may hinder innovation. I take a closer look at
these difficulties in Chapter Four. I will now turn to examine changes in
the distribution of research activities between Science and Technology.
those elements incorporated in industrial products that aim to enhance their
attractiveness by aesthetic features. Usually, registration, deposit, some objective
novelty and some degree of innovation are required. Theoretically, functionally
determined designs are excluded, but the frontier between aesthetic and functional
design is often a blur. Those laws provide exclusive rights similar to patent law but the
duration is usually shorter (10 or 15 years)
Dissatisfaction with industrial design suigeneris laws led some countries in the late
1980s to come back to the old solution to protect designs by means of copyrights laws.
The practice that still existed in France has been judicially revived in Benelux and in the
United States, while in the United Kingdom the Copyright Designs and Patent Act
1988, grants a copyright-like protection for 15 years.
'3° I will study those rights in details in the second part of this dissertation.
In 1984, United States enacted the Semi-conductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA). It
affords short-term (10 years), copyright-like protection to "mask works" i.e. surface
images of integrated circuit. Like copyright law, SCPA requires originality and flxation;
it does not protect any idea, procedure, and process, and systems, methods of
operation, concept, principle or discovery. It protects against copying but not against
independent creation. Mask work must be registered and are protected for ten years.
Two years later, the European Union Council adopted a Directive 87/54/EEC on the
Legal Protection of Semi-conductor Product creating a similar suigeneris right.
'32 In 1996, the European Union Parliament and Council adopted a Directive 96/9 on
the Legal Protection of Databases. The suigeneris regimes mandated by this directive
confer as strong and potentially perpetual exclusive property right in collection of data
and information as such. This regime convert data and information - previously
unprotectable raw materials - into the subject matter of a exclusive property right that
is paradoxically more powerful in some elements that either the patent or the copyright;
Jerome H. Reichman (1994) "Legal Hybrids..."
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3.3 Distribution between Open Science and Proprietary
Technology
In the last several decades, the economic and legal division between
Science and Technology, as well as the norms of science, have been
largelyaffected by a series of changes: a change in the innovation process
and a change in the innovadon policy. Both of these changes have lead
to adaptations in patent law and in universities' attitudes towards
patenting. To some extent these changes are common to most technical
sectors, but it is once again in the biotechnological sector that they
appear most strongly.
3.3.1 Changes in the Innovation Process
The relationship between Science and Technology has changed; their
common frontier is increasingly blurred. In the 1930s, the important
research-based industries were in the chemical and electrical fields. As
chemistry and electrical engineering were stiU young, the findings in
these disciplines were quite basic. Therefore, the distance between
science and technological application was very large. Important time-lags
and investments were necessary before science findings could lead to
commercial products. By the 1970s andl980s, the time-lag between
science and technology had coUapsed. In important sectors such as
biotechnology, the transformation of science findings into commercial
products became increasingly shorter. For instance, it only took three
years for the Cohen-Boyer findings on recombinant DNA in 1973 to led
to a commercial product and to the creation of an enterprise
(Genentech).>35 Moreover, it has become increasingly difficult to
pinpoint research problems into one particular category; rather they
transcend traditional categories and straddle several scientific disciplines.
Academic and industrial researchers often work on the same problems;
scientific discoveries are made in industries and patentable inventions are
made in universities. Actually, it would be more exact to delineate
research activities into three categories.
'3'' In the context of this dissertation, I focus on patent, but some similar trends could
be observed in the copyright field and more precisely in database matters. For more
details, see Jerome H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir (2003), "A Contractually
Reconstructed Research Commons..."
See the works of Robert Teitelman (1994), Profits of Science: TheAmericanMarriage of
Business and Technology, New York: Basic Books, quoted by Robert P. Merges
(1996), « Property Rights Theory and The Commons...", p. 156.
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The third category, basic research inspired, by an application,seems to
have taken on a growing importance. As we shall see infra, this type of
research is located at the source of challenges in the organization of the
innovation process. There is likely a high degree of of tension between
the reward system and the norms of behavior of Science and
Technology.
This change in innovation process is further increased by a change in the
ease of gathering capital for research-intensive industries. For a long
time, it was thought that only large corporations could offer long-term
oriented basic research. More recentiy, the capital-markets have been
placing value on intellectual property long before a product is ready for
the market. Start-up companies based on new scientific findings can
acquire capital from firms specializing in such speculative investment.
However, there are some important differences between the United
States and Europe. Even if things are changing the "start up model" is
less widespread in Europe, notably in France where this type or research
is stiU largely carried out by the public sector^s Moreover, it is still more
D. Stoke (1994), «The Impaired Dialogue Between Science and Government and
What Might Be Done About It", AAAS Science and Technology Tolig Yearbook,
Washington DC., quoted by Dominique Foray, (2000), "L'economie de la
connaissance", p. 38
For an detailed analysis of this type of innovation called « Pasteur like activities » by
contrast to "Bohr like activities" (pure basic research) and "Edison like activities" (pure
applied research) see Richard R. Nelson & P. Romer (1994), "Science, Economic
Growth, and Public Policy", in B.L. Smith & C.E. Barfield, Technologj!, Re^D, and the
Economy, The Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. pp. 49-74
For a comparison between the American "start up model" and the French "clinician
model" see Maurice Gassier & Jean-Paul Gaudilliere (2000), "Les relations entre
science, medecine et matche dans le domaine du genome: pratiques d'appropriation et
pistes pour de nouvelles regulations: le cas de lagenetique du cancer du sein". Working
Paper IMRI, pp. 45-53
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difficult to raise funds for early stage technologies in Europe than it is in
the United States.'^'
3.3.2 Change in Innovation Policy: the Bayh-Dole Act and
Similar Legislation
These changes in the relationship between Science and Technology wiU
be important factors in promoting intellectual property claims in basic
research discoveries. However, the most important change probably
occurred in 1980 when the American Congress enacted the Patent and
Trademaris Law Amendments Act. Known as the Bayh-Dole Act, these
amendments launched an important change in American innovation
policy and the justifications underlying patent law. Traditionally, the
justification for patents was that they provide incentive to invent. In the
Bayh-Dole Act, the policy objective is not about promoting invention as
such, but rather it is to use thepatent system to promote the utilisation of
inventions arisinifromfederally supported research ordevelopment}'^ '^
Before the enactment of the Bayh-Dole act, only a handful of American
universities were moving science from the laboratory to industrial
commercialization. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was much debate
surrounding government patent policies. There was no government
policy'"*' regarding the ownership of inventions made by government
contractors and grantees under federal funding. The flow of
government-funded inventions to the private sectors was very low."'^
The problem was pardy due to government reluctance to relinquish
ownership of federally funded inventions to the inventing organization.
Instead, the government retained tides and made these inventions
'39 Veronica de Juan (2002), "Comparative Study of Technology Transfer Practices in
Europe and the United States", 15 JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
Technology Managers 31
35 U.S.C. 200, emphasis added. About the economic justification of the Bayh Dole
Act and its critic see Arti K. Rai (1999) "Regulating Scientific Research...". More
broadly about the development of "ex post justifications" for intellectual property that
focus not on incentive to create new ideas, but on what happens to those ideas after
they have been developed see Mark Lemley (2003) "Ex Ante versus E,x Post
Justification for Intellectual Property" Working Paper
Before 1980, each federal agency sponsoring research (there were 26) had its own
policy, more or less restrictive: Rebecca. S. Eisenberg (1996) "Public Research and
Private Development: Patents and technology transfer in Government Sponsored-
Research", 82 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1694
According to U.S. Government Accounting Office Report to the Congressional
Committees entided "Technology Transfer, Administration of the Bayh-Dole Act by
Research Universities", May 7 1998, in 1980, the federal government held tide to
approximately 28,000 patents. Fewer than 5% of these were licensed to industry for
development of commercial products.
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available only through non-exclusive licenses to anyone who wanted to
use them. As a result, firms were less inclined to invest in and develop
new products if compedtors could also acquire licenses and then
manufacture and sell the same products.
The goal of the Bayh-Dole Act'^ is precisely to overcome this situation
and to promote the widespread utilization of publicly funded research.
In this sense, it authorizes universities to patent inventions made under
federal funding and to become involved in their commercialization. It
also permits exclusive licensing when combined with fast development
and transfer to the marketplace.'"''' In addition, the Bayh-Dole Act
requires universities to share patent royalties with inventors so that both
universities and individual scientists have incentives to seek patents for
their inventions and collaborations with firms ready to invest in the
development of their innovations.
The results have been very impressive. In the late 1970s, the number of
university patents had increased due to the apparent promise of rapid
commercial applications for biological research. In 1979, 264 patents
were issued to American universities. After the enactment of the Bayh-
Dole Act, many universities set up technology transfer offices (TTO) or
revitalized the existing ones and the patenting trend accelerated
significantiy.'^ By 1997, the total number of patents granted annually to
universities had increased to 2,436.''"^ This ten-fold increase is much
more important than die two-fold increase in overall patenting activity
during the same period'"'' and largely exceeds growth in university
research funding.'"*®
143 See also Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
480, par. 2, 94 Stat. 2311-2320 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. par. 200-212
(1994) that entrusted the federal agency sponsoring research with the responsibility of
technological transfer.
144 35U.S.C.202
145 Pierrick Malissard, Yves Gingras et Brigitte Gemme (2003), « La commercialisation
de la recherche scientifique», LES ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCE SOCIALE,
N°148 (Juin) pp. 57-68
146 Mowery D.C. et al. (2001), «The Growth of the Patenting and Licensing by U.S.
Universities ; an assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980", RESEARCH
Policy 99,104
147 In 1979, a total of 48, 54 utility patents were granted. By 1997, that number had
increased to 111,983. Source: U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years, 1963-2000,
available at http://www.upsto.gOv/web/offices/ac/ido/oeidp/taf/reports.htm#PSR.
However, it must also be mentioned that despite the increased involvement of the
industry with university,industry only funds a small part of university-based research
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***
In Europe, university-industry partnerships are less developed than in
the United States, although since the 1980s some measures have been
taken to encourage suchpartnerships."'
Ironically, Professor Merges observes that the first proposals to protect
the results of basic research were launched in Europe. In 1922, a
Member of the French Chamber of Deputies and law professor, J.
Barthelemy, introduced a detailed bill to overturn the prohibition on
patenting "principles, methods systems, discoveries and theoretical or
purely scientific conceptions for which no industrial application are
indicated."'5o According to die proposal, a scientist should obtain a
"patent of principle" that would confer a right of remuneration but not
an exclusive right to make or use a discovery. Anyone would be free to
obtain a license to use the discovery, so long as he paid royalties to the
discoverer. The duration of protection would have been similar to
copyright at that time: the life of the innovator plus fifty years. Similar
proposals were made in several other countries and a draft convention
was even prepared by a committee of experts at the League of Nations.
These proposals were part of a larger post-World War I movement in
favor of the "droit de suite" and other "moral rights" for authors and
creators. However, the proposal lost momentum and raised objections.
These objections included the difficulty to trace the scientific origins of
an industrial application, the lag time between the disclosure of the
discovery and the development of industrial applications, and above all,
the argument that such property rights would be at odds with science's
free and open system of communication. Finally, the idea to protect
basic scientific research was defeated.'^ ' Although this proposal was
abandoned, it remains interesting as it demonstrates the idea of
endowing authors of discoveries with a right of remuneration, i.e. a
liabilityrule {Cf. infra) as opposed to an exclusiveproperty right.
Despite the defeat of these proposals, some academic institutions, in
engineering in particular, have a long tradition of partnerships with
industry and of patenting results of research. It is not the purpose of
this dissertation to describe the different situations in the various EU
149 Jeremy Howells & Carole McKinley (1999), Commercialisation des resultats de la
recherche universitaire enEurope, Rapport final au groupe d'experts sur la commercialisation
des resultats de la recherche universitaire du Conseil consultatif (Canadien) des sciences
et de la technologie.
150 French Patent Law of 1844
'5' For more details on these proposals, see Robert P. Merges (1996),« Property Rights
Theory and the Commons..."
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member states. However, it can be said that from the 1980s onwards, in
light of the reduced time-lag between a discovery and its industrial
application, and from keen observation of the situation in the United
States, most European states have taken measures to support university
patenting and cooperation between academics and industrials. These
measures have included the relaxation of legislation prohibiting contacts
between universities and firms, legislation promoting the patenting of
universities' research results, a general increase of risk-capital, and the
creation of technology transfer organizations. Schematically, European
countries can be divided in three groups.'52 One group of countries or
regions have recentiy enacted laws, regulations or policies assigning
ownership or the first right to ownership to Universities. This is the case
for Austria, Belgium (with differences between the three regions'^ ^),
Denmark, France, Spain and Russia. In a second group of countries,
there is a system of "professor's privilege" assigning inventions to
university professors. This is the case for Finland, Norway and Sweden.
Germany had a similar system, which has recently been abolished. In
contrast, Italy has enacted a system of professor's privilege. The last
group includes countries that have not yet taken a definite policy
orientation for university-based technology transfer.
In closer examination of France,'^ ''for example it is seen that a
progressive effort is made to enhance the patenting policy of academic
and medical institutions.In 1967 a progressive step was taken with the
creation of the agency for the promotion of public research (ANVAR)
and another step forward occurred in 1973 with the constitution of the
industrial relations committee within the national center for scientific
research (CNRS). A further step was made in 1982 when the promotion
of public research and its industrial application become an explicit
mission of the CNRS. An audit of the early 1990s highlights the small
number of patents for which licenses were granted. During the same
period a joint subsidiary of ANVAR and CNRS was created for the
Expert Group Report (2004), Management of Intellectual Property in Publicly-Funded
Research Organisations: Towards European Guidelines, European Commission
See notably Region wallonne, Decret programme du 17 decembre 1997, portant
diverses mesures en madere d'impots, taxes et redevances, de logement, de recherche,
d'environnement, de pouvoirs locaux et de transports, Moniteur beige (IVl.B.)
27.01.1998
'S"* For a detailed analysis of the situation in the United Kingdom, see Richard Lambert
(2003) Review of Business-University Collaboration, Final Report, available at
www.lambertreview.org.uk
'55 Maurice Gassier (2002) "L'appropriation des connaissances dans les partenariats de
recherche entre laboratoires publics et entreprises: quelques tendances recentes",
Working Paper IMRI p. 41
60
protection and exploitation of innovations derived from public research,
notably by the creation of start-ups. Most notable, a 1999 law on
innovation and research'^ *^ has created a general environment that
encourages collaboration between Science and Technology; it modifies
the statute of public researchers and public research institutions in order
to facilitate cooperation with private firms. This law further creates a
fiscal and legal framework to favor the creation and development of
innovating enterprises. Generally speaking, in France as in other
European countries, public authorities have removed obstacles to
cooperation with the private sector and have tried to modify the
traditional indifference or opposition towards patenting in the academic
community. So far, despite the concern of some researchers, the trend
toward increased marketing of universities research results has aroused
littie debate, as the expectations of positive economic effects'" tend to
defuse any opposition. As a result, even if Europe remains a few steps
behind the United States, a large increase in the patenting activity of
universities is being observed in Europe, especiallyin life sciences.
3.3.3 Changes in Patent Case Law
These two developments —the narrowing of the conceptual gap between
fundamental research and commercial application and the Bayh-Dole
view that the role of patent is not only to spur invention but also to
foster efficient development and commercialization —have led to an
upstream shift in patenting activity. This shift has received littie
opposition from the courts.
In American law, the move can be seen on three fronts: (i) legal
scholars criticizing Brenner v. Manson, (ii) the Courts, and (iii) the Patent
Office. Not all legal scholars have been positive about Brenner v. Manson
and some have argued that Brenner's utility requirement could impede
progress in chemistry by discouraging disclosure of new chemical
"intermediates" i.e. chemical compounds useful to create other
compounds.'5'
'55 Loi n° 99-587 du 12 juillet 1999 sur I'mnovation et la recherche, J.O. n° 160 du 13
juillet 1999 page 10396
157 OECD (2000), A Neiv Economy'? The Changing Role of Innovation and Information
Technology in Growth
'5® For example in France, among the 10 most patenting organizations since 1995, 6 are
public institutions, and among the 50 most patenting organizations, 16 are public
instimtions.
'5' See Mirabel (1987), '"Practical Utility' is a Useless Concept", 36 Am.U.L.ReV. 811;
Cooper (1976), "Patent Problem for Chemical Researchers— The Utility Requirement
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In a series of cases, the Federal Circuit started loosening the utility
requirement. The Court found that some upstream inventions
demonstrate utility, despite the fact ; that they are far from
commercialization. In Cross v. the Federal Circuit held that if a
novel compound revealed someapparent pharmacological activity during
in vitro testing (i.e. outside of a living environment) such activity was
sufficient to establish its practical utility. This was sufficient so long as
there existed a probability that subsequent in vivo testing (i.e. much
further downstream in the innovation chain) would be successful."''
Then, in In re Brana, the Federal Circuit reversed a decision that rejected
claims to novel compounds that were structurally similar to other
compounds having an anti-tumor effect on mice. The Court recognized
that further research was necessary before the compounds could be
administered to humans but held that "Usefulness in patent law, and in
particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily includes the
expectation offurther research and development." '^'^
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was also part of this
trend towards the loosening of the patentability requirements. One weU-
known example is the attempt of the National Health Institute (NIH) to
obtain patents for gene expressed sequence tags (ESTs). In 1992, the
USPTO rejected the claim for lack of utility, particularly because
"although the oligonucleotides embraced bj the claims may be hjbridi^d to a variety
ofdifferentpreparations ofother nucleic acids, one ofskill in theart has no clue as to
the significance ofany resultofsuch hybridis^ation..However a few years later
the, USPTO changed is position, stating that ESTs may be patentable.
After Brenner v. Manson", 18 IDEA 23; Eggert (1969), "Uses, New Uses and Chemical
Patents-A Proposal", 51 J.PAT.OFF.Soc'y 768; Velvel (1967), "A Critique of Brenner
V. Manson", 49 J.PAT.Off.SOC'Y5; Meyer (1967), "Utility Requirement in the Statute",
49 J.PAT.OFF.Soc'y 533; Charles E. Smith (1984) "Comment: Requirement for
Patenting Chemical Intermediates; Do they accomplish the Statutory Goals?" 29 ST.
Louis U. L. J. 191, or Samuel A. Oddi (1989), "Beyond Obviousness: Invention
Protection for the Twenty-First Century", 38 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1097
Cross V. li^ika, 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Circ. 1985)
''' See also Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853 (C.C.P.A.1980) and Kenneth D. Sibbley
(1992), "Practical Utility: Evolution Suspended?", IDEA 203
Iti reBrana, 51 F.3d 1560 (1995) at 1565-69, emphasis added. Compare with the 1966
decision of the Supreme Court on the utility requirement: Brenner v. Manson 383 US.
519, 534-5, quoted in chapter 2 (paragraph 2.2.2)
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A few months afterIn re Brana the USVTO adopted "Utili^ Examination Guidelines.These
Guidelines also came after a series ofpublic hearings at which members ofthebiotech industry stressed
that application ofan overly restrictive utility requirement discourages investment in the early stage ofa
company's life ly postponing the promise ofpatent exclusivityfor too long. Disregarding the Supreme
Court's ruling in Brenner v. Manson thatpatentapplicants must demonstrate "substantial utili^", the
guidelines setupa "credible utility" standard, instructing examiners that "ifthe applicant hasasserted
that theclaimed invention is usefulfor any particularpurpose (i.e., a specific utility) and that assertion
would be considered credible by aperson ofordinary skill in theart, do notimpose a rejection based on
lackofutility". Theguidelines did notelaborate onthemeaning of "specific utility", seeming to equate
specific utility with anyparticularpurpose. Hence, they appear to indicate that if an applicant honestly
and credibly asserts anypurposefor the invention, even an utterly trivialuse, then the examiner could
not reject the applicationfor lack ofutility}^^ Because all substances can, in theory, serve somepurpose,
the USPTO's and Courts' benevolence towards patents haspromoted imaginative claiming strategies
and unprecedented levels ofpatenting activity. Throughout the course of a single year, the USPTO
received 350 gene patent applications claiming more than 500,000 sequences. The patent office
estimated that it would take one patent examiner 200years to examine these applications. In late
1998, thefirst gene expressed sequence tags (ESTsJpatent wasgranted to Inyte Pharmaceuticals,
which at thattime hadfiled application on 1.2millionpartialgenefragments."'^
A few years later, however, the USPTO took a step backwards. In
December of 1999, the USPTO replaced the 1995 guidelines with the
"Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines''" '^^ attempting to clarify
the patent office's position on the meaning of the utility requirement.
After receiving public comments on the interim guidelines, final
guidelines '^"' were issued in 2001. Referring expHcitiy to Brenner v. Manson,
the 2001 guidelines require not only specific and credible utility but also
a substantial assertion of utility: "a claimed invention must have specific and
substantial utility". The "Training Material for Examiners" further
provides that a "specific utility" is defined as a utility that is specific to the
subject matter claimed. Thiscontrasts with a general utility that would be applicable
to the broad class of invention; while a "substantial utility" is defined as a
utility that defines a "real world" use. Utilities that require or constitute carrying out
further research to identijfy or reasonably confirm a "real world" context ofuse arenot
substantial utilities!''' The immediate effect of this increased utility
"^3 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, "Utility Examination Guidelines", 60 Fed. Reg.
36,263 Ouly 14,1995)
Robert P. Merges and John F. Duffy (2002), PatentL^w and Polig: Cases andMaterials,
Lexis Nexis, Third Edition, p. 248
""5 Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth (2002), "Reinventing the Double Helix:
A Novel and Nonobvious ReconceptualizaUon of the Biotechnology Patent" 55
Stanford Law Review 303, p. 325-326
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, "Revised Interim Utility Examination
GuideUnes", 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440 (December 21,1999)
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, "Utility Examination Guidelines", 66. Fed. Reg.
1092 (January 5, 2001)
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, "Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training
Materials (1999)", available atwww.uspto.gov
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standard has been to put an end to attempts to patent ESTs. This
interpretation of the utility requirement and the refusal to grant patent
for ESTs has been challenged in front of the Court of Appeal of the
Federal Circuit. In September 2005, in In Re Fisher,the Court
confirmed the non-patentability of ESTs for lack of utility.
Nevertheless, beyond the controversy over the patentability of ESTs, it is
difficult to assess precisely how demanding the patent office and Courts
are, and whether the utility requirement stiU plays a role in mediating the
boundary between academic science and commercially valuable applied
technology.
In Europe, one can observe, to some extent, a similar evolution. The
European situation is more difficult to document as there is no uniform
case law in Europe and courts rarely reverse the EPO decisions to grant
a patent. However, it can be noted that in the case of biotechnology, (i)
the distinction between discovery and invention tends to blur, and (ii)
the requirement of industrial applicability is interpreted loosely.
The distinction between a discovery and a patentable invention appears
to be particularly difficult to apply in the biotechnological sector.
According to the EPO case law, the criterion used to make the
distinction is "the importance of the human intervention".'™ Thus, the
invention is realized from the discovery; isolating and revealing a natural
substance through a precise description makes it an invention. This
evolution is confirmed by Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of
biotechnological invention that defines the biotechnological invention by
two functions: the first function consists of the isolation of a biological
material from its environment, and the second function is in the ability
In re Fisher, No. 04-1465 (Fed. Cir. September 7, 2005), the real party in Interest is
Monsanto Technology LLC, which is owned by the Monsanto Company.
""See e.g. EPO (Dec. 8, 1994) O.J. EPO 1995, 388.. In this Relaxine case, opponents
to the patentability of a DNA fragment codifying a human protein (Relaxine H2)
evocated some arguments on the disdnction discovery versus invention. In their
opinion, admitting the patentability of this DNA fragment would be equivalent to
admit the patentability of the Moon discovery in 1969 or the mummy Otzi discovery in
an alpine glacier.). The EPO answered by recalling its case law on nawral substances
patentability: Finding a substance in nature is a discovery d:iat cannot be patented.
However if a new substance is found in namre and if a process allowing access to this
substance is developed, the process may be patented. Moreover if this substance can
be sufficientlycharacterized by its structure, it may be patented.
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to produce the biological material through a technical process (article
3)."' This leads Professor Michel Vivant"^ to ask whether it would not
be better to conceive of the distinction in terms of "continuum" rather
than in terms of "separate territories". The transformation from
discovery to invention is reduced to very litde. Accordingly, assigning a
function to a law of nature, or to a product discovered or revealed,
converts their transformation into a patentable invention. It is difficult to
know whether the distinction between discovery and invention could
have been interpreted in a different way. However, it can be said that as
it is interpreted, the distinction cannot draw a boundary between Science
(basic research) and Technology (applied R&D).
Regarding the industrial application requirement, it has been loosely
interpreted and has not received much attention. The EPO has been
reluctant to use the requirement in mediating the boundary between
basic research and commercially valuable applied technology. Firstly, the
EPO tend to regard industrial applicability as a loose requirement
concerning the context in which the invention is used. The EPO
considers that an invention can be considered as having an industrial
application if it can be made or used in any industry.'" So far, this
interpretation has been used only to reject the patentability of inventions
employed in private and/or personal spheres.""^ Secondly, in the
expression "susceptible of application", the EPO put the emphasis on
the word "susceptible" to accept the patentability of inventions whose
industrial application is not yet totally known. If the applicant can prove
a potential future industrial application rather than an actual one, the
industrial application criterion is deemed to be fulfilled."^ Moreover, it
has been observed that in practice, evidence of a potential industrial
application is often fabricated by computer analysis, which compares the
invention in question with similar known substances, and suggests
potential functions, the existence ofwhich may later beconfirmed.'^ ''
In sum, the requirement that an invention must be susceptible to
industrial application has never had an important function. Indeed, often
Directive 98/44 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, O.J.
99/101
'''2Michel Vivant (2003), Proteger les innovations dedemain (...) p. 46
"3 In T 144/83 (OJ 1986, 301)
'7"In T 74/93 (OJ 1995, 712)
"5 Michel Vivant, Proteger lesinnovations dedemain (...), p. 61
Henri Feyt (2001), "La protection de la propriete intellectuelle sur le vivant:
historique et debats actuels autour des variete vegetales», RevUE OleagiNEUX, CORPS
GRAS, LiPIDES, n°5 p. 522, quoted by Michel Vivant, Proteger les innovations dedemain (...),
p. 77
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this requirement has been interpreted as being similar to the discovery-
invention distinction. Several patent specialists consider that the
industrial application criterion functions as a boundary between Science
and Technology; however, this interpretation of the requirement has
never been widely adopted.
However this conclusion needs to be slighdy qualified. Directive
98/44/EC stipulates that the industrial application of gene sequence of
partial sequence must be "concretely" exposed in the patent application
(article 5, 3°). This statement may appear to be empty but it is generally
understood as the European legislator's rejection of the American Patent
Office's practice at that time of granting patents on sequences without
attached functions or with theoretical function not yet proven.''^ At the
same time, an Opposition Division of :the EPO defined industrial
application in the context of gene sequencing with words that were
strikingly similar to the wording used in the new USPTO Guidelines:
the potential utilization of a sequence disclosed in an application must
not be speculative, i.e. it must be "specific, substantial and credible.""®
Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess with any precision if this apparentiy
demanding interpretation of the industrial applicability requirement wiU
have any effect beyond the controversy over the patentability of ESTs.
In brief, one can wonder whether the discovery-invention distinction
and the industrial applicability requirement still play any boundary
function between Science and Technology.
***
In sum, the three-part transformation including (i) the narrowing of the
conceptual gap between basic research and commercial application, (ii)
the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act (and similar legislation in European
countries), and (iii) the evolution of patent case law, has lead to a
dramatic increase in patent-filing by institutions that previously made
their discoveries freely available."' It is important to understand that this
change has two dimensions.'8° First, the types of discoveries that are the
•'"Sven J. Bostyn (2004), Patenting DNA Sequences (...), p. 52
Decision of the Opposition Division of 20 June 2001, ICOS/SmithKline Beecham
and Duphar International Research, OJ EPO 6/02, p.293. An appeal has been lodged
against this Decision but it is not further pursued.
So far, mainly in the U.S. and in Canada, this move is weaker and less-documented in
Europe.
'8" Rebecca S. Eisenberg (2001), "Bargaining over Proprietary Research Tools: Is This
Market Failing or Emerging", in Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane. L. Zimmermann & Harry.
Fist (eds.). ExpandingtheBoundaries of Intelkclual Property, Innovation Poligfor theKnowledge
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subject of proprietary claims have expanded to include upstream
discoveries or "research tools", far removed from product development.
In addition to the narrowing of the conceptual gap between basic
research and commercial application, the Bayh-Dole Act, and the
patentability requirements^®' have failed (or refused) to maintain the
distinction between downstream inventions that directly lead to
commercial application, and research discoveries that enable further
scientific investigation. Second, the types of institutions claiming
property rights in their discoveries have grown. Universities and non
profit organizations have launched themselves into patenting their
research findings. Additionally, in the biotechnological sector one can
observe the emergence of commercial biotechnological firms in market
niches that lie between fundamental research and end-product
development. These firms differ from traditional large pharmaceutical
industries. They often have scientists as founders, keep strong scientific
and financial ties with universities, and rely on government funding for a
part of their research efforts. Some of these firms lack end products and
their survival is ensured through the sale of research tools or their
personnel's research capacities to major pharmaceutical firms. So, the
domain of proprietary exchange has become more diverse both in terms
of objects and participants. The analysis of the American situation
demonstrates that this policy has achieved impressive results but that
some side effects are also incurred.
***
In this chapter, I have described how technological changes and changes
in governments' innovation policies have led to legal changes that
modify both the distribution of research activities between Technology
and Science, and the combination of incentives to produce and share
knowledge within both Technology and Science. However, these
modifications of the initial two-part balance elicit unexpected difficulties
that may hinder innovation. This is the subject matter of the next
chapter.
Society, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 226-227, hereafter Rebecca S.
Eisenberg (2001), "Bargaining over Proprietary Research Tools..."
Particularly the utility requirement in the U.S. and the distinction discovery/
invention as well as the industrial applicability requirement in Europe
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4. Unexpected Side Effects and New Issues
In the previous chapter, I attempted to describe how intellectual
property has been modified to cope with changes both in innovation
policy and innovation process. In this chapter, I observe that the
evolution of intellectual property law has not been perfectiy efficient. I
further identify new issues, such as the coordination of knowledge and
IPR exchanges in the context of collective and cumulative innovation, as
well as the role of social norms and other forms of self-regulation in
shaping knowledge exchanges. Then, I explain how intellectual property
scholarship attempts to cope with these new issues by integrating several
existing theories into intellectual property theory.
4.1 Transaction Costs
4.1.1 Unexpected Problems: Patent Thickets and the Risk of
Anticommons
In the first section of the previous chapter, I described how intellectual
property law has been adapted to increniental innovation, in order to
grant property rights to smaU-scale innovation. In the second section, I
described the tendency towards granting patents on upstream research
tools. Thoughtful observers are increasingly noting some side effects that
have developed from these adaptations. Where innovation is cumulative
and collective, innovators must use a series of patents or obtain a
number of licenses in order to innovate and legally bring their new and
improved products to the market. In this scenario, seamless IPR
licensing transactions become an important condition for innovation;
the proliferation of IPRs granted for smaU-scale innovations and
upstream patenting hinders the ease of these transactions and may
ultimately forestall new products from reaching the market.
The patenting of smaU-scale innovations and upstream patents are two
elements identified by Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg as the
ingredients for a possible anticommons tragedy:
Anticommons can be best understood as the mirror image of commons property. ^
resource isprone to overuse in a tragedy of the commons when too many owners each
have aprivilege to use agiven resource and no one has theright to exclude another. By
contrast, a resource is prone to undenise in a 'tragecly of the anticommons" when
multiple owners each have a right to exclude othersfrom a scarce resource and no one
has an effective privilege of use. In theory in a world of costless transactions, people
could always avoid commons or anticommons tragedies by trading their rights. In
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practice, however, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming transactions costs, strategic
behaviors, and cognitive biases ofparticipants, with success more likely within close-
knit communities than among hostile strangers. Once an anticommonns emerges,
collecting rights into usableprivateproperty isoften brutal and slow}^^
On its own, the proliferation of exclusive property rights on small-scale
innovation (e.g. fragments) is likely to create situations of anticommons
or at least thickets of rights that are difficult to break through. Indeed,
commercial products (i.e. therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests)
are likely to require the use of multiple small-scale innovations. A firm
wanting to develop these products must launch into costly transactions
in order to obtain and bundle licenses from the different owners.
This problem is likely to be reinforced by upstream patenting. First,
some upstream patents also protect smaU-scale innovations. More
importandy, the value of upstream patents is very difficult to assess
because it is uncertain whether or not they wiU lead to a valuable
commercial product. To overcome this risk and valuation problem, the
owners relinquish immediate royalties and resort to other types of
compensation through so-called 'reach through' or 'grant back'
licenses.This type of licenses gives the owner of a patented invention, used in
upstream stages of research, rights in subsequent downstream discoveries. Such rights
mcy take theform ofa royalty onsales that resultfrom use of the upstream research
tool, an exclusive or non-exclusive license onfuture discoveries, or an option to acquire
such a license. In principle, thej offer advantages to both patent holders and
researchers. Thejpermit researchers with limitedfunds to use patented research tools
right away anddeferpayment until the researchyields valuable results} '^^ However,
these commitments to extend future licenses create a problem for users
of multiple research tools who are faced with similar demands from
various other owners.A user cannot promise an exclusive license on
future inventions more than once in the course of a research project.
Even past promises of non-exclusive licenses conflict with future
promises of exclusive-licenses over the same invention. Thus, there is
important risk of stacking these overlapping and inconsistent claims on
potential downstream inventions. If a particularly valuable invention is
highly probable, the developer might be able to reach an agreement with
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1998), "Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research", 280 SCIENCE 698, p. 699, footnotes
omitted
'83 In some sense, such type of licenses has some connections with the "droit de suite",
one of the moral rights of artists in the author right legislation.
'8't Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1998), "Can Patents Deter
Innovation?...", p. 701
'85 Rebecca S. Eisenberg (2001), "Bargaining over Proprietary Research Tools...", p.
230
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all the rights holders, but if the outcome of the research is more
uncertain or has a small potential commercial value, the parties might fail
to reach an agreement.
Commentingon the Report ofthe National Institutes ofHealth Working Group
on Research Tools^ '^', Rebecca Eisenberg identifies four difficulties.'87 First,
transaction costs are a greater obstacle to low value exchanges than to
high values exchange. Thus, theyare more likely to prevent the exchange
of research tools than commercial end-products. Second, cultural
heterogeneity among instimtions in a technical community (e.g.
universities, pharmaceutical firms and biotechnological firms) complicate
the search for mutually agreed terms of exchange. Third, even within
institutions, the interest and the culture of scientists who make and use
research tools are different from the interest and culture of lawyers and
business people who negotiate the exchange agreements.And fourth,
evaluation of research tools and estimation of their possible contribution
to potential futureinventions is highly speculative and subjective.
If not all observers share the pessimistic view of Heller and Eisenberg,
most of them are increasingly expressing concerns that our patent system
is in fact creating a patent thicket, i.e. a dense web of overlapping
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in
order to actually commercialize new technology.'®' With cumulative,
innovation and multiple blocking patents, stronger patent rights can have
the perverse effect of stifling, not encouraging, innovation.
Walsh, Arora and Cohen"" conducted an empirical study in the United
States that surveyed actors from university and industry. This study
observed that actors generally manage to find their wayin this congested
landscape. The authors of the study noted several "working solutions"
Report of the National Institutes of Health Working Group on Research Tools
Presented to the Advisory Committee to the Director (June 4, 1998), available at
http:/ /ww\v.nih.gov. /news /researchtolls/index.htm'
'S' Rebecca S. Eisenberg (2001), "Bargaining over Proprietary Research Tools..." p.
231-248.
188 "j-he second and third point notably are also idendfied and analyzed in a detailed
study of research partnerships in France. See iVIaurice Gassier (2002) "L'appropriation
des connaissances dans les partenariats de recherche entre laboratoires publics et
entreprises:quelques tendances recentes".Working Paper IMRI, 130 p.
Carl Shapiro (2000), "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patents Pools
and Standards Setting", Working Paper No. CPCOO-11, Competition Policy Center,
University of California, Berkeley
John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M. Cohen (2002), "The Patenting of
Research Tools and Biomedical Innovations". A summary of this survey has been
published in John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M. Cohen (2003), "Working
Through the Patent Problem" 299 SCIENCE 1021




that combine taking licenses, inventing around patents, infringement
often invoking a research exemption (which does not exist in today's U.S
patent law), developing and using public databases and finally
challenging patents and other access restriction in courts. However, if
Walsh, Arora and Cohen contest the existence of a total deadlock
situation, they acknowledge the increasing cost and delay of negotiating
licenses and other access contracts, specifically for universities.
Moreover, the authors also observe a reduction in the investigations
around a research tool which is exclusively owned by a single actor. In
light of the above findings, I conclude that creating situations where
exclusive property rights exist but are subsequentiy ignored by other
actors, is not the most stable way to find the right balance between
protection and diffusion.
After having briefly described possible problems generated by recent
changes in the intellectual property system, I will now turn to examine
the economic theory of intellectual property to see how it attempts to
deal with these new issues.
4.1.2 A New Issue Theoretical Issue: the Coordination of
Knowledge and IPRs Exchanges
In the early stages of IPR economic theory, property rights were
assumed to be roughly co-extensive with marketed products. A patent
was thought to be a property right over an end-product which had its
own economic market. Similarly, a copyright was conceived as a property
right over a particular book or picture. In this theoretical context, the
discussion was about deciding whether an IPR could be justified: does
the benefit of legal incentive to create new works outweigh the reduction
of access (deadweight loss)?
This understanding of the economic role of IPRs starts to change as
scholars observe the increasing importance of cumulative and collective
innovation, and the need for an inventor to obtain pernussion from
several patent holders to use their inventions, and the risk of patent
thickets. Subsequentiy, the economic literature attempts to explain the
role of IPRs in facilitating or hindering exchanges of knowledge. The
literature does so by integrating into intellectual property theory a basic
rule of economic theory: the creation of property rights is a necessary
condition for the efficient use of resources; it is not a sufficient
condition as the rights must also be transferable. Efficiency requires a
mechanism by which the owner of a resource can be induced to convey
the resource to someone who values it more; a transferable property
right is such a mechanism.
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The importance of transferable property rights is best seen by way of
example. Suppose inventor A makes an invention and obtains a patent.
This inventor values the patent at $10,000 (A's threat value''') . Inventor
B thinks he could combine his own technology with A's invendon and
turn the result into a more valuable product. Inventor B estimates that
the value to him of obtaining A's patent is $20,000 (B's threat value).
Because the potential buyer values the patent more than the potential
seller, the sale is possible. The price that the two parties may agree to is
likely to be somewhere between $10,000 and |20,000 (e.g. $15,000).
Thus, moving a property right from someone who values it less to
somebody who values it more creates value. An efficient market requires
that the property right be transferred until it ends up in the hands of the
person who values it the most. In this example, moving the patent from
Inventor A, who values it at $10,000, to Inventor B, who values it
$20,000, creates a $10,000 value. Before the transfer, if B had $3,.000 in
savings, and the value of the patent to A was $10,000, the total wealth of
A and B combined was $40,000. After the transfer, their total wealth
amounts to $50,000: $15,000 (A's money) + $20,000 (the value of the
patent to B) + $10,000 (the remaining of B's savings) = $50,000.'" Using
game theory terminology, we can describe the process of transferring
rights as a three steps process. First, the parties must establish their
threat values: their respective valuation of the property right ($10,000
for A and $20,000 for B). Second they have to determine the cooperative
surplus: the value that can be created by transferring the right (B's threat
value minus A's threat value). Third, they must agree on the division of
the cooperative surplus, and in doing so fix a price."''
However, if transferring a property right from someone who values it
less to somebody who values it more creates wealth, successful
bargaining is not always guaranteed. The expression "transaction costs"
is used to refer to all the impediments to bargaining. There is no
exhaustive and generally agreed upon list of element included in
transaction costs, nevertheless, transaction costs can be divided into
several large categories.One category, often referred as search costs.
The expressions between brackets refer to game theory terminology.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that B wants to buy the patent rather than
negotiate a license that leaves A or third parties using A's patent.
If they agree on a different price between $10,000 and $20,000, the three numbers
will change but the total will remain the same.
Robert Cooter andThomas Ulen (2004), luiw & Economics (4"" ed.), Addison-Wesley,
pp. 78-80




designates the costs of locating an exchange partner; that is to say-
locating a person who wants to buy what you are selling or seUs what
you want to buy. Search costs are usually low for standard goods and
services and high for unique goods or services. A second category of
transaction costs, is the costs of reaching an agreement. These costs are
often called bargaining costs. Bargainingcosts can be high for a number of
reasons These costs tend to increase as more parties become involved in
the negotiation, especially if the parties are dispersed. Bargaining cost can
also be high when parties are privatelyinformed. Negotiations tend to be
simple when the parties can identify each other's threat value and the
cooperative solution. Only once the threat values and cooperative
solution are out in the open is the information said to be public;
conversely, the information is said to be private when one party knows
some of these value and the other does not. Private information
complicates negotiations because it must be turned into public
information before the parties can identify possible terms for a bargain.
The parties may be reluctant to reveal all their private information and
may instead act strategically because their share of the cooperative
surplus may depend on their ability to keep some information private.
Finally, cultural differences or even hostility can also induce bargaining
costs. Two additional categories of transaction costs occur when an
agreement takes time to fulfill. Monitoring costs designate the cost of
observing the behavior of the parties and enforcement costs involve the cost
of sanctioning violations of the agreement.
In the real world, transaction costs are never zero; they are lower or
higher than the cooperative surplus. If transaction costs are lower, the
parties will bargain successfully but their cooperative surplus will be
reduced by the amount of transaction costs. If transaction costs are
higher than the cooperative surplus, the parties will not bargain
successfully, and they wiU loose the cooperative surplus. This loss of
cooperative surplus is also called deadweight loss. Patents thickets are an
example of the first scenario and the anti-commons tragedy"^ is an
illustration of the second scenario (in that case a cumulative invention
will not occur).
Note however that Anticommons is not necessarily a tragedy. First, the resources
held in anticommons may be moved to a private property regime by the market if
transaction costs are low, or by government intervention {Cf. chapter 5). Second, close-
knit groups may over time develop informal norms that help them manage the resource
relatively efficiendy(Qf chapter 6).Third, some (rare) resources may be most efficiendy
held as anticommons. See Michael Heller (1998) "The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets", 111 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 621
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It is important to further distinguish different issues. In the "discrete
innovation model" {Cf. section 2.1), the inventor makes a final product.
The main issue concerns the relationship between the inventor and the
consumer. In this situation, an economic analysis of intellectual property
must first undertake a cost-benefit evaluation in an attempt to identify
the best trade-off between access and incentives. In other words, the
analysis must attempt to identify whether and when the granting of
intellectual property rights is justified. The economic function of
intellectual property law is to minimize the deadweight loss caused by
IPRs.
In the context of collective and cumulative innovation, this issue remains
important, but the main problem concerns the relationship between
inventors with interdependent patents. The concern of the intellectual
property system is to ensure that the patent ends up in the hands of the
inventor who values it the most. When transaction costs are high, the
market may not be sufficient to ensure an efficient coordination of
knowledge and IPRs. To overcome the limits of the market, the law can
diminish the cost of bargaining failure (i.e. deadweight loss) by directiy
allocating the patent to the inventor who v^alues it the most. To some
extent, this is the objective of the economic literature on patent scope''^ ,
which is beyond the subject of this dissertation. The law"® can also
encourage private bargainingby reducing transaction costs. In Chapters
Five and Six, I examine two bodies of economic literature, the
entitiement theory and new-institutional economics. These theories
suggest ways in which to reduce transaction costs. In conclusion, one
can say that a change in patent law is efficientwhen it reduces the sum of
transaction costs anddeadweight losses'''.
See Richard Gilbert and Kari Shapiro, (1990) "Optimum Patent Length and
Breadth" 21 RAND JOURNAL OFECONOMICS 106; Paul Klemperer (1990), "How Broad
Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?", 21 RAND. J. ECON. 113; Robert P. Merges
& Richard R. Nelson (1990), « On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope », 90
COLUM. L. Rev., 839; Suzanne Scotchmer (1991), "Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law", 5 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
Perspective 29; J.R. Green and Suzanne Scotchmer (1995), "On the Division of
Profit Among in Sequential Innovation", 26 RAND. J. ECON 20; Howard F. Chang
(1995) "Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy and Cumulative Innovation" 26 RAND. J. ECON
34, or Sven J.R. Bostyn (2002), "European Perspective on the Ideal Scope of
Protection and the Disclosure Requirement for Biotechnological Inventions in a
Harmonised Patent System; The Quest for die Holy Grail?", 5 JOURNAL OF WORLD
Intellectual Property 1013
>58 Or economic actors themselves {Cf. Chapter 6)
See Robert. C. Elliclcson (1993),"Property in Land", 102 YALELAWJOURNAL 1315
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4.2 Social Norms and Other Forms ofSelf-Regulation
4.2.1 Unexpected Problems: A Possible Erosion of the Norms
of Science
The upstream shift in patenting activity, the entry of patents into the
realm of Science, and to some extent the objectives of the Bayh-Dole
Act and similar legislations have created a conflict of interest within the
norms of science. Adhesion to the norm of open access ("communism"
in Merton's words) remains strong in the community of Science despite
the fact that patents are largely available for segments of basic research.
One observes, however, an increasing number of scientists departing
from this norm, and thus the norm's effectiveness is threatened. .
Indeed, these trends in patent law aggravate the tension between the
norms of science and science's reward structure. As explained above, the
reward system of science grants recognition to the first researcher to
make a discovery, thus creating incentives to keep research results out of
the hands of research competitors. Traditionally, the incentive to be
secretive has been limited by the need to publish in order to gain
recognition. Now patent law gives inventors the rights to exclude others
from using their research findings in rival or subsequent research, even
post-publication. This has modified the balance of incentives and may
even undermine Science's mechanisms to grant free access to new
knowledge for further research. However, the concern is larger than the
issue of upstream patenting in universities. Scientists face a larger range
of appropriation methods other than patents. These include: contracts of
access (often exclusive) to upstream genetic material collections, and
material transfer agreements (MTA) between firms and universities and
between universities and universities, which are now frequently
undertaken in order to exchange research materials.It is increasingly
feared that competitors will seek patents based on research that was
"loaned" by another lab. This fear increases the difficulty of obtaining
information or research tools on a reasonable or friendly basis.The
20° Maurice Gassier (2002), "L'appropriation des connaissances dans les partenariats de
recherche entre laboratoires public et entreprises: quelques tendances recentes",
Working Paper IMRI, 130 p.
2°' A recent empirical survey in the U.S. provides some evidences that access to
research inputs is increasingly restrictive. Actually, these restrictions might be more
problematic for basic research than restricted access to patented material. See John P.
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potential value of possible future patents makes the open-access norm
less universal and more expensive.
As observed by Professor Merges, even if scientists strongly believe that
the norm of open-access ("cooperation" in game theory language) is the
correct mode of behavior, they know that their colleagues can be
tempted to ignore it because of higher payoffs offered through patenting
or restricting access. If scientists find that it is in their self-interest to
limit access to their research tools ("defect" in game theory language),
they wiU expect their colleague to do the same. The expectation that
others will defect wiU lead those who strongly adhere to the norm of
open access to defect as well, since the worst position is to cooperate
when no one else does. For example, this happens where a scientist
refuses to patent his research results (or refuses to impose conditions for
the use of research tools in a MTA) while all other scientists are
patenting their work. The non-patenting scientist would have to pay
royalties to all the other scientists in order to access their findings while
his own work would be free for anyone to use and he would receive no
compensation. Consequendy, in game theory language, it can be said that
the "equilibrium strategy" is to defect even if aU the players would be
better off if the cooperative behavior continued. In other words, the
problem is that the new reward structure no longer sustains the norm of
open-access as there is no way to bind other community member to
follow the cooperative arrangement.^"^
This unanticipated erosion of norms (or its unanticipated consequences)
progressively appears to be a possible obstruction to innovation.
Intellectual property scholars have begun to realize the importance of
norms as mechanisms for coordinating exchanges of knowledge among
scientists. Formnately, as observed by Professor Rai, this erosion of the
norms of science has coincided with American legal scholarship
becoming interested in the role of social norms in shaping human
behavior.^"'
Walsh, Charlen Cho and Wesley M. Cohen (2005) "View from the Bench: Patents and
Material Transfer" 309 SCIENCE 2002
Robert P. Merges (1996), "Property Rights Theory and The Commons..." pp. 157-
158
Arti K. Rai (1999), "Regulating Scientific Research...", p. 78
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4.2.2 A New Issue for IPRs & Economic Theory: the Role of
Social Norms and Self Regulation
To deal with the role of social norms in knowledge exchanges, some
intellectual property scholars turn to the law-and-norms theory, initiated
by Robert C. EUickson. This theory analyzes the interaction between
positive law and social norms in ruling human behavior^"'' and new-
institutional economics, a closely related branch of economic theory that
focuses on the role of institutions in facilitating cooperative behaviors.
Norms are rules that emerge spontaneously. They have a social (bottom-
up) origin defined by two ingredients: a practice ("what people do") and
a sense of obligation.
Norms differ from law not only by their conditions of emergence but
also by their mechanism of enforcement. While violations of the law are
monitored and punished by state actors, enforcement of social norms is
decentralized and ensured by private actors (peer supervision). Sanctions
imposed on norms violators range from informal gossip to exclusion
from the group, ruled by the norms. Compliance with norms is not only
insured by sanction but is also insured by reward, like the priority rule
described above.
Enforcement is one of the main weaknesses of social norms. First, if
enforcement is left to the private initiative of individual members of a
group, the level of enforcement is likely to be suboptimal. Indeed,
monitoring and punishment are public goods; they are costiy to the
punisher while the benefits are diffusely distributed among all
participants.^"' Second, norms are subject to internal defection in the
sense that legal or technological changes can modify the incentives to
comply with the provisions of social norms and induce members to
disregard the norms. Third, norms can also suffer from external
defection, in the sense that third parties not subject to the norms of the
Robert C. Ellickson (1990), Order without haw, How Neighbors Settle Their Disputes,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, hereafter
Robert C. Ellickson (1990), Order without Imw (...). See also Eric A. Posner (2000) Law
and Social Norms, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London,
England
Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons. The Evolution ofInstitutionsfor Collective
Action, Cambridge University Press, hereafter Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the
Commons (...), p. 45 or Francesco Parisi (1999) "Spontaneous Emergence of Law:
Customary Law" in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.) Engclopedia ofLaw
e^-Economics, http://encyclo.findlaw.com/
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group may behave in contradiction with the norms and in so doing
influence its effect.
From the standpoint of intellectual property scholarship, it is worth
examining what role social norms can play in the coordination of
exchanges of knowledge and IPRs.^*"^ Indeed, the "Law and Norms"
literature and new institutional economics have observed how social
norms can act as an alternative to law in order to overcome problems of
collective action. They can also play a role in reducing transaction costs.
Social norms can take the form of agreed upon lower cost forms of
measurement (e.g. standardized weight and measures) or make
enforcement effective by specific monitoring or sanctioning devices^"^. In
Chapter six, I examine how social norms and other forms of self-
regulation can help coordinate exchanges of knowledge and IPRs.
Arti K. Rai (1999), "Regulating Scientific Research..." p. 78. See also Douglas C.
North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Changes and Economic Performance, Cambridge
University Press, p. 41, hereafter Douglas C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional
Changes andEconomic Performance
Douglas C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Changes and Economic Performance,
p.41
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5. First Element of Solution: How Rights are
Protected?
In Chapter Two I explained how the first stage of economic analysis of
intellectual property law examines whether the creation of IPRs are
worthwhile. In Chaper Three, I described the increasingly cumulative and
collective dimension of innovation and the proliferation of IPRs, which
require a growing number of transactions among IPRs holders. In
Chapter Four, I examined the anti-commons literature that focuses on
risks of transaction failures. Now I turn to discuss the legal entitlements
literature, which focuses on the question of how rights are protected
rather than whether they are protected. This analytical framework helps
one to understand the relationship between intellectual property rights
and IPR transacting (licensing). The entitlement literatare originates with
the work of Ronald Coase.^"® Coase was interested in seeing that rights
end up in the hands of the person who most values them. He began
asking who should hold an entitlement. He first observed that in the
absence of transaction costs, the identity of the initial rights holder is
irrelevant (in terms of efficiency), as parties will bargain to an efficient
outcome. He also observed that situations where there are no or weak
transaction costs are quite rare, and that in presence of transaction costs,
initial entitiements do matter. Following Coase, scholars have asked not
only who should receive the initial entitiement, but also how this
entidement should be protected. That is precisely what the entitiement
literature examines.
5.1 Entitlement Theory: Property Rules and Liability
Rules
In order to understand how intellectual property law effects inventors
who must acquire access to multiple IPRs before introducing a product
to market, some scholars^"' have turned to entidement theory, a bodyof
literature not usually associated with intellectual property.
™ Ronald Coase (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost", JOURNAL OF LAW AND
Economics, vol. 3, October, p. 1-44
The most interested is probably Jerome Reichman, see notably Jerome H.
Reichman (1994), "Legal Hybrids..." and Jerome H. Reichman (2000), "Of Green
TuHps..."
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The expression "entitlement theory" actually refers to the framework for
legal analysis set up in a well-known paper by Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed. '^" In this framework, Calabresi and Melamed attempt
to integrate various legal relationships which are traditionally analyzed in
separate subject areas, such as property law, contracts law and tort law,
by articulating a concept of "entitiement". The "entitiement" is
protected either by a property rule, a liability rule or an inalienability rule.
For Calabresi and Melamed, the first issue any legal system must face is
what they call the problem of "entitiement". Whenever two or more
people (or groups of people) have conflicting interests, the government
must decide which side to favor; law decides who is entitied to prevail.
Without government intervention, access to goods and services would be
decided on the basis of "might makes right." For the present purposes,
there is no need to dwell on this first issue, the interesting insight lies in
the second issue. The state not only has to decide whom to entitie, it
must also decide the manner in which entitiements are protected, and
whether an individual is allowed to sell that entitiement. Calabresi and
Melamed identify three types of entitiements:
(1) -entitiements protected by a property rule to the extent that
someone who wishes to remove the entitiement from its holder
must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the
value of the entitiement is agreed upon by the seller.
(2) -entitlements protected by a liability rule whenever some one
takes (destroys) the initial entitiement, he must be willing to pay
an objectively determined value for it.
(3) -entitiements inalienable to the extent that their transfer is not
permitted between a wiUing buyer and a willing seller.
The three categories imply different levels of government intervention.
Property rules are the form of entitiements that require the least amount
of intervention; they imply a decision as to whom to entitie but not as to
the value of the entitiement. Liability rules imply an additional stage of
government intervention; the value of the entitiement is determined
collectively (by the government or some organ, i.e. judges) and not by
the parties themselves. Whenever an entitiement is inalienable,
government intervention goes one step further: it must decide whom to
entitie, determine the compensation to be paid if the entitiement is taken
or destroyed, and in some or all circumstances, also forbid its sale
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed (1972), "Property rules. Liability rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral", 85 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1089
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In their framework, Calabresi and Melamed attempt to identify the
circumstances in which the different types of entidement are most
appropriate, according to two criteria: economic efficiency and
distributional goals. In the context of this dissertation, I wiU only refer to
the distinction between property rules and liability rules in terms of
economic efficiency. To illustrate their typology, Calabresi and Melamed
use the example of the government's eminent domain to take property so
long as it pays just compensation.^" They imagine a situation where a
town plans to create a public park at the edge of the city. One thousand
owners, in 1000 identical parcels each valued at $8,000, own the tract of
land where the park could be created. It is assumed that the park would
benefit 100,000 citizens to the extent that they would each be willing to
pay an average of $100 to have the park. On this assumption, the
creation of the park seems desirable: the aggregate value of the parcels
for their owners is $8,000,000 (owners' threat value) '^^ and the value of
the park for the citizens is $1,000,000 (citizens' threat value). Yet, the
park might not be created. On the selling side, if enough owners hold
out for more than $10,000 to obtain a share of the $2,000,000 (bargaining
surplus) that the buyers are ready to pay over the value attached by
sellers, the price demanded wiU be more than $10,000,000 and the park
will not be created. Similarly, on the buying side, some citizens might
attempt to free-ride and say that they only value the park $50, or even
nothing, hoping that others wiU admit a higher value and wiU make up
the $8,000,000 price. '^^ The authors conclude that in such situations,
where despite the transfer of the entitlement would benefit all the parties,
the cost of establishing the value of an initial entitlement is so great that
it does not take place; as such it would be better to have recourse to a
liability rule and collective valuation. In the context of this particular
example, the law actually does use a collective valuation technique in its
resort to eminent domain. In this case, society organizes a collective
valuation and put a compulsory purchase order, or expropriation, on the
parcels of land (the holdout problem is solved). In the same way, society
values collectively each citizen's desire of a park and charges him with a
taxes based on this value (the free-rider problem is solved). If the total
2" Ibidem, pp. 1106-1108
2The expressions between brackets refer to game theory terminology.
213 If the individual parcel had no or little value separately, this example can be regarded
as a spatial anticommons. Michael Heller distinguishes spatial anticommons from legal
anticommons: In a spatial anticommons, an owner may have a relatively standardbundle ofrights,
but too little spacefor ordinary use. Bycontrast, in a legal anticommons, substandard bundles ofrights
are allocated to competing owners in a normal amount ofspace (...). Michael Heller (1998) "The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets", 111
Harvard Law Review 621, at 651. The proliferation of patents on interdependent
inventions may create a "spatial anticommons".
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amount of taxes is higher than the sum of the compensation paid to
parcels owners, the park willbe created.
Eminent domain is only one example of situations where society can
convert a property rule into a liability rule, In their paper, Calabresi and
Melamed also examine pollution and criminal sanctions for crimes
against property and bodily integrity, though they argue that their
framework may be applied in many different ways for different areas of
law. The Calabresi-Melamed framework can be adapted to intellectual
property; firms wanting to produce new products must first obtain
permission from dozens of patent holders.
The example can be rephrased in general terms. The parties (bilateral
valuation) are likely to find an agreement in what game theorists call
"common knowledge" situations, that is to say when the parties can
easily identify their mutual threat value and their possible cooperative
surplus.^ '^' In these situations, information is said to be public.
Conversely, information is "private" when one party knows some of
these values and the other party does not. Situations where aU the parties
do not hold complete information are referred to as information
asymmetries. Negotiations tend to be more difficult when information
about threat values and cooperative surplus is private. Private
information hinders bargaining because it must be made public before
the parties can evaluate reasonable terms for cooperation. '^^ Parties may
be willing to share part of their private information; but they may want
to retain some of their information, as their part of the cooperative
surplus depends to some extent on keeping information private.
Bargaining may be even more complicated by cultural differences, lack of
thrust or increased number of parties involved. In these situations, it is
worth considering the option of a liability rule: (1) suppressing the need
to obtain the consent of the right holder and (2) transition from bUateral
valuation to collective valuation.
Why not then convert all property rules into liability rules? Liability rules
also have real problems, including issues with collective valuation.
Collective valuation is costiy to organize and it may be difficult or
impossible to carry out. Moreover, collective valuation represents only
an approximation of the value. It is an attempt to determine an
2''' In this case, threat values are the lowest price the seller is ready to accept and the
highest price the buyer is ready to pay; the cooperative surplus is the difference
between the two threat values.
^'5 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen (2004), Imw and Economics, Fourth Edition,
Addision-Wesley, p. 92
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"objective" value of the good; it does not take into account the owner's
"subjective" value of the good. In the example of eminent domain,
different owners of similar parcels of land may value their property
differently for subjective reasons, such as sentimental attachment. Thus,
collective valuation, even when possible and inexpensive, always implies
a risk of under or over compensation.
In sum, property rules can be defined as "absolute permission rules:" '^^
one cannot take the entitlement without prior permission of the holder
who sets the price. The adoption of property rules is recommended by
the following factors: few parties, difficult valuation problems and
otherwise low transaction costs.Liability rules can be defined as "take
now pay later rules": third parties are allowed to use the entitiement
without permission of the rights holder so long as they adequately
compensate him later. Liability rule have three main characteristics: (1)
the suppression of the need to obtain the consent of the rights holder in
order to access the protected knowledge, 2) a principle of ex post
compensation, and (3) a mechanism of collective valuation that replaces
bilateral negotiations. In terms of transaction costs, liability rules are
especially useful to overcome one category of costs: bargaining costs.
5.2 Application to Intellectual Property Law: Compulsory
Licenses
As in the case of eminent domain, when one looks at IPRs in a
transactional perspective, the objective of intellectual property law is to
summarily place the rights in the hands of the party who values them
most. This is one of the policy objectives that justify compulsory
licenses, government imposed qualifications on IPRs.
Compulsory licensing enables a government to license to a company, a
government agency, or another party the right to use an IPR protected
asset without the titieholder's consent. A competent authority must grant
a compulsory license to a designated person, who typically must
compensate the titleholder through payment of remuneration.
Compulsory licenses do not deny patent holders the right to act against
21^ The expressions between quotation marks come from Robert P. Merges (1996),
"Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations" 84 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1293; hereafter Robert P. Merges (1996),
"Contracting into Liability Rules..
Robert P. Merges, (1994), "Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property", 94,
Columbia Law Review 2655
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non-licensed parties. Thus, compulsory licenses are liability rules, as
described by Calabresi and Melamed.
In patent law, compulsory licenses are granted on an ad hoc basis. That is
to say, compulsory licenses concern individual patents (or small groups
of interrelated patents), and are due to solve well-identified problems,
and specific judicial or administrative processes examine the pertinence
of their grant. Consequentiy, in patent law, there is no general liability
rule; the patent system lies on property rules and in some circumstances a
specific patent may be turned into a liability rule. With some divergences,
European legislation, and that of numerous other countries, allows the
granting of compulsory licenses in four principal circumstances. '^" First,
it is not be permissible to use the exclusive right of a patent to hinder the
development of new technologies. Second, a patent is not a pretext for
precluding the exploitation of a technology. Third, in some situations,
states require the patentee to produce the invention within their territory.
In the case of a refusal by the patent, holder, states may grant a
compulsory license to a local producer. Four, the state might grant itself a
compulsory license for "government use" or for general interest
purposes. American patent law does not provide for compulsory licenses,
but theyareallowed underspecial legislation aswell as antitrust law.^"
The increasing cumulative dimension of the innovation process confers a
new importance on the first two motives for granting compulsory
licenses: "dependent" patents, and "patents suppression."^^" A
dependent or improvement patent is a patent which cannot be
developed without falling within the scope of another patent, usually
referred to as the dominant patent.This means that the holder of the
218 William Cornish & David Llewellyn (2003),Intellectual Property (...), p. 288-296
The United States largely resorts to compulsory licensing, though it is litde-known,
and despite their reluctance during internaaonal negotiations to loosen the conditions
for granting compulsory licenses. See Jerome H. Reichman and Catherine Hasenzahl
(2003) Non-Voluntary IJcensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, I^egal Framework
under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the United States of America,
UNCTAD/ICTSD Capacity Building Project on Intellectual Property Rights and
Sustainable Development (Issue Paper No. 5)
220 See the UK Royal Society (2003) Keeping Science open: the effects of intellectual
property policy on the conduct of science, p. 10 recommending that "governments
further facilitate compulsory licensing and application of competition law in simations
where single or multiple patents do, on balance, unreasonably affect use and
development of inventions."
22' Marie Ang^e Hermitte and Benoit P. Joly (1990), I^s relations entre I'evolution de la
propriete intellectuelle et I'acces aux ressources genetiques et aux technologies, Geneve ONU ; Marie
Ang^e Hermitte and Benoit P. Joly (1991), «Plant Biotechnology and Patent in
Europe ; An economic Analysis of Alternative Intellectual Property Rights Models", 1
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dependent patent must obtain consent from the dominant patent holder
to work his invention. Thus, a typical situation of holdout risk is created.
Patent suppression is part of a broader phenomena generally referred as
"strategic patenting." Where an invention is thought to be so efficient
that it may change the future course of an entire industry, an inventor
may patent the invention in order to prevent its use by others. This
situation is referred to as "patent suppression", and the objective of the
patentee is to prevent the emergence of a new technology.^^^ Another
aspect of strategic patenting lies in "defensive patenting." Traditionally it
is thought that firms seek patents to recapture their fixed R&D costs. In
"defensive patenting" a firm will apply for a patent because it wants to
prevent its competitors from obtaining a patent that would otherwise
prevent them from using their own innovation and force them to incur
licensing fees in order to use it.^^^ In these situations, the objective of
legislation on compulsory licenses (liability rules) consists in transferring
the power of deciding to grant or refuse a license from the rights holder
to a judicial or administrative body.
Despite the provisions for compulsory licenses in many national laws,
relatively few compulsory licenses have been granted. This is probably
due to highly cumbersome procedures.Commentators have agreed
International Journal of Technology Management Biotechnology
Review 76 ; Suzanne Scotchmer (1991), "Standing on the Shoulders of Giant:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law", 5 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
29
Landes & Posner (2003), TheEconomic structure ofIP law (...), pp.320-321 and Kurt M.
Saunders (2002), "Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to
Technology Suppression", 15 HARVARDJoURMALOF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 389
The figures of an American survey suggest the importance of defensive patenting :
according to the survey, "at any given time, over about 95 percent of patents are
unlicensed and over about 97 percent are generating no royalties" in Samson Vermont
(2002) "The Economics of Patent Litigation", in Bruce Berman (ed.) From ideas to
Assets:Investing Wisely in Intellectual Property at 327, 332
Simplifications of these complex procedures are not likely to occur as article 31 of
the TRIPs Agreement imposes a multitude of conditions for the grant of a compulsory
license. Each instance has to be considered individually, and must be preceded by
attempts of voluntary negotiation. The scope and duration of the license must be
limited to its purpose and must be open to review when circumstances change. The
license must be non-exclusive, non assignable and predominately for the supply of the
domestic market. Adequate remuneration must be required. Finally, any decision,
whether authorized or remunerated, must be open to judicial review. Additional
conditions are needed where a "head" or "dominant" patent is being licensed in order
to permit exploitation of a "subsidiary" or "dependant" patent: the dependant
patent must involve an important technical advance of considerable economic
significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent; the owner of the first
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that the mere authority to grant compulsory licenses, might promote
some degree of competition: the practical value of the existence of compulsory
licenses provision in patent laiv is that the threat of it usually induces the ^ant of
contractual licenses on reasonable terms, and thus the objective ofactually working the
invention is accomplished}^^ Nevertheless, it is not certain that compulsory
licenses will be the solution to the difficulties raised by cumulative
innovation.^^'
Compulsory licenses in copyright law are different from those in patent,
and are often called statutory licenses. While compulsory licenses for
patents are granted for individual patents through a judicial or
administrative procedure, compulsory licenses in copyright are generally
legislative liability rules, i.e. standard compulsory licenses concerning
broad categories of copyrighted works. Whereas a primary concern of
compulsory licensing in patent law is overcoming the veto right of the
patent holder, the primary concern of compulsory licensing in copyright
law is enforcement and standard contracting. One of the oldest and
clearest examples of copyright statutory licenses is the mechanical
compulsory license in the United States.The history begins in 1908
with a Supreme Court decision, White-Smith Music Publishing and co v.
Appolo and co^^^ which ruled that player piano roUs^^" are not
copyrightable. The United States Congress reacted by recognizing that
recording and mechanical reproduction rights are a part of copyright.
The 1909 Act submits this right to a particular regime; any manufacmrer
of recordings and other mechanical reproductions can use any musical
record without prior consent from the holder of the copyrighted work.
There are only two requirements, (1) the work must already have been
licensed for mechanical reproduction, and (2) the manufacturer of the
mechanical reproduction has to pay statutory compensation to the
patent must be entitled to a cross-license; and the use authorized in respect of the first
patent shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the second patent.
225 Stephen Ladas (1975), Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights. National and
International Protection, Cambridge, p. 427
For an analysis of die pros and cons of compulsory licenses in the biotechnological
sector see SvenJ. Bostyn (2004), TatentingDNA Sequences (...), pp. 91-104
22' For a detailed examination of this example, see Robert P. Merges (1996),
"Contracting into Liability Rules..." and Robert P. Merges (1994), « Of Property Rules,
Cease and Intellectual Property", 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 2664.
228 There are other cases of non-voluntary licenses in copyright where the decision to
turn a property rule into a liability rule has been taken by rights holders themselves and
not by the state (gC infra).
22'209 U.S. 1 (1908)
23" Piano rolls are perforated or punched cards used to enable mechanical pianos to play
a piece of music.
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copyright holder. The adoption of this liability rule is seen as a
compromise between the two extremes; a property rule on the one end,
and no rights at all on the other. The immediate effect was an increase in
competition: before 1908 the market was dominated by one company,
after the Act hundreds of competitors appeared on the market. This first
case has been followed by a long series of legislatively mandated
compulsory licenses, namely on musical public performances, books and
CD rental rights, etc. The multiplication of such regimes in copyright law
is due to the importance of transaction costs related to the exploitation
of copyright, especially the cost of identifying the rights holder (search
cost), the costs of monitoring uses of the protected work and the costs of
enforcing rights against infringers. In such legislated compulsory licenses,
the copyright property rule is replaced by a standard contract or liability
rule which saves bargaining costs. Additionally, this type of compulsory
license is often equipped with administrative support that saves the
parties the costs of record keeping, payment collection and royalty
disbursement (search and monitoring costs). In the field of copyright, the
importance of transaction costs has further increased with the
development of cumulative technologies such as multimedia. Multimedia
works heavily rely on a multitude of inputs generally covered by IPRs,
most often copyrights. The transaction costs associated with IPRs
consume a lot of resources within the multimedia industry. It is thought
that some products are not brought to market for the very reason that
they are too expensive to assemble. Consequently, there is an urgent need
to find a device to lower transaction costs. Among the policy proposals,
several voices call for the adoption of compulsory licenses.^ '^
Finally, compulsory licenses are not limited to patent and copyright law;
they can also be used for other IPRs or between different types of IPRs.
The European Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions organizes a system of dependent licenses
between a patent and a plant breeders' right.
5.3 The Limits ofCompulsoryLicenses
One of the main features of the Calabresi and Melamed framework lies
in collective valuation. According to the thrust of Calabresi and
See for instance Lawrence Lessig (2001) TheFuture ofIdeas, NewYork tVintage Book
outlining a plan for compulsory licensing of copyrighted works, where music and
movies publishers should allow anyone to download and use of digital works as long as
they pays to copyright holders a fee fixed by statute.
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Melamed's framework, courts do collective valuation. In IPRs and
compulsory licensing there are two kinds of collective valuadon:
legislative valuation and judicial evaluation.^^^ Both types of valuation
have serious limits.
Legislative liability rules, mainly used in copyright, suffer from two
defaults. First, the valuadon is far from perfect. Legislators have little
information about the value of individual IPRs. They have to take their
information from group interests; however, as is common across
disciplines, some groups may have more influence in the political arena
than others. This may or may not be proportionate to their economic
leverage in the market.^^^ Moreover, legislators have to resort to gross
average evaluation, and do not take into account the sectoral differences.
Second, once established, royalty rates are fixed and inflexible. The heavy
legislative procedures needed to change royalty rates or to dislodge an
unnecessary statutory license are so burdensome that the system is often
not able to ensure a responsive valuation system.
Judicial (or administrative) compulsory licenses are mainly used in the
field of patents to solve blocking patents and other holdout situations.
The risk of bargaining breakdown in pioneer-improver negotiations is
high and judicial liability rules may prevent the deadweight loss to which
such breakdowns lead. Judicial valuation might be more tailored and
flexible than legislative valuation. Indeedj by definition, courts work
case- by- case and if judges have littie knowledge on the value of the
patented invention, they can rely on the parties and possibly independent
experts. However, judicial liability rules are afflicted by two
shortcomings. First, as mentioned above, procedures to obtain a
compulsory license are so cumbersome that, so far, they have never
procured a viable solution. Second, if judicialcompulsory licensing or the
simple threat of them can help to overcome bargaining breakdown
between two patent holders, the types of transactions costs are very
different from the costs of market transactions where multiple IPRs are
needed as inputs.The multiplication of products using a large number
of IPRs as inputs imposes repeated costs of locating rights holders and
valuating each unique IPR input. Litigation is costly and courts are ill-
equipped to treat high volumes of transactions. Litigation would become
Or an individual administrative decision.
233 For an analysis of the political economy of intellectual property law see notably the
last chapter of WUliam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner (2003), TheEconomic Structure of
IPLaw(...)
23'' Robert P. Merges (1996), "Contracting into Liability Rules ..at 1316
frequent due to the valuation problem and costs would extend the list of
existing transaction costs.
Consequendy, it appears that legislative and judicial collective valuations
have some shortcomings. Calabresi and Melamed's analytical framework
only envisages two options: either the legislature issues property rules or
it establishes a liability rule with a collective evaluation. In the spirit of
the authors, they only consider legislative or judicial valuation; they do
not discuss other types of collective valuation.
In addition to valuation difficulties, liability rules suffer from a second
limitation. Liability rules on their own only address one category of
transaction costs: bargaining costs. They do no deal with search costs,
monitoring costs or enforcement costs.
To complete the Calabresi and Melamed analytical framework, I wiU
follow the suggestion of Professor Robert Merges.^ '^ I will now mrn to
examine another dimension of intellectual property law, "collective rights




6. A Second Solution: Individuals Can Modify
their Initial Entitlements
In Chapter Four, I observed that in a context of cumulative and
collective innovation with a proliferation of property rights, the
coordination of IPRs and knowledge exchanges becomes a major issue.
High transaction costs hinder this coordination and hamper innovation.
In the case of high transaction costs, where the market does not
sufficientiy ensure an efficient coordination of property rights exchanges,
two solutions are typically considered. Either government (the law)
diminishes the cost of bargaining failure (i.e. deadweight loss) by directiy
allocating the property right to the agent who values it the most, or,
government (the law) encourages private bargaining by reducing
transaction costs.
In Chapter Five, I examined the entidement literature, which suggests
that government (or courts) can reduce transaction costs by resorting to
liability rules (compulsory licenses). The entitiements literature focuses
on the issue of strategic bargaining (holdout and free riding) and suggests
an interesting instrument (liability rules) to lower one category of
transaction costs, i.e. bargaining costs. In so doing, it assumes that
government is omniscientand the only actor in the design of transaction
patterns. Economicagents must hope that the government is sufficientiy
inspired in the grant of entitiements, as they are unable to modify the
pattern of post-grant transactions.^ '^'
In this chapter, I look at alternative forms of coordination, other than
market or government intervention, which I will refer to as 'self-
regulation' defined by (i) having some degree of collective constraint,
other than that directiy emanating from government, (ii) in order to
engender outcomes (iii) which would not be reached by individual
market behavior alone.^^^ In exploring the capacity of economic agents
to self-regulate and resort to coordination mechanisms more complex
than the market when transaction costs are high, I follow Professor
Merges' suggestion^^® towards the new institutional economics literature.
236 See Robert C. Ellickson (1991), Order mthout Law (...), p. 138, criticizing the legal-
centralism of law and economics scholars.
237 Julia Black (1996) "ConstitutionaUsing Self-Regulation", 59 MODERN LAW REVIEW,
24-55
238 Robert P. Merges (1996) "Contractinginto LiabilityRules..."
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6.1 Self-Regulation and the NewInstitutionalEconomics
Literature
New institutional economics (NIE) is an interdisciplinary enterprise
combining economics, law, organization theorjf, political science,
sociology and anthropology in order to explain what institutions are,
what function they fulfill, how they arise, how they change and how they
can be reformed.^^' NIE concentrates on the coordination between
economic agents. Behind the central principle of coordination lie two
concepts: transactions and institutions.
Transactions are the mechanisms of economic exchanges; they are
roughly equivalent to the legal notion of contract. One contribution of
the NIE has been the development of an analytical framework for
describing transactions. It attempts to explain the role of institutions and
their evolution by giving a central role to transaction costs in their
explanation. NIE uses transaction pattern to positively explain why
different institutions result in differing levels of economic performance
but can also normatively prescribe certain institutional solutions as being
more efficient than others.
Although there is no single universally accepted set of definitions, all
new-institutionalists distinguish between the instimtional environment
and institutional arrangements. The institutional environment designates
the 'rules of the game', that guide individuals' behavior. They can be
both formal, explicit rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and
informal, often implicit rules (social conventions, norms). Among NIE,
several groups of scholars focus on different levels of analysis. Douglas
North '^"' and his followers have mainly worked at this macro level,
examining the institutional environment and the mutual influence
between it and economic agents. To some extent, what I have said in
previous chapters on the creation of property rights, or government
intervention to overcome bargaining failure in replacing property rules
by liability rules, can be associated with this level of analysis.
By contrast, institutional arrangements are specific guidelines designed
by economic agents to coordinate particular exchanges.^"" Oliver
23' Peter G. Klein (1999) "New Institutional Economics" in Boudewijn Bouckaert and
Gerrit De Geest (eds.) Engclopedia ofLam Economics, http: / / encyclo.findlaw.com/
See Douglas C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2'^ ' Peter G. Klein (1999) "New Institutional Economics" in Boudewijn Bouckaert and
Gerrit De Geest (eds.) Engclopedia ofLaw& Economics, http: / / encvclo.Findlaw.com/
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Williamson's work '^'^ focuses on this micro-level, examining how
economic agents choose between different coordination mechanisms
such as market, hierarchies (e.g. business firm, public bureaucracy or
non-profit organization) or hybrid institutional arrangements (long term
contract). This level of analysis and the work of Williamson can certainly
be very inspiring in an examination of the system of intellecmal property.
However, in this chapter, I would like to focus on a different level of
analysis, somewhere between the institutional environment and
Williamson's institutional arrangements. The question I am dealing with
is whether technical communities in which numerous exchanges of
knowledge and IPRs are able to set up coordination mechanisms that
reduce transaction costs.
While the institutional environment and institutional arrangements such
as those examined by Williamson have received the bulk of attention,
other scholars have extended the analysis to other instimtions, showing
that communities throughout the world use many alternatives to market
exchanges and hierarchical institutions.
For instance, Brousseau, Fares and Raynaud '^'^ attempt to identify an
intermediary mode of coordination between the institutional
environment and the contractual institutional arrangements examined by
Williamson that they designate "private institutions." These private
institutions have two characteristics. First, like the institutional
environment but unlike contractual institutional arrangement, they are
collective in the sense that the order they create is not entirely negotiated
by each individual. Second, like contractual institutional arrangements
and unlike the institutional environment, they are voluntary, in the sense
that creating private institutions or joining them is voluntary.
In a book entitied Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom presents a wide
array of field research on private institutions that administer common
property resources. She focuses primarily on the observation of
examples of common pool resources (CPR)i governance '^*'' as shebelieves
Oliver Williamson (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets,
"Relational Contracting, New York: Tine Free Press.
'^'3 Eric Brousseau, M. Fares and E. Raynaud (2004) "The Economics of Private
Institutions," - 8th ISNIE Conference-Tucson, USA.
Common pool resources iCf. chapter 1) share two attributes of importance for
economic activities. First, it is costiy to exclude individuals from using the good either
trough physical barriers or legal instruments, therefore CPRs are subject to free riding.
Second, the products of CPRs are rival; tiiey are therefore subject to problems of
congestion, overuse and potential destruction.
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that the processes of self-regulation are easier to observe in this type of
situation.245 The results of her woris are not confined to the governance
of CPRs, rather they are relevant for all situations where collective action
and high transaction costs problems are present.In addition, she
makes a link between forms of self-regulation and forms of common
property regimes that can also be useful for this stady.
Finally, as I already mentioned in Chapter Four, the work of law
professor Robert EUickson^"*^ has focused on one specific category of
coordination mechanisms, describing how social (non-legal) norms can
emerge out of repeated interactions among members of close-knit
communities and help to overcome collective action and transaction cost
problems. My objective in this chapter is not so much to look at the
process of spontaneous emergence of social norms. What I am
interested in is rather their vulnerability in terms of enforcement as
revealed in the example of the norms of science described in previous
chapters. They cannot be enforced against third parties (external
defection) and change in incentives can reduce members' compliance
(internal defection). In an example described below, we will see that in
order to improve their capacity of enforcement, members can either
245 Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons (...), p. 26
One could say that there is a great similarity between the governance of CPR - often
referred as the tragedy of the commons —and the anticommons tragedy. A tragedy of
the commons is likely to surge when separate persons are assigned rights of use but no
rights of exclusion. The classical example is a herder that may use the open commons
as pasture but may not prevent others from doing the same. Thus, the exercise of the
rights of use creates interdependencies that remain outside of the calculus of the choice
makers (here the herders): there is a risk of overuse (overgrazing in the example). In the
tragedy of the anticommons, the situation is basically symmetrical. The anticommons
problem arises when there are multiple rights of exclusion. Individuals may reduce use
of the commons by others who also can exercise their exclusion right. In the extreme
situation, all members of a large group are assigned rights of exclusion, so that each
potential user must secure the permission of all members; in that case, the resource may
not be used at all despite its potential value. The basic logic is equivalent in the two cases. The
inefficient arises because separate decision makers, each of whom acts in exercise of assigned right
(either rights of use or rights of exclusion), i;f;pose externaldiseconomies on others who hold
similar rights. (James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon (2000), "Symmetric Tragedies:
Commons and Anticommons", 43 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1). In other
words, in both case, individuals acts independendy in a simation of high
interdependence and as long as they stay unorganized, they cannot achieved a joint
return as high as they could obtain if they would organize to coordinate their action.
Thus, in both situations, it is worth considering Ostrom's work on a theory of self-
regulation and of common-property regimes.
2"''' See Robert C. EUickson (1991), Orderwithout luiw (...)
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create a private institution and/or "formalize" their social norms to rely
on legal or external enforcement. '^'®
In this chapter, I examine how different groups of knowledge holders^"*'
modify their initial entidements creating institutional arrangements to
coordinate their exchanges of knowledge and IPRs. I use the expression
"collective rights organizations" ("CRO") to designate these
institutional arrangements because they include a notion of common
property or collective management of property rights.
6.2 The Notion ofCollective Rights Organizations
The rationale for creating these collective rights organizations is their
ability to reduce of transaction costs. First, they may reduce search
costs with mechanisms that help to match providers and users. For
instance, they may include a cadastre identifying precisely who holds
what knowledge and what property rights. They may also work as a
clearinghouse mechanism offering licenses to a large range of inventions
or even package licenses. Second, collective rights organizations can also
reduce monitoring and enforcement costs in several ways. Members
can benefit from economies of scale if monitoring and enforcement
involve fixed cost that can be shared.^^" Specialization enables private
enforcers to perform their task more efficiendy. They can rely on
alternative monitoring systems such as peer supervision. They can also
include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that are more
responsive and specialized than courts. Also, they offer alternative (non
legal) sanction mechanisms such as depriving those who do not fulfill
their commitments from the benefits of the service provided by the
CRO either through loss of reputation, ostracism or control of access.
Last, adhesion to the rules should be higher as members take part in
theirdrafting and voluntarily joined the CRO.^®'
Third, collective rights organizations may reduce bargaining costs in
several ways. They can notably offer economies of scale in the design of
In terms of enforcement, there are important differences between social norms and
private institutions. Enforcement of social norms is decentralized; it is insured by peers
•without possibility to resort to state enforcement. By contrast, private institutions may
include a centralized enforcement mechanism; it might be possible to resort to state
enforcement if the construction of the private institutions leans on contracts and
property rights.
"5 Whether they have a formal IPR or not
^5" Eric Brousseau, IVI. Fares and E. Raynaud (2004) "The Economics of Private
Institutions," - 8tii ISNIE Conference-Tucson, USA
251 Ibidem
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rules, as there are many redundancies in contracts ruling exchanges of
property rights (licenses), and mandatory or optional standard
contractual provisions allow parties to negotiate only a limited number
of issues.^^^ Collective rights organizations can also include collective
valuation mechanisms. As I mentioned earlier, collective valuation can be
more efficient than bilateral (market) valuation when there are important
information asymmetries (information about the threat values and the
bargaining surplus is private). Collective valuation by CROs can be more
efficient than legislative or judicial liability rules: valuation is more
customized because members have more expertise than legislators and
judges; valuation is more responsive because valuation rules can be
modified much more quickly than legislation.
It is worth observing that CROs often create some forms of liability
rules to rule relations among their members and between their members
and third parties; i.e. (1) the suppression of the need to obtain the
consent of the right holder to have access to the protected knowledge, 2)
a principle of ex post compensation and (3) a collective valuation
mechanism that replaces bilateral negotiations. Therefore, in the analysis
of collective rights organization we can combine the theoretical insights
from entitiement literature and new institutional economics literature.
After observing that private institutions or collective rights organizations
can be useful to reduce transaction costs, it is worth examining their
institutional design. For this purpose, I follow the suggestion of
Robert Merges and Michael Heller to look at the work of Elinor Ostrom.
From observing a large number of successful and enduring private
institutions, she identifies a series of design principles or elements that
help to account for the success of theseinstitutions^":
252 Ibidem, p. 25
253 Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing theCommons..p. 90
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a) Ckarlydefined boundaries
The boundaries of the resources collectively managed must be clearly defined, as must
individuals who have rights to benefit these resources.
b)Congruence between appropriation andprovision mles andlocal conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and!or quantity ofresource units are
related to local conditions andto provision rules requiring labor, materialand!ormoney.
c) Collective choice arrangements
Most individuals affected ty the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational
rules
d)Monitoring
Monitors, who actively audit conditions of resources collectively managed and appropriators
behavior, areaccountable to the appropriators orarethe appropriators
e)Graduated sanctions
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions
other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, orby both.
f) Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Appropriators andtheir officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts
among appropriators or between appropriators andofficials.
g)Minimal recognition ofright toorganic
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external
governmental authorities.
For resources collectively managed that areparts oflarger ystems
h) Nested enterprises
Appropriation, provision, monitoring enforcement, conflict resolution, andgovernance activities
areorgani^d in multiple layers ofnested enterprises.
Last, one must observe that these collective rights organizations may
modify the property regime for knowkdge, creating intermediary
situations between the two extremes of exclusive individual rights and
the public domain.
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6.3 Three Case Studies
The next paragraphs are devoted to the study of a few cases of collective
rights organizations in IPRs where IPRs holders have succeeded in
creating CROs that rely on liability rules to regulate relations among their
members and between their members and third parties. For each
example, I examine how collective rights organizations reduce
transaction costs and possibly modify the initial property regime, and
whether they follow the institutional design principles identified by
Ostrom.
6.3.1 Inside Proprietary Technology: Patents Pools^s^
Attempting to overcome a possible tragedy of the anti-commons, or at
least to find their way through patents thickets, firms resort to cross
licensing or patents pools. A cross-license is an agreement between two
companies that grants each other the right to practice the other's
patents.^^^ Cross-licensing is a necessary and widespread phenomenon.
When two companies each have a patent that overlaps with the other,
cross-licenses are commonly negotiated where the use of each other's
patents is essential for the development of products or processes. Rather
than blocking each other and going to court or ceasing production, the
two firms enter into a cross-license. Especially with a royalty-free cross-
license, each firm is then free to compete, both in designing its products
without fear of infringement and in pricing its products without the
burden of a per-unit royalty due to the other. However, if the number of
interdependent patents and the number of holders increase, if the
valuation of the different patents is complicated, or if there is enduring
interdependence between the patent holders, then a step further towards
the creation of patent pools is likely to be considered.
^5'' This brief presentation is largely taken from the work of Robert P. Merges. For a
detailed analysis of patent pools in a new institutional economics perspective see
Robert P. Merges (1996), "Contracting into Liability Rules...", pp. 1337-1354 or
Robert P. Merges (2001), "Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions : The Case
of Patent Pools" in Rochelle Dreyfus et al (eds.), Expanding the Boundaries ofIntellectual
Propert)! : Innovation Poligfor theKnowledge Society, Oxford University Press, New York ,
hereafter Robert P. Merges (2001), "Institutions for IP Transactions...". See also
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson (1990), "On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope", 90 Columbia Law Review 83.
255 Carl Shapiro (2001), "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patents Pools
and Standards Setting" in Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern (eds.) Innovation
Polig and theEconomy, Volume I, MIT Press
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A patent pool is an arrangement among multiple patent holders to
aggregate their patents. Among members of the pool, a large apparatus
for cross-licensing is set up; members grant each other access to their
patents (as well as their unpatented technical information) on standard
terms, either for free or for a set price. Vis-a-vis third parties, patents
pools constitute a single ticket office offering a package license. T)rpical
patent pools allocate a portion of the licensing fees to each member
according to a preset formula or procedure. Depending on the size and
development of the pool, members of the pool can set up a central entity
to which they assign or license their individual rights. In turn, this central
entity exploits the collective rights by licensing, manufacturing, or both.
Thus, patent pools are collective rights organizations whose economic
function is to facilitate licensing or exchanges of property rights by
reducing transaction costs. To reduce bargaining costs, patent pools
function according to liability rules. Under the rule of a patent pool,
members are allowed to use any other member's technology for a set fee.
Thus, once the pool is created, the three ingredients of liability rules are
present: (1) the absence of necessary permission from the holder, (2) a
principle of ex post compensation and (3) a mechanism of collective
valuation. In some sense, patents pools may look like compulsory
licenses but there is one major difference: in these organizations, the
members, and not the legislator or a court, set the price. This involves
extensive negotiations and sometimes, ongoing adjustments often carried
out via a permanent administrative structure.^ '^' Patent pools can also
reduce other categories of transaction costs. They may reduce search
costs for members by identifying precisely who owns what patents and
associated know-how. They may also reduce search costs for third
parties in constituting a single ticket office offering a package license.
FinaUy, patent pools may reduce monitoring and enforcement costs
either by limiting the need to monitor actions of members or by offering
economies of scale in monitoring and sanctioning possible infringement
by third parties.
Patent pools are not totally new. In the middle nineteenth century, there
was a famous case in the United States involving the sewing machine
industry. Early twentieth American jurisprudence also contains two
notable pools in the context of the aircraft and automobile industries.
After World War II, the number of pools has considerably subsided
because antitrust authorities have been rather skeptical about this type of
horizontal agreement. However, patent pools have been recurring in the
Robert P. Merges (1996), "Contracting into Liability Rules..pp. 1337-1354
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last few years with the growing importance of collective innovation and
the possible problems of patents thickets or anti-commons/^^
It is also worth observing patent pools in terms of property regimes.
They create a sort of two-tiered regime: conditions of access to a
patented technology are not the same for non-members as they are for
members. This difference can justify their close examination by antitrust
authorities. What is interesting for this dissertation is that patent pools
replace a system of private property rights with something like a
common property regime or a "limited commons," i.e. a scenario where
property is held in common among the members of a group, but
exclusively vis-a-vis the outside world.^^*' I will return to this later.
Regarding institutional design, to what extent can we say that
Ostrom's design principles are applicable in the intellectual property
field? Principle (a) requires that the identity of the rights holders, and the
specific patents pooled, must be clearly defined. This principle is quite
obvious and it is likely to be the first step firms wiU take in considering
setting up a patent pool. However, identifying actors in the long term in
an evolving economic and technological context where new firms
emerges and other disappear, (notably through vertical integration) might
not be an easy task. Similarly, pool negotiators must be careful in
stipulating whether or not the pool is confined to patents issued (or
pending) as of the date of the creation, or to what extent it may include
patents to be granted by a certain time in die future.
Principle (b) could be reformulated as a proportionality principle. At the
heart of pools is the proportionality between each member's
contribution to the institution and his claim to common resources. One
central element of patent pools is the provision of a system of collective
valuation for each patent through contractual provisions and sometimes
arbitration procedures so as to split royalties among members according
to their proportional contribution.
Principle (c) concerns voting rules. Ostrom observes that institutions
where most members affected by the rules can participate in modifying
the rules are better able to tailor their rules and to modify them over time
so as to better fit them to the specific characteristics of their setting. It is
^57 Another important reason for considering the creation of patents pool is the issue of
setting technical standards
This notion is developed by Carol Rose (1998) "Eldred v. Reno, The Several Futures
of Property, of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems", 83
Minnesota Law Review 129
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difficult to assess whether every patent pool respects this principle. At
least, the two most analyzed patent pools in the aircraft and automobile
industries had such governance structure, votes were given to all
members but weighted to reflect their respective contributions.
Principles (d) and (e) require systems of monitoring and graduated
sanctions. On this issue, the creation of a patent pool can only improve
the situation of patent holders. Indeed, one characteristic of the IPRs
system is that for the most part, enforcement of rights is left to rights
holders. There are no "police" to detect patents infringement. Courts
only become involved when a possible infringement is detected and a
complaint is made by the patent holder. As in many long-enduring
organizations observed by Ostrom, the costs of monitoring are lower in
these organizations as a result of the rule in use. Similarly, patent pools
both reduce the problem of infringement and reduce the costs of
monitoring. As patent pools consistof sharing patented technology, their
creation suppresses, for the most part, the issue of infringement among
members. A residual problem might lie in the obligations to
communicate the use made of other member's technology and/or to
pour new improvements into the pools. As patent pools createclose-knit
technical communities where potential free riders or shirkers are well
identified, they effectively reduce monitoring costs.
According to principle (f), members should have rapid access to low-cost
specialized arenas to resolve conflicts. Here again, it can vary according
to the size and development of patent pools. Small contract-based pools
might only have a valuation mechanism but larger institutionalized
patent pools are likely to provide an arbitration mechanism or some
other device to put an end to litigation.
Principle (g) provides that the rights of members to devise their own
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.
Patent pools are relatively rare, at least formal ones. One possible
explanation might lie in the governmental attitude which has varied from
quasi-coercion to quasi-prohibition. Some pools have been created only
when government helps to overcome the collective action problem. So,
in several cases where a militarily useful technology was not being
developed because of blocking patents, the United States government
threatened to resort to eminent domain or compulsory licensing and this
effectively contributed to the creation of patent pools. On the opposite
side, formation of patents pools has long been restrainedby the skeptical
attitude of the antitrust authorities. Today, with the growing importance
of collective innovation and the possible problem of patent thicket or
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and-commons, there seems to be increasing agreement among
policymakers and economists that patent pools may benefit both
intellectual property owners and consumers, provided that the pools
include patents thatare complementary or blocking.^ '^
In conclusion, as observed by Professor Robert Merges, it seems that the
validity of the design principles identified by Professor Elinor Ostrom
goes much beyond natural resources management. Indeed, it appears
that most of these principles are present in patent pools, which are an
example of collective organizadons in the field of IPRs.
I now turn to another case of collective rights organizations whose goal
is not only the reduction of transaction costs but also the preservation of
the social norms of Science.
6.3.2 Open Science: Formalizing the Norms of Science
As mentioned above, despite the fact that the two worlds of Science and
Technology are increasingly intermingled and that patents are now
available for an growing part of basic research, the norms of science, and
particularly open access —or "communism" in Merton's terminology —
remain strong. However, despite this intellectual adhesion to the norms
of science, one can observe a sizeable increase in patenting within
universities and even more important a decrease in the sharing of
research tools. '^° In other words, the legitimacy of the norms remains
strong while compliance is decreasing. This gap between intellecmal
adhesion to an open access norm and divergent practical behavior can be
explained by a change in incentives. The increasing value of potential
patents makes it more costly to comply with the norm of open access.
Moreover, decentralized enforcement through non-legal sanctions, such
as informal gossip or a highly unlikely exclusion of the academic
community, is no longer sufficient, especially if the frequency of norm
violations increases. Therefore, scientists are likely to seek patents and to
259 Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole (2002) "Efficient Patent Pools", WP 9175, NBER
In the case of many research projects, scientists need not only access to information
provided through publication or access to patented inventions, they need also access to
biological material necessary to replicate or build on the initial results. The problem is
that negotiating access through case by case material transfer agreement is very cosdy;
and if transaction costs are too high, scientists will think that is not worth and the
research material will not be shared. The situation might be more problematic in the US
than in Europe because there is no clear research exception in US patent law as there
exists in most EU countries.
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be reluctant to share research tools, even if they believe that the scientific
community would be better off given a widely respected open access
norm.
There is, however, no fatality in this situation. Obviously, the law could
be changed to modify the incentive for scientists or even better,
scientists themselves may be able to self-regulate in response to this
situation.
One can observe the behavior of some individual actors who attempt to
define or shift downstream the boundary between open access and
intellectual property, and in so doing overcome the risks of deadlock in
the exchange of research tools. In numerous cases, scientists holding
patents assert against the community only a limited set of rights and not
the full exclusionary force bestowed by their patents. In a similar spirit,
academic scientists and occasionally private scientists bypass the business
and legal agents of their university or company, and freely exchange
research tools.^"
Beyond these ad hoc measures,universities can also take more general and
enduring initiatives to meet the challenges. The challenges concern both
the content of the norms that must be adapted to new innovation and
the enforcement of the norms. As to the content of the norms, scientists
must identify criteria to distinguish discoveries that are better developed
and disseminated through open access from discoveries that are better
developed and disseminated with intellectual property rights; they must
also identify which actor is best situated to make that decision. Regarding
enforcement, they need to design devices to enforce the norm of open
access when it best suits. Hereafter are some examples of such
initiatives.
In 1995, the American Association of University Technology Managers
(AUTM) proposed a new standard contract for the transfer of biological
research tools called the Uniform Biotechnological Material Transfer
Agreement (UBMTA).^^^ This initiative isworth examining for a series
of reasons.
Concerning the content of the norms, this standard material transfer
agreement (MTA) codifies into contract what scientists think are the best
Rebecca S. Eisenberg (2001), "Bargaining over Proprietary Research Tools..."
2''2 60 Fed. Reg. 12771 (March 8, 1995). The text is also available at
http:/Avww.aun-n.net/UBMTA/intro.hti-nl
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practices in terms of knowledge and IPRs exchange. In so doing, the
content of the norm of open access is written down and updated.
The uniform MTA actually leans upon four distinctions; the two first are
old distinctions while the last two are new and direcdy related to the
Bayh Dole Act. A first distinction is between two types of uses: non
commercial purposes (research and teaching) on the one hand and
commercial purpose on the other. A second distinction is between
research material users: profit organizations and non-for-profit
organizations. A third distinction is between two types of rights: access
rights and use rights. And in a later stage, a fourth distinction has been
added concerning the objects of the MTA that are either better used
through shared access or resources that can be used with some form of
proprietary control.
The UBMTA provides that non -profit organizations may agree to give
themselves mutual access to their biological research material. The
material is provided at no cost or with an optional transmittal fee solely
to reimburse preparation and distribution costs. However, this mutual
access is limited to teaching and research purposes, any commercial use
requires the negotiation of a classical license and the provider is under no
obligation to grant such a license. Any transfer of material to a for-profit
organization is deemed to be a commercial purpose. Provision of
material from non-profit organizations to for-profit organizations is not
covered by the UBMTA, each organization can negotiate these scenarios
on a case-by-case basis, or according to their own standard contracts.
Provision of material from industry to non-profit is the object of another
text, whose content is similar to the UBMTA, but which has remained in
a draft form.^" What is new is an implicit distinction between access
rights and use rights. The UBMTA is actually an incomplete contract.
The provider gives free access to its research material, i.e. the right to
work on it for research (and teaching) purposes and the material remains
the property of the provider. Consequentiy, as mentioned before, any
commercial use of the material requires the prior consent of the
provider. In the event of success, i.e. the realization of an innovation
containing this material, the recipient must negotiate the use rights of the
material. '^^ '* The fourth distinction will be described further in this
The text is also availableat http:/ /u'ww.ai.itm.net/UBMTA/intro.html
It is worth keeping in mind the main characteristics of this model contract for the
second and third part of this dissertation, as this template contains many ingredients
very similar to the claims of biodiversity rich countries and communities about their
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Chapter. Regarding transaction costs, the UBMTA has a similar effect
as it codifies and updates the norm of open access. The UBMTA offers a
set of standard contractual terms that can significandy reduce bargaining
costs. In regards to other categories of transaction costs, its effect is
more limited. There is no obvious effect on search costs; it pardy
reduces monitoring^^^ and enforcement costs by providing mutual access
to biological material for teaching and research purposes, i.e. those uses
where transaction costs might be higher than the cooperative surplus and
therefore prevent exchanges of biological material {Cf. chapter 4).
Commercial uses, however, must still be monitored.
In terms of property regimes, the drafting of the UBMTA creates or
rather codifies the creation of a two-tier property right regime: it
distinguishes exchanges between non-profit organizations themselves,
and exchanges between non-profit oirganizations and for-profit
organizations. Nevertheless, the situation is substantially distinct from
the original one or at least from the idealistic Mertonian description of
Science. This regime of shared-access within Science is very different
from an open-access and free use regime. Scientists are induced to pour
their research materials into a "limited commons" rather than into the
public domain (open access).^*'''
What can be said about UBMTA in terms of instimtional design? The
UBMTA has had limited success, at least in its first stage. Many of the
signatory universities substitute their own agreements for the UBMTA
when they send their materials out to other universities. These
agreements are often more restrictive and need to be reviewed by
instimtional representatives before being accepted. One possible
explanation for this limited success may be that the agreement does not
fulfill all of the design principles identified by Ostrom. The distinctions
made between different categories of users (non-profit/ for-profit
organizations) and different uses (research and teaching/commercial
uses) are applications of design principles (a) and (b). The negotiation of
genetic resources and tradidonal knowledge. I refer above all to two issues: prior
informed consent and indication of the material origin.
The UBMTA could also reduce the costs of monitoring the departure from the
norm of open-access; substituting the UBMTA by a material transfer agreement with
more restrictive terms is tantamount to signaling a departure from the norm.
Robert P. Merges (1996), "Property Rights Theory and the Commons..." p. 160.
Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisemberg call it a "limited public domain among universities"
see Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisemberg (2003), "Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine" 66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBi:ems 289, p. 306 hereafter Arti Rai
and Rebecca Eisemberg (2003), "Bayh-Dole Reform and..."
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the UBMTA within the Association of University Transfer Managers is
(partly) an application of design principles (c). However, the weakness of
the UBMTA is in its enforcement: it does not include a mechanism for
monitoring and sancdoning (design principles d and e); actually, it is not
even mandatory among signatories. As explained above, without
monitoring, commitment will be weak. In addidon, there is no conflict-
resoludon mechanism when a university refuses to resort to the UBMTA
and rather imposes more restrictive conditions. When the enforcement
of norms is weak, one possible solution is to look for external coercion.
Interestingly, a solution came from the National Institate of Health
(NIH), the principal source of public funds in American Bio-medical
research. Except in very limited circumstances, and after long
procedures, the NIH has no legal power to constrain its grantees to
make their inventions more available.^''^ However in several
circumstances, the NIH has successfully exhorted its grantees to act
collectively to keep basic research results in the public domain. After
some ad hoc interventions, '^'' in 1999 the NIH adopted a more general
statement of '^ 'Principles and Guidelines for Sharing Biomedical ^search
R£source/'^ ''^ to guide its grantees in their claim and exercise of property
rights. Basically, the content of these principles and guidelines is similar
to the UBMTA and they explicidy recommend its use. The Principles and
Guidelines only add useful criteria to distinguish between different types
of research resources to help research institutions determine the best
strategy (patent, shared access or public domain) in order to enhance the
2" 5 U.S.C. §.202 (b) 1
Concerning human genome mapping see NHGRI Policy Regarding Intellectual
Property of Human Genomic Sequence (April 9, 1996) available at
hnp://www.nhgri.nih.g-ov . See also the "the Bermuda rules", which require publicly-
funded investigators to deposit all newly identified DNA sequences and mutations in
the publicly-accessible GenBank database within 24 hours, (they derive their name from
an agreement entered into at the International Strategy Meeting on Human Genome
Sequencing held in Bermuda in 1996). For SNPs, the NIH undertook a similar strategy
before the SNP Consortium stepped forward to put SNPs in the public domain, see
National Institutes of Health RFA HG-98-001, Methods for Discovering and Scoring
Single Nucleodde Polymorphisms (January9, 1998),available g/http:/Avww.nih.rov
268 Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health,
Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed.
Reg. 72,000, 72,093 (December, 23, 1999)
Department of Health and Human Services, National Instimtes of Health, Principles
and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and
Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,000, 72,093
(December, 23. 1999)
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ultimate availability of die resource {rf. Ostrom design principles (a) and
(b)):
"Recipients shonlr! determine whether: 1)theprimary usefulness ofthe resource isasa toolfordiscovery
rather than an PDA-approved product or integral component ofsuch a product; 2) the resource is a
broad, enabling invention thatwill be useful to many scientists {or multiple companies in developing
multiple products), rather than a project orproduct-specific resource; and3) the resource is already
useable or distributable as a toolratherthan thesituation where private sector involvement necessary o r
the most expedient meansfor developing ordistributing the resource. Recipients should ensure thattheir
intellectualproperty strategyfor resourcesfitting one ormore ofthe above criteria enhances rather than
restricts theultimate availability oftheresource."
But, probably the most important point of the NIH intervention is that
it has given the small dose of monitoring and sanctioning necessary to
enforce the norms of free access (design principles (d) and (e)). The dose
is very small indeed as the NIH's constraint on the discretionof research
institutions has littie legal weight. It is no more than a grant policy
though it has enjoyed some success.^™
Thus, it appears that left to their own devices, American universities may
not be able to take sustained collective action in favor of the public
domain. However, the NIH intervention has shown that with a little help
from outside, the situation may look different. Ostrom highlights the
importance of external factors, notably the political regime. Here,
support in terms of monitoring and sanctioning in the form of the NIH
grant policy seems preponderant (design principles (g) and (h)).
Nevertheless, it may not be totally sufficient which is why some
American scholars caU for modifications to patent law.
Law can facilitate enforcement of social norms in several ways. The
provisions for norms can be written down in a contract that can be
enforced by court^ '^. The provisions of the norms can also be turned
into law bylaw-makers or courts that give legal force to social norms.^^^
Also, the law can be changed to modify incentives that act on scientists.
Several scholars have called for a revaluation of patent's utility
doctrine.Some steps in the direction of legal change can already be
Arti Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg (2003),"Bayh-Dole Reform and..."
I explore this possibilityin part two and above all in part three.
On this issue see notably Robert D. Cooter (1996), "Decentralized Law for a
Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant", UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
See Rebecca S. Eisemberg (2000), "Analyze this ..." at 85-88 ; Arti K. Rai and
Rebecca S. Eisemberg (2003), "Bayh-Dole Reform and ...", p. 299; Michael A Heller
(1999), "The Boundaries of Private property", 108 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 1163,at
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observed. The guidelines on utdlity issued by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office in 2001 exclude upstream research results from patent
protection unless research has a "specific, substandal, and credible"
utility (see Chapter Three)
Another much-discussed proposal275 is the "experimental-use doctrine"
which would exempt non-commercial research from infringement
liability. One possible effect of this doctrine would be to codify and
reinvigorate the eroding practices within the scientific communides.
Indeed, if the availability of upstream patents has modified the incentives
of scientists leading to departures from the (non-legal) norm of open
access and if there have been attempts to formalize the norm in a
voluntary standard contract (the UBMTA) and in the NIH guidelines,
then it might be worth codifying this norm in the law. However, this is
not the solution followed by the Federal Circuit.^ '^'
Before drawing some conclusions on actors' capacity to coordinate and
modify their initial entitiements, I would like to turn to another type or
collective organization: research consortiums. They have different
features than patent pools. First, they organize cooperation among
academic research centers or among academic researchers and private
firms; consequentiy they are confronted with the combination of both
cultures and their respective requirements. Second, for the most, they are
ex ante agreements, they arise from a common will of future cooperation
1174; Robert P. Merges (1996), "Property Rights Theory and The Commons..p. 165;
Arti K. Rai (2001), "Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical
Industry: The Role of Patent and Antitrust", 16 BerkELEYTECH. L.J 813, at 840-41.
Uiili^ Examination Guidelines (2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (January 5)
275 See Janice M. Mueller (2001), "No Dilettante Affair: Rethinldng the Experimental
Use Exemption to patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools", 76 WASH. L.
Rev. 1; Maureen O'Rourke (2000), "Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law",
100 Columbia Law Review 1177 ar Rebecca S. Eisemberg (1987), "Proprietary Rights
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research", 97 THE Yale LAW JOURNAL
177 at 220-231
See John M.J. Madg v Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, (Fed. Circ. 2002) 64 USPQ 2d.
The basic rule established by the Court is that: "[KJegardless ofwhether aparticularinstitution
or entity is engaged in an endeavorfor commercialgain, so long as theact is infurtherance ofthealleged
infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, orfor strictly
philosophical inquiry, theact does not qualifyfor the very narrowand strictly limited experimental use
defense. Moreover, theprofit or non-profit status of the user is not determinative^ The Supreme
Court refused to grant review in Duke University v.Madgi, No. 02-1007, cert, denied 539
U.S. 958, Oune 27, 2003).
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rather than from an existing blocked situation. Finally, the research
consortiums I briefly examine here are based in Europe.
6.3.3 Research Consortiums: Multilevel Agreement and Open,
Semi-Open and Closed Spaces
In the context of collective innovadon where IPRs are granted on small
pieces of innovadon, the collecting of aU rights to assemble a final
product might be very costly. Cross-licensing or patent pools are more
or less institutionalized forms of IPRs and knowledge exchanges.
Creation of research consortiums is another possibility; it allows
associating public research centers, firms, or both to coordinate their
future research efforts. Since, the number of these consortiums is
increasing, as collective innovation becomes the norm, it is interesting to
observe how scientists create these new institutional forms of
coordination. The following analysis leans upon the work of Dominique
Foray and Maurice Cassier^^^ who carried out several detailed studies of
research consortiums funded by the European Union.
Cassier and Foray identify four sources of tension for which consortium
members must find the right balance. First, they have to balance a
certain degree of knowledge sharing to stimulate collective innovation
with a degree of individual protection to incite partners to participate
and engage existing confidential resources. Second, they have to draw
allocation rules for research results according to the nature of the results,
their mutual contribution, and their cooperation/competition relation.
Third, they have to find a compromise on the difference of access
between members and non-members. Finally, when the consortium
gathers academic research centers and private firms, they have to
conciliate the requirement of rapid publication of the former with the
latter's needs of withholding and appropriation.
To this end, research consortiums set rules on the timing and the levels
of diffusion of knowledge and data. Depending on the type of
consortium, Cassier identifies up to four levels of access. The first circle
consists of the "team data" that are accessible only to the members of
one research center —or a subpart of the consortium —After a short
period, they must be transferred to aU the consortium participants. The
Maurice Cassier & Dominique Foray (1999), «La regulation de la propriete
intellectuelle dans les consortiums de recherche : les types de solutions elaborees par les
chercheurs », ECONOMIE APPLIQUEE, Tome LII, n°2, pp.155-182 and Maurice Cassier
(2002) « L'appropriation des connaissances dans les partenariats de recherche entre
laboratoires publics et entreprises: quelques tendances recentes »,Working Paper IMRI
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second circle is made up of the "pooled data" accessible to all
participants and may not be communicated to third parties without the
authorization of the author of these data. The third circle lies in the data
communicated to a circle of firms that are not members of the
consortium but pay a right to access data before publication. The fourth
circle consists of the "public data" that are made available to any
potential user by publication or deposit in a public database. This
concentric diffusion process allows participants to conciliate the
advantage of both reward systems (patent and priority in publication).
Consortiums tend to organize a regime of slightiy postponed diffusion;
in so doing, they enable members to sell access to confidential
knowledge or to apply for a patent.This period is relatively short (a
few months) because it slows down the researchers in their course to
priority publication. But, most of all, the second circle of "pooled data"
creates an area of collective invention among all the participants. These
"pooled data" have a hybrid nature mixing characteristics of public
goods and private goods; some economists could call them "club
goods.They are placed in a temporary legal regime of common
property or limited commons before becoming public data {if. infra).
These rules of diffusion are completed by a set of rules on the
allocation of property to the results. According to the general
principle set in the European standard contract, property is given to the
author of the results. However, situations of collective inventions require
more tailored attribution rules. Gassier and Foray observe that scientists
manage to design custom-made attribution rules in function of several
factors such as the characteristics of the research object (whether it is
divisible or not), the property of the pre-existing resources invested in
the collective research, or the nature of the collective innovation process
(the levelof cooperation/competition). Participants can set a mechanism
of separate property when the consortium is based on the gathering of
research material belonging to different and rival authors. In that case,
the collective innovation process is limited to the sharing of research
data; material and technological developments remain exclusive. They
can also resort to a mechanism of dividedproperty. This system is likely to
be used when participants work on a divisible object (e.g. the genome)
and have at their disposal a precise sharing tool (e.g. a cadastre). In this
case, the collective innovation process consists of a work division, and
278 Indeed, in European patent law by contrast to U.S law, there is no grace period and
the patent is granted to the first to file rather than the first to invent. Thus, immediate
diffusion of the results would destroy the possibility to obtain a patent.
Club good is the denomination given to goods that are excludable like private goods
and non-rival like public goods.
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members work in parallel. Above aU, scientists can also choose a system
of collectiveproperty. They will resort to such a system especially when they
do not have a sharing tool or when research results are by nature
collective, i.e. the contribution of participants are highly complementary.
Obviously, the management of collective property is a delicate issue that
can require the creation of an additional institutional device. For
instance, in the Eurofan consortium, they created a trust to manage this
collective property and transactionswith third parties.
As for institutional design, if we confront the organization of these
consortiums, it appears that for the most part Ostrom's design
principles are all present. These systems of concentric diffusion and
property allocation are an application of principle (a) on clearly defined
boundaries, as well as principle (b) on the congruence between
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. Gassier and
Foray note that all the consortium agreements they have analyzed have
been elaborated by scientists (c). They observe further tiiat this
elaboration by local actors facilitates their coordination and the
application of the rules. Consortiums analyzed have some mechanisms
of monitoring and arbitration in case of conflict ((d) and (f)). Then,
participants in a consortium enjoy recognized freedom to organize (^.
Indeed, the European Union, which is the principal source of funding
for these consortiums, provides them with legal resources such as a
standard consortium agreements while giving them large autonomy to
adapt their own rules to the special features of their organization. The
degree of formalization and the legal status of these rules can vary: some
rules are unwritten and can be only the object of oral discussions, some
are written as guidelines, others lie in formal contracts that could be
invoked in courts. Often, these contracts or guidelines are given legal
recognition through their inclusion in the contract negotiated between
the European Union and the consortium. Finally, the last principle (h)
on nested organizations is also present. Out of Gassier and Foray's
description, it appears that consortiums are often included in larger
systems, either larger consortiums or in a network of privileged users. In
a separate study,^®" Gassier identifies an interesting case created by the
French National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA). A
consortium of seven European academic research centers collectively
produced a large collection of gene sequences. It was decided that after a
short period of time the collection would be placed in the public domain
280 MauriceGassier (2002) « L'appropriation des connaissances dans les partenariats de
recherche entre laboratoires publics et entreprises: quelques tendances recentes»,
Working Paper IMRI pp. 107-110
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and consortium members or their industrial partners could not be
prevented from using the patents on modified genes derived from the
collection. According to the rules of the consortium, aU members are
free to apply for a patent but they must grant licenses to the consortium
members as weU as the industrial partners of each of the consortium
members. This process thus creates a two levels network and a
community of licensees. The coordination organized among academic
research centers for the upstream stages of research is thus extended to
the industrial partners and to the downstream stages of the research.
In brief, these consortiums constitute successful examples of self-
regulation by actors involved in a process of collective innovation. As in
the precedent example, we face a two-tiered (or multilevel) regime, one
that rules exchanges among members, and another that rules exchanges
with third parties. In so doing, they create a form of common property
or limited access commons. Within this limited commons, relations are
ruled by a principle of reciprocity (shared access), which is buttressed by
a mechanism for compensation (liability rule) in situations where the
contribution of members is not equal.
In the examination of each of the above collective rights organizations, I
referred to the fact that these organizations create something like a new
property regime for knowledge: a common property or a limited
commons. It is now time to dwell on the possible evolution of the
different property regimes for knowledge.
6.4 Intermediary Forms of Property Regimes
In the first chapter, I described how knowledge is a public good, i.e. a
non-rival good and a non-excludable good. This implies that from the
appropriation viewpoint, knowledge should be in open-access, i.e. in the
public domain, as there is no risk of overuse. However, from the
provision viewpoint there is an incentive problem. As the knowledge
produced by an agent benefits third parties without compensating the
agent, the agent wiU have no incentive to invest in the production of
knowledge. Consequentiy, there are two imperfect solutions to this
knowledge dilemma. First, the state can modify the incentives to produce
knowledge, creating legal means that provide some temporary exclusivity
in knowledge. Second, the state can provide the funds for the production
of knowledge and the knowledge so produced will be in open-access, i.e.
in the public domain.
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It is observable from the previous section that the range of property
status for knowledge might be larger than the classical categories:
temporary private property rights and open access. To refine this
observation, it might be interesting to follow the suggestion of Professor
Carol Rose,281 a property law specialist, who resorts to the Roman law
developments and legal thought on non-exclusive forms of property.
Very briefly, five categories of non-exclusive property existed in Roman
law and were defined as follows;
Res nullius Things that are not by their nature nonexclusive; they
have simply not yet been appropriated by anyone
Rfj Communes Things incapable of "capture" or any other act of
exclusive appropriation. They are open to all by their
nature
Rw Vublicae Tilings belonging to the public and open to the public by
the operation of law
universitatis Property belonging to a (public) group in its corporate
capacity
Rer divinijuris Things that are unowned by any human being because
they are sacred, holy or religious
From these categories, it can first be argued that as knowledge is a non
excludable good (except through secrecy) it can be seen as res co?nmunes.
Then, Professor Rose suggests that the function of intellectual property
law is to turn some res communes, things by their nature incapable of
ownership, into res nullius, things not yet owned but capable of
appropriadon. Under certain conditions, intellectual property law gives a
temporary property right to some pieces of knowledge. When the patent
or copyright expires, the encapsulated knowledge does not become res
nullius again, open to new appropriation, but rather respublicae, wide open
to the public through the operation of law.
Furthermore, it is argued that the public domain fits into the definition
of res publicae. under intellectual property law, knowledge placed in the
public domain belongs to the public. To refine the analysis, it can be said
that knowledge turns into res publicae, or in other words, is placed in the
public domain at three different stages. Under intellectual property law,
some pieces of knowledge cannot be appropriated, e.g. general ideas,
discoveries, etc.; these things are thus immediately turned into respublicae.
Other pieces of knowledge are turned into res nullius. In that case, these
281 Carol Rose (2003), "Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public
Property in the Information Age" 66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (Winter/
Spring) p. 89, hereafter Carol Rose (2003),"Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators..."
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pieces of knowledge can be either published (e.g. by an academic
researcher) and turned into res publicae or protected by intellectual
property rights. If they are protected by intellectual property rights (e.g.
by a firm), when the duration of the rights runs out, the pieces of
knowledge wiU end up as res publicae as weU. Consequently, what is
interesting with intellectual property law is that sooner or later, aU
knowledge is turned into respublicae.
Res nulliu. •IPRs — • Res publicae (expired IPKs)




Throughout the analysis of the evolution of intellectual property law, one
can observe the development of some forms of common property
regimes. Thus, it might be useful to turn to another Roman law category,
res universitatis. Res universitatis refers to property belonging to a group in
its corporate capacity. It can exist when a resource is too large for
individual ownership, but stiU sufficiendy bounded that it can be joint-
managed by a limited group. In the intellectual field, this notion
acknowledges the usefulness of property rights in creative
accomplishments while encouraging interaction and cooperative joint
management that foster inventiveness.
Going back to the schema of evolution through time of the property
status of intellectual matters, res universitatis might well be an additional
stage on the path from res cotnmunes, things that cannot be appropriated,
to their final destination, res publicae, things open to all by operation of
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law. On the basis of the different cases of collective rights organizations
examined above, one can distinguish two different situations. First, in
the UBMTA or in research consortiums, academic scientists agree to
share information {res nullius) with others in the same intellectual pursuits
and to enjoy creative synergies. These academic scientists, however, are
unwilling to share the sameinformationwith commercial firms or third
parties, notably for lack of reciprocity. Thus, through the drafting of
UBMTA or the creation of a research consortium, they turn their
information into temporary res universitatis. Second, there are situations
where several firms hold IPRs on complementary pieces of knowledge.
As these pieces of knowledge cannot be used independentiy, they may
turn their IPRs in a res universitatis, and create a patent pool
Res communes \








Here, Ostrom's work on common property and collective rights
organizations concurs with the Roman law terminology. A Res
universitatis, or limited commons being more limited in membership than
the public at large, might generate a rather dense set of rules or social
norms. In the intellectual field, these rules and norms in turn can help to
limit both the risk of under-use for lack of knowledge sharing and the
problem of under-provision for lack of incentive.
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A small clarification of terminology must be made. Neither Roman law
nor Professor Rose makes a clear distinction between the nature of the
good and the form of the property regime. In this dissertation, I have
distinguished four categories of goods (private goods, club goods,
common pool resources and public goods) according to two distinctions:
rival/non-rival, excludable/non-excludable). One can also distinguish
different property regimes according to the identity of the owner: an
individual, a group, the government or the public at large. In the Eght of
the distinction between the nature of the good and the form of property
regime, it appears that the expression res comtnmes designates a type of
good and not a property regime; res communes are things incapable of
ownership (non exclusive-goods), either public goods or common pool
resources. By contrast, the four other expressions designate different
property regimes.
More broadly, the different authors I mention in my reconstruction of a
history of intellectual property law do not use a unified terminology to
designate different forms of property regimes. It might therefore be
useful to classify these expressions used and to gather those with similar
content.
It is also worth integrating in this classification the entidement theory
distinction between liability rules and property rules. In so doing, it is
important to keep in mind that there is a continuum starting from
property rules, passing by liability rules and ending with the public
domain. Professor Reichman argues that property rules and the public
domain are two extreme cases of liability rules. In the public domain
there are minimal restrictions on how the property may be employed and
the price users pay is zero or limited as to the cost of transferring the
property from the innovator to the user. At the other extreme, property
rules use restrictions so severe that the effective price users pay for the
propertywithout the consent of the innovators is infinite.^®^
Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis (2005) "Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local
Innovation in Developing Countries: a Law and Economics Primer", in Keith E.
Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman (eds.) Internationalpublic Goods and Transferof Technolog
Undera Globalised Intellectual Property Regime, Cambridge University Press
115
Expressions Type ofaccess andvaluation mechanism
Property rule -Access issubmitted tothepriorconsent ofthe right holder
-bilateral Valuation (by theparties)
Uability ruleor
PajingpuhHc domain
-Access is notsubmitted to theprior consent oftheright bolder







-Access is notsubmitted theprior consent oftheright holder
-Usually compensation is not required, however a
compensation can be required especially if contribution of the
members are not equal (liability rule)
- Collective valuation when a compensation is due
Vis-a-vis the outside world
-Access is submitted to theprior consent of the right holders




-Access is notsubmitted toprior consent






-Access is notsubmitted toprior consent
-No compensation is due
-Derived product including the accessed knowledge must be
accessible under the same conditions.
-Obligation to include a similar condition in subsequent
transfers
6.5 A New Issue: Favoring the Emergence of Collective
Rights Organizations
Collective rights organizations can enhance the welfare of their members
by reducing transaction costs. However, it does not mean that they will
automatically emerge each time they could be useful. Indeed, problems
of collective action may arise in the process of creating a collective rights
organization, as a public good is provided. Because of free riding
collective rights organizations could fail to emerge.
It is important to examine the literature on the emergence of such
coordination mechanisms based either on empirical^ '^' or historical
283 This expression is used by Anupan Chandler and Madhavi Sunder (2004), "The
Romance of the Public Domain" 92 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1331
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surveys,or on game theory analysis. From this literature, one can
observe a large convergence but a lack of precision in the identification
of the conditions in which individuals are likely to stop acting
independendy and start coordinadng. All the literature observes
congruence between private institutions and the existence of
"communities", but without much more precision. In an effort to
elaborate on this notion of community, Elinor Ostrom lists a series of
internal characteristics of a group facing a collective action problem
positively related with the likelihood of starting to coordinate their
action:
1) Most members share a common judgment that they will be harmed if
they do not adopt an alternative rule
2) Most members will be affected in similar ways by the proposed rule
change
3) Most members have a low discount rate. In others words, individuals
are more likely to start coordinating their actions if they highly value the
continuation of their common activity.
4) Members face relatively low information, transformation and
enforcement costs. In other words, members of a group are more likely
to coordinate if the costs for the group of considering a rule change, of
effectively changing the rules and of monitoring and sanctioning the
possible infringement of the rule are low.
5) Most members share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that
can be used as initial social capital.
6) The group is relatively small and stable-^®^ (repeated interaction)
See notably Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Conitmns (...) or Robert C. EUickson
(1991), Ordermithout 'Laiv(...),
See notably Avner Greif (1989), "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade:
Evidence on the Maghribi Traders", 49 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 857-882;
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass, C. North, and Barry R. Weingast, (1990), "The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs", 2 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 1-23; Bruce L. Benson (1989), "The
Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law", 55 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL,
644-661.
See notably Robert D. Cooter (1996), "Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:
The Strucmral Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant", UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW or Francesco Parisi (1999) "Spontaneous Emergence of
Law: Customary Law" in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.) Eng/clopedia
ofhaw & Economics, http:/ / encyclo.Findlaw.com/
287 Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons, (...) p. 211
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What can be observed in the examples examined here above? Regarding
the examination of successful patent pools, as is done by Robert Merges,
it seems to confirm Ostrom's internal characteristics for the study of
collective organizations created in the field of IPRs. Indeed, members of
successful patent pools seem to share most internal characteristics of a
group positively correlated with likelihood of stopping to act
independendy and starting to coordinate their action, setting up
institutions and modifying their initial entitiements. One must keep in
mind, however, that the mere existence of some successful patent pools
does not imply that economic actors owning complementary pieces of
knowledge will always succeed in integrating them. In addition,
successful patents pools would not have emerged without some form of
• • 288government mtervention.
For example, the American academic community working in biotech
possesses, at least partly, the internal characteristics identified by Ostrom
as positively related with the likelihood of overcoming the collective
action problem and adopting new rules to improve their joint welfare.
Moreover, more than 100 universities, including all the major research
universities, have signed the UBMTA as the governing document for the
materials that scientists receive from other institutions. The existence of
the UBMTA thus seems to confirm the positive correlation identified by
Ostrom. The fact that a similar agreement aimed at ruling material
transfers from for-profit to non-profit organizations remained as a draft
could be explained by the fact that in 1995 the biotech community at
large (including both academic scientist and firms) did not possess aU the
characteristics identified by Ostrom. However, as described above, the
presence of these characteristics does not imply the automatic formation
of a successful collective rights organization. In this case some form of
government intervention has also been useful, not so much for the
emergence of a collective rights organization but rather for enforcement.
Concerning the third case study, research centers that set up a
consortium constitute a group with all the internal characteristics
identified by Ostrom which point to increasing the likelihood of
coordination. The situation can be a littie more complicated when the
consortium includes both academic centers and private firms. In this
situation, members of the consortium often resort to two-tiered regimes
to preserve different social norms. In this example, once again some
Arti K. Rai (1999) "Regulating ScientificResearch...", p. 132 and Robert P. Merges
(1996) "Contracting into LiabilityRules..p. 1352
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form of governments support has facilitated the creation of these
research consortiums. Indeed, The European Union, one of the main
funders of these consortiums, provides them with template contracts
that can be seen as default rules, permits researchers to adapt their own
rules, and endorses the rules on which they have settled.
In sum, if Ostrom's theoretical insights appear applicable in the
intellectual property field and if in some circumstances actors seem able
to coordinate their actions, to modify their initial entitlements and to set
up collective rights organizations, it is far from clear that it wiU always be
the case and that no bargaining failure is to be feared. The economic
theory of intellectual property has made much progress by placing the
coordination of knowledge and IPRs exchanges at the center of its
research agenda and by integrating the lessons of the entitiement
literature and new institutional economics. However, intellectual
property theory still needs to suggest solutions for situations where
collective rights organizations would be efficient but do not emerge. In
other words, we must still strive to understand when and how
government (law) can facilitate the emergence of these collective rights
organizations.^ '^ One this issue, competition law has long been a
hindrance to the creation of CROs because of the fear of carteUzation.^'"
Recentiy, antitrust authorities have been more receptive to inter-firm
collaborations aimed at coordinating knowledge and IPRs exchanges (or
setting technical standards).^" It might not be enough to remove
obstacle to the creation of CROs, their creation might require positive
encouragement. Professor Reichman has suggested a possible
solution.. '^^ He explores whether the propensity to stop acting
independentiy and to coordinate in order to create a collective rights
In this sense see notably Arti K. Rai (1999) "Regulating Scientific Research...",
Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis (2005) "Using Liability Rules..." and Jerome H.
Reichman (2000), "Of Green Tulips..."
A limit of self-regulation consists in negative externalities: it is not because a self-
regulation is efficient for the members of particular social groups that they are efficient
for society as a whole. Regarding exchanges of IPRs, cartelization is the main cause of
possible negative externalities that is why antitrust authorities have long been very
cautious with patent pools and other CROs.
2" About the US antitrust policy see US Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission, Antitmst Guidelines for the Ucensing of Intellectual I'ropeiy-1995, 4 TRADE
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, 132 (Apr. 11, 1995). As to the European policy, see Valentine
Korah (2006), Intellectual Property BJghts and the EC Competition Rules, Oxford: Hart
Publishing
^'^Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis (2005) "Using Liability Rules..." andjerome H.
Reichman (2000), "Of Green Tulips..."
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organization would be higher if the initial entidement (the default rule)
was a liability rule rather than a property rule.
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Conclusion and Future Developments
Synthesis
This dissertation started with two observadons. First, the current
property regime of genetic resources and the ongoing debate on the
protection of traditional knowledge do not provide satisfying answers.
Second, these two issues —genetic resources and traditional knowledge —
both concern knowledge, its production, its conservation and its use. In
order to shed some light on these issues, I turned to the branch of law
that typically regulates the production and the use of knowledge:
intellectual property law. In this first part of the dissertation, I
reconstructed a history of the evolution of the intellectual property
regime —with a special emphasis on patent and biotechnology —trying to
identify factors of legal change, unanticipated problems and attempted
solutions. Similar factors of change, problems and solutions could be
present in both the current genetic resources regime and a potential
regime for traditional knowledge. However, international negotiators and
commentators often ignore these solutions.
To reconstruct a history of the intellectual property regime, I started with
the presentation of the notion of knowledge and its public good
dimension. As knowledge is a non-exclusive good, there is a need for a
legal mechanism that enables knowledge producers to restrict access to
the knowledge produced in order to appropriate the benefits of their
investment. Knowledge, however, is a non-rival good which suggests
that it should be freely available to ensure its efficient use (Chapter One).
These contradictory implications of knowledge characteristics create the
knowledge dilemma that was often resolved by a two-part balance. First,
R&D, the activity of knowledge production, is undertaken by two modes
of production. Basic research is mainly government-funded and its
results are open-access; applied research is mainly funded through
revenues from IPRs and is carried out by the private sector. Second,
within private sector research, the right level of protection must be
identified. Therefore, the thresholds for protection can be seen as a
means to ensure that access to knowledge is not unduly restricted while
knowledge producers have sufficient incentives (Chapter Two).
After having presented this point of departure, I identified some changes
in the law of intellectual property that modified the two-part balance. To
explain the evolution of IP law, I examined two engines of change. First,
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technological change or change in the innovation process can modify the
costs and benefits of creating or enforcing intellectual property rights
and can lead to developments in patent offices, the Courts, and even
statutory law. Second, change in a country's innovation policy can also
lead to modifications of inteUectual property law (Chapter Three).
I further explained that these changes have led to unanticipated
problems. First, the proliferation of IPRs and the resulting need to
license a large numbers of patents in order to develop a new product or
even to conduct research. This can hinder innovation as trading IPRS
implies high transaction costs. Second, the patenting of public research
runs counter to a series of social norms that rule exchanges of
knowledge and research material in academia and are vital for the
advancement of science (Chapter Four).
From a theoretical point of view, these unanticipated problems require
intellectual property scholars to take into consideration IPRs exchanges
and transaction costs. This has led some scholars to integrate existing
theories, such as the notions of property rules and liability rules
identified by Calabresi and Melamed and the role of institutions in the
reduction of transactions costs analyzed by new institutional economists,
into IP scholarship. From a practicalpoint of view, I then analyzed some
solutions developed by the government and economic agents.
One possible solution to overcome the limits of the market in
coordinating exchanges of IPRs is to resort to government intervention
to reduce transaction costs. This consists of replacing exclusive rights by
liability rules —statutory or compulsory licenses. Liabilityrules have three
main characteristics: 1) the absence of necessary permission from the
holder, (2) a principle of expost compensation, and (3) a mechanism of
collective valuation which suppresses the need to obtain the consent of
the rights holder in order to access the protected knowledge, and the
existence of a collective valuation mechanism that replaces bilateral
negotiations. In terms of transaction costs, the advantage of a liability
rule lies in the possible reduction of bargaining costs (Chapter Five).
A second and possibly more efficient solution lies in the capacity of
economic agents to self-regulate and resort to coordination mechanisms
that are more complex than the market. Economic agents can overcome
the limits of the market by resorting to property rights and contracts to
set up institutional arrangements. This is done in so as to reduce
transaction costs or formalize social norms (in order to better enforce
them and avoid internal and external defections). An additional
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characterisdc of these institudonal arrangements is that they create some
form of intermediary property regimes (common property) in addition to
the two classical extremes: individual property and open-access.
Future Developments
Self-regulation and collective rights organizations do not automatically
emerge each time they could potentially be useful. Therefore, one
important theme on the agenda for future intellectual property research
may be to better understand when and how government (law) could
facilitate the emergence of these collective rights organizations.
Using this first part as an analytical framework, next I will analyze a
genetic resource property regime that regulates the control and exchange
of genetic resources. I will write a parallel history of the evolution of this
regime, identify a similar departure, parallel legal changes, comparable
unanticipated problems and related attempts at solutions.
Later, I wiU also use those themes to analyze the ongoing discussion
about a possible protective regime for traditional knowledge.
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Part Two:
The Property Regime of Genetic Resources
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Introduction
The objective of Part Two of this dissertation is to provide a better
understanding of the genetic resources property regime and how it
evolved. In order to reconstruct the history of this regime, I employ the
same theories I introduced in Part One.
In the first chapter, I introduce the notions of biodiversity and genetic
resources. Genetic resources can be seen as knowledge goods; they enter
into a chain of innovation as a part of biodiversity and end up
reconfigured as a new drug or crop. As knowledge goods, genetic
resources face the public goods problem. However, the public goods
problem is slightiy different depending on the applicable stage of the
innovation chain. On the upstream end of the innovation chain,
knowledge (biodiversity) exists but has to be conserved; whereas on the
downstream side, new knowledge must be produced by research and
development (R&D) efforts.
In the second chapter, I describe the progressive emergence of a first
equilibrium. The first element of this equilibrium consists of creating a
specific intellectual property right - plant breeders' right. Plant breeder's
rights enable the development of a private R&D effort in plant breeding.
They also protect innovations (plant varieties) but the genetic resources
they contain are left in open-access. The second element is the public
funding of genetic resource conservation complemented by some
agricultaral R&D for developing countries. The last element lies in the
legal notions of the Common Heritage of Mankind and the International
Undertaking on Phytogenetic Resources. These provide an inclusive
regime for genetic resources considered to be the basic material of
agricultural R&D, and must therefore be left in the public domain.
In the third chapter, I analyze how this equilibrium will be contested by a
two-part change. First, downstream of the innovation chain, the
development of modern biotechnologies will modify the costs and
benefits of creating IPRs on genetic resources. The possibility of
patenting the fruits of modern biotechnology is reconsidered. Once the
patenting of living organism is admitted, the coexistence of two systems
of protections —patent and plant breeders' right- causes some difficulty,
which has led to a revision of the UPOV '^^ Convention. Finally, the
253 UPOV is the French acronym for Union pour la Protection des Obtentions
Vegetales, i.e. Union for the protection of plant breeders' rights.
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TRIPS Agreement will extend to all WTO members the choice of
patenting livingorganisms.
Second, on the upstream side of the innovation chain, traditional farmers
and biodiverse countries will claim control over their genetic resources
and require compensation for access. These legal changes, both
downstream and upstream of the innovation chain, put an end to open-
access and provide an atmosphere for the Convention on Biological
Diversity ("CBD") that relies on exclusive rights to regulate genetic
resources.
In the fourth chapter, I present the CBD and assess its first years of
implementation. After presenting the text of the CBD and its main
provisions on access to genetic resources and benefit sharing, I observe
the process of national implementation of the Convention, using the
case of the Philippines as an illustration. Then, I assess, provisionally,
the CBD and national legislation on access to genetic resources ad
benefit sharing (ABS), looking first at the situation in Philippines and
then drawing generalobservations in terms of transaction costs. Finally, I
mention a few adopted or considered changes that aim at improving the
CBD regime without modifying its logic.
Negotiators of the CBD and drafters of national ABS legislation
primarily have the pharmaceutical R&D community in mind when they
frame access to genetic resources and benefit sharing. In the fifth
chapter, I analyze the reaction of the agricultural R&D community. This
community does not consider the CBD regime to correspond with its
activities. Therefore, the community has created its own regime that
works within the legal framework set up by the CBD, while completely
modifying its logic.
I then examine the extent to which the solutions observed in Part One
have been used to overcome transaction costs and take into account the
norms of open-access and reciprocity in this community. First, I examine
how the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources includes
devices that can be analyzed in terms of liability rules and collective
rights organizations attempting to reduce transaction costs and maintain
social norms. Second, I observe how the international treaty creates
intermediary forms of property between the two extremes, exclusive
rights, and public domain. Finally, I use Elinor Ostrom's work to
examine the process of emergence of the Treaty (institutional change) as
well as the likely resilience of the regime it creates (design principles).
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1. Biodiversity as Knowledge: a Double Public
Goods Issue
1.1 The Notion ofBiodiversity
According to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the
expression "Biological diversity" or "Biodiversity" designates the
variability among living organisms from aU sources including, inter alia,
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity, within species.
between species and of ecosystems.^^" Biologists regard biodiversity as
the natural stock of genetic material within an ecosystem. The number of
genes in different organisms varies from about 1000 in bacteria, 10,000
in fungi, up to 100,000 for a mammal and 400,000 for flowering plants.
Genes are important because they determine the specific capabilities of a
particular organism; they contain the information which determines the
particular characteristics of that organism. The greater the variety in the
gene pool, the greater the variety of organisms which exist or which will
exist in the future.^'^
The evolution of biodiversity is usually observed at the species level. It is
estimated that there are between 5 and 30 million species, and the
number of species currendy described is between 1.7 and 2 million. '^^
The evolution of biodiversity is evaluated as a result of the speciation
(i.e. the creation of new species) and the extinction of species. The
diversity of species and the creation of new species result from the
process of radiation, i.e. the process by which a species adapt to a
particular environment^ '^ and their consequent expansion into
unoccupied niches. Extinction is also a natural process, and fossil
records indicate that the natural longevity of any species ranges from 1
to 10 millions years. Current biodiversity is the result of around 4.5
2''* Article 2, the text of the Convention on Biological Diversity is available at
http: / /www.biodiv.org/convention /articles.asp. (emphasis is mine)
Timothy M. Swanson (1997), GlobalActionfor Biodiversity. An International Framework
for Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity, Earthscan, London, p. 7, hereafter
Timothy M. Swanson (1997), GlobalActionfor Biodiversity...
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) Ecogstemsand Human Well-being: Biodiversity
Synthesis. Washington: World Resources Institute
There is speciation (creation of a new species) when mutant cannot anymore
hybridize with old form of the species.
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billions years of biological history. During most of this biologicalhistory,
the rates of speciation and exdnction have been approximately equal.
The threat to biodiversitj^ arises when the rate of extincdon of species
exceeds the rate of speciation. In the biological history, there have been
at least five periods of mass extincdon during which over fifty percent of
the animal species became extinct. '^® These periods of mass extinction
were caused by exogenous shocks to the earth such as extreme volcanic
activity or collisions with meteors. But even taking into account those
periods of "mass extinction", the rate of extinction was very low,
averaging nine percent per million years, and as such, biodiversity has an
extremely slow period of renewal. Before commenting on how the
development of human societies has induced an important depletion of
biodiversity, it is important to understand that biodiversity is a non-
renewable resource. Even if individual biological organisms are
renewable resources, the diversity of biological resources is a one-time
endowment of the evolutionary process.
1.2 Human Development and BiodiversityErosion
The previous section briefly explained the concept of biodiversity. This
next section wiU briefly describe the important benefits that biodiversity
renders to human societies. First, it must be pointed out that the
depletion of biodiversity has generated important benefits for human
society.
Indeed, one of the fundamental paths for human development has been
the conversion of naturally existing forms to other forms that are more
highly valued by humans. Over the past ten thousand years, human
societies have reallocated base resources towards a very small selection
of species. These are the domesticated and cultivated varieties that have
been developed for use in agriculture. Thus, through this conversion
process, human societies and their associated species have expanded
while reducing the resources available to other species.^" Therefore, the
human development process has been closely related with diversity
decline over the past ten thousand years.
™ D. Raup (1988) "Diversity Crises in the Geological Past", in E.O. Wilson (ed.)
Biodiversi^, National Academy Press, Washington D.C.
Timothy M. Swanson (1997), GlobalActionfor Biodiversiiy..., p. 11. See also Robert
Solow (1974), "The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics", 64
American Economic Review, 1-12
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Table 1: Increasing Pressures on the Land
Location Area of arable land & permanent crops in 1000 ha Percent
1961 1996 change
Africa 155 272 197 972 27.5





102 265 161 961 58.4
Oceania 34 789 54 869 57.7
North
America
225 709 22 500 -1.4
Europe* 151 365 135 392 -10.6
USSR
(former)
239 800 226 158 -5.7
World
(developing)
675 567 853 183 26.3
World
(developed)
669 894 658 147 -1.8
World (total) 1 345 461 1 511 330 12.3
*not taking into account the relevant part of the former USRR
Source: FAO^O"
A similar process within agriculture moreover completes this conversion
process where a problem of genetic erosion in agricultural species and
varieties is also observed. Differences and variations within traditional
agricultural practices are being replaced worldwide by uniform modern
intensive agricultural practices. Thus, not only have human societies and
their associated species developed at the expense of other species, but
also agriculture increasingly relies on a diminishing number of species
and varieties. So, while thousands of plant species are edible and
convenient for human consumption, the majority of the woirld food is
provided by about twenty plant species, and among them the four
biggest crops (wheat, rice, maize and potato) take the lion's share. The
same is true for animal species where a handful of species (sheep, cattie,
goats, pigs) provide most of the terrestrial source-protein. A similar
phenomenon occurs within species where one can observe a
specialization on a few high-yield varieties.^"'
300 FAO (199^), AgriculturalUtnd Use, Rome, FAO
301 Timothy M. Swanson (1997), GlobalActionforhiodiversi^..., p. 52
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Table 2: The Extent of Genetic Uniformity in Selected Crops
Crop Country Number of variedes
Rice Sri Lanka From 2,000 varieties in 1959 to less
than 100 today, 75% descend from a
common stock
Rice Bangladesh 62% varieties descend from a
common stock
Rice Indonesia 74% varieties descend from a
common stock
Wheat USA 50% of crop in 9 varieties
Potato USA 75% of crop in 4 varieties
Soybeans USA 50% of crop in 6 varieties
Source: World Conservation Monitoring Center 1992^°^
Why is there such a specialization? The answer lies in species-specific
learning. To put it simply, progress in agriculture comes from three main
factors; tools, chemicals and species-specific learning. With an increasing
understanding of the biological nature of a species and of the possibility
of influencing it, it is possible to increase the production. Broadly
speaking, when over time a group of cultivators have developed
knowledge on one species, it is easier for other groups to adopt that
species taking advantage of the already existing knowledge rather than
constructing equivalent knowledge for other species. Because of the
cumulative and non-rival nature of knowledge, and as exchanges
between different human societies increase, food production is
increasingly concentrated on a few species.^"^
In the previous paragraphs, the conversion and specialization processes
have been briefly described as well as their link with human
development. This link has resulted in a remarkable asymmetry among
countries. Indeed, the most developed countries are those that have
converted most of their lands and as a consequence they have lost an
important part of their biodiversity. Conversely, the biodiversity rich
countries are those that have not yet converted their land, and almost
without exception they figure among the poorest states.^""* Quite logically
and legitimately, those unconverted countries that host most of the
remaining biodiversity aspire to a higher levelof economic development.
So far human development has been associated with a conversion
World Conservation Monitoring Center (1992), Global Biodiversity: StatusoftheEarth's
living resources, Chapman and Hall, London
^"3 Timothy M. Swanson (1997), GlobalActionfor Biodiversity..., p. 53-54
3"'' Ibidem, p. 54
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strategy. If all the unconverted developing countries adopt such a
conversion strategy, there would logically be a dramatic depletion in
biodiversity. Therefore, we must think about the possibility of
dissociating development and conversion, or we must invent alternate
means for biodiversity conservation. Before addressing those issues, it is
time to explain why biodiversity is useful and worth conserving.
1.3 Biodiversity as Useful Information
One important benefit provided by biodiversity, and the one of most
interest in this dissertation, lies in its role as input into the research and
development process (R&D) in industries concerned with the regulation
of biosphere (e.g. pharmaceutical and agricultural industries). These
"bio-industries" can be conceived of as defense systems or dynamic
contests between human societies and nature. These industries consist
of relentless efforts to struggle against the erosion of human erected
defense against a hostile biological world.^"^ In agriculture, there is a
perpetual renewal of the defense system that guards, our food crops
against constantiy evolving pests and predators. Similarly, in medicine,
there are efforts to defend human beings against direct aggressions. In
both sectors, our defense efforts are perpetually eroding and must be
constantiy renewed.For instance, in the agricultural sector, the
development of a new variety usually takes about 10 years while the
developed resistance characteristic is often viable only for 4 or 5 five
years. Therefore, a continual breeding effort for new resistance is
essential.'"^ The same is true for the pharmaceutical industry and new
medicines.
Biodiversity is an essential ingredient in the defense of the human
domain because it contains relevant information. The same forces that
are operating against the human domain are also at work against other
living organisms. Any life form that survives has developed resistances
that are successful in a hostile environment. It is for the retention of
these existing resistance strategies of resistance that human societies
need biodiversity. In certain cases, biodiversity provides a sort of
alternative to the R&D process. For instance, in the use of medicinal
Timothy M. Swanson (1996), "The Reliance of Northern Economies on Southern
Biodiversity: Biodiversity as Information", 17 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, p. 2 hereafter
Timothy M. Swanson (1996), "The Reliance of Northern Economies..."
Ibidem,-p. \?>
3"''Timothy M. Swanson & R.A. Luxmore (\99T), IndustrialReliance on biodiversity. World
Conservation Press, (WCMC) Cambridge, UK, 98 p
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plants, biodiversity provides a solution to a problem. More often, the
information provided by biodiversity is a raw informational input into
the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries.^"® Thus, the primary value
of biodiversity lies in its informational content and its utility in the R&D
process of those industries.'"'
Technically, this information can be used in two ways. In the first case,
the industry takes notes of the phenotype (i.e. the visible expression of
the genes) and makes use of that information to develop new products.
This strategy is used by pharmaceutical industries. They screen diverse
plants and other life forms in order to detect the presence of chemicals
with biological activity. If some information is identified as useful, the
pharmaceutical industry wiU usually make a chemical synthesis of that
information. With such a strategy, there is no translocation of the
biological material, rather pharmaceutical industry transports the
interesting information (successful strategies of resistance) through the
chemical replication of the strategy, possibly across vast biological
distances (e.g. from a plant to human beings). In the second case,
industry observes the genotype (i.e. the nature of the genes possessed by
the individual whether they are expressed or not), identifies interesting
traits and attempts to transport it to a closely related organism through
breeding. Traditionally, this has been the quasi-exclusive strategy pursued
by agricultural industries. With such a strategy the interesting
information is transported between near relatives using actual genetic
material. Recendy, the important progress within biotechnology has
diminished the technical constraints on the transferabiEty of biodiversity
information, which should increase the usefulness and thus the value of
that information.^'"
To what extent do bio-industries rely upon biodiversity? In a stady about
the agricultural industry, it appears that the sources of useful biological
information range from the already exploited cultivars to completely wild
species. Each year, around six and a half percent of the successful
genetic research resulting in a marketed innovation comes from
germplasm of unknown species, while eighty-two percent comes from
already exploited cultivar. This indicates that everyyear, the R&D system
requires an injection of seven percent new (existing in the nature but
unknown hitherto) genetic material. In other words, the stock of
308 Timothy M. Swansonand Timo Goeshl (2000), "Property Rights Issues Involving
Plant Genetic Resources: Implications of Ownership for Economic Efficiency", 32
EcoLOGicAi. Economics 75-92
Timothy M. Swanson (1996), "The Relianceof Northern Economies p. 3
3'° Ibidem, p. 4
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plants, biodiversity provides a solution to a problem. More often, the
information provided by biodiversity is a raw informational input into
the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries.^"® Thus, the primary value
of biodiversity lies in its informational content and its utility in the R&D
process of those industries.'"'
Technically, this information can be used in two ways. In the first case,
the industry takes notes of the phenotype (i.e. the visible expression of
the genes) and makes use of that information to develop new products.
This strategy is used by pharmaceutical industries. They screen diverse
plants and other life forms in order to detect the presence of chemicals
with biological activity. If some information is identified as useful, the
pharmaceutical industry wiU usually make a chemical synthesis of that
information. With such a strategy, there is no translocation of the
biological material, rather pharmaceutical industry transports the
interesting information (successful strategies of resistance) through the
chemical replication of the strategy, possibly across vast biological
distances (e.g. from a plant to human beings). In the second case,
industry observes the genotype (i.e. the nature of the genes possessed by
the individual whether they are expressed or not), identifies interesting
traits and attempts to transport it to a closely related organism through
breeding. Traditionally, this has been the quasi-exclusive strategy pursued
by agricultural industries. With such a strategy the interesting
information is transported between near relatives using actual genetic
material. Recendy, the important progress within biotechnology has
diminished the technical constraints on the transferabiEty of biodiversity
information, which should increase the usefulness and thus the value of
that information.^'"
To what extent do bio-industries rely upon biodiversity? In a stady about
the agricultural industry, it appears that the sources of useful biological
information range from the already exploited cultivars to completely wild
species. Each year, around six and a half percent of the successful
genetic research resulting in a marketed innovation comes from
germplasm of unknown species, while eighty-two percent comes from
already exploited cultivar. This indicates that everyyear, the R&D system
requires an injection of seven percent new (existing in the nature but
unknown hitherto) genetic material. In other words, the stock of
308 Timothy M. Swansonand Timo Goeshl (2000), "Property Rights Issues Involving
Plant Genetic Resources: Implications of Ownership for Economic Efficiency", 32
EcoLOGicAi. Economics 75-92
Timothy M. Swanson (1996), "The Relianceof Northern Economies p. 3
3'° Ibidem, p. 4
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population went back into deep poverty. '^^ Obviously, today, farmers
have technological answers to the attacks of nature. However, even in
the age of pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers, pathogens may sdU be
able to exploit the specific weaknesses inherited from common parent
lines. For example, in 1970 the "corn bUght" decimated the corn yield in
the United States. Although the pest was only dangerous for a few forms
of maize, the maize yields were cut by fifteen percent because ninety
percent of corn crop cultivated in the U.S shared genetic material from
the same parent line.^""
In sum, biodiversity provides many different values to human society
that could justify conservation efforts. In this dissertation, I focus on
information value and insurance value but there are other values for
biodiversity. '^^ Nevertheless, information and insurance values provide
sufficient arguments for biodiversity conservation. Other types of value
can only strengthen the need to conserve biodiversity.
1.4A Chain ofInnovation and Public Good Issues
We have to cope with a chain of innovation for knowledge goods,
originating in ecosystems and ending with a final product that is either a
new plant variety or a medicine. Often, the chain of innovation is not
continuous and linear, but when one has a final product such as a new
plant variety or a medicine (downstream), one can always find some
biological resources at the upstream end. As the innovation chain
concerns knowledge production, it faces the public goods problem.
Actually, if the innovation chain is not vertically integrated and different
agents operate different stages of the chain, there might be more than
one public goods problem. In this case, the public goods problem might
be present at each stage of production.
At first, the innovation chain can be divided in two main stages, which
can be later subdivided in different stages. In the first stage, we must
conserve existing biodiversity; in the second stage, we need to carry out
continuing R&D efforts to create new medicines and new crops.
David S. Tilford (1998), "Saving the Blueprints : The International Legal Regime for
Plant Resources", 30 CASE WESTERN RESERVEJOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW 373
Jack R. Kloppenburg jr. and Daniel Lee Kleiman (1988), "Plant Genetic Resources:
The Common Bowl", in Jack R. Kloppenburg Jr. (ed.) Seeds and Sovereign^, the Use and
ControlofFlant Genetic Resoams, at 6
OECD (2002), Handbook of Biodiversity Valuation: A Guide for 'Policy Makers, Paris:
OECD
134
Regarding the first issue, I mentioned that biodiversity provides useful
information or knowledge, or in other words, a public good. In this case,
the stake is not so much to create new knowledge but rather to conserve
an existing and continuously evolving stock of knowledge. However, it
does not make a great difference because this stock of knowledge is
threatened by erosion and conserving this existing knowledge is just as
costiy as providing a new one. '^® Concerning the second issue, it is a
classical question of R&D efforts, as was described in the first part of
this dissertation.
In both stages, we face the problem of public goods and the knowledge
dilemma. Knowledge conservation and production generate a profit that
cannot be totally appropriated by the conservator and the inventor,
because knowledge is a non-excludable good. A part of the profits are
externalized, i.e. captured by others. In the presence of such externalities,
the conservator and the inventor anticipate that they will receive less
than the social benefit of their effort. In addition, knowledge is not only
non-excludable but it is also non-rival and cumulative; the positive
externalities of knowledge conservation and production and
consequendy the difference between the social benefit and the private
benefit increase even more. Therefore, it is a typical lack of incentive
situation that leads to an insufficient level of private investment. As
outlined in the first part of this dissertation, different types of
interventions attempt to provide efficient conservation and production
of knowledge, but they are confronted by the knowledge dilemma, i.e.
only the anticipation of a profit wiU lead economic agents to invest in the
conservation or production of knowledge, but only marginal cost, or no
profit, can assure the efficient use of knowledge.
The first possibility is to remedy the public good problem by increasing
the degree of appropriability of the return on knowledge conservation or
production. If some form of exclusive rights were granted for the
conserved or newly produced knowledge, it would enable the
conservator or producer to fix a price for its use. In this system, the gain
in dynamic efficiency, as result of the greater conservation and
innovation activity, is intended to balance out the losses from static
inefficiency, i.e. the underutilization of knowledge. The second
possibility is the substitution of a public initiative for a private initiative:
society is responsible for covering costs of knowledge conservation and
production. In this case, the knowledge conservator or producer has no
exclusive right, the knowledge conserved or produced belongs to the
Remember the opportunity cost of not converting lands for conservation purpose.
135
whole society and a general practice of quick communication and
knowledge sharing is expected. '
The second part of the dissertation is dedicated to the analysis of how
the international community, over the past several decades, has resorted
to both possibilities in order to maintain the different stages of the
innovation chain. It must be remembered that there are not one, but
several public goods provision issues: biodiversity conservation and
pharmaceutical and agricultural innovation. Moreover, these issues are
more complicated because of their international dimension. Both
activities are likely to lead benefits for the entire human community, but
they will take placein some countries. There is not one State (Leviathan)
and one private agent but a community of states and privateagents. It is
particularly true for biodiversity conservation. As most of the remaining
biodiversity is located in a limited number of developingcountries, most
of the conservation effort (e.g. not converting land) must be carried out
within their territory. For instance, when one of these biodiversity-rich
countries makes a land -use decision dedicating some land to biodiversity
conservation or converting it to a more productive use, it should take
into consideration the value of biodiversity conservation not only for its
citizens but also for the human community. We are thus confronted
with an international public goods provision issue, where individual
states tend to act as private agents in a market and where the community
of states must organize to play the role of public authorities.
The next chapter will describe a first equilibrium that resorts to both
IPRs and public funding in order to ensure biodiversity conservation and
pharmaceutical and agricultural innovation.
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2. A First Equilibrium with Three Branches
The issues of conservation and innovation, both considered to be public
goods, appear first in the agricultural sector. This explains the
predominating role of agronomists and breeders in the design of an
initial equilibrium. This equilibrium mixes private and public funding,
and combines private property rights, elements of open access and to
some extent a common property regime. In the evolution of this
property regime, one can identify an initial equilibrium comprised of
three branches. The first branch lies in private research activity,
encouraged by a sui generis intellectual property right. The latter's
characteristic consists of protecting new varieties but leaves genetic
resources in an open access regime through a breeders' exemption.
Moreover, it tolerates farmers re-sowing through farmers' privilege. The
second branch lies in the creation and financing of an international
network of R&D centers and gene banks that carry out some agricultural
innovation and a conservation policy, and place innovation and
conservation efforts in open access. This is a case of public provision of
public goods. Finally, the third branch lies in the affirmation of a general
principle according to which genetic resources are the common heritage
of mankind. Under this principle, states must allow access to genetic
resources present in their territories. Moreover, the notion of common
heritage provides an inclusive regime for genetic resources considered to
be the basic materials of agricultural research, which must therefore be
placed in the public domain for the use of all mankind.
2.1 Exclusive Rights to Innovation and Genetic
Resources in Open Access
The first branch of this equilibrium lies in the progressive development
of private research activities, encouraged by a sui generis intellectual
property right. The latter's characteristic consists of protecting new
varieties but leaving genetic resources in open access through a breeders'
exemption. Moreover, it tolerates farmers re-sowing through a farmers'
privilege.
In the late eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, one observes
a growing change in the breeding innovation process that modifies the
costs and benefits of creating property rights to foster breeding activity.
The development of genetics increases the potential benefits of R&D in
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breeding techniques and calls for its autonomy from farming activities.
In turn, the development of an independent breeding sector requires
some legal intervention both in terms of incentives and regulation.
Following this, intellectual obstacles and administrative costs must be
overcome. It takes time to identify the precise needs of the breeding
sector, to agree on the best-fit solutions and to build the administrative
capacity to deal with it.
2.1.1 Technological Context: Plant Breeding Becomes an
Independent Economic Sector
The need for a legal framework for agricultural research and
development, and more precisely plant R&D, is the result of several
technical and social changes: plant improvement or plant breeding has
become a scientific activity, derivingits autonomy from farming activities
and increasingly carried out by the private sector.
Littie is known about how farmers have domesticated and improved wild
species for thousands of years. Domestication of plants is an artificial
selection process^" conducted by humans to produce plants that have
fewer undesirable traits than wild plants, and which renders them
dependent on artificial (usually enhanced) environments for their
continued existence. The practice is estimated to date back 9,000-11,000
years. Many crops in present day cultivation are the result of
domestication in ancient times. Today, all of our principal food crops
come from domesticated varieties.^^"
It is not before the end of the seventeenth century that scientists and
landlords were spurred by a real wiU of methodical crop improvement.
During the eighteenth century, experiments were carried out on an
empirical basis without real scientific understanding. A few attempts of
hybridization were made which gave birth to new varieties, but only for
species with asexual reproduction (Cf. infra), such as ornamental plants,
tuberous plants and fruit trees. Asexual reproduction is a biological
process by which an organism creates a genetically similar copy of itself
There is debate within the scientific commmi^ over how the process ofdomestication works. Some
researchers give credit to natural selection, wherein mutations outside of human control make some
members ofa species more compatible tohuman cultivation or companionship. Others have shown that
carefully controlled selective breeding is responsible for many ofthe collective changes associated mth
domestication. These categories are not mutually exclusive andit is likely that natural selection and




without the combination of genetic material from another individual. As
for plants, this process is called vegetative reproduction and can take
many forms. Some plants, like helms, send up new shoots from their
roots, while other species, like potatoes, regenerate from root tubers.
Plants with vegetative reproduction can occasionally be sexually
reproduced. Thus breeders can succeed in creating new varieties by
hybridization and then reproduce genetically similar copies through
normal vegetative reproduction. For example, in 1719 Thomas Fairchild
created the first artificial hybrid of a carnation and a sweet william, and
in 1727, the French Vilmorin Company established a method of
breeding sugar beets.
As for sexually reproduced plants {Cf. infra), most notably the plants
reproduced by grains (angiosperm) such as cereals, it took an extra
century to gain some empirical understanding of how parent
characteristics are transmitted to their progeny. Sexual reproduction is
the second main category of reproductive systems. It involves the
organism producing special cells that only contain half the normal
number of chromosomes. Thus, these cells contain only half of the
genetic material; they are called haploid gametes. The two haploid
gametes needed to create a new organism can come from the same
organism (self-fertilization) or from different organisms (cross
fertilization or out crossing). The majority of angiosperm (e.g. cereals)
shows facultative cross-fertilization. They tend to outbreed most of the
time, but in some circumstances, they may resort to self-fertilization. So,
new varieties can be created by hybridization and then multiplied by man
through self-fertilization.
On the theoretical field, In 1866 Mendel published "^Experiments in Plant
Hybridi^iation", invented the notion of gene as unit factor that transmits
the hereditary characters, and formulated the laws of inheritance. It was
not until the early twentieth century that plant breeders integrated
Mendel's findings on the non-random namre of inheritance and the
possibility of predicting the frequencies of different types as a result of
deliberate crossing.^ '^ The rediscovery of Mendel's findings was followed
by a series of findings that fostered plant breeding. In 1908, George
Harrison ShuU described heterosis, also known as hybrid vigor, i.e. the
tendency of the progeny of a specific cross to outperform both parents.
By the 1920s, statistical methods were developed to analyze gene action
32' Initially, Mendel's experiments did not gain much attention. They were rediscovered
around 1900 by Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns and Erich von Tschermak working on
similar problem. They were then popularized by William Bateson who first coined the
word "genetics" and founded the Journal of Genetics in 1910.
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and distinguish heritable variation from variation caused by the
environment.
In practice, plants are crossed to introduce genes from one species into
another genetic background. As an illustration, a variety of corn resistant
to a specific pest may be crossed with a high-yielding but non-resistant
corn variety. The objective is to introduce the resistance withoutloosing
the high-yield characteristics. Progeny may thenbe backcrossed with the
high-yielding parent to ensure that the progeny are most like the high-
yielding parent. Then, field tests are made to ensure that both yield and
reastance characteristics are present.Beyond yield and resistance traits
plant breeders also try to introduce characteristics such as tolerance to
environmental pressures (drought, extreme temperature, salinity), to
pests and herbicides.
In total, during the first decades of the twentieth century, breeders have
had at their disposal the tools to create technical and scientific breeding
activity that become one of the leading factors in a continual increase in
agricultural yields. While during the nineteenth century breeding was stiU
a non-profit activity limited to a few enthusiasts and carried out on the
fringes of their production activity, breeding left the domain of
agriculture and progressively become its own independent economic
sector.
2.1.2 The Long Way towards Plant Variety Protection
The emergence of this new economic sector demands legal supervision.
There are two distinct dimensions in the need for legal supervision but in
a first stage they are confused.^^^ The first aspect concerns the protection
of farmers, i.e. seeds users. Farmers no longer produce their own seeds.
Because Farmers can only assess the quality of seeds after a harvest, they
need information on the quality of seeds before they purchase them and
protection against dishonest sellers. The second aspect concerns ex ante
incentives for innovations in plant breeding. There are at least three
reasons why plant breeders need a device to obtain a return on their
investment; (1) the breeding activity has become an autonomous
economical sector, (2) the creation of new varieties is a long and costiy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plant_breeding
Marie-Ang^eHermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources genetiques
exclusivismes et echanges au fil du temps" in Marie Angele Hermitte et Philippe Khan
(eds.) ressources genetiques vegetales et k droit dans les rapports Nord-Sud, Bruxelles,
Bruylant, p. 21 hereafter Marie-Angele Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des
ressources genetiques..
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process,and (3) new plant varieties can readilybe copied by free riders
(farmers or rival breeders). Because of confusion between these two
aspects, the first protection breeders will obtain resembles a trademark.
Then, after long discussions on the possibility or the interest of patent
protection, farmers obtain a sui generis right that shares some features
with copyright.
2.1.2.1 Product License Approach
The first government intervention in seed trade concerns users'
protection and resembles a product license. In France, agricultural
stations were set up as early as 1884 to check the quality of seeds, their
homogeneity and their correspondence to their denomination. This first
step was enhanced in 1905 by a law on the repression of fraud in seeds
trade. After the First World War, an influx of new varieties was proposed
to farmers. Most of them disappeared quickly and only the most
successful ones survived. Moreover, there was some confusion with the
name of the varieties, as there were some single varieties being caUed
several different names. To bring some order in this market, two decrees
were issued in 1922 and 1925 announcing the creation of a nomenclature
of varieties and a monitoring authority. Decades later, variety catalogues
were created. In Germany, the evolution was similar. A system of seeds
control was created in 1895 by the farmers union. In 1905 a registry of
varieties^^^ and an official system of seeds monitoring was set up. These
measures contributed to instituting some order in the seed trade and
gave some protection to users. These measures did not, however, answer
the question of breeder's remuneration.
These measures were not useless for breeder's protection because they
brought new notions that were useful for subsequent intellectual
property protection. Indeed, the creation of catalogues of varieties led to
a clearer legal definition of what constitutes a seed variety. In order to be
legally considered a variety, a variety must be distinct and homogenous
(uniform). Similarly, to remain in the catalogue, a variety must remain
stable over generations; the contrary would be cumbersome for farmers
and would hinder breeders' work. As observed by the French Professor
M.A. Hermitte, the technical issue —homogenous and stable varieties are
more efficient than heterogeneous farmers' varieties —concurs with the
economic and legal logic according to which it is easier to sell and then
From 8 to 10 years for annual species and 15 and more for perennial species
325 Actually, this system also confers to breeders the right to control the two first
generations obtained by multiplication. However this right had little effect as when a
new variety is created a large number of multiplications is required to create enough
seeds for sale.
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define property rights on well defined objects. Thus, the mechanisms of
seed trade controls constitute the conceptual beginning of intellectual
property protection for breeders, identifying the object of protection - a
variety - and the conditions for protection - distinctness, homogeneity
(uniformity), and stabUity.^^*^ Before obtaining such protection, attempts
were first made to resort to trademark law.
2.1.2.2 Trademark Law Approach
As I have just mentioned, the preliminary efforts to distinguish,
catalogue, and denominate new varieties come from the observation that
the source of the problem is the inability of growers to distinguish one
plant breeder's seeds from those of competitors. It is therefore tempting
to consider breeders' protection through trademark law. Indeed
trademark law provides incentives for product differentiation.
Trademark law differs from patent and copyright, as it does not confer
exclusive rights on an invention or a work. Rather, it confers an exclusive
right on the use of a brand name or symbol associated with a product
and/or service. Trademarks are used to inform the consumer as to the
quality of goods and/or services. The value of a trademark comes from
its reputation for quality and depends on the firm's investments in
product quality and advertising. Once the reputation is created, the firms
can expected a double benefit, first an increase in sales because of
repeated purchases and a growing number of purchasers, and second
consumers are usually ready to pay a higher price in exchange for saving
search costs and an assurance of consistent quality.
Indeed, in the United-States, one of the earliest intellectaal property
measures devoted specifically to plants takes a trademark approach. A
legislative proposal introduced in 1906'^ ® suggested affording breeders
the opportunity to register the name of their new variety and to secure
for twenty-years the exclusive right to propagate it for sale under the
registered name. This proposal, however, was never enacted.^ '^ In
Marie-Angele Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
genetiques..." p. 20-21
327 Williatn M. Landes & Richard A. Posner (2003), TheEconomic Stmcture ofIntellectual
Property haiy..., chapter 7 "The Economics of Trademark Law".
328 A Bill to Amends the Laws of the United States Relating to the Registration of
Trademarks, H.R. 13570, 59''' Cong. (1906)
325 Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan (2002), "U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and
Fury...?", 39 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 727, p. 731 hereafter Janis & Kesan (2002) "U.S.
Plant Variety Protection..."
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Germany, some breeders obtained trademark protection but such
protection was prohibited in 1920.^^° In France, breeders resorted to a
combination of trademaric law and variety denomination. All plant
varieties were to be sold with a denomination that had to have been
mentioned in any transaction. In principle, the denomination of a variety
could not be appropriated; everyone was authorized to produce the same
variety. However with the use of trademark law, some breeders managed
to appropriate a denomination and in so doing obtain a form of
monopoly on the sale of the variety's seeds.Nevertheless, the
problem extends beyond product differentiation and it is not the case
that trademark law, when available, provides sufficient incentive to invest
in breeding innovation.
From then, the two issues of consumer (farmer) protection through
product licenses and the encouragement of innovation by means of
intellectual property rights are clearly separated. In the following
paragraphs, I only focus on the second issue. Breeders naturally consider
the option of claiming patent protection. Nevertheless, there are some
obstacles to plant patentability, and for various reasons, it is felt that the
patent system is an inappropriate method of protecting new plants. The
obstacles to patentability were first defeated in the United States. The
first steps to overcome the inadequacy of patent protection through the
creation of a suigeneris breeder's right were taken in Europe.
2.1.2.3 Obstacles to Patentability
First, there are some economic and evidential preoccupations. According
to patent law, the farmer who saves a part of his harvest in order to use
Henri Feyt (2001), «La protection de la propriete intellectuelle des obtentions
vegetales ; Genese et rapide historique de la mise en place des droits », Colloque les
brevets dans I'histoire : Propriete industrielle, historique et econonnique, Paris,
Sorbonne 1-2 October, p. 6
Ibidem, p.7
In Italy, breeders obtain some protection for some species through contract with
users. In United Kingdom, there is no debate on breeders' rights before the Report ofthe
Committee on the Transaction in Seeds in 1960 because there is quasi no private breeding
activity for major crops, most of it is carried out by the public sector or foreign
breeders.
In the United-States within weeks of the failed effort to use trademark system to
create an incentive structure for plant breeders, the same Representative Allen tried
introducing a bill to amend the utility patent statute to allow plant patenting. This biU
and a few others are defeated in the early 1900s until the adoption of the Plant Patent
Act in 1930. See D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan (2002), "U.S. Plant Variety Protection ..."
In Germany, after the prohibition of trademark protection, some breeders obtain
patents, but this protection appears littie adequate.
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it as seeds for the following season is considered to be a counterfeiter. At
the time, it seems absurd to require a farmer to pay in order to resow
seeds derived from his own harvest. Besides, it is very difficult to
prove or document circumstances where a farmer conserves his harvest
to use as seeds. Moreover, politicians are worried about a possible raise
of the agricultural production costs.
A second category of objections focuses on non-compliance with patent
law requirements."^ Remember that the requirements for patentability
are: invention, novelty, inventive step, industrial applicability and
adequate disclosure in Europe; novelty, non-obviousness, utility and
adequate disclosures are the requirements in the United States. It is
contented that breeders' products are not inventions, i.e. the result of a
creative process, but rather products of nature or discoveries and
therefore cannot be patented.^ '^^ For similar reasons, it is sometimes also
argued that plants cannot comply with the novelty requirement.
Similarly, it is also contended that plant varieties do not involve an
inventive step (non-obviousness condition) as the breeding processes are
quite obvious havingregard to the state of the art.
Two further objections relate to the subject matter . It is argued that
patent law has been tailored for inanimate objects and not living
organisms. In the same vein, some commentators interpret the industrial
applicability condition as excluding agricultural products.
One of the most serious objections raised against plant patenting is that
new plants and their breeding processes are unamenable to the statutory
requirement of written description. In the same vein, the non-
reproductibility impediment '^^ is raised. Although not literally present in
^35 For a detailed study of these impediments, legaldoctrine and case law references see
Geertrui Vanoverwalle (1999), "Patent Protection for Plants: A comparison of
American and European Approaches", 39 iDEA-JOURNAL OFLAW AND TECHNOLOGY
143. See also Geertrui Vanoverwalle (1996), Octrooieerbaareid van Plantenbiotechnologishe
Uitvindingen. Patentability ofPlant Biotechnological Inventions, Bruylant, Brussells or Linda J.
Demaine & Aaeon XavierFellmeth (2002) "Reinveting the Double Helix:A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualizarion of the Biotechnology Patent" 55 STANFORD LAW
Review 303 at 330-387
In US Case law see for instance American Wood-Paper Co. v. FibreDisintegrating Co., 90
U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874) or Cochrane v. Badische Anilin Soda Fabriek, 111 U.S. 293
(1884)
337 When a new variety is created after crossing two existing varieties (sexual
reproduction), obtaining a same plant through the same process is hazardous as in
sexual reproduction, for the most it is the hazard that determines what characteristics
the progenywill take from eachof the parents. However,with a minimumof flexibility,
the objection can be dismissed. Indeed, once obtained through outcrossing, the new
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patent acts, the reproductibility requirement stems from the obligation to
provide an enabling-disclosure in the U.S law and from the industrial
applicability requirement in Europe. In broad outline, it is argued that a
person skilled in the art should always be able to repeat the process of
making a new plant. Whereas plants spread by natural multiplication,
without necessary repetition of the breeding process which created them.
Sometimes, this process is no longer available. The issue is thus whether
a description of the breeding process is required or whether a description
of a mode of reproduction is sufficient.
Later most of these objections will be easily dismissed but three of them
maintain some importance and will shape the future protection: the
difficulty of description, the fact that identification of new plant varieties
looks closer to discoveries than inventions, and the fact that breeding
processes are quite obvious and that all breeders use the same ones.
2.1.2.4 The U.S. Plant Patent Act
In 1930, the U.S. Congress enacts the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent
Act'^ ® creating a patent regime for asexually reproduced plants. The Plant
Patent Act had a three-part contribution. In the short term, it provided
limited protection; in the long term it laid the groundwork for the
patentability of plants, which occurred in the 1980s; and in the medium
term, it suggested that a suigeneris right could be more adequate. Actually,
the Plant Patent Act met some obstacles to plant patentability in
dismissing them and affirming the patentability of plants, but also in
seriously limiting the subject and scope of protection.
The Plant Patent Act provides that:
"Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct
and new variety ofplant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids,
and newly found seedlings, other than a tuberpropagated plant or a
plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to theconditions and requirements oftitle.
Theprovisions of this title relating topatentsfor inventions shallapply
topatentsforplants, except as otherwiseprovided."
First, the requirement of sexual reproduction draws the line between
what can be protected and what is excluded from protection. The
variety can be asexually reproduced, providing perfect copies, (f. infra the plant patent
act)
35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164, Commonly referred as Plant Patent Act
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protected subject matter is plant variety asexually reproduced; this
limitadon excludes seed reproduced plants (e.g. cereals) from protection.
This limitation is as much due to the characteristics of asexual
reproduction as it is to economic and political considerations. Neither
the U.S. Congress, nor the agricultural sectors were ready in the 1930s to
grant patent for plants with such economic importance.'^ ' For the same
reasons, the Act explicidy excludes tuber propagated plants (i.e. potatoes
and Jerusalem artichoke) from protection. Thus, the protection was
limited to the nursery industry (ornamentals and fruit) where the lacii of
appropriation lays in competition from other nurserymen, not farmers. '^"'
Second, the requirement of asexual reproduction also greatiy narrows the
scope of protection. It is only the fact of cloning the patented plant
(malting a perfect copy with the same genotype'"") that infringes the
plant patent. Consequentiy, the term "variety" as used in the Plant Patent
Act, must be understood to encompass a single, individual plant.
Infringement of a plant patent is extremely limited, requiring an actual
physical taking from thepatented plant.'''^ Actually, theU.S. Plant Patent
Act only exerted a limited practical impact as the protection offered by
plant patents was seriously limited both in terms of subjectof protection
and scope of protection.
Third, the Plant Patent Act constituted a first step towards the
protection of breeding iimovation through intellecmal property while
dismissing some obstacles to plant patentability. In itself, the Act
dismissed the argument that living organisms cannot be patented, and
introduced an exception to the U.S. Patent Act, which characterizes
patentable subject matter in terms of processes, machines, manufactures,
or composition of matter.'"*' Also, the term "discovers" overcame the
objection that plants are discoveries or products of nature. Moreover,
the requirement of asexual reproduction was an additional answer to the
objection that plants are discoveries or products of nature because
reproduction often requires human intervention. Eventually, the
requirement also overcame the reproductability objection, as asexuaUy
reproduced plants are perfect copies of the original.
Mark D. Janis, & Jay P. Kesan (2002), "U.S. Plant Variety Protection: ...", p. 736.
See also GaryFowler (2000), "The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of
its Creation", 82JOUIUMAL OF PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICES SOCIETY 621
3to Ibirlem
3"" Having the same essential characteristics as the protected plant is not sufficient to
constitute infringement.
Ima^o Nurseg,Inc. v. Daiiia Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560,1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
35 U.S.C. §101
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Because this protection was circumscribed both in subject matter and in
scope and limited to the United States, breeders' struggle for intellectual
propertyprotection continued. '^*'^ The next initiative came from the other
side of the Adantic. The European initiative deemed patent protection
inadequate and envisaged the drafting of a suigeneris right.
2.1.2.5 Inadequacy of Patent Law
The subject matter that breeders want to protect is the object they sell to
farmers, i.e. a new variety. The identification of "variety" as the subject
matter of protection has several implications in the design of a law for
protection. The breeding activity is not made up of discrete innovations;
rather it is a cumulative process whereby today's invention is built on
yesterday's innovation. In broad outline, a new variety is made up of two
elements: a new element that induces a variation compared with existing
varieties, and an old element, i.e. a variety already existing to which the
new element has been combined. In patent law the protection is limited
to the new element; what breeders want to protect, however, is not the
new element, but rather the whole variety. On the other hand, as the new
variety will, in its turn, serve as a base for yet-to-be identified varieties, it
is deemed important to allow open-access to the invention because it is a
source for a new invention. This is not possible in patent law where the
inventor who incorporates a patented invention into his own invention
must obtain the consent of the patentee and pay royalties. Consequentiy,
the desire of plant breeders may appear to be a littie contradictory.
Breeders want property rights not only on the new element but on the
whole variety, while at the same time they want an open-access regime,
not only to the old element but also to the whole variety. In fact, as
noted by Professor Hermitte, in breeders' minds, the same variety has
two functions and should be submitted to two property regimes. The
variety is a final product sold to farmers, and as such it should be
protected; the variety is also research material, and as such it should
remain in open-access.^"*^ Another way to distinguish the two roles of
plant varieties -final product and source of innovation - is to distinguish
3'*'' Nevertheless, 2700 plant patents were issued under the Plant Patent Act between
1930 and 1970. See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent (1995), "International
Intellectual Property Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational
Conventions and the Exception for Agriculture", 27 CASE WESTERN RESERVE
Journal of InternationalLaw 83
Marie-Angele Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
gteetiques..."pp. 21-22
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varieties and genetic resources. Plant varieties are protected while the
genetic resources they contain remain in open-access.
2.1.2.6 The International Convention for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants^^e ("UPOV")
In the late 1930s, the development of plant breeding, the first attempts
for protection and the inadequacy of patent law produced a consensus
on the following elements: (1) a sui generis system of protection was
needed; (2) the subject matter of protection must be the variety; (3)
access to the protected variety must be given to breeders for breeding
purposes. In 1938, the ASSINSEL (Breeders Association for the
Protection of Plant Varieties) '^'^ was founded. After the interruption of
the war, the first step came from Germany where a Seeds Act '^'® was
enacted in 1953. Then in 1957, France took the initiative to convene an
International Conference for the Protection of Plant Varieties which set up an
expert committee in charge of proposing an international convention.
The text of the UPOV Convention^"*', inspired by tiie German law, was
adopted at the second session of the conference in 1961. It was initially
signed by France, Germany and the Benelux countries, and was signed
the following year by the United Kingdom, Denmark and Switzerland.^^"
The UPOV Convention came into force on August 10, 1968, and was
slightiy modified in 1972, 1978 and with more extensive modifications in
1991. By April 2006, UPOV membership had swelled to 61 members.
Most notably, the United States completed their Plant Patent Act by the
Plant Variety Patent Act in 1970"' that for the most was inspired by the
UPOV Convention. This American legislation led to their adhesion to
UPOV in 1981.
The texts of the successive version of the convention can be founded at the UPOV
website at the following address;
http:/ Av\v\\'.upov.int/en/publ)cations/c.onventions/index.html
ASSINSEL is the French acronym of Association Internationale des Selectionneurs
pour la protection des obtenrions vegetales
For an English translation of the German law see "Patents. Law concerning
Protection of the Seed of Cultivated Plants" 54 PATENT & TRADEMARK REVIEW 358-
66 (1956)
349 UPOV is the French acronym of Union pour la Protection des Obtentions
Vegetales, i.e. Union for the Protection of new Varieties of Plant
350 For a detailed record of the different conference, see Anne-Marie Flury-Jeker (1987),
1m protection jimdique des obtentions vegetales, Editions Ides et Calendes, Neuchatel,
Switzerland.
351 7 U.S.C §§ 2321-2583 (2000)
148
Regarding the content of the UPOV Convention, it first sets the
principle of plant variety protection through intellectual property rights.
It gives members states the choice between two types of protection:
patent or breeder's right '^^ but requires that these rights be mutually
exclusive in that no one country can offer both rights.^^^ The rest of the
UPOV Convention relates to the creation of the new suigeneris right.
Hequirementsfor Protection
As hoped for by breeders, the protected subject matter under the UPOV
Convention is a discrete plant "variety." There are four substantive
requirements for protection: the variety must be new, clearly
distinguishable,'^ "' sufficiendy homogenous or uniform'^ ^, and stable in
its essential characteristics '^^ Similar to patent protection and most
intellectual property rights, the variet}' must be "new". The condition of
distinctiveness is closest to the novelty requirement and on close
examination looks like a definition of novelty rather than an extra
requirement. Indeed, Article 6(1)(a) provides that the new variety must be
clearly distinguishable bj one or more imporiant characteristicsfrom any other variety
whose existence is a matter of common knowledge at the time when protection is
appliedfor. The same article adds that the protection is available whatever
mcy be the origin, artificial or natural, of the initial variation from which it has
resulted. The variety must be homogenous or uniform. Homogeneity is an
ingredient in the definition of variety, rather than being an extra
condition. A sufficient level of homogeneity is necessary to identify and
distinguish a new variety. As total homogeneity does not exist, some
tolerance is admitted but the number of aberrant plants, i.e. plants
differing from the description of the variety, must be limited.'^ ^ For the
same reasons, the variety must be stable. Genetic stability is also an
integral part of the notion of variety. The variety must continue to
352 1961 UPOV, article 2 (1)
553 The prohibition of the double protection will be removed in the 1991 revision.
35" 1961 UPOV, article 6 (1) (a)
355 1961 UPOV, article 6 (1) (c). The condition of homogeneity is replaced by a
condition of uniformity in UPOV 1991 with no change in the meaning. That is why
the protectability requirements are often referred by the acronym "DUS": distinction,
uniformity and stability.
35<i 1961 UPOV, article 6 (1) (d) that is to say,it must remain true to its description after
repeat reproduction or propagation
357 See Anne-Marie Flury-Jeker (1987), protection juridique des obtentions
Editions Ides et Calendes, Neuchatel, Switzerland, p. 131
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conform to its definition after each multiplication. All in all, there is less
to say about these requirements '^'' than about what is not required.
The majordifference with patent lawlies in the absence of a counterpart
to the requirement of inventiveness (non-obviousness). Under patent law
an invention must involve an inventive step that, with regard to the state
of the art, is not obvious for a person skilled in the art. The raison d'etre
of this requirement is that patents are deemed to be unnecessary for
small-scale improvements that are within the reach of those working in
this sector. For these small-scale innovations, the social cost of granting
a patent (restricting access) is presumed to exceed the benefits of its
incentive effect. On the contrary, in the UPOV regime, there is no
concern about the process and the scale of inventions. Plant varieties
that are simply discovered can be protected. In addition, breeding
processes cannot be protected. This is due to the nature of these
breeding processes; there are few, they are well known and there is littie
substitution. Consequendy, it would be of littie sense to require a high
degree of inventiveness, and it is essential to leave processes in open
access.^''
Scope of'Protection andUmitations ofProtection
Like every intellectual property right, the breeders' right is a temporary
exclusive right. The breeder has an exclusive right on the production for
reproduction purposes, and on the offering for saleand marketingof the
variety. '^"'' However, as hoped for by breeders, the exclusive rights under
the UPOV regime are subject to limitations and exceptions that extend
well beyond those found in patent law. The breeders' right includes a
provision exempting from infringement the utilization of the new variety
as an initial source of variation for the purpose of creating another
varieties and the marketing of such varieties.^^i This essential provision,
often called the breeder's exception, extends beyond research exceptions
that may exist in the European patent laws. Open access to the variety is
not limited to the research phase but also applies to the marketing of the
However these requirements, especially homogeneity, will later be subject to
criticism for reinforcing trends towards genetic uniformity, thus leading to a higher
degreeof geneticvulnerability. See Gary Fowlerand Pat Mooney (1990) Shattering. Food,
Politics and the Loss of Genetic Diversity, University of Arizona Press, Tuckson, and
Crucible Group (1994), People, Plants, and Patents, International Development Research
Centre, Ottawa, Canada.
^5' Marie-Angele Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
genetiques... ", p. 25
360 ^961 UPOV, article 5 (1)
UPOV, article 5 (3)
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new variety.Actually, in the UPOV regime, there exists an exclusive
right to the variety, but the genetic resources included in the variety —
which are the source of the variation - remain in open-access for
breeding purposes^". In addition, contrary to breeders' wishes, breeder's
rights are also limited by an fanner's privilege, which allows farmers
who grow protected varieties to save the resulting seeds for the
production of a subsequent crop. The text of the Convention is silent on
this issue, but at the time, this old practice was not called into question.
Ending this brief presentation of the breeders' right, it is worth
mentioning some features it has in common with copyright. When an
author has a copyright in a book, there are three goods and three owners.
The purchaser owns the physical manifestation of the book, the text or
the content belongs to the writer and the ideas presented in the books
are in open-access. Similarly, with breeder's rights, the purchaser owns
the individual plant, the variety belongs to the breeder and the genetic
resources contained in the plant are in open-access.
In this section, I have reported the emergence of a breeding sector
fostered by the enactment of intellectual property legislation. However,
this is only one branch of the equilibrium. Indeed, northern private
agricultural research is not sufficient to assure the food security of
mankind and an international conservation policy is necessary to feed the
agricultural research appetite for genetic resources.
2.2 The Public Supply ofa Double Global Public Good
In this section I explain how it appeared increasingly necessary to
complement the R&D effort provided by the breeding sector with an
international and publicly funded agricultural research capacity and to
initiate an international conservation policy. Thus, the second branch of
the equilibrium lies in the public supply of an international network of
gene banks and R&D centers, which carry out a conservation policy and
part of the agricultural innovation and then place the results of their
conservation and innovation efforts in open access.
Compare with the Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement described in
part one in which research use is authorized but an extra authorization is required for
the marketing of a new variety
Marie-Angye Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
genetiques... pp. 24-25 .
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2.2.1 Technological Context
2.2.1.1 Genetic Resources: of Old but Growing Importance
The search for plant products has a long history. With precious metals,
plants have been an essential objective of European conquest since the
second half of the fifteenth century. The Portuguese setded in Asia to
secure a monopoly on pepper and species. For similar reasons,
Columbus was induced to launch his ships into the Adandc Ocean; in
Cuba he found "species, cotton, mastic, (..•), rhubarb and cinnamon"
Naturalists and botanists accompany the great military expeditions to
collect inventories of potential plant products. At the end of the
nineteenth century, the amassing of these inventories becomes methodic
and systematic.'^ '* The potential benefits from botanies are not limited to
these inventories. Since the end of the eighteenth century, the transfer of
plants from one part of the world to the other became a crucial stake in
the economic competition among colonial states. European states
attempted to introduce exotic species into their own territory to increase
and diversify their agricultural production. In addition, colonial powers
endeavored to transfer foreign plants into their economic sphere. For
instance, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Dutch managed
to implant coffee in Java and to supplant the Arabian production.
Afterwards they were supplanted by the; French who succeeded in
introducing coffee into Santo-Domingo thus assuring half of the world's
production at the end of the eighteenth century.'*^® To organize these
transfers, botanists and botanic gardens played a leading role. In 1654
the Dutch company of the Indies created the first overseas botanical
garden in Cape Town, South Africa. . In the Nineteenth century, plants
inventories, transfers and selections intensified and a real world network
of 200 botanical gardens was in place.
The United States has a different history but they also depended on
many other countries for most of their important crop plants. Very early
on, they set up systems of germplasm collections. Official recognition of
this work for agricultural development came in 1827 when President
John Adams requested all American consuls to send home seeds or
plants of promising crops and trees for subsequent distribution by the
U.S. Patent Office to American farmers.'*^^ In 1862, the U.S. Department
Christophe Bonneuil (2001), "L'empire des plantes", COURRIER DE LA PlANETE,
vol. 62, p. 6
Ibidem
Robin Pistorius (1997), Scientists, Plantsand Politics. A histoty ofthePlant Genetic Resources
Movement, Roma: IPGRI, p. 4, hereafter Robin Pistorius (1997), Scientists, Plants and
Politics...
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of Agriculture (USDA) was created and six years later the newly founded
Seed and Plant Introduction Section of USDA begun promoting the
collection and introduction of new crops. An inventory of the new
plants was created, listing every plant collected by the USDA that
entered the United States. This catalogue was accessible to breeders that
could obtain seeds or cuttings. Progressively, the U.S. germplasm system
structured itself around a National Seed Storage laboratory in Fort
Collins, Colorado and a network of regional centers responsible for the
evaluation and regeneration of the species.
Russia also played a pioneering role in the initiation of collection and
conservation policies. In the 1920s, Nikolai Vavilov, in charge of the
Soviet Union's Institute of Plant Industry in Leningrad, was convinced
that plant breeders should look for "fresh" genetic materials to revive the
vigor of cultivated varieties. He suggested that more primitive land races
and wild relatives of modern cultivars contain genetic material that could
provide some of the environmental tolerance lacking in the cultivated
varieties. To access this genetic material, he called for a global inventory
of both cultivated plants and their wild relatives and sent expeditions to
all parts of the Soviet Union and to sixty other nations. In total, Vavilov
established a network of 400 research and experimental centers
throughout the Soviet Union, and maintained relations with similar
centers in other parts of the world. In addition, Vavilov identified twelve
regions of the earth containing a high degree of biological diversity and
he suggested that most major food crops originated from these "centers
of diversity," located for the mostpart in developing countries.^ '^
In the context of this growing interest for genetic material, the need to
organize international cooperation policies for agricultural R&D and
conservation appeared.
2.2.1.2 Agricultural Research for AH, an American Initiative
After World War II and the success of the Marshall Plan, the idea of an
agricultural technical aid for the benefit of developing countries was in
U.S. National Research Council (1993), Managing GlobalGenetic resources, Washington
D.C: National Academy Press, p. 34-35; see also E. James (1972) Organization of the
United States National Storage Laboratory, in E.H. Roberts (ed). Viability of Seeds,
London: Chapman & Hall
David S. Tilford (1998), "Saving the Blueprints: The International Legal Regimes for
Plant Resources", 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'l L. 373, at 384-385 and Robin Pistorius
(1997), Scientists, Plants and Politics..p. 7
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the air in the United States.^* '^ Rather than traditional food aid or
emergency aid, agronomical research helping to increase the producdon
capacity of developing countries and food security appeared as a
sustainable contribution. Moreover, the problems of developing
countries, such as pests and diseases, could reach developed countries; it
could thus be useful overseas. Additionally, the United States, as well as
Northern countries, have constant need of new genetic material; helping
developing countries rich in biodiversity, to develop their research
capacity provided an opportunity to identify, evaluate and import
interesting crops. Finally, during the cold war, fostering the agricultural
development of developing countries, hotably through the green
revolution, was seen as weapon against the seduction of the communist
block.'™
The first step did not come from the government but from two private
foundations: the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation. In
the 1940s, after preliminary studies, the Rockefeller Foundation
launched, in collaboration with the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, an
intensive program of crop improvement, called the Mexican Agricultaral
Program.'^ ' After a decade of collaborative research and training
focusing on a few species, important results were reached in reducing
food deficits. After this first success, similar programs were launched in
the 1950s in Columbia, Chili and India. Worried about food shortages in
Asia, the Rockefeller foundation associated itself with the Ford
foundation; and in 1959, the two foundatioHS and the government of
Philippines founded the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) that
built an international collection of rice varieties and undertook a large
breeding program, looking for high-yield varieties. After this first
success, the two foundations repeated the project and created a series of
similar centers. For example, the Center for the improvement of wheat
and maize (CYMMIT) was set up in Mexico. CYMMIT developed maize
varieties with high growth, rigid straw, resistance and adaptation to
fertilizers. These varieties largely increased the yield not only in Mexico
but also in many developing countries, most notably, India, Pakistan and
Turkey. The overall success of this handful of International Agronomical
Lowell S. Hardin (2001) "Des interets bien comjDris", COURRIER DE LA PlANETE,
vol. 62, p. 27
3™ Nicolas Brahy & SelimLouafi (2004) "La Convention sur la diversite biologique a la
croisee de quatre discours", Les RapportS DE L'IDDRI, n°4, p. 10-12, hereafter
Nicolas Brahy & SelimLouafi (2004) "La Convention sur la diversite biologique..."
Robin Pistorius (1997), Scientists, Plantsand Politics.p.5
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Research Centers (lARCs) constitutes the golden age of international
agricultural research andis often referred to as the green revoluQon.^^^^
After these first developments, the idea of an international agricultural
research and development effort went through two important changes.
First, increasing attention was given to genetic resources conservation;
second, the desire to reproduce the success of the IRRI, CYMMIT and
the other first lARCs was out of reach for private foundations, thus
implying that the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations should defer to
governments.
2.2.2.3 The Need for an International Conservation Policy
In the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis was on developing germplasm
collections for immediate breeding efforts, as conservation was not a
major preoccupation. However, the focus increasingly shifted towards
conservation as the awareness of genetic erosion was growing. In the
USA, the need to prevent genetic erosion was due to mono-cropping
with new hybrid varieties. By the late 1950s, 90% of the total maize
surface was covered by new hybrids. Action to prevent further loss was
called for. The European Society for Research and Plant Breeding
(EUCARPIA) made a similar observation. The first international claim
for action in conservation particularly for landraces^ '^' and wild
relatives^^^ came during the tenth conference of the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1959. It is noted that namral
vegetation and primitive cultivated forms was being eliminated by the
conversion process (i.e. overgrazing, burning, and clearance for new
cultivated land) and specialization (i.e. their replacement by high-yield
variety). It was also noted that many exiting crops had a narrow genetics
base, and that genetic resources from areas of diversity were litde
exploited. A progressive wiU to organize an international effort for
conservation and use of genetic resource emerged in the international
community and the FAO.^^^
The next steps of this budding conservation effort lay in a few issues:
How to conserve? Who wiU carry on the conservation? And how is
Norman Borlaug the central scientific figures of the Green Revolution received the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1970
LoweU S. Hardin (2001) "Des interets bien compris", COURRtER DE LA PlANETE,
vol. 62, p. 28
Landraces are farmer-developed cultivars of crop plants which are adapted to local
environmental conditions.
Uncultivated relative of crop species
Robin Pistorius (1997), Scientists, Vlants and Politics...., p. 5-16.
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conservation to be funded? Those questions have been the subject of
nunnerous founding meetings and controversies. Here, I briefly present
their outcomes to the extent that it is necessary to understand the
foUowing.'^ ^ Once the conservation objective is accepted, there are two
different approaches to cope with: exsitu and in situ conservation. These
differboth in their implications for genetic resources conservation and in
their impact on land use. In situ conservation means that genetic
resources exist within ecosystems and nataral habitats and, in the case of
domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have
developed their distinctive properties. On the contrary, ex situ
conservation refers to conservation outside the original or natural
habitat. One of the comparative advantages of in situ conservation is that
it allows continued evolution of the crop variety under human and
environmental selection. In knowledge economics terminology, it can be
said that in situ conservation is focused on the optimal appropriation of
information arriving over time.^^® Conversely, in ex situ conservation,
genetic resources are pulled out of the evolution process; it is focussed
on the conservation of existing stocks of useful crop genetic resources.
The emphasis is put on the possibilities of immediate uses. For breeders
or other users, ex situ conservation is the simplest way to find useful
genes to work with; breeders can extract genetic traits from storage and
transfer them to elite lines. In knowledge economics terms, it can be said
that ex situ conservation is focused on the optimal utilization of a given
germplasm at a given point in time.^™ The relative values of these two
approaches are stUl discussed today, but at that time the choice of exsitu
conservation is made mainly for practical reasons; in situ conservation
requires large quantities of land, must be organized in a decentralised
way and in the zones of diversity. This is the case, for the most part, in
developing countries while ex situ conservation is cheaper, requires
hardly any land, and can be organized in a centralised way and is more
immediately useful for breeders.^®"
Once the choice of ex situ conservation made, it must be decided who
wiU carry on this conservation effort and with what funding. These
For detailed record see Robin Pistorius (1997), Scientists, Plants and Politics.., or
Nicolas Brahy& Selim Louafi (2004) "La Convention sur la diversitebiologique..
Swanson, Timothy M. & Timo Goeshl (1998) "The Management of Genetic
Resources for Agriculture: Ecology and Information, Externalities and Policies",
CSERGE Working Paper GEC 98-12
379 Ibidem
380 For more detail on the choice of ex situ conservation see Robin Pistorius (1997),
Scientists, Plantsand Politics..., or Nicolas Brahy and Selim Louafi (2004) "La Convention
sur la diversite biologique... "
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questions were answered at the same time as, and with a similar solution
as, the international agricultural research effort for food security. I briefly-
present them in the following paragraphs.
2.2.2 The CGIAR Networks: Public Provision of Two PubKc
Goods
2.2.2.1 International Agricultural Research: Creation of the
CGIAR
Unprecedented harvests from new varieties of rice and wheat based on
research done by the four first lARCs raised hope that this
transformation of agriculture practice could be expanded worldwide and
gave rise to a demand for the creation of new centers. Increasing the
number of centers was out of reach for private foundations and required
public funding. In 1971, after two years of negotiation, the World Bank,
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the African and Inter-American
Development Banks, as well as a handful of countries —the United States,
Canada, Japan, France, United Kingdom and Sweden - agreed to found
the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Co-
sponsored by the World Bank, the FAO and the UNDP, the CGIAR's
founding objective was "to increase the pile of rid'' —in reality food —in
tropical countries that faced scarcity. The priority was first given to
research on cereals such as rice, maize, wheat and cassava, before being
extended to such commodities as chickpea, sorghum, potato, miUet and
eventually to twenty-seven other commodities.^®' In order to do so,
CGIAR was responsible for the strengthening of the existing lARCS and
the creation of a series of new ones in addition to being in charge of
ensuring maximum complementarities and coordination of international,
regional and national efforts in financing and undertaking agricultural
research.^®^ Since then, the membership of the group has increased to
fifty-eight countries and the number of CGIARs centers (lARCS) has
grown to sixteen.^^^ I mentioned earlier that research and development
38' CGIAR, The CGIAR Histoiy available at wvw.cgiar.oiy/who/w'u'a historv'.hrm
382 CGIAR, 'Resolution on theObjectives, Composition and Organi^tionalStructure, Washington
D.C. May 1971. The text of the resolution is available at
http://vwf\v.\vorldbank.ort'-/hti'nl/c.piar/publications/foundinp.html
383 For a list of the International Agricultural Research Centers and a description of
their respective activities as well as for a good evaluation of CGIAR's work see Curtis
Farrar (2000), "The Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research", Case
Study for the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks, available at
http:/ / u'^v^^'.dobalpublicpolicy.^et
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(as a knowledge production activity) is a public good. Thus, it can be said
that the creation and the funding of the CGIAR and the lARCS
constituted an effort of the international community to provide a global
public good and to place it at the disposal of the community of states
and their citizens.^ '^* In order to provide this public good, the elected
option was public funding, which enabled the choiceof open-accessas a
property regime.
2.2.2.2 International Conservation Strategy: a World Network
of Genebanks
The CGIAR was not only in charge of providing one public good -
agricultural R&D - but was also entrusted with the provision of a second
public good -genetic resources conservation.
To answer the threat of genetic erosion and to carry on the ex situ
conservation effort, it was decided to create a world network of gene
banks. After contentious discussions,^®^ it was decided - notably because
of the lack of alternative international infrastructure and funding - to set
up a network of national and international genebanks under the
supervision of the CGIAR with a coordinating center, the International
Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR).^®'' The IBPGR was in
charge of the collection function. It organized missions to collectgenetic
resources to increase existing collections. Members of the network
assumed the conservation and distribution functions. . Once collected,
the resources were entrusted by the IBPGR to a national or a CGIAR
gene bank. In legal terms, the network was in the sum of the bilateral
relations between the IBPGR and each gene bank. It took the form of a
letter ofacceptance signed by the organizations that received the resources
for conservation. The letter of acceptance enumerated the latter
obligations: the acceptance of the material, the commitment to dedicate
the necessary funds for its conservation and distribution and above all
the recognition of the open-access principle.
National governments are in charge of setting up large distributions of new seeds to
their national farmers.
385 For a record of the pros and cons of this option by comparison with an alternative
approach focused on regionalgenebanks settied in biodiversityrich regions or for more
detailed on the competition between the FAO and the CGIAR, see Robin Pistorius
(1997), Scientists, Vlants and Politics.. .p. 48-68. Or Nicolas Brahy and Selim Louafi (2004)
"La Convention sur la diversite biologique... "p. 10-12
386 Now named International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI)
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Within ten years (from 1974 to 1984), the IBPGR managed to develop a
cooperative network of agricultaral research centers in about 100
countries, it organized and co-financed about 300 collecting missions in
about 90 countries, collecting 120,000 new seeds accessions from 120
species; it provided assistance to developing countries who established
national conservation facilities; it established an information system with
standard procedures in documentation, recording and storage, etc?®'
Today, the CGIAR holds the world's largest collection of plant genetic
resources (over 600,000 accessions of more than 3,000 crop, forage, and
pasture species) in public trust for the future.
It has been said that genetic resources provide useful information or
knowledge, that is to say a public good. As biodiversity is threatened by
human development, it is necessary to conserve this existing stock of
knowledge. In terms of provision, the establishment of this international
network of gene banks is thus a joint-production of a public good by
individual states (national gene banks) and the international community
(international gene banks). In terms of a property regime, genetic
resources conserved in the gene banks network are in open-access.
In sum, the international community has set up and funded two
branches of an international network that provides two public goods —
part of the agricultural research, and a conservation policy. It remains to
provide access to genetic resources present in plants in their nataral
states and to affirm a formal and general property regime for genetic
resources. To this end, an international undertaking on phytogenetic
resources wiU be negotiated and genetic resources wiU be recognized as a
common heritage of mankind.
2.3 Genetic resources as Common Heritage ofMankind
In the first section, I mentioned that UPOV plant breeders rights include
a research exception or breeder's exception that allows access to genetic
resources contained in the protected varieties for breeding purposes.
However, this is not enough for feeding the breeding R&D appetite. It is
also necessary to facilitate access to the reservoir of genetic resources
contained in plants that are in their natural state world wide, but above
all in tropical developing countries. This implies that governments
should not claim any exclusive right to their genetic resources and should
allow international and foreign national research organizations or private
387 Robin Pistorius (1997), Scientists, PlantsandPolitics...^. 57
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companies to collect genetic resources on their territory and to conserve
them in open-access. As this could become less obvious after
decolonization, phytogenetic resources for food and agriculture are said
to be the Common Heritage of Mankind, i.e. in open-access, regardless
of national borders. '^'® Therefore, a general regime of open-access for
genetic resources is in process, leaning on two legal concepts: the
breeder's exception and the Common Heritage of Mankind. More
precisely, a de juri'^ open-access regime succeeds a de facto open-access
regime in vigor up till then.
In addition, the legal concept of Common Heritage of Mankind - a new
notion that entered into vogue in the late seventies and early eighties -
not only provides open access to plants in their natural state but it also
constitutes a general legal framework which could integrate the different
components of a genetic resources regime; a general open access
including all genetic resources, and a management system carrying on
their conservation and some R&D.
2.3.1 Common Heritage in International Public Law
2.3.1.1 Common Heritage as a Property Regime
It is generally agreed that the origin of the expression "Common
Heritage of Mankind" and its content are to be attributed to the Maltese
Ambassador, Arvid Pardo who presented it on 1 November 1967 at the
First Commission of the United Nations Assembly discussing the future
legal regime of the seabed and its subsoil. At that time, the expression
"Common Heritage", or synonyms, was mainnly used in two domains:
the management of natural resources (sea, space and genetic resources)
and the management of cultural heritage. '^" In his weU-known course on
the notion of Common Heritage of Mankind at The Hague Academy of
International Law^", - Professor Alexandre Kiss evoked some
precedents and parallel concepts, notably res communis. It is probably
388 Marie-AngMe Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
genetiques..." pp. 26-33
389 Note however, that the legal nature of this property regime is ambiguous as the
International Undertaking is not a legallybinding instrument.
39° Philippe Khan (1998) "Les patrimoines communs de I'humanite: quelques
reflexions", in Michel Prieur et Claude Lambrechts, Les Hommes et I'Environnement,
quels droits pour le vingt-et-unieme siecle?, Mankind and Environment, What Rights
for the Twenty First Century? Etudes en Hommages a Alexandre Kiss, Paris, Editions
Frison-Roche, p. 307
39' Charies-Alexandre Kiss (1983), "La notion de Patrimoine Commun de I'Humanite"
Recueil de Cours de i'Academie de Droit International de la Haye, Tome 175, pp. 99-
256
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about the legal nature of high sea and seabed that the evolution and
hesitation are the most illustrative. Very early on it was agreed that the
high seas could not be appropriated because of its immensity, and it
must consequendy escape state sovereignty. However, there has been a
long doctrinal debate about the legal statute of high seas between the
supporters of the notion of res nullius (i.e. things no yet appropriated) and
those in favor of the notion of res communis (i.e. things open to all by
nature). The advocates of res nullius mainly put forward objections to the
concept of res communis, arguing that it implies a common sovereignty,
which at the time did not correspond to the state of the law nor the
practice. In contrast, the supporters of Rescommunis' argued that resnullius
implies that anybody can appropriate the thing in question, which is not
the case for the high seas. The theory behind res cojnmunis thus seems
more appropriate, as it implies joint-ownership and allows for
internationalization and a common regulation. It is further argued that
the concept of res communis' has been confirmed by the growing
regulation of the high seas. Additionally, there is unanimity in
considering that outer space is res communis '^^ thus supporting the
contention that the high seas are as well. However, as noted by
Alexandre Kiss, the exact meaning of this concept has never been
satisfactorily defined. '^^ It was only agreed that the high seas and outer
space were open to aU states.
It seems to me that the doctrinal debate on res nullius and res communis and
the lack of clarity on the notion of res communis comes from confusion
between the nature of a good and the nature of its property regime. The
notion of res communis designates a type of good. communis
encapsulates what Professor Carol Rose calls the impossibility argument
against private property: the character of some resources makes them
incapable of "capture" or any other act of exclusive appropriation. '^'' To
use the economic classification presented in part one, good in res
cofnmunis are non-exclusive goods, which makes them either public goods
or common pool resources; whereas res nullius designates a property
regime, goods in res nullius are not goods incapable of ownership, but
they are simply things that belong to nobody. Therefore, in my opinion,
it is an error to view the notion of res communis as a legal regime for the
high seas and outer space. The confusion was possible and so long as
there are no consequences, things incapable of ownership are de facto in
open-access. However, the impossibility argument may not be definitive,
352 Ibidem, p. 120
This was the main argument of the supporters of the resnullius conception
Carol Rose (2003), "Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators..."
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technological change can help to overcome technical obstacles or change
the costs and benefits of appropriating and make it worthwhile. Indeed,
this is what has happened with the part of the sea that has been partly
appropriated byStates under the legal notion of an Exclusive Economic
Zone. In this situation, if it is preferable to keep a good in open access,
then it is necessary to set up a de Jure open-access property regime. In
Romanlaw, things belonging to the publicand open to the publicby the
operation of law were designated as respublicae. Thus, respublicae does not
designate a type of good but rather a property regime where concerned
goods are in open-access. Consequentiy, it is important to note that
goods in res publicae are not ungoverned; on the contrary open-access
requires mechanisms of governance either through informal self-
governance or government regulation. Moreover, the notion of res
publicae is not incompatible with private property and mixed regimes are
often needed. '^^ In modern international law, the concept of the
Common Heritage of Mankind constitutes an attempt to embody these
ideas.
2.3.1.2 The Content of the Notion of Common Heritage of
Mankind
There is no exact and definitive definition of Common Heritage but a list
of criteria have been put forward by Avid Pardo and later by Alexandre
Kiss and several other authors.'"^
1) Non-appropriation; States may use the space or resources but
they may not claim sovereignty over it (open access);
2) Peaceful use: onlypeaceful uses are allowed over the space or
resources;
3) A system of management: there must be a system of
management between all potential users or on their behalf by an
international organization;
4) Rational and sustainable use: if necessary, use of the common
heritage must enable its renewal, and for non-renewable
resources, the exploitation must be optimal, taking into account
the long term interest of mankind;
5) Equitable benefit sharing: the benefits coming from the
common heritage use must be equitably shared among the
different states.
^'5Ibidem, p. 100 and ss.
S. Bastid (1973) «L'etat du droit international public en 1973 »,Journal du Droit
International, p.lO; J . M. Le Besnarais (1976), «L'Amerique latine et le droit de la
mer » Notes et Etudes Documentaires n°4316-4317,27 Septembre, p. 90 ; and Nguyen-
Quaoc Dinh-Daillet-Pellet (1980), Droit International 'Public, 2= ed. Paris,p. 628
162
In addition, some or all of these criteria are present in a series of
conventions concerning Antarctica/'^ radio spectrums, outer space '^®
and celestial bodies, cultural heritage, '^' natural resources and the
seabed.'""' Before genetic resources, the notion of Common Heritage of
Mankind was explicitly applied to two subject matters: the Moon'"'' and
above all the seabed, which constitutes the most elaborated legal regime
of world common heritage.
2.3.1.3 The Law of the Sea as a Model
The United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
declares that the area —the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof,
are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction'"'^ —and its resources are the
common heritage of mankind. The principles of non-appropriation'"'^
and peaceful uses'*"'' are affirmed.No State may claim any sovereignty"*"^
on the area and its resources, nor may they behave as they wish but
they must behave in accordance with the provisions of the convention.'*"''
The area and its resources are vested in mankind through an
international organization, called "the authority," that wiU assume their
management on behalf of mankind. The requirement of rational and
sustainable management appears in a litany of instructions notably in
terms of environmental protection,''"^ and sustainable use."*"® Above all, it
The Antarctic Treaty signed at Washington, on 1 December 1959, and the
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources signed in
Canberra in 1980
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 1962
(XVIII) in 1963, and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activides of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies adopted by the General Assembly in it resolution
2222 (XXI). In 1966
Notably, the UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage signed in 1972
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in Montego Bay in 1982
The Moon Agreement was considered and elaborated by the Legal Subcommittee
from 1972 to 1979. The Agreement was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 in
resolution 34/68. The Agreement provides that the Moon and its natural resources are
the common heritage of mankind and that an international regime should be
established to govern the exploitation of such resources when such exploitation is
about to become feasible.
UNCLOS, Article 1
"03 UNCLOS. Article 137
"WUNCLOS, Article 141
"fs UNCLOS, Article 137
UNCLOS, Article 138
to' UNCLOS, Article 145-146
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outlines the mechanisms for benefit-sharing between states takingpart in
the exploitation of the area and States that are not able to do so.
Interestingly, benefit sharing is mainly envisaged in terms of transfer of
technology and scientific knowledge to developing countries.''"' It is also
worth noting that scientific research in the area takes an important place
in the mind of the Convention Negotiators.''"' In order to assume the
sustainable use of this common heritage and equitable benefit sharing,
the Convention establishes the Authority'"' in charge of the
administration of the area,""^ complete with several organs, notably an
assembly,'"^ a council,'"'' and a secretariat.""' The Convention also
establishes the Enterprise'"'^ in charge of the exploitation and a tribunal
with a Seabed Special Chamber''" in charge of dispute settiement
concerning the seabed.
The objectives of (1), helping developing countries through benefit
sharing and transfer of technology, (2) resource conservation, (3)
sustainable use, and (4) coordination of scientific research were the same
objectives as the negotiators of the International Undertaking on
Phytogenetic Resources for Food and Agriculmre.'"® Logically, they take
the Common Heritage principles — above aU the ideas of non-
appropriation and rational and sustainable use- as a model. It is
important to keep in mind the interlocking of non-appropriation and
rational use that has been misunderstood by some critics of the
International Undertaking. Open-access does not imply an absence of
control. On the contrary, open-access calls for regulation; in a sense
property rights and regulation are two alternative forms of control.
2.3.2 The FAO International Undertaking
In 1983, after two years of negotiation, the FAO assembly adopted a
non-legally binding resolution called the International Undertaking on
"08 UNCLOS, Articles 150-154
w UNCLOS, Article 144
tio UNCLOS, Article 143
"" UNCLOS, Articles 156-158
"•2UNCLOS, Article 157
"13 UNCLOS, Articles 159 & 160
UNCLOS, Articles 161-165
"•5 UNCLOS, Articles 166-169
"iii UNCLOS, Article 170
UNCLOS, Articles 187-189
See Christine Noiville. (1997), 'Ressoimes genetiques et droit, Essai sur les regimesjuridiques
des ressourcesgenetiques marines, Paris,Institut Economiquede la Mer, Pedone, p. 178
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Phytogenetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.'"' The first article
affirms its objective and declares that genetic resources are the common
heritage of mankind:
The objective of this Undertaking is to ensure that plant genetic
resources ofeconomic andjor social interest, particularlyfor agriculture,
will be explored, preserved, evaluated and made available for plant
breeding and scientific purposes. This Undertaking is based on the
universally acceptedprinciple thatplant genetic resources are a heritage
ofmankind and consequently should be available mthout restriction*^"
In terms of access to genetic resources, this declaration has two
important implications. First, breeders, scientists or conservation
organizations are free to continue collecting genetic resources in
biodiversity-rich countries. It was an important element because after the
decolonization period, the idea of national sovereignty over natural
resources was appealing. Second, this declaration also concerns genetic
resources collected and conserved in botanical gardens or gene banks,
and it provides that they should be placed in open-access.
As demonstrated by the words used, the status of genetic resources as
common heritage is not new. The International Undertaking is
declaratory; it does not modify the property regime of genetic resources
but recognizes it officially. Indeed, genetic resources have always been
implicidy considered to be common heritage. It was notably apparent in
several points of the agricultural chain. First, in farmers' communities
there are long traditions of collective innovation and seed exchanges due
to the perpetual need for new seeds to be adapted to the constantly
changing environment. This tradition does not always prevent
recognition of individual contribution but possible rewards are more
envisaged in terms of reputation rather thanin exclusivity.'* '^ Besides, this
practice was acknowledged in the drafting of the first UPOV
Convention that allowed for some resowing and seed exchanges among
farmers. The principle of open-access is also in harmony with the
practice of the CGIAR. More broadly, as noted by Stephen Brush,"^^
Annex to the resolution 8/83 of the 22"'^ session of the FAO Conference, Rome,
1983. The text is available at the following address:
htq^://\v\^'w.fao.oriT/at'/CCT:fa/lU.htni
•'2" Emphasis added
For documentation of such traditions see Stephen Brush (1996) "Is Common
Heritage Outmoded?" in Stephen Brush and Doreen Stabisky (eds.) Valuing Ijocal
Knowledge. Indigenouspeoples and intellectualproperty VJghts, Washington, Island Press, p.150
Ibidem, p. 148
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there is a strong convergence between the concept of common
heritage and the norms of Science, as is briefly presented in Part One.
The norm of Science that most interests us here is the one called
"communism" by Merton. It implies a norm of open-access based on
the conviction that one cannot monopolize incremental contribution
that increases collective knowledge. Once again, this norm of open-
access does not imply an absence of obligation; rather it creates a
requirement of reciprocity. This close link between the norms of Science
and Common Heritage is fostered by the fact that at the dme most of
the actors involved in the negotiadon of the internadonal undertaking
were scientists. FinaUy, the importance of open-access to research
material was acknowledged in the text of the UPOV Convention via the
breeders' exception.
The interlocking with science and above all breeding activities also
appears in the area of application to the open-access regime for
coUection of genetic resources. This application is defined in terms of
(1) subject matter, (2) genetic resources ownership, (3) type of use of
genetic resources and (4) is subject to some' conditions. First, in terms of
subject matter, the International Undertaking does not apply to just any
genetic resources but only to the plant genetic resources of species that
are of economic and/or social interest for agriculture.''^ ^ Second, Articles
5 draws a distinction between genetic resource owners. Open-access is
only required from public collections.'* '^' This limitation has two
consequences: private collections are concerned only to the extent that
their owners choose to adhere to the system. Improved varieties
protected by a breeder's right (UPOV) are not required to be in open-
access. However, as explained before, the UPOV Convention leaves the
genetic resources included in a protected variety (breeding exception in
open-access). Third, a distinction is made between the types of use:
open-access to samples is granted for scientific and conservation
purposes; other uses are not regulated. Fourth, open-access is submitted
to on the condition of reciprocity;'*^^ it is a furtherillustration of the close
link with the norms of science. It is also an incentive for states and
private institutions to join, as it seems to indicate that access may be
refused to non-adhering institutions. Thus, those distinctions clearly
"25 lU, Article 2
Even if the lARCs are not formally signatories of the Undertaking, their collection
have always been in open access and in 1994most of them willsign formal agreements
in which they place their collections in the Intemational Network "in trust for the
benefit of the international community", and they agree not to claim ownership, or seek
intellectual property rights, over the designatedgermplasm and relatedinformation.
••25 lU, Article 7
166
elucidate one of the objectives of the treaty: fostering reciprocal access to
genetic resources for agricultural R&D purposes, and the intimate link
with science and its norms.
Not only do the Undertaking and the concept of Common Heritage
affirm the principle of non-appropriation, but they also integrate the
elements of a management system for genetic resource use and
conservation for breeding purposes. A Global System on Plant Genetic
Resources was set up with the establishment of the FAO Commission
on Plant Genetic Resources''^ ^ in charge of coordinating reports on the
state of the world's plant genetic resources. This Commission was to also
put into place a Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and
Sustainable Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture.''^ ^ The CGIAR network that provides an important effort
for breeding research and conservation is included in the system and it
plans to increase the number of centers and further develop the network
so as to achieve as complete coverage as necessary, in terms of species
and geographical distribution. States together with the CGIAR network
are required to collaborate to identify plant genetic resources in danger,
and to carry out their conservation and facilitate their exchange."*^® The
aim is to progressively cover all plant species that are important for
agriculture and other sectors of the economy, in the present and for the
future.'* '^ In terms of benefit sharing, the lU implicidy affirms that the
principal way of sharing benefits lies in the free exchange of material. In
addition, it is a goal to establish and strengthen the capabilities of
developing countries so as to help them take part in the conservation
efforts, but above all to enable them to make full use of plant genetic
resources for the benefit of their own agricultural development."'^ ''
***
In this Second Chapter, I have identified a first equilibrium in the
evolution of the property regime of genetic resources. One public good
-agricultural research - is provided for in part by the private sector,
thanks to a suigeneris intellectual property right and in part by publicly
funded research centers. Conservation, a second public good further
upstream in the innovation chain, is mainly provided thanks to public
'•2'' It is now named the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture or
CGRFA.
See the website of the CGRFA http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/PGR.htm




funding by a network of national and international gene banks. Finally,
genetic resources are said to be the common heritage of mankind, i.e. in
open access. Observed from the breeders' standpoint, breeder's right
(UPOV) and the Common Heritage principle are not contradictory but
rather they complement each other. Open-access for genetic resources
for conservation and research purposes is the optimal condition for
carrying out agricultural research.
However, this equilibrium wiU be contested for several reasons. First, it
wiU be argued that the equilibrium is unbalanced. If one takes a closer
look, it appears that when genetic resources are said to be the common
heritage of mankind, they are above all available for breeders
(researchers). What lies in open access is the research material, i.e. plants
in their natural state (and the genetic resources they contain) as weU as
genetic resources containedin protected new varieties; whereas exclusive
rights protect new varieties developed by breeders. The problem is that
while breeders can make use of genetic resources included in a protected
variety, farmers only work at the variety level. Exaggerating a littie bit, it
could be argued that under a dejure open access regime, genetic resources
are defacto the common property of plant breeders, that is to say in open-
access among breeders but defacto inaccessible for third parties (farmers).
In itself, this situation is not problematic but there is an asymmetry
among states. Agricultural research capacities are for the most part in
industrialized states while most genetic diversity is contained in landraces
or wild plant varieties (i.e. unprotectable) located in tropical developing
countries. Thinking in terms of varieties rather than in terms of genetic
resources, those countries observe that their varieties are in open-access
while intellectual property rights protect the northern varieties.
This lack of balance will further increase with the development of
biotechnologies, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, which increase
the value of genetic resources and call for a reconsideration of the
possibility of patenting genetic resources. This, therefore, reduces access
to "northern" genetic resources. Moreover, the TRIPs Agreement will
reinforce the sense of unbalance. Before the TRIPs Agreement,
developing countries were not obliged to offer IPR protection for
innovations protected in developed countries. The Paris Convention on
patent law only required low standards of protection and allowed for
exceptions. In addition, there was no real control on how countries
offered effective protection, to foreign inventors. This situation wiU be
challenged by the TRIPs Agreement, which will impose high and
uniform standards of protection, limit possible exceptions and monitor
how countries protect foreign inventors. Finally, biodiversity erosion is
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continuing and conservation efforts must be increased. In this context,
controlling access to genetic resources and charging for access appears to
be a potential means to fund conservation.
In the next chapter, I analyze how this first equilibrium is upset by two
changes. Downstream of the innovation chain, patents will be granted
on final inventions that reduce open-access. On the upstream side of the
innovation chain, traditional farmers and bio-diverse countries will claim
control over their genetic resources and require compensation for access,
which further reduces open-access. Those two legal changes pave the
way for the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity that puts
an end to open-access and instead relies on exclusive rights to regulate
genetic resources.
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3. Two Changes and the End of Open Access
In the previous chapter, I mentioned a situation that seemed to be an
equilibrium: plant genetic resources in open access, private R&D
fostered by an intellectual property right on new varieties, and this all
complemented by a publicly funded conservation effort that collected
PGR, conserved them and put them at the disposal of breeders or
farmers. However, this situation never reallybeen regarded as a balanced
regime. As noted by Gregory Rose, "The lU has been dogged by controvert
since its adoption as it deals with the politically explosive issues ofPGRs control. Its
effectiveness has been hampered by competing interests of the (mostly developing
countries which have a natural abundance ofPGR andwish tomaintain some control
over them, and, on the other hand, the (mostly developed) countries which have made
capital investments in refining and wish to exercise control themselves. Each also
desires unhindered access to the others' holdings ofPGR"* '^.
In this chapter, I analyze how this equilibrium was contested by a double
change. Downstream of the innovation chain, the development of
modern biotechnologiesmodified the costs and benefits of creating IPRs
on genetic resources and the possibility of patenting them was
reconsidered. Once the patenting of living organisms was admitted, the
coexistence of two systems of protections -patent and plant breeders'
right- caused some difficulty, which led to a revision of the UPOV
Convention. Finally, the TRIPS Agreement extended the choice of
patenting living organisms to all WTO members. On the upstream side
of the innovation chain, traditional farmers and biodiverse countries
claimed control of their genetic resources and demanded compensation
for access. Those legal changes, both downstream and upstream of the
innovation chain, paved the way for the adoption of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, which put an end to open-access and conversely
relied on exclusive rights to regulate genetic resources.
Gregory Rose (1996), "International Regimes for the Conservation and Control of
Plant Genetic Resources" in Michael Bowman and Catherine Redgwell (eds),
International Laiv and the Conservation of Biological Diversity" Kluwer Law International,
London, p. 153
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3.1 Downstream: the Protection ofFinal Inventions
I previously argued that in the middle of the twentieth century the early
developments in genetics and the breeding sector growing autonomy
from agriculture led to a demand for economic incentives under the
form of plant breeders' rights. In the first part of this dissertation, I
mentioned the theory of property rights developed by Demsetz and
others,which predicts that the creation and the enforcement of
property rights is primarily a function of changes in value. When the
value of a good rises, potential owners will attempt to convince
governments or courts to change property laws to allow for the capture
of the new value. Exogenous change as technological changes that
increase the value of a good can create sufficient incentives for the
development of property rights. In the 1980s and 1990s, the advent of
modern biotechnology and related changes in the innovation process
increased the potential benefits of increased appropriation of genetic
resources and led to a reconsideration of the possibility of patenting
living organisms. In addition, the technical or intellectual obstacles to
patentability were progressively overcome. Then, in reaction to genetic
resources patenting, plant breeders asked for a revision of the UPOV
Convention. Finally, the TRIPS agreement extended intellectual property
to all WTO members.
3.1.1 Technological Changes
The emergence of new biotechnologies significandy improves our ability
to utilize plant genetic resources. In particular, recombinant DNA
techniques, in combination with a series of other technologies such as
tissue culture, cell fusion, fermentation, and enzyme technology move
the focus of the biological sciences to cellular and molecular structures,
and are increasingly overcoming the natural barriers that prevent the
exchange of genetic materials between different species.lt is in principle
possible to isolate any DNA fragment from any organism, and
incorporate it into any other orgaiusm. This enhances the potential
economic value of genetic resources not only in the agricultural sector
but in many other sectors and specifically in the pharmaceutical sector.
The increasing value of genetic resources results in pressure to bring
Harold Demsetz (1967) in "Towards a Theory of Property Rights" 57 AMERICAN
Economic Review 347; Thrainn Eggertsson (1990) Economic Behavior and Institutions,
Cambridge University Press; Douglas C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change
and Economic Petformance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Yoram Barzel (1997)
TheEconomicAnalysis ofProperty ^ghts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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genetic resources, such as DNA segments, genes, and cell lines, under
the protection of the industrial patent system.
This move is further increased by the arrival of new economic actors.
The commercialization of biotechnology offered new opportunities to
industries from the chemical sector whose development was threatened
by the difficulty to identify new useful, safe and environment friendly
molecules. Moreover, biotechnologies foster synergies between their
agricultural and non-agricultural (pharmaceutical, energy, chemicals)
applications and increased the diversification of large chemical and
pharmaceutical companies. So, in the agricultural sector, one observed
several large chemical companies turning to agricultural biotechnologies
and purchasing seeds companies for their expertise in seed production
and plant breeding as well as for their marketing outiets.''^ ^ In the
agricultural sector where the public and private R&D sectors had long
coexisted, one observed an increasing involvement of the private
sector in agriculture accompanied by stagnancy in public funded
R&D. In the USA, for instance, the private sector spending on plant
breedingincreased between the 1960s and the 1990s at an average annual
rate of growth of seven percent and was multiplied by more than ten. In
contrast, public sector expenditures rose more slowly until 1980, after
which it stagnated and even declined.'* '^'
In conclusion, the new developments of biotechnologies, the effect of
budgetary constraints on public R&D and the interest of the private
sector increased the potential benefits of intellectual property rights. In
addition, new biotechnological products lent themselves to more
absolute forms of proprietary protection, especially industrial patenting.
Breeders using direct gene transfer (transgenesis) and similar techniques
have an interest in legally protecting genes and gene complexes
themselves, rather than the finished crop varieties. Finally,
biotechnologies foster interest in genetic resources not only in
agriculture but also in a large range of sectors, particularly the
pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, regulation of genetic resources is no
FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources (1989), "Implications of New
Biotechnologies for the International Undertaking" CPGR/89/9 and Matie-Angele
Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources genetiques..." p. 36
434 p Heisey,., C.S. Srinivasan and C. Thirde (2001), "Public Sector Plant Breeding in
a Privatizing World" AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION BULLETIN, No. 772 Economic
Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C., and Susan
Bragdon (ed.) (2004), "International Law of Relevance to Plant Genetic Resources: A
Practical Review for Scientists and Others Professionals Working With Plant Genetic
Resources", ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES No.lO pp. 111-115
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longer the monopoly of the agricultural R&D community; it has become
a multi-sector issue where the pharmaceutical sector plays a leading role.
As a consequence, there is a strong call for the reconsideration of the
issue of patenting genedc resources and more broadly living organisms.
For this purpose, technical and intellectual obstacles to patentability are
progressively overcome.
3.1.2 Legal Changes
3.1.2.1 Patenting of Genetic Resources
The Disclosure T^quirement and theBudapest Trea^
As mentioned earlier, one of the main obstacles to the patentability of
plant varieties, and more broadly living material, was that they do not
meet the statutory requirement for description.''^ ® Indeed, a fundamental
requirement of patent law is that the details of the invention must be
fully disclosed to the public. For the disclosure to be adequate, an
invention must be described with sufficient precision to permit a person
skilled in the art to repeat the effect of the invention. Description is
normally achieved by a written description, sometimes completed by
some drawings. However, inventions involving the use of new
microorganisms feature problems of disclosure in that their repeatability
often cannot be achieved by means of only a written description. For
instance, in the case of an invention consisting of a microorganism
isolated from the soil or the sea and improved by mutations and
selection, it would be impossible to describe the strain and the selection
sufficiendy for another person to obtain the same invention from the
soil or the sea.
In the 1970s, this growing importance of inventions including
microorganisms led to some industrialized countries requiring or
recommending that the written disclosure of the invention be
complemented by the deposit of the microorganism in a recognized
culture collection. The microorganism then became available to the
public at the appropriate point in the patenting procedure. Actually, the
deposit requirement was less an additional requirement than an
alternative to the description requirement and it helped overcome one of
the main obstacles to the patenting of living organisms. The adoption of
the Budapest Treaty on International Recognition of the Deposit of
In Europe, Article 83 of the European Patent Convention, in the United-States, 35
U.S.C. U12
173
Microorganisms for tlie Purpose of Patent Procedure in 1977 and its
entry into force in 1980 generalized and organized the deposit pracdce.
Thus, at the end of the 1970s, there was a legal framework that allowed
for the patentability of microbiological inventions and their products but
it had not been conceived to patent microorganisms as such." '^^ In fact,
there was another obstacle to overcome: discoveries or products of
nature were not deemed patentable. However, the courts and statutory
change later helped to overcome this second obstacle.
Disrevardin? Discovery and Product ofNature Objections
The first step came in 1980 from the Supreme Court of the United States
with its Diamond v. Chakrabaty decision. Before that decision, it was
generally agreed that discoveries and products of nature were not
patentable. In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v Kalo Inoculant Co. the Court repeated
the general principle that products of nature were not patentable.''^ ^ It
held that natural products like the beat of the sun, electrici^, or the qualities of
metals, arepart ofthe storehouse ofknowledge ofall men. Thejare the manifestations
oflaws ofnature, free to all tnen and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers
hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it that is
recognisable under the law. Ifthere is to be an inventionfrom such a discovery, it must
comefrom the application ofthe law ofnature to a new and useful end^ '^^
In 1980, In Chakrabaty v Diamond, the Supreme Court admited the
patentability of genetically modified microorganisms. In 1972 Mr.
Chakrabaty filed a patent for a human-made, genetically engineered
bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.
Because of this property, which was not, possessed by any naturally
occurring material, Chakrabaty's invention could have had significant
value for the treatment of oil spills. Chakrabaty's claims included a claim
to the bacteria itself The patent examiner disregarded the fact that no
naturally occurring material had the same property and rejected that
Marie-Angele Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
gteedques...", p. 36
However to be precise, it must be mentioned that the principle that a discovery is
not to be patented had first been challenged in 193,9 in Dennis v. Piiner. The patentee
claimed that he had discovered an insecticide in an extract from the root of a cube
plant. The Supreme Court held that the subject matter was patentable. However the
patent was finally not granted because it appeared that the patentee was not the first to
discover the insecticide use of cube plants roots. See Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F.2d 142, 145
(7th Cir. 1939)
Funk Bros. SeedCo. vKalo Inoculant Co.,333 US 127 (1948)
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claim on two grounds: (1) that micro-organisms are products of nature
and (2) that as living organisms they are not patentable subject matter.
Upon appeal, it was affirmed the examiner on the second ground.
Relying on the legisladve history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the
1970 Plant Variety Patent Act, the Board argued that the 35 U.S.C. § 101
statutory terms "manufactured objects" and "composition of matter" did
not include living material and that a legislative act was required to
include them as patentable subject-matter. The Court of Customs
reversed on the authority of its previous decision in reBerg)i in which it
held that the fact that microorganisms are alive is without legal
significance to patent law. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Customs decision agreeing that the relevant distinction is not between
living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether
living or not, and human made inventions. In so doing, the court
provided a more restrictive interpretation of the product of nature
doctrine than that of the patent office and gave the largest interpretation
ever of patentable subject matter, holding that it included anything under
the sun made byman.'''"'
After this first step, the patentability of living organisms quickly
extended both geographically and in terms of subject matter.
Fearing they would loose competitiveness, industrialized countries
quickly followed the American direction. In Europe, the European
Patent Office and the courts took into account article 53 of the
European Patent Convention that provided some exceptions to
patentability. In particular paragraph B stated that European patents shall
not be granted in respect of (b)plant oranimalvarieties or essentially biological
processes for the production ofplants or animals; thisprovision does not apply to
microbiological processes or theproducts thereof On 11 December 1981, one
year after the Chakrabaty v Diamond decision, the European Patent Office
(EPO) provided an interpretation of Article 53.b affirming that
microbiological processes - that are patentable under the convention -
included the fabrication process of new micro-organisms, for instance by
genetic engineering, and it made clear that the product obtained by those
processes, i.e. the micro-organism itself, is patentable as a product. So,
by an administrative decision of the EPO, Europe followed the United
States in the patentability of living forms."*"" There were some discordant
In RsBergf, 563 F.2d 1031 (1977)
Yet the Court qualifies its broad statement with the declaration that /aw of nature,
physicalphenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable.
For more details, see Marie-Angele Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des
ressources genetiques..." pp.39-40.
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voices, like the Austrian patentoffice, which in 1985 decided against the
patentability ofmicro-organisms. However, in the face of opposidon, the
Austrian parliament modified the legislation and confirmed the
patentabilityof livingorganisms.
Then, both in the United States and in Europe, patentability was
quickly extended to all forms of life. First, cell and tissues were
assimilated to microorganisms and were available to be patented.
Logically, genes that are inserted into ceUs or microorganisms also
became patentable. Then, the next issue was the patentability of
modified plants. In the United States, the issue was whether the
existence of specific legislation, such as the Plant Patent Act and the
Plant Variety Patent Act, prevented the patentability of plants. In Ex
parte Hibberd'''^ the Patent Office Board of Appeal concluded that plants
can fall under statutory scope and be granted a patent. In 2001, the
Supreme Court confirmed the legality of fifteen years of plant patenting
inJ.E.M. AG. Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc.''*^
In Europe, the patentability of plants is ruled by article 53b of the
European Patent Convention that forbids the patenting of plant and
animd varieties. However, some commentators'*''^ argued that UPOV-
type protection provides insufficient incentives to foster investment in
plant biotechnology and pled in favor of plant patenting. The EPO
partiy foUowed those comments by adopting a narrow interpretation of
article 53b. In Transgenic Plant!Novartis the Enlarged Board of
Appeals of the EPO permitted the issue of patents on genetically
engineered plants provided that the claims were not directed to a specific
variety or varieties. The Board argued that a claim to a plant defined bj
single recombinant DNA sequences was patentable because the claim was
d^ned by a part ofits genotype and not by the taxonomic category within the
traditional classification of the plant kingdom to which the plants belong '^'" But a
claim directed to a specific variety was not allowed even where the new
variety had been created by genetic modification resulting from a
biotechnological process.'*''^ The Board of Appeal interpreted article 53b
ExparteHibberd, 227USPQ 443 Bd.Pat.App. 1985
AG. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred lnt% 124(2001)
See Joseph Strauss (1989), "AIPPI and the Protection of Inventions in Plants -Past
Developments, Future Perspectives", 20 iNT'L Rev. IND. ProP & COPYRIGHT L. 600,
or Joseph Strauss (1986), "Patent Protection for New Varieties of Plants: Should
'DoublePatenting' BeProhibited?" 17iNT'L REV. iND. PROP &COPYRIGHT L. 95
"•"•s Transgenic PlantjNovarlis 11, G 001/18 (EPO Enlarged Board of Appeals, December
20,1999)
Ibidem, at 19
w Ibidem, at 36
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as serving the purpose ofexcludingfrom patentability subject-matter which is eligible
for protection under UPOV. However, this interpretation does not prevent
double protection because a breeder's right could cover a particular
variety that could also fall within a broader patent defined by its
genotype.
An additional step occurred when the concept of invention was
interpreted to include not only human made inventions but also
substances isolated from a naturally occurring material;'*''® this was the
end of the product of nature doctrine. The distinction is important
because most microorganisms and genes are not manipulated and are
used for their natural properties. Moreover, this means that genetic
resources collected in developing countries could be patented after mere
isolation without any further modification.
Consequences
Patenting of genetic resources has important consequences in terms of
access. While the UPOV plant breeders' rights protects plant varieties
and leaves genetic resources in open-access, patents grant exclusive
rights on genetic resources themselves. Moreover, in contrast with plant
breeders' right, patent legislation includes no or limited research
exceptions. In addition, plant patents do not permit farmer's privilege
and seeds exchange among farmers.'''" Finally, the coexistence of two
systems of protections —patent and plant breeders' rights- causes some
difficulty and has led to a revision of the UPOV Convention.
3.1.2.2 The Revision of the UPOV Convention
The extension of patent to plants and the recognition of legal ownership
of single genes, gene complexes, genetic characteristics and specific
techniques used to produce new crop varieties, is a direct challenge for
the traditional breeding sector and its protection under the UPOV plant
breeders' right. In opposition to plant breeders' rights, industrial patents
prevent plant breeders from freely using each other's varieties because
parts of the genetic resources contained in these varieties have been
recognized as someone else's exclusive property. This difference
between UPOV plant breeders' rights and patent law creates an
See article 3.2 of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and the
Council on the Legal Protection of the Biological Inventions.
Note however that in the EU, the Directive willintroduce a limited farmers privilege
in patent law {CJ. infra)
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asymmetry between plant breeders using classical breeding methods and
modern biotechnological inventors. Indeed from the classical plant
breeder viewpoint, there is danger that the more commercially valuable
patented genes and gene complexes wCU2349CEill accumulate in new
varieties. This implies that breeders will have to obtain the consent of
several patents holders and pay increasing royalties. Conversely, from the
modern biotechnological sector perspective, there is a need for stable
varieties in which interesting genes can be included. To access such
varieties, biotech companies can either buy traditional seed companies or
simply take advantage of their own varieties. Indeed, under the terms of
1978 UPOV Convention, a breeder cannot prevent a biotech company
from using one of its varieties, introducing some genes within it and be
granted protection. In other words, the 1978 UPOV Convention allowed
protected varieties to be open-access research tools for biotech
companies whereas classical breeders lost access to any variety
containing a patented gene.'*^"
This unbalanced situation led in 1991 to the adoption of a new version
of the UPOV Convention. While conserving the principles of an
exclusive right to plant varieties and the breeder's exception, this new
version introduces the notion of "essentiaUy derived variety."
Henceforth, the breeder's exclusive right extends to varieties which are
essentially derivedfrom theprotected variety, that is to say varieties that meet the
UPOV protection requirement of distinctiveness but which have
conserved the main biological and commercial characteristics of the
initial variety.''^ ' This new element can be seen as an extension of
protection or as an exception to the breeder's exception. It introduces a
sort of inventiveness threshold, not as a protection requirement but
rather as a condition to have access to the protected variety. As a
consequence, a biotechnological inventor wanting to use a protected
variety and to introduce a new gene within must obtain the permission
of the breeders and pay royalties. This way a balance is reintroduced
'•5" Marie-Angele Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
genetiques..p. 47
Article 15 considers a variety as essentially derived from another variety when
1) it is predominantly derived from the initial variety, or from a variety that is itself
predominantly derived from the initial variety, while retaining the expression of the
essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of
the initial variety,
2) it is clearly distinguishable from the initial variety and it is clearly distinguishable
from the initial variety and
3) except for the differences which result from the act of derivation, it conforms to the
initial variety in die expression of the essential characteristics that result from the
genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial variety.
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between classical breeders resorting to PBRs and biotech companies
using patent/^^ However, the result is a renewed attack against open
access of genetic resources.
The re-working of the 1991 UPOV Convention was also an opportunity
to introduce two additional changes that further reduced the open access
of genetic resources. First, the prohibition of double protection was
removed. In its 1978 version, the UPOV Convention required member
states to protect new plant varieties either by plant breeders' right or by
patent but stipulated that states admittingprotection under both theseforms may
provide only one of them for one and the same botanical genus or species''^ ^. On
request of the United States, which provided both types of protection,
this restriction was suppressed in the 1991 UPOV Convention and
member states were free to grant both protections for the same
element.'*^''
Second, the so-called farmer's privilege that allows them to use
former harvests as seed sources for subsequent seasons (farmer-saved
seeds) became more regulated. Actually, the farmer's privilege was
explicitiy mentioned for the first time. Thus far, the farmer's practice of
resowing was not mentioned in the UPOV Convention but was tolerated
as an old practice. However, the meaning of the practice has changed, as
farmers no longer reuse their own inventions but instead use the
research results of a plant breeding companies. As long as the resowing
practice remained limited, breeders tolerated it. Then, when diminishing
prices of cereals led farmers to increase resowing,the cost and benefit
of monitoring farmer's resowing activities was modified and they asked
for compensation. The pressure towards regulating farmer's resowing
practices was further increased by the competition of patent laws that
provided a stronger degree of monopolization and legally excluded the
"•52 In addition in the European Union, article 12 of the Directive 98/44/EC of the
European Parliament and the Council on the Legal Protection of Biological Inventions
(OJ L 213/13 30.07.98) requires member states to introduce non-exclusive cross-
compulsory licenses where a breeder cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety right
without infringing a prior patent or where the holder of a patent concerning a
biotechnological invention cannot exploit it without infringing a prior plant variety
right.
Article 2, International Convention for the Protection of new Varieties of Plants of
December 2,1961, as revised at Geneva on November 10,1972, and October 23,1978
''5'' According to a 1999 survey by the World Seed Federation, there are only a few
countries (namely USA, Australia and Japan) where protection through utility patents is
also used and mainly implemented in the US.
'•55 Marie-Angye Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
genetiques...", p. 47
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possibility of farmers usingtineir own seeds. Consequently, article 15.2of
the 1991 UPOV regulates farmer's resowing under the form of an
optional and limited exception to the plant breeders' right. Member
states may authorize farmers to use their harvest as a seed source but
farmers can only use the harvest that they have obtained on their own
holdings and only for their own use. Therefore, seed exchanges among
farmers or seed sales by farmers are prohibited. In addition, resowing
must remain mthin reasonable limits and ps] subject to the safeguarding of the
legitimate interests ofthebreeder.
Farm-Saved Seed of Small Grain Cereals in the EU












As the farmer's privilege has become optional, the situation varies
according to the choice made by UPOV member states. In the European
Union, the matter of plant breeders' right is ruled by the Council
Regulation No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community Plant Varieties
Rights'*" (hereafter the basic regulation),which includes the farmer's
privilege. The basic regulation authorizes farmers to use their harvest as
seed sources under limited conditions as set forth in the UPOV
Convention: they can only use the harvest, that they have obtained on
their own holdings and only for their own use. Regarding the 1991
UPOV convention requirement to safeguard the legtimate interests of the
breeder, the basic regulation draws a distinction between small farmers
and other farmers. The former category may freely resow their harvest
while the latter group is required to pay an equitable remuneration to the
holder of the plant breeders' right (PBRs).
'^ 56 Rabobank (1994), The World Seed Market: Developments and Strateg/, Agricultural
Economic Institute (LEI-DLO)/Rabobank/Ministry of Agriculture, Nature
Management and Fisheries, Netherlands
Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety
rights (OJ L 227 of 01.09.94 p. 1)
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In addition, the basic regulation and its implementing rules'*^® provide an
interesting system, inspired by the copyright system, to deal with the
important transaction costs that this system is likely to cause. This
system contains elements that can be analyzed in terms of liability rules
as well as collective rights organization. Liabilit}' rules help reduce
bargaining costs by suppressing the need to obtain the consent of the
entitiement holder and provide a mechanism of collective valuation.
While collective rights organizations can help reducing search costs,
bargaining costs, and monitoring or enforcement costs. Bargaining
costs designate the costs of reaching an agreement. In this case, they can
be high for a series of reasons. If there is contestation among farmers of
the legitimacy of the restriction of the farmer's privilege, it does not
favor the reaching of agreement. Similarly, plant breeders accept this
system as a compromise but would prefer farmers to buy new seeds
every year. In addition, the cost of negotiating royalties with each farmer
might be high in comparison with the small amount of money at stake.
Consequently, one can see in the implementing rules an attempt to
overcome this difficulty. The choice of a statutory license (as there exist
many in copyright laws) or a liabiKty rule, in Calabresi & Melamed's
and Reichman's terminology, suppresses the need to obtain the consent
of the breeders who might be reluctant to authorize cheap resowing and
rather prefer promoting the sale of new seeds. Regarding the collective
valuation of the remuneration to be paid, the implementing rules support
the conclusion of standard agreements on the level of the remuneration
to be paid by means of negotiation between breeders' and farmer's
organizations. Then, the implementing rules provide that agreements
between breeders' and farmer's organizations shall be used as guidelines
for the determination of the remuneration to be paid in the area of and
for the species concerned.''^ ' Finally, to further decrease bargaining costs,
the implementing rules provide a default rule for the determination of
the level of remuneration.'^ '''' So, if the parties cannot reach an agreement
or if they do not want to incur the costs of negotiating a customized
contract, they can rely on the default rule.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1768/95 of 24 July 1995 implementing rules on
the agricultural exemption provided for in Article 14 (3) of the Council Regulation (EC)
No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community Plant Variety Rights, (OJ L 172,
25/07/1995 pp. 0014-0021) as amended by 398R2605 (OJ L 328 04.12.98p. 6)
''59 Article 5 par. 4 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1768/95 of 24July 1995 as
amended in 1998
In that case, the remuneration shall be 50% of the amounts charged for the licensed
production of propagating material (article 5 par. 5)
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Regarding others categories of transaction costs, search costs refer to
the costs of locating an exchange partner; that is to say locating a person
who wants to buy what you are selling or sell what you want to buy;
monitoring and enforcement costs include the cost of monitoring the
behavior of the parties and the cost of sanctioning violations of the
agreement. The cost of identifying and above all monitoring farmers'
resowing has long been one the main reasons for plant breeders to
tolerate it. As European agriculture is increasingly regulated, it becomes
easier to obtain information to monitor farmers' behavior. The
implementing rules provide some help for reducing monitoring costs by
encouraging rights holders to negotiate information requirements with
farmers and processors. Processors here play a fundamental role because
farmers most often need their help to process a part of their harvest into
seeds; consequentiy they can provide rights holder with useful
information.'" '^ In addition, the implementing rules provide default rules
in case rights holders, processors and farmers could not reach an
agreement or would not incur the cost of negotiating customized
information obligation.""^^ Finally, the implementing rules call for the
negotiations of arrangements with organizations of farmers and
processors to ensure assistance in the monitoring of the use of the
farmer's privilege.
To take advantage of this legislation, plant breeders have gathered into
associations that act as copyright collective rights organizations."'^ ^ In
some European countries, they negotiate standard agreements with
farmers associations on the amount of compensation. Acting on behalf
of a large numberof plant breeders, theymonitor farmers resowing, they
collect the fee, and when necessary they can also sue farmers refusing to
payor to provide information on their activities. In so doing, theyreduce
monitoring and enforcement costs to a reasonable level. For example,
the Saatgut-TreuhandverwaltungsgeseUschaft mbH (STV), a German
breeders association, acts on behalf of more that 60 plant breeders
detaining rights on more that 500 plant varieties. It sends information
Articles 8 and 9 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1768/95of 24July1995
Ibidem
Article3 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1768/95 of 24July 1995explicitly
provides that plant breeders associations may act on behalf of their members.
Questioned on what conditions an breeders organization could rule
In a recent case the European Court of Justice precised the conditions under which a
breeders' organizadon can act on behalf of their member. ECCJ 11 March 2004
C-182/01 Saatgut-Tnuhandvmvaltmgsgeselhchaft mbH V. WernerJager.
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requests to most German farmers and has sued several of them who
refused to either provide information'" '^' or pay.
Finally, it should be mentioned that in the European Union the Farmers
privilege is no longer a specialty of the UPOV system. The Directive
98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biological Inventions obliges the
Member States of the European Community to introduce a similar
farmer's privilege into theirpatent laws.'"^^
3.1.2.3 The TRIPs Agreement: Geographical Extension of
IPRs
After the extension of patent and plant breeders' rights protections to
genetic resources, the next step in the appropriation of genetic resources
lies in the geographical extension of intellectual property laws, especially
in the protection within developing countries for inventions made in
developed countries. Until 1994, every state was free to adopt the level
of protection it wanted. Actually, many countries, especially less
developed and developing countries, offered a low level of protection
and littie help in the enforcement of property rights obtained in another
country. In addition, those countries often excluded several subject
matters from protection, most notably medicines and living organisms.
However since the late 1970s, the industrialized countries, stroked by the
slowdown of their economies and the competition of newly
industrialized countries, have realized that their main comparative
advantage lies in their technological advances and they want to reinforce
it by generalizing and strengthening intellectual property protection.
After some unsuccessful negotiations in the framework of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (W.I.P.O), the discussions are turned
to the G.A.T.T. where the generalization and strengthening of
intellectual property law can be negotiated against other trade issues like
providing access for developing countries products into the markets of
industrialized countries.''^ '^ As a consequence, the 1994 Marrakech
Agreements, which found the World Trade Organization (W.T.O) and
In a recent decision, the European Court of Justice construed the farmer's
information obligations in restrictive terms. ECCJ 10 April 2003 C-305-00 Shulin v
Saatgut-Treuhandvenvaltungsgeselkchaft mbH
'"'5 Article 11 of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and the Council
on the Legal Protection of BiologicalInventions (OJ L 213/13 30.07.98)
For a brief historical account of the TRIPs negotiation see Nicolas Brahy and Selim
Louafi (2004), "La Convention sur la Diversite Biologique..."pp. 18-19. For a detailed
account see Susan K Sell (1998), "Power andIdeas, North-South Politics ofIntellectual Property
andAntitrust, State University of New York, New York.
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concluded the G.A.T.T round of negotiations (Uruguay Round), include
an Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs).'*'^ ^ The TRIPs Agreement first requires W.T.O. member
states to join the main existing international conventions on intellectual
property, and then it raises the minimum standards of protection. More
precisely, article 27§1 requires member states to provide patents for any
invention, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that theyare new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application. Consequentiy, the freedom of W.T.O. member
states to deny patent protection to some subject matters is strongly
restricted. Concerning livingmaterial, under the terms of article 27§3(b),
inspired by the European Patent Convention, W.T.O. member states
may only exclude from patent protection plants, animals and essentially
biological processes for their production but they may not exclude
micro-organisms and microbiological processes. In addition, they must
provideprotection for plant varieties, either by patents or by an effective
suigeneris system or a combination of both.
As a consequence of the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries must
now protect plant varieties and biotechnological innovations. Not only
do they have to protect their own inventions but above all they have to
protect within their territory inventions made abroad.
3.2 Upstream: Protection ofInputs to Innovation
The abandonment of the Common Heritage (open access) doctrine may
also be explained in regards of technological change and the two
complementary bodies of theory on the justification, creation and
evolution of property rights previously described.
3.2.1 Technological Change: In Situ Conservation and
Compensation for the Inputs to Innovation
First, biotechnological developments give the impression that raw plant
genetic resources are extremely valuable. Some voices even use the
expression Green Gold to describe raw genetic resources. As suggested by
Demsetz and others, the prospect of appropriating a part of the rent
provided by biotechnological inventions incites biodiversity rich
The TRIPs Agreement is annex IC of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakech, Morocco on 15 April 1994.




countries to reject the Common Heritage doctrine and to claim
compensation for their resources. In addition, there had already been a
growing feeling among these countries that there was an asymmetry
between the North and South and they had the conviction that the
regime created by the UPOV Convention and the International
Undertaking was unbalanced. This conviction was reinforced by the
patenting of genes and plants, which further reduces the open access to
genetic resource included in modern varieties.
Second, the theory of property rights developed by Coase predicts that
problems of externalities and public goods can be solved by the creation
of property rights. I have already explained that conservation of genetic
resources is a public good. Thus far, the option chosen to ensure
conservation has consisted in publicly funded programs ex situ
conservation funded where the conserved genetic resources are in open-
access. However, it progressively appears that ex situ conservation is not
sufficient and must be completed by in situ conservation. This
observation leads first to a reconsideration of the role of traditional
farmers and developing countries in the conservation of genetic
resources. Then, it requires choosing the best way to fund m situ
conservation, i.e. a public good, either by public funding or property
rights.
Ex situ and in situ conservation are two strategies to reach
complementary but not identical objectives. As I previously mentioned
biodiversity operates as an input into agricultural and pharmaceutical
R&D both as a stock and as a flow. situ conservation is static in
nature: it attempts to freeze the current stock of germplasm for later use.
From the set of existing varieties, a set is selected and conserved in a
gene bank. In that case, their information content is frozen at the time of
collection. The information contained in non-conserved genetic
resources is likely to disappear with the ongoing biodiversity erosion.
Similarly, future information flows from the conserved varieties is lost
because in gene banks stop adapting to the constant evolution of their
natural environment. In brief, ex situ conservation consists of an attempt
to make the optimal use of existing stocks of information contained
within the existing stock of genetic resources.
Timothy Swanson and Timo Goeschl (1999), "Optimal Genetic Resource
conservation: in situ and ex siti/', in Stephen Brush (ed.), Genes in the Field. On Farm
Conservation of Crop Diversity, Lewis Publisher (Boca Raton, USA), IDRC (Ottawa,
Canada) and IPGRI (Rome, Italy), p. 182
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Conversely, the stake of in situ conservation is precisely to focus on the
"reception" of information flows. In situ conservation is dynamic in
nature; it allows varieties currently in use to evolve. Therefore, in situ
conservation requires very different types of actions. It does not consist
in the creation of collectionof genetic resources but rather constitutes an
attempt to tackle directly the cause of biodiversity erosion. As I
explained in Chapter One, two important causes of biodiversity erosion
are first the conversion of the naturally existing areas to other land uses,
which are more highly valued by humans and second, a phenomenon of
specialization in a limited number of species and varieties within
agriculture {Cf. Part II, chapter 1). The FAO and the agricultural R&D
community will first focus on specialization and then reconsider the
contribution of traditional farmers to in situ conservation. Then, not only
the FAO but also the environmental community wiU pay more attention
to the conversion process and the role of biodiverse countries.
3.2.1.1 Specialization and the Role of Farmers
One aspect of in situ conservation lies in the continuing cultivation of a
large diversity of crops by farmers together with their practice of
observation and selection.''^ ' Professors Swanson and Goeschl regard
the flow of information or the innovation chain in the agricultural R&D
as a three stages process.''^ ° Stage I designates the information produced
by an ecosystem and natural selection. Only varieties that are able to
survive threats, like pests and pathogen, survive. As the threats are
constantiy changing, the environment produces a continuous flow of
new information on the characteristics that are fit under the current
environment. Stage II designates the contributions of traditional farmers.
Traditional farmers have survived by observing the naturally generated
flow of information and by selecting and using interesting traits and
characteristics. In this way, traditional plant varieties constitute a stock of
information on naturally generated resistance strategies that have been
successful in changing the environment over time. Farmers are the
receptors of this information. Stage III is the modern plant-breeding
sector that uses nature and farmers as information providers. The plant
breeding industry collects landraces and their informational content and
tries to recombine and concentrate interesting traits into new varieties.
In situ conservation implies a group of individuals who continue to
dedicate some amount of land to the cultivation of a large diversity of
varieties so as to maintain the flow of information. Because of regional
Ibidem, p. 167
™ Ibidem, p. 171
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diversity, access to large market was not sufficient to induce
specialization; In addition, because using a large diversity of crops and
technologies has long been used as an insurance mechanism against
varieties yield variability, the amount of crop diversity maintained by
farmers in developing countries has long been sufficient to maintain a
substantial base of resources for agricultural R&D. This base, however,
is threatened''^ ' by a process of specialization.
Modern agriculture involves very different technology from traditional
farming. It relies on a limited number of homogenous and high yielding
varieties and their related inputs, as well as chemicals and mechanization.
As the share of modern agriculture increases, homogeneity replaces
traditional diversity. The spread of Green Revolution hybrids and the
associated techniques have resulted in the cultivation of fewer varieties
of crops. Some crops have seen upwards of a ninety percent reduction
rate in crop varieties.''^ ^ In addition, today's economy provides farmers
with alternative insurance mechanisms on the financial and labor
markets."*^^ Consequentiy, farmers are increasingly reluctant to provide in
situ conservation service, and there is a need to give them economic
reasons to continue.
As a consequence, it is progressively acknowledged that developing
countries biodiversity does not only consist of wild varieties provided by
nature but instead a large part has been conserved and improved by
generations of local farmers. It thus appears that farmers can play a key
role in the conservation of genetic resources, not only for their own
benefit but also for the international community. This "on farm
conservation" effort could be fostered by some compensation. The
feeling that farmers' varieties embody some innovation that should not
be available for free, especiallywhen the development of biotechnology
increases the value of genetic resources and sharpens the conflict for
their control, sharpens this trend. The idea that traditional farmers
deserve compensation for their inputs was first recognized in 1989 with
Ibidem, p. 165. See also FAO (1996) Report ontheStateofPlant Genetic Resourcesfor Food
and Agriculture prepared for the Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources;
Leipzig, Germany; 17-23 June 1996. It notes that there should be a halt on the
extinction of farmers' varieties because the replacement of farmers' varieties by modern
varieties of crops is an important cause of genetic erosion.
""2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_revolution
For more details see also Timo Goeshl and Timothy Swanson (1996), "Market
Imperfections and Crop Genetic Resources", Paper prepared for the International
Plant Genetic Resources Institute. Rome : IPGRI
187
the apparition of a notion of "Farmers" rights' in two FAO resolutions
interpreting the InternationalUndertaking.
3.2.1.2 Land Conversion and the Role of Biodiverse Countries
If the conceptof farmers rights attempts to answer the phenomenonof
specialization by considering economic incentives for some farmers to
carry on cultivating a large range of species and varieties, the main cause
of biodiversity erosion is probably land conversion. Land Conversion is
the process by which human societies convert naturally existing lands to
other land uses that are more highlyvalued by humans. Over the past ten
thousand years, human societies have reallocated land towards a very
small selection of species. These are the domesticated and cultivated
varieties that have been developed for use in agriculture. Thus, through
this conversion process, human societies and their associated species
have expanded while reducing the resources available to other species.
Therefore, the human development process has been closelyrelated with
diversity decline over the past ten thousand years. Today, highly
developed countries have lost a good part of their biodiversity and most
of the remainingbiodiversity lies in tropical developing countries.
As a consequence, one of the main costs of biodiversity conservation is
the opportunity cost of not converting extra land. The public goods
problem appears in the fact that even if the social benefits of conserving
biodiversity are higher than the social benefits of additional conversion
and specialization, the private benefits for a state considering the latter
are much higher than the private benefit of conservation. Within the
territory of a state, the government can either provide some public
funding for biodiversity conservation or create property rights to enable
conservators to appropriate the returns on their investment. However, as
most of the remaining biodiversity is in a limited number of developing
countries, most of the conservation efforts must be carried out within
their territory for the benefit of all mankind, and more specifically for
the benefits of user countries and their industries. There is, therefore, a
need to channel the benefits (or internalize the social benefit) of
biodiversity conservation to those countries. This issue was first
considered in the three resolutions adapted by the FAO before
becoming a central issue of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
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3.2.2 Legal Changes
Resolutions 4/89 and 5/89''^'' introduce the idea that the sources of or
inputs to innovation —developing countries' genetic resources —deserve
compensation and emphasize the role of farmers. Resolution 4/89
provides that States adhering to the Undertaking recogni^ the enonnous
contribution thatfarmers ofall remans have made to theconservation and development
ofplantgenetic resources, which constitute thebasis ofplantproduction througjjout the
world, and which form the basisfor the concept ofFarmers' Rights. The rationale
for a possible compensation is further explained in Resolution 5/89 that
considers that in the history ofmankind, unnumberedgenerations offarmers have
conserved, improved and made available plant genetic resources and that the majori^
of these plant genetic resources come from developing countries, the contribution of
whosefar?7iers has not been sufficiently recognit^d or rewarded. As a consequence,
Resolution 5/89 endorses the concept of Farmers' Rights defined as
rights arisingfrom thepast, present andfuture contribution offarmers in conserving
improving and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the
centers oforigin diversity.
Apart from acknowledging the role of farmers and enouncing the
rationale for their compensation, resolutions 4/89 and 5/89 observe that
farmers are both at the source and at the end of the conservation and
innovation chain: they conserve genetic diversity and provide the inputs
to the innovation chain; by cultivating the new crops they are also the
end users of the conservation and innovation efforts. So, Resolution
4/89 specifies that the best way to implement the concept ofFarmers' Right is to
ensure the conservation, the management and the use ofplantgenetic resources, for the
benefit ofpresent andfuture generations offarmers. Resolution 5/89 adds that
Farmers' Rights should allow farmers, their communities, and countries in all
regions, toparticipatefully in the benefits derived, at presentand in thefuture,from
the improved use ofplant genetic resources, through plant breeding and other scientific
methods.
FAO Conference Resolution 5/89, it is an annex to the International Undertaking;
Adopted 29 November 1989; 25 Session of the FAO Conference; FAO, Rome.
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3.2.2.1 Farmer's Rights: Considering Liability Rules''^ ^^ and
Collective Rights Organizations.
Once the rationale for compensatirig traditional farmers as
conservationists and input providers is set, the design of a compensatory
mechanism remains. Unfortunately, on this aspect the two resolutions
provide littie detail. However, they give some clues on how such a
compensatory system could be designed. First, Resolution 4/89 provides
a new interpretation of the notion of free access stating that the tern "free
access" does not meanfree ofcharge. Second, it adds that the benefits to be derived
under the International Undertaking are part ofa reciprocal system, andshould be
limited to countries adhering to the International Undertaking. Third, Resolution
5/89 vests Farmers' Rights in the international community as trustee for
present and future generation of farmers. And fourth, the ulterior
Resolution 3/91'* '^^ provides that Farmers' Rights wiU be implemented
through an international fund on plant genetic resources which will
support conservation and utilization programs.
Because the international community will not implement Farmers'
Rights, they cannot reaUy be regarded as a legal device. However, since
the adoption of those resolutions, they remain a mobilizing political
concept. The ideaof compensating farmers and developing countries for
their contribution in to conservation and innovation wiU later be
implemented through different devices. It is nonetheless worth trying to
figure out what kind of device(s), Resolution 4/89 and 5/89 call for.
The assertion thatfree access^^^ does not meanfree ofcharge, points towards the
creation of an entitiement protected by a liability rule and the
constitution of a form of a paying public domain. Indeed, in the first
part of this dissertation, it has been said that an entitiement is deemed to
be protected by a liability rule whenever someone may take the
entitiement if he is willing to pay an objectively (collectively) determined
value for it. A liability rule does not require a prior agreement of the
entitiement holder. Thus, it can be said that an entitiement protected by
'fs Por another text suggesting an analysis of Farmers' Rights in terms of liability rules,
see Valerie Boisvert and Emmanuelle Caron (1998), "Biodiversity and Property Rights:
The Contributions of a Neo-institutional Approach", Second International Conference
of the European Society for Ecological Economics March, University of
Geneva, Switzerland.
FAO Conference Resolution 3/91 is the third annex to the International;
Undertaking; Adopted 25 November 1991; 26 Session of the FAO Conference; FAO,
Rome.
As die word "free" can imply either no price or no prior consent, the expression
"Open access" would have been clearer that free access
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a liabilityrule is infree access butnotfree ofcharge as said by Resolution 4/89.
The creation of an entitlement —a Farmers' Right —protected by a
liability rule requires some collective decisions on the following
questions. Like for any intellectual property rights, one must know who
is entitled to it, and the acts that trigger an obligation to compensate. In
addition, protecting an entidement by a liability rule requires a
mechanism of collective evaluation of the compensation. The answers
provided by the resolution are confusing because there seems to be a
juxtaposition of two compensation systems.
The first compensation system lies in the possibility of genetic resources
holders claiming compensation when asked to provide access to their
resources. In this case, the entidement holder is the holder of the
resources whose access is requested. The debtor of the compensation is
the one asking access to the genetic resources. But, the mechanism of
collective evaluation is missing. Indeed, littie is said about the amount
that can be charged but one can think that it is only necessary to
compensate the cost of transferring the resources plus part of the cost of
their conservation, though it could by no means threaten the principle of
open-access.
Regarding the second system of compensation, the resolutions ask for
the creation of an international fund that would finance conservation
and utilization programs for the benefit of farmers. This fund would be
supplied by user-country contributions. Thus, in this system, farmers
collectively hold the entidement, while their rights are vested in trust by
the international community, which is in charge of collecting and
managing the funds. The asymmetry between biodiversity rich and
technologically poor countries (providers) and biodiversity poor and
technologically rich countries (users) triggers an obligation to
compensate. The use of a trust fund, and the fact that it is due to be fed
by user countries, eliminates the necessity to precisely identify an
individual provider and an individual user in each accession to genetic
resources. However, it requires specifying contributions and distribution
rules. If those rules had been specified, the system could have looked like
a collective rights organization, but the resolutions are mute on these
issues. Actually, this second system looks more like solidarity among
nations rather than a collective rights organization or a true liability rule.
In addition to this suggestion for a compensation mechanism for
farmers, the resolutions claim that the benefits of the open-access regime
are part of a reciprocal system and call for the limitation of the open-
access principle to countries adhering to the lU. In so stating.
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Resolution 4/89 suggests that a regime of shared access (limited
commons or res universitatis) based on reciprocal obligations might be
better than an open-access regime (or public domain or res publicae).
Because access is conditioned by a series of reciprocal obligations, it is an
incentive for would-be users to provide their contributions. In other
words, moving from an open-access regime to a shared-access regime
could be viewed as a means to reduce free riding. Like the two previous
provisions, this provisionhas never had any effect.
3.2.2.2 National Sovereignty: Opting for a Property Rule
As a matter of fact, neither the potential of a liability rule nor that of a
shared access regime will be explored because genetic resources quickly
evolve to a more proprietary regime. While users ask for new intellecmal
property rights to their innovations, states wiU claim national sovereignty
over their genetic resources. In its next Conference, the FAO adopted a
new Resolution 3/91 in which it asserts that the concept of common
heritage as applied to genetic resources is submitted to the national
sovereignty of states over their resources. Even so, if the expression
common heritage is maintained, the assertion of sovereign rights on
genetic resources puts an end to the open-access regime. One year later,
the Convention on Biological diversity was signed at the Earth Summit
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This legally binding treaty removes all
references to the notion of Common Heritage and vests biodiverse
countries with national sovereignty over thdir genetic resources. National
sovereignty can is a way for those countries to negotiate access to their
genetic resources, and in so doing, appropriate some of the benefits of
their conservation efforts.'*^® It is, therefore, an attempt to solve a public
goods problem through the creation ofproperty rights.'* '^
addition, the move from the common heritage doctrine towards national
sovereigntyis politically facilitated by the notion of permanent national sovereigntyon
namral resources that appeared as a cornerstone of development law. See notably
Marie-Angele Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources genetiques...",
pp. 42-44
An alternative solution could have consisted in vertical integration. Biodiversity
conservation and biotechnological inventions form an innovation chain. The patenting
of biotechnological inventions enables to appropriate some benefits of the innovation
chain. Consequently, one possibility to fund biodiversity conservation could consist in
the vertical integration of the innovationchain. Either biodiversity rich countries could
develop a biotech industry or biotech industries could invest in the purchasingof land
in biodiverse countries for conservation purposes. Nevertheless, these two variants of
vertical integration are unlikely to happen. As for the first one, most biodiverse
countries are developing countries with littie technical capacities; they are thus unlikely
to develop their own biotech industries in the short run. However, emerging countries
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In legal terms, it might seem strange to compare the notion of national
sovereignty with the concepts of property rights or intellectual property
rights. Nevertheless, the practical effect and the economic rationale of
vesting states with national sovereignty over their genetic resources share
some common traits with property rights and intellectual property rights.
To some extent, national sovereignty on genetic resources includes both
fundamental attributes of property rights: exclusivity and transferability.
The exclusivity prerogative entities the holder to the exclusive possession
of the right at stake. It is supposed to provide a maximum incentive to
invest in resource conservation. This is precisely the objective pursued
by the drafters of the Convention. The transferability prerogative enables
the holder to transfer the rights at a mutually agreed price and
conditions. Such an attribute provides the conditions for an efficient
allocation of the concerned right, i.e. its transfer to the economic agent
who most values it. As for national sovereignty, it is obviously not
transferable but it enables the transfer of genetic resources. The person
collecting genetic resources with the authorization of the providing states
ends up with a property right to the samples he collects. However, the
exclusivity and transferability of the state's rights must be qualified to
take into account the role of property on the genetic resources
considered. The Convention on Biological Diversity does not affect
property law, and as a consequence if someone wishes to access plants or
microorganisms in private land or from land where the management has
been committed to a local or an indigenous community, must also obtain
permission of the landowners.
Vesting states with national sovereignty over their genetic resources
provides them not only with the two main prerogatives of property
rights, but also with more specific traits of intellectual property rights.
First, national sovereignty and the related right to regulate access to
genetic resources is mainly a right to information. Even if Article 15 of
the Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes the sovereign rights
of states over their natural resources, the rules on access provided by the
rest of the article only apply to genetic resources, which are defined as
living materials containing functional units of heredity of actual or
potential value. That is to say that Article 15 provisions apply to natural
like Brazil, India and China may one day consider that option. Concerning the second
variant, one can observe that biotech companies are reluctant to invest in the purchase
of large area of land for conservation and R&D purpose notably for reasons of legal
certainty see Timothy M. Swanson (1998),"Property Rights Issues Involving Plant
Generic Resources: Implications of Ownership for Economic Efficiency", CSERGE
Working Paper GEC 98-13
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resources when they are used as pieces of useful information in a R&D
process but not when theyare used as a product for direct consumption
(e.g. construction wood or game). Another important trait that national
sovereignty has in common with intellectual property rights is that they
both enable the holder to control some uses of the goods subject to
these rights even after the transfer of the good to a third person. So, a
patentee can sell the machine he invented but he retains the exclusive
right to manufacture it. In a similar way, a state can sell plants containing
genetic resources, and if the state transfers the full ownership of the
individual plants, it continues to retain some rights over the use of
genetic resources and their informational content."*®"
***
In this chapter, I have described legal changes both upstream and
downstream of the innovation chain that put an end to the open-access
regime for genetic resources and replace it with a regime based on
exclusive rights. This new regime is regulated by the Convention on
Biological Diversity, which I mentioned above. It is now time to dedicate
it a chapter. In the following Chapter, I will examine the provisions of
the Convention regarding access to genetic resources and benefit
sharing. I will then describe how it has been implemented by
governments and try to provide an assessment of the new regime a
decade after its entry.
"•so The precise extend of these control wUl finally be determined by the terms of the
contract between the providing state and the user. Indeed, it seems clear that states
keep some control on any product containing some of their genetic resources. By
contrast, the CBD itself does not mention "derivatives" such as semi-synthesized or
totally synthesized compounds based on structures discovered from studying genetic
resources or sales of hybrid plants that result from access to two-parents.
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4. The Convention on Biological Diversity and its
Implementation
In the previous chapter, I described two legal changes, (1) the patenting
of genetic resources and (2) national sovereignty on genetic resources.
Together, these changes effectively put an end to open-access genetic
resources and have prepared the coming of the Convention on
Biological Diversity ("CBD"). In this chapter, I wiU present the CBD
and assess the first years of it implementation. I start with a general
presentation of the CBD before taking a closer look at some of its
provisions and the property regime it creates for genetic resources. Then,
I discuss the process of national implementation of the Convention,
using the Philippines as an illustration. Following this, I suggest a
provisory assessment of both the CBD and national ABS legislations,
first looking at existing studies on the Philippines situation, and then
trying to draw general observations in terms of transaction costs. Finally,
I mention a few improvements that have been adopted or that are under
consideration.
4.1 Presentation ofthe CBD
There are two groups of developments that have opened the way for a
new property regime for genetic resources that is based on the
generalization of exclusive property rights and the negotiation of bilateral
agreements between providers and users of genetic resources. These
groups of developments are: the evolution of the discussions within the
FAO and the negotiation of the three interpretative resolutions on the
one hand, and the patenting of genetic resources, the revision of the
UPOV Convention and the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement on the
other hand. These new elements will be integrated into the negotiation
of the CBD. Signed in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit and entered into
force in December 1993, the CBD codifies and generalizes this new
property regime.
In fact, the CBD contains littie change in comparison to existing
biodiversity-related law. In actuality, the CBD can be seen as both a
framework convention and a codification of the existing law. As a
framework convention, the CBD, for the first time, gives recognition to
and integrates a series of movements implied in the use and conservation
195
of biodiversity.''"' These movements include the "parks and protected
areas movement"''®^ that pursues the creation and maintenance of
national parks, the "sustainable utilization movement" pursuing system
of controlled utilization of wildlife,and the "plant genetic movement."
In each of those movements, there had been independent recognition of
the need for economic incentives for conservation, or more precisely the
need to align the incentives of national and local decision-makers and
individuals with the conservation objectives.'*®'* Similarly, Article 1 of the
CBD states that the objectives of the convention are the conservation of
biological diversity, the sustainable use ofits components and the fair and equitable
sharing ofthe benefits arising out ofthe utili^tion ofgenetic resources. The CBD is
also a framework convention in the sense that most of its provisions are
not self-executing, they focus on objectives and leave member states
space for flexible implementation.''"' The CBD also provides an
institutional framework for further discussions on the integration of
those movements and the implementation of their objectives. As for the
precise content of the CBD text, it represents little more than a
codification of the existing law. Concerning plant genetic resources, the
CBD codifies the different bodies of law that I mentioned earlier and
extends their application.
On the one hand, the CBD's article 16 on Access to and Transfer of
Technology, takes note of the possibility to obtain intellectual property
rights on genetic resources, and more broadly biotechnological
inventions in most developed countries. It also takes note of its future
geographical extension to all members of the WTO as required by the
Timothy M. Swanson (1997), GlobalActionfor Biodiversity...,^. 81
•*82 See CBD article 8. Since long, there have been numerous protected areas in colonial
Africa and North Africa. The movement was revitalized in 1962 with the First World
Park Conference in Seattle, USA under the supervision of the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (lUCN). Since then, the practice of
designating and protecting areas under the lUCN system has become universal with
around 37.000 sites covering around 8 million square kilometers, or 4% of the
unconverted area habitats.
See CBD article 10 and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) signed in Washington, DC, in 1972.
Timothy M. Swanson (1997), GlobalActionfor Biodiversity..., p. 81
"•85 Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin (1998), "L'acces aux ressources genetiques: les suites
de I'article 15 de la Convention sur la Diversite Biologique"in Michel Prieur et Claude
Lambrechts (eds.) 'Les Hommes etL'Environnement, Quels droitspour levingt-et-mieme sikle ?
Etudes en Hommages a Alexandre Kiss, Frison-Roche, Paris, p. 551 ; hereafter Francoise
Burhenne-Guilmin (1998), "L'acces aux ressources g&etiques... "
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coming TRIPS Agreement/®^ On the other hand, the CBD reaffirms
(preamble) and recognizes (article 16) the sovereign rights of States over
their natural resources and their authority to determine access to their
genetic resources.
There is little to add regarding the patenting of genetic resources that has
not already been described at length in the previous chapter and in the
Erst part of this dissertation. In addition, the CBD is not the source of
this evolution, it merely adapts to it. Conversely, there is more to say
about state sovereignty over their natural resources and particularly their
genetic resources. Even if the assertion of sovereign rights over genetic
resources was already present in the FAO Resolution 3/91, the CBD
extends the scope of the notion, both in terms of subject matter {ratione
materiai) and in terms of contracting parties {ratione personae). While the
FAO resolution only concerned the states adhering to the International
Undertaking and a limited range of genetic resources used in the
agriculture and food industry, the CBD covers aU vegetal and animal
genetic resources and applies to almost all states.''®^ In addition, unlike
the International Undertaking and its interpretative resolutions, the CBD
is a legally binding treaty applying to almost aU states and it is considered
to be the founding text for the recognition of state sovereignty over
genetic resources. Finally, the CBD gives more precision on the notion
of national sovereignty over such goods as genetic resources and
provides a forum for further discussion on its implications.
4.2 The Text ofthe CBD
Given the direction taken in the FAO and the arguments previously
explained, the Convention logically reasserts state sovereignty over their
genetic resources. The Preamble of the Convention goes one step
further than the FAO, and conscientiously avoids restating the Common
Heritage principle. Rather, the Preamble refers to biodiversity
conservation as the "common concern of humankind," in order to dilute
the idea of collective ownership that is implied in the expression
"Common Heritage."'*^® Article 15, is the main provision of the
The TRIPs Agreement is only signed in 1994 with the rest of the Marrakech
Agreements and entered into vigor in 1995 but it has been negotiated for years and its
content was pardy imown at the time of the negodation of the CBD.
'•8'' There are now 188 contracting parties (June 2006).
488 David Tilford (1998) "Saving the blueprints: The International Legal Regime for
Plant Resources", 30 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
373, at 414
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Convention concerning the rights and obligations of states over access to
genetic resources and the uses of these resources.
The main elements can be summarized as follows. First, Paragraph 1
recognizes the sovereign rights of states over their natural resources and
makes it clear that the authority to grant access to genetic resources rests
with national governments and is subject to national legislation.
Consequendy, states have the right to regulate access to their genetic
resources and to enjoy a great deal of discretion in detailing access
conditions. Second, Paragraphs 4 and 5 contain some important
principles on the general conditions on which access to genetic resources
can be made dependent. By conditioning access on attaining mutually
agreed terms. Paragraph 4 calls for the negotiation between the country
granting iaccess to genetic resources and an individual, company or
instimtion seekingaccess to genetic resources. Under Paragraph 5, access
to genetic resources maybe subject to thepriorinformed consent of the state
providing the genetic resources. The notion of prior informed consent
contains at least two elements; if the providing state chooses the option
to rule access to its genetic resources, its consent must be obtained
before accessing genetic resources and the party interested in access to
genetic resources must provide information on the subsequent use of
those resources. The expression prior informed consent thus caUs for a
system of licenses of access with a procedure detailing the information
required before access is granted."*®' Third, Paragraph 7 provides that
each contracting party shall take appropriate measures with the aim of
sharing the results of R&D and the benefits arising from the utilization
of genetic resources with the providing state. However, regulation of
access must enable benefit sharing but not hinder access; indeed
Paragraph 2 requires all member states to endeavor to createfacilitated access to
genetic resources. Finally, Paragraph 3 limits Article 15 domain of
application to genetic resources collected after the CBD comes into
force. As a consequence, owners of ex situ collections of genetic
resources, botanical gardens or pharmaceutical companies, may continue
to use their collections without being subject to the convention.
4.3 ABS Legislation: the Case ofthe Philippines
If Article 15 of the CBD vests states with national sovereignty over their
genetic resources, the authority to determine access rests with the
national government and is subject to national legislation. A decade after
Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin (1998), "L'acces aux ressourcesgenetiques... p. 552
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the CBD's entry into force, about fifty countries have adopted, or are
developing access and benefit sharing (ABS) measures'"" at the regional,
national or local level. As it is impossible to present every national
legislative measure, I will focus on the legislation in the Philippines as an
example. In 1996, the Philippines became the first country to convert the
CBD into national law, and it has subsequendy inspired other legislation.
Because the Philippine legislation has been in application for ten years, it
is possible to assess the first years of application. After describing the
legislation, I wiU briefly mention some bioprospecting contracts that
were negotiated under its terms. Then, I will broaden the focus and
provide some evaluation of the existing ABS legislation and
bioprospecting contracts taijen from existing cases studies.
The Philippines has a very high rate of biodiversity, however it is
declining at an alarming speed. It is estimated that it harbors more than
40,000 wildlife species, which is around five percent of the world's
known flora.'"^ The value of the country's biodiversity is of particular
importance because a great number of species are endemic, which means
that they exist only in the Philippines.'"^ This natural heritage is
disappearing at an unparaUel pace due to an uncontrolled conversion
process, in addition to deforestation that leads to the disappearance of
ecosystems.
490 Argentina, Australia, Belize, Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji,
the Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Samoa, Salomon Islands, Seychelles, South Africa, South Korea, Tanzania, Thailand,
Turkey, USA, Vietnam, Yemen have a national legislation or are developing it. In
addition, the member of the Andean Pact, Bolivia, Columbia Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela adopted a common legislation. The ASEAN countries are also considering
regional access measures while dne African Union drafted a model legislation for its
members. The text of the existing measures can be found on the website of the CBD
secretariat at the following page: http://wwvv.hiodiv.org/proinrammes/socio-
eco/benefit/measures.aspx
A. Wood et al. (no year) "Socio-economic Root Causes of Biodiversity Loss in the
Philippines", Summary
""2 A.G.N. La Vina, M.J.A. Caleda and M.L.L Baylon (eds) (1997) RegulatingAccess to
Biological and Genetic Resources in the Philippines. A manual on the Implementation
of the Executive Order No. 247, Quezon City, p. V
•*'3 Philippines forest cover has been reduced from more than 50% to less than 24%
over a period of 40 years; 30% to 50% of its seagrass beds has been lost in the last 50
years; only 5% of its coral reef is still in an excellent conditions and around 80% of its
mangrove areas have been lost in the last 75 years. About 50% of national parks are
estimated to be no longer biologically important. See C.V. Barber and A.G.M. La Vina
(1997) "Regulating Access to Genetic Resources: The Philippines Experiences" p.ll5-
141 in J. Mugabe, C.V. Barber, G. Henne. L. Glowka and A. La Vina (eds.) Access to
Genetic Resources, WRI, ELC-IUCN, ACTS Press, Nairobi Kenya.
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Adopted after a large participatory process/''' tiie 1995 Presidential
Executive Order 247 (EO 247) established the legal framework for
access to genetic resources.'''^ In 1996, it was complemented by the
Department Administrative Order 96-20'*"' (DAO 96-20), which set out
the administrative rules implementing EO ,247. The provisions of those
regulations can be summed up in four points. First, regarding genetic
resources property regime, the EO 247 reaffirms the constitutional
provision saying that the States owns all forest, wildlife, flora and fauna
and other natural resources.'"'' However it also recognizes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities and other Philippine communities to
their traditional knowledge and practices where this information is
directiy and indirectiy put into commercial use. Research activities in
their domains must be in compliance with specific rules. {^. infra)
Second, in terms of implementing organizations, it established an Inter-
Agency Committee for Biological and Genetic Resources to coordinate
the process of application for access to genetic resources, to monitor the
implementation ofthe research agreements, and to assess the rules.'*"*
Third, the regulations organize the procedures to apply for and negotiate
a bioprospecting agreement. EO 247 draws a distinction between two
categories of agreement: Commercial Research Agreements (CRA) and
Academic Research Agreements (ARA). However, the distinction has a
limited effect because ARA only concerns domestic academic
institutions and intergovernmental agencies and not foreign academic
institutions. In addition, the only differences between them consist of
allowing more comprehensive agreements, both in terms of prospected
areas and duration of the prospecting.'*®' Then, EO 247 details the
minimum terms of the CRA and ARA witiiin which the concerned
agency and the collector have some freedom to negotiate agreements.
For an account of this participatory process, see Kristina Swiderska, Elenita Dano
and Olivier Dubois (2001), "Developing the Philippines Executive Order 247 On
Access to Genetic Resources", published by International Institute For Environment
and Development (IIED)
•"5 Philippines, Executive Order No 247 Prescribing Guidelines and Establishing a
Regulatory Framework for the Prospecting of Biological and Genetic Resources, their
By-products and Derivates, For scientific and Commercial Purposes, and for Other
Purposes. The text can be found on the website of the CBD secretariat at the
following page: http://ww\\.'.biodiv.org/programmes/socio-eco/benefit/measures.aspx
The full text of DAO 96-20 is available at www.psdn.org/chmbio
"'7 EO 247, Section 2, article XII
EO 247, Sections 5, 6 and 8 and DAO 96-20, Sections 10 and 11
EO 247, Section 3 and 5
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DAO 96-20 provides a detailed administrative process to obtain the
agreement. These minimum requirements include some information
requirements such as the explanation of the purpose of the research,
source of funds, duration, and a list of biological and genetic material
that will be taken.In the case where the research activities conducted
in Philippines lead to a commercial product, the collector must inform
the Philippines government as well as the affected local and indigenous
cultural communities.'"' In terms of benefit sharing, the regulations
contain both monetary and non-monetary requirements. As for
monetary benefit sharing, the collector must be paid a small fixed-fee'"^
and the agreement must include a provision for the payment of royalties
to the national government and the private landowners or the local and
indigenous community in charge of the prospected land in case a
commercial product is derived from the biological and genetic resources
taken.'"^ Non-monetary benefits all loosely relate to technology transfer.
The collector is required to deposit a sample of aU living specimens
collected, he must actively involve Philippine scientists in the collection
and research activities, and he is asked to donate research equipment to a
Philippine institution.^"'' Finally all commercial products derived from
Philippine resources must be made available to the Philippines
government and concerned local communities.'"' In other words,
whenever a commercial product is derived from Philippine resources and
patented, the Philippines must have a free compulsory license.
Fourth, in addition to the government authorization, the collector must
obtain the prior informed consent (PIC) of those in charge of the lands
he wants to prospect.""^. According to the legal status of the area, he
must obtain one of: the PIC of the Head of the Local Government unit
responsible for collection on communal land, the PIC of the Council of
Elders or a recognized head of an indigenous community responsible for
ancestral lands,'"^ the PIC of the protected Area Management Board for
protected areas,'"® or the PIC of a private land owner. The collector must
obtain a PIC for each region he wants to prospects in. The regulations
pay special attention to the PIC of indigenous cultural communities.
500 £o 247, Section 4 and DAO 96-20, Section
50' EO 247, Section 5 (d) and DAO 96-20, Section 8.1.9
502 EO 247, Section 5 ® and (o)
503 EO 247, Sections 5 (e) and DAO 96-20, Section 8.2.2
50'' EO 247, Section 5 (i)and DAO 96-20, Section 8.2.3
505 EO 247, Section 5 (1) and DAO 96-20, Section 8.1.9
SOS DAO 96-20, Section 7
507 EO 247, Section 2 and DAO 96-20, Section 5
508 DAO 96-20, Section 4
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Both the EO 247 and the DAO 96-20 state that their prior informed
consent must be obtained in accordance with the customary practices
and mores of the concerned communities. Section 7 of the DAO
stipulates detailed procedural requirements to ensure that communities'
PIC is validly given. The procedure is made more complicated by the
enactment of the 1997 Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) that
recognizes, protects, and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities. This Act also allows access to biological and genetic
resources within ancestral domains in accordance with customary law of
indigenous community. The procedure to obtain the consent of the
concerned community, however, is not the same but in rather even more
demanding. As a legislative act, the IPRA supersedes the Executive
Order and essentially replaces it in this regard. Finally, the regulations
also contain minimum requirements on conforming to environmental
protection law and regulations.
4.4A Few Years ofApplication
After having described the contents of the Philippine regulations, I
would like to feature several existing case studies on the Philippines to
give an account of the initial applications. I wiU then briefly present one
research agreement (bioprospecting contract). Later, I will present a
broader analysis of the existing ABS legislation and bioprospecting
contracts.
Based on a study conducted by the German Development Institute in
2002,^°' which came sixyears after the enactmentof the EO 247 and the
DAO 96-20, it first appears that the number of applications for research
agreements was smaller than expected by the drafters of the regulations.
By April 2002, the Inter-Agency Commission for Genetic Resources
(lACGR) had received applications for fifteen commercial research
agreements (CRA) and twenty academic research agreements (ARA). .
The number of concluded agreements, however, was even smaUer. Out
of these thirty-five applications, fifteen did not enter in the scope of EO
247 and were referred to the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau
50' Klaus Liebig eta\. (2002) "Governing Biodiversity: Access to Genetic Resources and
Approaches to Obtaining Benefits from their Use: The Case of the Philippines",
Reports and Working Papers 5/2002, German Development Institute, Bonn. See also
Paz J. Benavidez II (2004), "Philippines: Evolving Access and Benefit Sharing
Regulations", in Santiago Carrizosaeta!, (eds.) Accessing Siodiversity andSharing the Benefits:
lessonsfrom Implementing theConvention onBiological Diversity, lUCN Environmental Policy
and Law Paper, No 54, Gland, Switzerland pp.153-173
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(PAWB) for a free permit; nineteen demanded a research agreement. '^"
Out of these nineteen applications, six have been approved by the
lACGR, and they have led to bioprospecting contracts. Five of these
have been explicidy withdrawn due to applicants complaining about the
regulations. Most notably, among the withdrawn applications, there were
two from the U.S. National Cancer Institute. The organization probably
the world's most experienced in bioprospecting, decided to end existing
collaborations and to coUectgenetic resources in other countries in order
to avoid the Philippine regulations. As for the remaining eight
applications, it is not clear whether they are still pending or whether they
have been withdrawn since applicants have not answered requests for
additional documents. Finally, the German Development Institute's
study notes that the application process for those approved agreements
was lengthy and in some cases took up to three years.
Before analyzing the reasons for the small numbers of agreements
concluded, for the purposes of illustration, I wiU outline the content of
two joint agreements. Two commercial research agreements (CRA) have
been concluded between the University of Utah, USA, which is the
principal collector (PC), the University of the Philippines's Marine
Science Institute (UP-MSI), which is the co-coUector (CC), and the
Department of Agriculture, which assists in the evaluation of research
proposal in the areas of agriculture, fishery and other natural resources.
The first agreement (CRA 98) concerns the collection of marine sponges
and ascidians for research on anti-cancer drugs. The second agreement
(CRA 2002), signed in 2002, authorizes the collection and purchase of
marine conus for research on compounds affecting muscles and nerves
that could serve as painkillers.
As for the application procedure, the first agreement (CRA98) was
applied for in January 1998, was approved relatively quickly, and signed
in June of the same year. As it was a three-year contract, a new
agreement was applied for in 2001 and was renewed in 2002. By contrast
to the first contract, it took nearly four years to gather all the necessary
documents and signatures to have the CRA 2002 approved. Because the
research collaboration between UP-MSI (CC) and the University of Utah
(PC) had been ongoing since the 1970s, the collector and co-coUector
obtained a provisional permit while the application was pending. In
addition to the authorization form, the collectors had to obtain the PIC
of several communities. This meant that they had to hold a public
5'° The 35* application as been referred to another agency according to the terms of
the Wildlife Act, enacted in 2001 which modifies the application procedure.
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meeting with the local authorities and representatives of each
community, and provide an explanation of the procedures, and a detailed
presentation of the research project and its objectives. It seems that the
communities' members were very reluctant at first but, once the research
value for health and environmental conservation was explained, their
resistance was partly overcome. Once the communities' PIC's were
obtained, there was a need to obtain the signatures of the local
authorities. In most cases, obtaining the PIC of the communities and the
signatures of the local authorities took much more time than the sixty
day period required by the EO 247.^"
In terms of benefit sharing, both CRAs contain similar provisions on
monetary and non-monetary benefits, and their distributions to the UP-
MSI (the Co-collector), the Philippines' government and the local and
indigenous communities. So far, the main benefits havegone to UP-MSI
under the form of equipment, research training and salaries. In the
second CRA, those benefits are estimated at US$ 73,000 for three years.
However, it must be noted that the parties do not consider this funding
as being related to the EO 247; they consider it, rather, as a continuation
of their research collaboration that started in the 1970s. In the long run,
if any invention is made, the royalties will be shared equally between the
principal collector and the co-collector. As for the government, it
receives no benefits in the short term, except a yearly bioprospecting fee
of PhP 10,000 (US$225). In the medium term, it can expect some
capacity building benefits consisting of some conservation training for
communities and research training for some government officials. In the
long term, the government can expect both technology transfer and
monetary benefits. The government wiU have access to the inventions
derived from Philippine genetic resources. For endemic species, the
government will also have a compulsory license on aU the technologies
used to make the invention. In addition, the Philippines must be
recognized as the country of origin in all publications and documents
mentioning its resources. In case of commercial use of an invention
derived from Philippine genetic materials, the Department of Agriculture
will get five percent of the net revenue. For the communities, their
benefits lie in some training and explanation of the research results. In
the case of successful commercialization, they will obtain five percent of
the five percent of royalties given to the government. So far, no
The description of the two join agreements is derived from the study carried by
Klaus Liebig et al and the cases studies carried out Columbia University School of
International and Public Affairs (1999), "Access to Genetic Resources: 7ki Evaluation
of the Development and Implementation of Recent Regulation and Access
Agreements", Environmental PolicyStudiesWorking Paper #4
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commercial product has been developed and as a consequence no
royalties have been shared.
Even though the number of applications for access to genetic resources
is limited, the Philippine case study confirms that research institutions
and pharmaceutical companies are interested in obtaining access to the
genetic resources of biodiversity rich countries. However, negotiating
access to genetic resources appears difficult and costiy. Obtaining the
government's agreement and the PIC of communities or local authorities
requires potential users going through lengthy procedures that can be
discouraging. In addition, some potential users reported fear of the EO
247 provision that creates the possibility of a compulsory license on
potential inventions. From the standpoint of providing countries,
drafting an ABS regulation after an important participatory process and
the organization of an administrative procedure constitutes an important
cost. Finally, in terms of benefit sharing, the Philippine case study reveals
that monetary benefits are limited to a (very) small upfront payment and
the hope of royalties in the case of the commercialization of an
invention. As a consequence, bioprospecting contracts seem to provide
limited or no funding for biodiversity conservation. However, there are
some non-monetary benefits under some forms of technology transfer.
More precisely, the main benefit for the providing country seems to lie in
the creation of a joint venture between the foreign user and a domestic
research institution. This joint venture helps to develop the domestic
R&D capacities. In addition, improved domestic research capacities
might increase interest in conserving the domestic biodiversity.
4.5Limited Success and Transaction Costs
The Philippines are only one of many countries that have enacted or
consider enacting ABS legislation. Similar observations have been made
in a large number of cases studies '^^ and in several OECD Reports^" in
5'^ It is not possible to draw here an exhaustive list of existing cases studies but I can
mention some collective surveys tiiat gather several cases studies. First, the secretariat
of the CBD has collected a series of case studies that are available at
http:/ /www.biodiv.org/programmes /socio-eco/benefit/cs.aspx. Second, the collective
study carried out by Columbia University already mentioned and available at the same
address; and Santiago Carrizosa et al. (eds.) Accessing Biodiversity andSharing the Ben^ts:
Lessonsfrom Implementing theConvention onBiological Diversi^, lUCN Environmental Policy
and Law Paper, No 54, Gland, Switzerland.
5'^ OECD (2003), Economic Issues in Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: A
Framework ofanaljsis, ENV/EPOC/GSP/BIO(2001)/FINAL, Paris and OECD (1996),
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addition to the very detailed study done by Kerry Ten Kate and Sarah
Laird on the Commercial Use ofBiodiversity."'' Most of the impediments to
negotiating bioprospecting agreements can be framed in terms of
transaction costs. In the next paragraphs I examine those hindrances in
further detail and order them according to different types of transaction
costs. As has been described above, transaction costs can be divided in
four main categories: search costs, bargaining costs, monitoring costs
and enforcement costs.
Search costs designate the costs of locating an exchange partner, that is
to say identifying a person who wants to sell what you want to buy or
buy what you want to sell. As for bioprospecting, search costs are likely
to be high for two reasons. First, genetic resources are not standard
goods with well-identified characteristics and well-known sellers. The
identification of interesting genetic resources gives unpredictable results.
Potential users know that they will probably have to screen thousands of
samples in order to identify a few promising compounds that might lead
to a valuable invention. In addition, genetic resource providers and users
give littie information on who has what to sell. In contrast to ex situ
collections where genetic resources are well classified and documented,
in situ genetic resources are undocumented and for a good part still
unknown.''^ Second, search costs might be high because once the
potential user has identified die country in which he wants to collect
resources, he still has to identify the "seller," or more precisely all the
persons whose permission he needs to obtain, and he must go through
complex and unclear procedures.
Bargaining costs designate the costs of reaching an agreement. As
explained earlier, the parties are likely to find an agreement in what game
theorists call "common knowledge" situations, that is to say, when the
parties can easily identify their mutual threat value and the possible
cooperative surplus. '^^ In these situations, information is said to be
public. Conversely, information is "private"when one party knows some
Issues in the Sharing of Benefits Arising out of the Utili^tion of Genetic 'Resources,
OCDE/GD(97)193. Paris
5''' Kerry Ten Kate and Sarah Laird (1999), The Commercial Use ofBiodiversity, access to
genetic resources and benefit-sharing, London: Earthscan; hereafter Ten Kate and Laird
(1999), TheCommercial Use ofBiodiversity (...).
We wUl see in Part Three that traditional knowledge detained by local and
indigenous communities can substitute documentation and facilitate the identification
of interesting plants and their potential uses.
In this case, threat values are the lowest price the seller is ready to accept and the
highest price the buyer is ready to pay; the cooperative surplus is the difference
between the two threat values.
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of these values and the other does not. Situationswhere all the parties do
not hold aU of the information are also referred as information
asymmetries. Negotiations tend to be more difficult when information
about threat values and cooperative surplus is private. Private
information hinders bargaining because it must be made public before
the parties can evaluate reasonable terms for cooperation.®'^ Parties may
be willing to share part of their private information; but they may want
to retain some of their information as their part of the cooperative
surplus depends to some extent on keeping information private. Private
information is not an important issue for standard goods with well-
identified characteristics. By contrast, in the case of bioprospecting
agreements two-sided private information is common. On the side of
genetic resource users, the private information may include knowledge
on the potential uses of genetic resources, on the cost of R&D, on
possible alternative providers, or alternative technologies. In addition,
genetic resources are complex goods and providing countries often have
limited capacities to identify their uses and values. On the providers'
side, there might also be some private information about the reliability,
quality and diversity of the information and samples to be provided. '^®
To overcome valuation problems and the cost of turning private
information into public information, the parties can relinquish up-front
payment, partially or totally. In such cases the parties can resort to ex-
post compensation through a share of the royalties in cases where a
commercially successful invention is derived from the genetic resources.
Sometimes, the level of royalties is settied in the contract, sometimes it is
left for further negotiations. This strategy has been followed in the
Philippine case and most other existing bioprospecting contracts. It is
worth mentioning that this strategy is related to the one followed by
research institutions holding upstream patents that overcome the
valuation problem by resorting to,"reach through license agreements" or
"grant back licenses" {Cf. Parti, chapter 4). The general advantage of such
a solution is that the level of compensation (i.e. the price) is fixed when
the parties disposes of more information on the value of the provided
genetic resources. In addition, the use of royalties creates a link between
the value of genetic resources and the level of compensation. Finally,
when the determination of the level of royalty is postponed to further
negotiations, it reduces bargaining costs as the parties must only
negotiate compensation in the limited number of cases where a
commercially successful invention is made. However, this solution has
5''' Robert Cooler and Thomas Ulen (2004), 'Law and Economics, Fourth Edition,
Addision-Wesley, p. 92
5'® OECD (2001), Economic Issues in Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: A.
Framework ofanalysis, ENV/EPOC/GSP/BIO(2001)/FIN7y:, Paris,p. 16
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limits. Indeed,. it only reduces and to some extent postpones the
bargaining problem. More importandy, it might effectively turn
bargaining costs into monitoring costs because the providing country
will have to track its genetic resources through the R&D process and
possibly across different corporations or other research institutions.
Other obstacles to bargaining are cultaral differences or lack of trust.
Cultural heterogeneity and suspicion within the "bioprospecting
community," i.e. pharmaceutical companies, research institutions,
national governments, and local and indigenous communities complicate
the search for mumally agreed terms,^" a bit like the licensing of
upstream patents {Cf. Part I, chapter 4).
Finally, bargaining costs tend to rise as the number of involved parties
increases. At first glance, it should not be an issue because
bioprospecting agreements are bilateral contracts. However,
bioprospecting oftenimplies more than one contract and two parties. As
for the number of negotiating parties, there is a tension between the
need to minimize the number of parties to facilitate the establishment of
agreements and the wish to implicate all stakeholders and their
interests.^^" Indeed, failure to involve all stakeholders has already
jeopardized the conclusion or the implementation of some contracts.
Monitoring and Enforcement costs occur when an agreement takes
time to fulfill; they include the costs of monitoring behavior and
sanctioning violations of the contract. Monitoring the agreement is
difficult because it involves tracking genetic resources through the R&D
chain. In some situations, the degree of transformation of genetic
resources is such that it becomes hardly possible to track them in the
innovation chain. Then, once an invention is made and
commercialized, it is costiy for the provider to verify the extent of the
commercial success including the level of sales and aU the costs that
5" For some testimonies on tlie "environment of suspicion", see Rex Dalton (2004),
"Bioprospects...", p. 598 or Ten Kate and Laird (1999), The Commercial Use of
Biodiversity, p. 296
520 Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (1999), "Access to
Genetic Resources: An Evaluation of the Development and Implementation of Recent
Regulation andAccess Agreements", Environmental Policy Studies Working Paper #4
Personnal communication with Brendan Tobin about the negotiation of
bioprospecting contract with Monsanto in Peru.
For a detailed account of these transformations and their consequences on
bioprospecting contracts see Bronwyn Parry (2004) Trading the Genome, Investigating the
Commodification ofBio-Information, New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress
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contribute to developing and seUing the product.^^^ Actually, providing
countries must not only monitor the fulfillment of contracts, they must
also enforce their ABS legislation. This implies the capacity to track and
monitor the use of genetic resources, which seems peculiarly difficult for
this type of goods. In addition, genetic resources are easy to collect and
for decades scientists have practiced "informal" bioprospecting,
collecting resources without permit when attending a conference or on
holiday. In 2000, for instance, three French scientists disguised as eco-
tourists were caught in the Philippines trying to smuggle medicinal
plants.Finally, sanctioning the violation of the agreement or violation
of the ABS legislation often implies suing the violator in his country,
which can be cosdy by comparison with the value of concerned genetic
resources.
In addition to those transaction costs, one must add the administrative
costs incurred by the providing countries that have to enact regulations
and develop administrative capacities to deal with the negotiation of ABS
agreements, the monitoring of compliance, and the sanctioning of
possible violations. So far, for many countries, the balance of
administrative costs and benefits is negative, which may tend towards a
preference for renouncing any enactment of ABS legislation —this has
actually been the choice of most developed countries.
Since the CBD's 1993 entry into force, the data shows that some
pharmaceutical companies have withdrawn from bioprospecting while
others have enhanced their collectingprograms. However, the net effect
has been a decrease in bioprospecting activity to a historically low
level.^^^ From interviews of potential users it appears that transaction
costs and legal uncertainty are the main reasons for this reduction.
Actually, it appears that bioprospecting is partiy in competition with
other technical solutions such as resorting to ex situ collections or
increased use of synthesized compounds.^^*^ Changes in the cost of one
solution are likely to produce a shift in the proportional use of the
available alternatives. In addition to the reduction of the bioprospecting
activity, interested companies are becoming more selective about the
523 OECD (2001), Economic Issues in Access and Beneflt Sharing of Genetic
Resources: A Framework of analysis, ENV/EPOC/GSP/BIO(2001)/FINAL, Paris, p.
16
Rex Dalton (2004), "Bioprospects less than golden" 429 NATURE 598, hereafter Rex
Dalton (2004), "Bioprospects..."
Ten Kate and Laird (1999), The Commercial Use ofBiodiversity, pp. 298 and 300, and
Rex Dalton (2004), "Bioprospects less ...", p. 598
Ten Kate and. Laird (1999), TheCommercial Use ofBiodiversity, pp. 300 and 302
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countries where they collectgenetic resources and the types of resources
they coUect.^" Several companies report avoiding countries with
legisladon that is unclear or too demanding. In addition, it seems that
the expectations, in terms of providing funds for conservation, are not
fulfilled. Not only have bio-diverse countries obtained modest benefits,
but onlypart of the benefits obtained havebeen invested in conservation
efforts."'
In conclusion, it appears that despite the efforts for designing weU-
defmed property rights, there is no such thing as a genetic resource
market with well-identified sellers and buyers, well-informed parties
(clear threat value and clear bargaining surplus) and well-defined
property rights. Rather, it is clear that the negotiation of a limited
number of long term contracts with littie in common with the instant
sale of genetic resource samples. '^" These contracts look like R&D joint-
venmres, and constitute attempts to integrate providers into the users'
research activities.Benefit sharing under the form of technology
transfers (provision of research material and research training) enables
providers to deliver more carefully selected genetic resources and useful
information on possible uses. In other words, providers are assigned to
carry out the first stages of the R&D. It is worth mentioning that these
R&D collaborations between pharmaceutical or biotech companies and
the providing countries are in many aspects similar to the research
cooperation contracts between universities and the same private
companies that have flourished since the enactment of the Bayh-Dole
Act and similar legislation.
4.6A FewExisting or Possible Improvements.
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, the Convention on Biological
Diversity only outlines the framework for an access and benefit (ABS)
regime. Even if access to genetic resources is regulated by bilateral
527 Ibidem,p. 58
528 Ibidem, p. 301
529 See OECD (2003), Economic Issues in Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: A
Framework ofanalysis, ENV/EPOC/GSP/B10(2001)/FINAL, Paris, p. 55
530 poj. an analysis of these long term contracts in light of Williamson's new institutional
economics see Padmashree Gehl Sampath (2005), Regulating Bioprospecting: Institutionsfor
Dmg Research, Access andBenefit Sharing, United Nations UniversityPress
53' Ibidem, pp. 58, 60, 69, and Frederic Morin (2003), "Les accords de Bioprospecdon
repondent-ils aux objectifs de la Convention sur la Diversite Biologique" REVUE DE
DROIT de L'UNIVERSITE de ShERBROOKE, vol. 34, No 1, Novembre
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contracts, there is room for additional regulations. The main regulation
effort has come from providing countries, which have enacted ABS
legislation. Two observations can be made more than a decade after the
entry into force of the CBD. First, it is increasingly obvious that access
and benefit sharing should not be facilitated and regulated solely by
providing countries but it should also be facilitated and regulated by
users and their countries. Second, due to important transacdon costs,
today's regulations reduce access to genetic resources thus providing
limited benefits incentives to conserve biodiversity.
In the following paragraphs, I mendon some existing or possible
improvements. I distinguish measures by their authors and the type of
transaction costs they are likely to reduce. Regarding measures taken by
providing countries, I continue to illustrate them with the example of
how the Philippines modified its regulation of ABS to address the many
critics of the Presidential Executive Order 247 (EO 247) and the
Department Administrative Order 96-20 (DAO 96-20). On July 2001,
The Philippines legislature enacted Republic Act No. 9147, also called
theWildlife Act,^^^ which removed bioprospecting for (non-commercial)
scientific purposes from EO-247 jurisdiction and called for the redaction
of new bioprospecting guidelines. On January 12, 2005 the Philippines
Government approved the new Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities
in the Philippines."^
Regarding search costs, there is an increasing awareness among
providing countries that they have to simplify the process of application
and negotiation of a bioprospecting contract, notably by identifying
clearly who is competent to negotiate the terms of the contract and give
access to genetic resources. In this direction, the new Philippines
guidelines slightiy simplify the procedure and designate one main
interlocutor for users requesting access.
As for bargaining costs, I distinguish three kinds of measures
according to their initiators. The conference of the parties to the CBD,
532 xhe text of the Wildlife Act is available on the CBD Secretariat website at
http://\vww.biodiv.org/programmes/sodo-eco/benefit/measures.aspx
"3Joint DENR-DA-PCSD-NCIP Administrative Order Nol Series of 2004. The Text
of the Guidelines should be available at the previous address, meanwhile it is now
available at: http://www.pawb.gov.ph/posted_files/0.1_Joint%20DENR-DA-PCSD-
NCIP%20AO%20No.%201%20signed%2001-12-05.pdf
'3'' The Secretary of the Department of Agriculture or/and the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and natural resources seem in charge of the all process
and must organize all the necessary consultation within the different Philippines
administration.
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that is to say both user's countries and providing countries, adopted the
Bonn Guidelines onAccess to Genetic 'Resources and Fair andEquitableSharing of
the Benefits Arising out of Their Utili^ationP^ These voluntary guidelines are
meant to assist governments and other stakeholders when establishing
legisladve, administrative or policy measures on access and benefit
sharing and/or when negotiating contractual arrangements for access
and benefit sharing. They contain a kind of checklist of issues and
provisions that should be considered in ABS legislation and contracts.
They do not constitute an international regime or a standard contract but
they offer the possibility for sharing and harmonizing practices. They are
also likely to be progressively improved by the conference of the parties.
Other initiatives are taken by users to deal with bargaining costs. First,
more and more users resort to intermediaries to access genetic resources.
Actually, Sarah Laird observes that almost mthout exception, every biodiversity-
prospecting collection effort undertaken on behalf of companies is done through
intermediaries. In most cases, these are research institutions, botanic gardens and
universities [...] because biodiversity prospecting is at heart a scientific underta}6ng.
[•••] A number offorprofitfirms speciali^ng in providing genetic )naterial to the
private sector have also appeared in recent jears."^ These intermediary
organizations can facilitate the negotiation of bioprospecting contracts:
using their expertiseand their intermediaryposition to reduce asymmetry
of information, and accumulating experience and reputation to
overcome the lack of trust and cultural heterogeneities. Intermediaries
can also possibly reduce search costs by helping identify potential
partners and reduce enforcement costs by monitoring the economic
sectors involved in bioprospecting related activities.
Second, some users or associations of users"^ develop theirown policies
of access and benefit sharing. In countries where there was/is no ABS
legislation these guidelines or ethical codes have facilitated the
negotiation of bioprospecting agreements. Sometimes, they serve as a
model for fumre legislation. They can also contribute to overcome lack
of trust and cultural heterogeneities.
5^5 Idonn Gmdelines onAccess to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of theBenefits
Arising out of Their Utilisation adopted by the Conference of the Parries, in The Hague,
April 7-19, 2002, Decision VI/24. The text is available on the website of the CBD
secretariat at http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/socio-eco/beneflt/bonn.asp
Sara A. Laird (ed.) (2002), Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge, Equitable Vartnerships in
Practice, Earsthscan, London, p. 422
E.g. the International Society of Ethnobotany, the American Society of
Pharmacognosy and the Society for Economic Botany
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Sometimes both phenomena are mixed. For instance, the U.S. National
Cancer Institate (NCI) acts as an intermediary —and carries out basic
research —between providing countries and private companies likely to
develop and market drugs. It also develops its own policy to facilitate
negotiations with providing countries and between providing countries
and private companies. It started in 1988 with a letter of Intent where
providing countries acted only as suppliers of genetic resources. Then,
building on experience and long-term relationship with those countries,
it moved in 1992 to a letter of collect; 1995 it moved to a Memorandum of
Understanding, each time increasing the implication of providing countries
in the research process, sharing intellectual property and forcing private
partners interested by research results to negotiate benefit sharing with
the concerned providing country. '^®
Initiatives to reduce bargaining costs can also come from providing
countries that can attempt to simplify their procedures of access. For
instance, the new Philippine guidelines provide default provisions and
minimum requirements in terms of benefit sharing between users and
the Philippines and among Philippine stakeholders. Default provisions
may reduce bargaining costs, it remains however to see whether users
will be interested by the minimum requirements.
Bioprospecting contracts involve important monitoring and
enforcement costs. Monitoring the respect of the agreement is difficult
because it involves tracking genetic resources throughout the entire
R&D chain. To facilitate this monitoring and to share the burden
between the providing country and the users' country; two proposals
emerged that sought to link ABS legislations and contracts with IPRs
application procedure. The first proposal consists in demanding patent
or plant breeders' right applicants to disclose the origin of the genetic
resources included in their invention.This disclosure of origin should
538 For a detailed analysis of the National Cancer Institute Policy see Kerry Ten Kate
and Adrian Wells, "The Access and Benefit Sharing Policies of the United States
National Cancer Institute: A Comparative Account of the Discovery and Development
of the Drugs Calanoide and Topotecan", Submission to the Executive Secretary of the
Convention on Biological Diversity by the Royal Botanic Garden, Kew, available on the
website of the Secretariatat http://www.biodiv.org/doc/case-studies/default.asp
'3' F. Hendrickx, V. Koester and C. Prip (1994), "Access to Genetic Resources: A Legal
Analysis" in Vicente Sanchez and Calestous Juma (eds.) Biodiplomag, Genetic Resources and
International 'Relations, Nairobi: ACTS. See also the proposition of Switzerland
suggesting to amend the Regulations Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) to
explicitly enable the Contracting Parties of the PCT to require patent applicants to
declare the source of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, if an invention is
directiy based on such resources or knowledge,WIPO-documents PCT/R/WG/4/13
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facilitate the task of monitoring the respect of providing countries' ABS
legislation and contracts. This proposal has been widely discussed and is
the object of feasibility studies both in legal and practical terms/'*° Thus
far there is no international consensus on, this measure, but the Bonn
Guidelines and the conference of the parties invite patent applicants to
disclose the origin of their genetic resources, and some countries have
integrated or have considered integrating this requirement into their
national legislation. '^'^ The second proposal originally argued that patent
applicants should not only disclose the origin of genetic resources but
also provide evidence of prior informed consent for their use.^"^ This
proposal goes one step further as it transfers the burden of proof to
users. It is no longer the providingcountry that must monitor the use of
genetic resources, and where appropriate demonstrate a breach of
contract or ABS legislation, but users that must provide evidence they
have fulfilled their obligations. Recentiy, the proposal has been amplified
and several studies examine the possibility of establishing an
international standardi2ed system of certificates of origin to document
and monitor genetic resource transfers.^"*^ However, there is no clear
understanding of how such a system could work, not to mention a
510 Nuno P. Carvahlo (2000) « Requiring Disclosure of Origin of Genetic Resources
and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing die TRIPS
Agreement/ The Problem and the Solution" 2 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL
OFLaw and Policy 371; WIPO (2004), Technical Study onDisclosure "Requirements Related
to Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, document prepared by the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore for the seventh meeting of the COP in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, from February 9 to 20, 2004, as document
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/INF/17. The Technical Study is also available on the WIPO
Website at http://www.\vipo.int/tk
5'" India in the Section 10 (contents of specification) of the Patents Act 1970 as
amended by the Patents Second Amendment Act (2002); the Andean Communities:
in the article 26 of the Andean Decision 486,: Costa Rica in the article 80 of the
(Biodiversity) Law7788; Belgium in the article 15 of the Patent Act 1984 as modified
by the Patent AmendmentAct on Biotechnological inventions 2005. See also Geertrui
van Overwalle (2002), "Belgium Goes its Own Way on Biodiversity and Patents", 24
European Intellectual Property Law Review 33
Brendan Tobin (1997), « Certificates of Origin: A Role for IPR Regimes in Securing
Prior Informed Consent » in John Mugabe, et al (eds.) Access to Genetic Resources: Strategies
for Sharing Benefits. Nairobi: ACTS Press.
BrendanTobin, David Cunningham, and Kazuo Watanabe (2004), "The Feasibility,
Practicality and Cost of a Certificate of Origin System for Genetic Resources.
Preliminary Results of Comparative Analysis of Tracking Material in Biological
Resources Centers and of Proposals for a Certification Scheme" Paper Submitted by
the United Nations University to the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity for the Third Meetingof the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Access and Benefit
Sharing Bangkok, 14-18 February UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/INF/5
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consensus on its prospects. Indeed, it is far from clear that the benefits
of certificates of origin would outweigh the costs.
Those existing or considered changes might help reduce transaction
costs and facilitate sustainable use of genetic resources; consequently,
they may also have some positive impacts on biodiversity conservation.
In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development called for the
negotiation of a legally binding international instrument on access and
benefit sharing. The measures mentioned above are now at the center of
the discussions in the CBD Ad Hoc Working Group on ABS.
However, after having analyzed legal changes induced by pharmaceutical
bioprospecting activities, and current proposals to delve into that
direction, I would like to come back to the agricultural sector where the
property regime promoted by the CBD seems inadequate and where a
different regime, moving in a rather opposite direction, has been
developed.
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5. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources
In the previous chapter I described the access and benefit-sharing regime
provided by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). This regime
relies on exclusive rights -patents and national sovereignty - and
bilateralcontracts. I also explained that more than a decade after its entry
into force, this regime is nearly exclusively used for pharmaceutical
research and has had limited success. In this chapter, I describe how the
agricultural R&D community has created its own regime that fits into the
legal framework set up by the CBD, though it completely modifies its
logic. First, I observe two traits of the agriculmral R&D community: the
collective and cumulative dimension of innovation and the importance
of social norms. Second, I explain the inadequacy of the CBD regime to
rule such a community. Third, I recount the path towards the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture. The last section is dedicated to the analysis of the Treaty in
light of the different theoretical notions presented in this dissertation.
5.1 Characteristics ofAgricultural R&D
The system of access and benefit sharing set up by the CBD that relies
on exclusive rights and bilateral contracts, seems ill-adapted to the
innovation process in the agricultural sector and conflicts with the still
vivid sharing norms of scientists and breeders.
5.1.1 Innovation is Collective and Cumulative
Plant breeding is a collective and cumulative innovation process in two
different senses. First, the innovation process is cumulative in the sense
that today's varieties build on and interact with older varieties; it is
collective in the sense that the creation of a new plant variety necessarily
implies the combination of traits present in a large number of varieties.
The creationof a new plant variety does not onlyimply the identification
of an interesting compound in one plant but it also includes the
identification of a large number of interesting traits among existing
plants and their combination into a new variety. According to Marianne
Banziger, maize plant breeder, plant breedingis like collecting big stonesfrom
all over the world. You smash them together to make the small stones, and with that,
jou make a mosaic/'*'* As an illustration, the genealogy of two recentiy
Daniel Charles (2001) "Seeds of Discontent", 294 SCIENCE 772
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created maize varieties shows the collective dimension of plant breeding.
The ancestors of those two varieties were landraces (traditional varieties)
grown by farmers in Latin America. Some landraces had originally been
collected by CYMMIT,^"*^ some by Latin American research institutes
and some by US scientists who placed them in a US seed bank. Some
seeds found their way from the US to CYMMIT through Egypt and
Kenya. To obtain two new varieties, Banziger spent ten years and
crossed fifty breeding lines that she had chosen out of the several
thousand in CYMMIT's collections.^""^ This example and those figures
are quite illustrative of the plant breeding activity as shown by the next
table.
Numbers of Landraces Contained in Pedigrees of Wheats
Released in Developing countries
Source: Smale et al. (2002)^ '^'
Second, plant breeding is a collective innovation process in the sense
that there exists high interdependence between countries. All regions and
'^•5 Center for the Iihprovement of Maize and Wheat, one the International Agricultural
Research Centers that form the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research
(CGIAR), see chapter 2
5'"' Daniel Charles (2001) "Seeds of Discontent", 294 SCIENCE 772, 26 October. The
names of the two maize varieties are Grace and Zm521.
Smale et al. (2002), "Dimensions of Diversity in Modern Spring Bread Wheat in
Developing Countries from 1965" 42 CROPSCIENCE 6 (November-December). For a
more detailed study, country by country see also Ximena Flores Palacios (1998)
"Contribution to the Estimation of Countries' Interdependence in the Era of Plant
Genetic Resource", Background Study paper 7, FAO available at ftp: / /exr-
ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/BSP/bsp7E.pdf
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countries are dependent on plant genetic resources from other regions or
countries. Several studies observed that for the major food crops all
regions are highly dependent on PGRFA from different regions.
Percentages of Regional Food Production Dependent Upon
Crop Species Originating in Other Regions of Diversity











e: Kloppenburg & Kleinman (1987)5''?
Taking into account the specificities of their particular innovation
process, plant breeders have developed formal and informal networks
both locally and internationally, which embrace both the public and the
private sector.®"*' At the international level, the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) network that links the
International Agricultural Research Center (lARCs) and dozens of
national agricultural research institutions (NARS) is an extensive
exchange network for genetic resources and other research materials.
Similarly, a series of regional networks have recendy developed around
the world. Finally, many breeders from different locations collaborate
informally on a case-by-case basis when they have common interests or
complementary skills and materials.^®" At the national level, one can
observe much cooperation between public and private research
organizations. As for the local level, farmers involved in plant breeding
have long traditions of seeds exchanges and collective innovation.
s'ts Jack R. Kloppenburg jr & DL Kleinman (1987), "Plant Germplasm Controversies-
Analyzing empirically the Distribution of the World Plant Genetic Resources", 37
Bioscience 190-8
5''' Ten Kate and Laird (1999), The Commercial Use ofBiodiversity (...), pp. 119 and 142
550 FAO (1996) Rapport sur I'etat des ressourcesphjtogenetiques damle mottde, chapter 6, table
6.1
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5.1.2 Agricultural R&D and Social Norms
Those collaborative networks and the practice of research material
exchanges are supported and ruled by social norms of shared- access and
reciprocity. For a long time plant breeding has been ruled by a norm of
shared-access relying on the conviction that one may not monopolize
incremental contribution that increases collective knowledge. Once
again, this norm of shared-access does not imply an absence of
obligation; rather it creates a requirement for reciprocity. As observed
by Ten Kate and Lairdfor mayyears the ethos ofplant breeding has been one of
open access toplant genetic resources, and the common heritage ofmankind as reflected
in the text of the original International Undertaking. Rfsearchers, breeders and even
companies, traditionally obtained samples of germplasm from each other without
payingand usedthem in theirbreedingprogrammes. The main benefit sharedthrough
the system was generally reciprocal access to other breeders' lines."' These norms
of shared access and reciprocity do not only apply to genetic resources
but also to information on research results. As one private breeder
explained: It is an unwritten rule ofethicsfor breeders that when someone provides
genetic resources, breeders willsendthem information relating to the research done.
As I described in Chapter two, plant breeders had succeeded in drafting
a tailored legal regime, supporting shared-access for genetic resources
and strengthening their social norms. On the one hand the Common
Heritage doctrine has enabled open-access to in situ and ex-situ genetic
resources and on the other hand the UPOV plant breeders' right has
included a breeding exception that allows breeders to have access to each
other varieties as research material. Plant breeders are much less satisfied
with the regime established by the CBD, which is focused on the claims
of developing countries and the pharmaceutical sector.
5.2Inadequacy ofthe CBD Regime
Breeders perceive the CBD regime, which is entirely based on exclusive
rights such as national sovereignty and patents, as being inadequate for
their purposes. First, the regime is likely to drastically increase
transaction costs. Second, there is a risk that the shared-access and
551 Ten Kate and Laird (1999), The Commercial Use ofBiodiversity (...), p.144; see also p.
145 & 148
552 A private plant breeding company interviewed and quoted by Kerry Ten Kate and
Sarah Laird (1999), TheCommercial UseofBiodiversity (...), p. 148
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reciprocity norms"''" tliat play an important role in the coordination of
genetic resource exchanges may become eroded.
5.2.1 A Problem of Transaction Costs
I have mentioned earlier that high transaction costs hinder the use of
bilateral contracts to access genetic resources for pharmaceutical use.
The presence of transaction costs is even more problemadc in the plant-
breeing sector because ofthe collective innovation process that strongly
increases the number of transactions (recall that is quite common for a
new variety to contain up to fifty other varieties in their pedigree). In
addition, the historical interdependence between countries for PGRFA
makes it difficult to use the notion of country of origin established in the
Some observers mention the risk of anti-commons in
agricultural R&D."® Without going this far, a recent study"^ attempted
to assess the importance of transaction costs and their likely effect. In
order to evaluate the importance of transaction costs generated by a
bilateral system, one must compare transactions costs with the value of
genetic resources to see whether they might prevent transactions from
occurring. In addition, it is interesting to compare them with the
transaction costs generated by an alternative system, i.e. a shared-access
multilateral system. Transaction costs are likely to be lower under a
multilateral system."^ A multilateral system can reduce search costs by
553 Hereafter, I use the expression norms of open access and reciprocity because
members of the agricultural R&Dcommunity consider that GR are openly accessible to
everybody. However, one must remember, as I mentioned at the end of chapter 2.2,
that if genetic resources included in a protectedvariety are de jure in open access, they
are often de facto the common property (shared access) of the agriculmral R&D
community
Gerald Moore & WitoldTymowski (2005): Explanatory Guide tothe International Treaty
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food andAgriculture lUCN Environmental Policy and Law
Paper No. 57 (Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK; lUCN). Available at
w\vw.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/EPI-P57EN.pdf. p. 3, note 11. Hereafter
Gerald Moore & Witold Tymowski (2005): Explanatoiy Guide to the International Treaty
(...)
555 Dwijen Rangnekar (2002), "Can TRIPs deter Innovation? The Anticommons and
Public Goods in Agricultural Research", Paper for Conference Science and Citizenship
in a Global Context; Challenges from New Technologies, Instimte of Development
Studies, University Of Sussex Brighton, UK, 12-13 December 2002
556 Bert Visser et aL (2000), "Transaction Costs of Germplasm Exchange Under
Bilateral Agreements", Global Forum on Agriculture Doc No GFAR/00/17-04-04
available
http://ww\v.egfar.org/documents/conference/GFAR 2000/gfl70404.PDF
557 Bycomparison with bilateral contracts, a multilateral system may be useful to reduce
transaction costs but this advantages must be balanced with maladaptation costs, i.e. the
fact that a collective rule cannot adapt to specific characteristics of each bilateral
exchanges as bilateral contract do.
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maintaining a register of the existing genetic resources and their owners
in order to facilitate the identification of users and providers as is done
by copyright collective rights organizations. Regarding bargaining
costs, a multilateral system can offer economies of scale in the design of
rules: as there are many redundancies in contracts ruling exchanges of
genetic resources (licenses), mandatory or optional standard contractual
provisions allow parties to negotiate only a limited number of issues. A
mviltilateral system can also include customized and responsive collective
valuation mechanisms. Similarly, monitoring and enforcement costs
might be reduced because access is free and there is no need to monitor
the use of genetic resources or to sanction the violation of the
agreements. A multilateral system may provide economies of scale if the
monitoring and enforcement involve fixed costs that can be shared. It
may also include alternative monitoring systems such as peer supervision
and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that are often more
responsive and specialized than courts. Last, it may offer alternative (non
legal) sanctioning mechanisms such as excluding those who do not fulfill
their commitments from the multilateral system.
This recent study attempts to assess and compare the transaction costs
generated under each system. According to this survey, the transaction
costs range from $900,000 to $1.3 million for a multilateral system
covering all non-industrial crops, and from $16 million to $48 million a
year for bilateral agreements covering all crops (including industrial).
There is thus an important reduction of transaction costs in the
multilateral system. The same study compares the estimated transaction
costs with the estimated expenditures of private sector breeders on the
maintenance of genetic resources. R&D expenditures amount to
approximately |1 billion per year from which five percent or $50 million
are allocated to genetic resource maintenance. Therefore, it appears that
in a comprehensive multilateral system, transaction costs are estimated at
two to three percent of the total maintenance costs; whereas under the
completely bilateral system, transactions costs are estimated at thirty-two
to ninety-six percent of the maintenance costs. It is difficult to foresee
the exact impact of those transaction costs on germplasm exchanges but
the authors of the study conclude that excessively high transaction costs
are entailed in a scenario in which all germplasm exchanges fall under
bilateral agreements. To be precise, it should be added that the public
sector is both the main users of genetic resources contained within
genebanks and the main investor in genetic resource maintenance. The
total public investment in conservation is estimated at $922 million, this
is almost twenty times the private sector investment. However, given
that the objective of bilateral agreements is to capture part of the
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benefits realized by the private sector, there is litde sense in creating a
system of bilateral agreements thatwill create transaction costs and offer
no shared benefits.
5.2.2 A Risk of Erosion of the Norms of Shared-Access and
Reciprocity
National sovereignty over genetic resources and the possibility to patent
them favors a property regime; where access to any genetic resource
requires the negotiation of a material transfer agreement, however, the
adhesion to the norms of shared-access and reciprocity, facilitating
exchanges of genetic resources, remains strong in the agricultural R&D
community. Notwithstanding, the effectiveness of these norms is
threatened and one can observe scientists and organizations departing
from it. Indeed, the CBD regime, relying on exclusive rights, creates
incentives that may run counter to these norms. The fear that another
breeder could obtain a patent or plant breeders' right with one's genetic
resources may render him reluctant to share his genetic resources to
other breeders.
Even if public or private plant breeders believe strongly that the norm of
shared-access ("cooperation" in game theory lan^age) is the correct
mode of behavior, they know that their colleagues may be tempted to
ignore it because of the higher payoffs of restricting access. If plant
breeders conclude that it is in their self-interest to limit access to their
research tools ("defect" in game theory language or "free-ride" in the
public good language), then they wiU expect their colleagues to do the
same. The expectation that others will defect wiU lead even those who
strongly adhere to the norm of open access to defect as well, since the
worst position is to cooperate when others defect. In this scenario, a
plant breeder would provide genetic resources for free while others
would not. The plant breeder would have to pay royalties to aU the
others in order to access their findings while his own work would be
totally uncompensated. Consequentiy, in game theorylanguage, it can be
said that the "equilibrium strategy" is likely to be to defect even if aU the
players would be better off wherethe cooperative behavior continued. In
other words, the problem lies in the new reward structure created by the
CBD; it is adverse to the enforcement of the norms of shared-access. In
addition, the risk of internal defection (appropriation by members of
the agricultural R&D community) is strengthened by external
defection. External defection is where third parties that are not
submitted to the norms, e.g., firms working in other sectors, decide to
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patent genetic resources thus making them unavailable for members of
the community.
Plant breeders were aware of the inadequacy of a regime based on
exclusive rights over their innovation processes and they understood the
potential conflict between this regime and the social norms ruling their
activities. Within the framework settied by the CBD, plant breeders have
thus progressively built a sub-regime that better suits their activities. In
the previous chapter I mentioned a 1991 modification of the UPOV
Convention. This modification introduced the notion of "essentially
derived variety" and attempted to introduce a balance between
traditional breeders who resort to plant breeder's rights and biotech
companies who resort to patents^^®. The snapshot of this modification is,
however, a renewed attack against genetic resource open access. This
time, within the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), plant
breeders succeeded in using exclusive rights to recreate a system of
limited open-access or shared-access.
5.3 The Way towards the Treaty
There were two triggers to new negotiations within the FAO. First, the
CBD, a framework convention, covers aU types of genetic resources. The
CBD's entry into force did not abrogate the FAO International
Undertaking, which focuses on plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture (PGRFA), though it was required that its revision be in
harmony with the CBD. Second, the CBD provisions do not apply
retroactively. Therefore, the CBD provisions on access and benefit
sharing do not apply to ex-situ collections of genetic resources
constituted before the CBD entered into force"'.
The need to (1) adapt the International Undertaking and (2) to rule
access to ex-situ collections created prior to the CBD is recognized in
resolutions adopted by both the CBD's organs and the FAO. The final
Act of Nairobi, which closed the negotiations of the CBD in May 1992,
includes a Resolution that recognit^es the need to seek solutions to outstanding
matters concerning plant genetic resources within the Global System for the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Kesources for Food and
Sustainable Agriculture, inparticular, (a) Access to ex-situ collections not acquired in
558 Actually some firms resort to both traditional breeding and transgenese and this
might be increasingly the case with the growing concentration of the sector.
559 It is explicidy stated in article 15 §3
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accordance with this Convention; and (b) The question offarmers' right/^". In 1993
the FAO Conference adopted a similar resolution that called for the
revision of the International Undertaidng and requested FAO to provide a
forum in the CGKPA,for the negotiation among governments, for (a)the adaptation
ofthe International Undertaking on 'Plant Genetic 'Resources, in harmony with the
CBD;(b)consideration ofthe issue ofaccess on mutually agreed terms to plantgenetic
resources, including exsitu collections not addressed by the CBD; and (c)the issue of
the realisation ofFarmers' Vdghts.^ '^
The first FAO achievement consists in the adoption in November
1993 of an International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm
CoUectinp- and Transfer. There is littie to say about this code of conduct.
Adopted just after the Rio Convention,it sticks with the text of the CBD
and diverges from the International Undertaking. The primary function
of this voluntary code of conduct is to serve as a point of reference until
such time as individual countries establish their own ABS regulations.
Although it contains useful guidelines for countries considering the
adoption of ABS regulations, the code draws littie attention. '^^ ^
The revisions of the International Undertaking and its transformation
into a legally binding International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture took eight years. Before describing the content
of this Treaty, it is worth mentioning a series of changes that took place
in the margins of the negotiations, yet prepared the content of the
Treaty. This enables us to see how both a community of public
researchers working for the International Agricultural Research Centers
(lARCs) and plant breeders progressively managed to draft a legal regime
that is well suited to their activities and is mumally supportive of their
social norms of shared-access and reciprocity.
The CBD left open an urgent question: the legal status of the genetic
resources collection held by lARCs and coordinated by the CGIAR
and IPGRI. Indeed, the CBD does not apply to pre-existing ex-situ
collections. Moreover, national sovereignty could not apply to these
5'° Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, "The Interrelationship between the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture". The text of the
Resolution is available at ftp: / /ext-ftp.fao.org/ag-/cerfa/Res /CBD3E.pdf
5 '^ Resolution 7/93, "Revision of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources", Twenty-seventh Session of the FAO Conference Rome, 1993. The text of
the Resolution is available at ft;^://ext-ftp. fao.org/ag/cgrfa/Res/C7-93E.pdf
Marie-Angye Hermitte (2004), "La construction du droit des ressources
genetiques...", p. 78
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collections because, even if they are located in host countries, the
international community has always funded them and furthermore, they
hold genetic resources collected from a multitude of countries. To
answer this question, the lARCs resorted to the legal technique of
bilateral contracts between each lARC that held an ex-siiu collection and
the FAO. All bilateral contracts are the same and a joint statement signed
by all the lARCs to clarify the content of the bilateral contracts
completes them.^^^ Regarding the content of the agreement, the CGIAR
centers placed their collection under the auspices of the FAO; these
collections must be part of an international network of ex-situ collections
already claimed by the 1983 International Undertaking. The CGIAR
centers consider themselves to be the trustee of those collections for the
benefit of the international community. Therefore, CGIAR centers
agreed to make their collections freely available.
While further describing the contents of the agreement, I employ some
of the theories presented in Part I. I first examine the effect of the
Agreement on transaction costs. Second, I look at how it affects the
property regime of genetic resources. Third, I observe that the
Agreement is a formalization of social norms in place among the
agricultural R&D community.
Transaction costs are not the main rationale behind the Agreement.
The Agreement does not deal with access to or exchange of genetic
resources but rather consists of a collective commitment of large holders
of genetic resources to place them in open-access. Nevertheless, placing
genetic resources in open-access minimizes transaction costs, because it
suppresses the need for owners and users to find each other (search
costs) in order to negotiate MTA's (bargaining costs), monitor each
other, and enforce MTA provisions in the case of violation (monitoring
and enforcement costs).
The heart of the Agreement is the safeguarding of shared access and
reciprocity social norms. The Agreement insists on the continuity with
past policies and social norms. The preamble of the agreement includes
563 Agreement Between [name of center] and the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) Placing Collections of Plant Germplasm under the Auspices
of the FAO (1994) and Joint Statement of FAO and CGIAR Centers on the
Agreement Placing CGIAR Germplasm Collection under the Auspices of the FAO
(1994). Both documents have been published in the Booklet of CGIAR Centers Volig
Imtniments, Guidelines and Statements on Genetic Resources, Biotechnolog and Intellectual Proper^
Rights, Version II, SGRP, Rome 2003. The Booklet is available at
http:/ /siniJer.criar.orp-/booklet.pdf
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recitals considering that the CGIAKadheres to apolig onplantgenetic resources
which is based on the unrestricted availability ofGennplasm held in theirgenebanks
and considering that the Germplasm have been donated [to the centers] or
collected [by the centers] on the understanding that these accessions will remainfreely
available and that they tvill be conserved and used in research on behalf of the
international community, in particular the developing countries. It is worth
examining how this Agreement preserves social norms by sUghdy
modifying their provisions (property regime) and formalizing them
through a combination of contract and property rights so as to be able to
enforce them against internal or external defection.
Regarding their property regime, genetic resources are in open access
(or res publicae). However, this property regime is not simply the public
domain. In a simple public domain, pieces of knowledge are available
only because they are not IPR protected and anyone can take and use
whatever they wish and can subsequently mix the knowledge with new
pieces of knowledge and qualify for IPR protections. By contrast, in the
property regime created by the Agreement, genetic resources are
available only for the purposes of scientific research, plant breeding
and/or conservation; open access is not guaranteed for other uses. In
addition, access is not unconditional; there are two conditions to
accessing this regime : (1) there is an obligation not to claim any IPRs
and (2) there is an obligation to include a similarcondition in subsequent
transfers. The recipient must agree notto claim ownership over the material, nor
to seek IPRs over that material or its genetic parts or components, in the form
received. The recipient must further agree to ensure that any subsequentperson
or institution to whom hejshe may make the samples of the material available, is
bound by the sameprovisions andundertakes topass on the same obligations tofuture
recipients ofthe material^"'' These types of provisions are sometimes called
"copyleft" or "share alike" because they only allow the recipient to
distribute copies of the materialor derivatives under a license identical to
the license that governs the first transfer. Such provisions are also said to
have a "viral effect" because the terms of the license allowing the
recipient to use the protected content must be included in any
subsequent transfer. Therefore, anyone wanting to develop an
invention/work including a piece of content protected by such a license
is required to make it available under the same conditions '^'^ . However, a
S'i'' The text of the standard Material Transfer Agreement is available in the same
booklet.
When the terms of the license prohibits claiming property rights Chander and
Sunder suggest that this can be analyzed as an example of the third type of rules
identify by Calabresiand Melaned, i.e. Inalienability. However in this case the protected
content does not inalienablybelongs to someone rather it is inalienably in open-access,
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very important issue in measuring the extent of the viral effect is to
determine the degree to which it is applied to derivation. In the case of
genetic resources held by CGIAR centers, it seems that the viral effect
does not extend to a high degree of derivation. This is because the
Material Transfer Agreement provides that the recipient, therefore, hereby
agrees not to claim ownership over the material, nor to seek IPRs over that material,
or itsgeneticparts of components, in theforms received. The recipient also agrees not
to seek IPRs over related information received.^ '^' However, the exact meaning
of the expression "in the form received" is not perfecdy clear. The same
expression was introduced in 2001 in the International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (the "International Treaty")
and elicited unsettled sharp controversies on the exact meaning of the
expression {Cf infra).
Beyond its content, this agreement is an interesting attempt to
"formalize social norms", i.e. insert their provision into contracts.
Indeed, genetic resources are in open access not because they are
unprotected by IPRs or because they cannot be protected by IPRS.
Rather, genetic resources are in open access because of the will of the
centers and through contractual mechanisms: users can obtain genetic
resources for free but they have to sign a standard Material Transfer
Agreement by which they commit to stick to the norm of open access.
They are some similarities between this agreement and the attempt of
American scientists to formalize their norms that I examined in Part I.
Similarities are even greater with open-source mechanisms first
developed in the software sector and then extended to other sectors
through initiatives such as Creative Commons'''^ . The open-source
community faced the same two threats as were faced by the agricultural
R&D community: the vulnerability of their norms-based regime to both
internal and external defection. One of the adopted solutions has been to
obtain formal intellectual property rights that allow third parties to use,
modify and redistribute the knowledge, as long as they respect the norms
of the community embodied in the text of the license. If a user violates
the norms, he can be sued either for breach of the license or for
infringement of the IPRs (copyright).
In this Agreement, MTAs play exacdy the same role as licenses in the
various open-source initiatives and in the different collective rights
it cannot be appropriated. See Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder (2004), "The
Romance of the Public Domain", 92 CALIFORNIALAW REVIEW 5 at 1333
566 ]y[y emphasis
51 '^ For a presentation of the Creative Commons initiative see
wwft'.crearivecommons.org
227
organizations. As to the role of formal property rights, the situation for
genetic resources held by CGIAR centers, are similar but slighdy
different. CGIAR centers can include open-access conditions in MTAs
because they have some rights to the transferred genetic resources.
However, the nature of their rights is not perfectly clear. The agreement
between the centers and the FAO provides that the centers shallnotclaim
legal ownership over the designated Germplasm, nor shall [th^] seek any intellectual
property rights over the Germplasm or related information, rather the centers
regard themselves as trustees of their genetic resources. There are
therefore two possible understandings of the rights of the centers. Under
the first interpretation, it could be argued that the CGIAR centers can
impose conditions on recipients because they are in possession of
material including genetic resources. In that case, recipients must accept
the center's terms and conditions requiring access to genetic resources.
This interpretation has two consequences. First, though it provides
centers with a contractual right against the recipient it does not give
them the right to take direct action against a subsequent recipient who
does not respect the condition of open-access. This is different from the
open-source case wherethe author is protectedby copyright, i.e. his right
is erga omnes; he can invoke his right against any subsequent recipient.
Second, if a center's rights are limited to possession of their collection, it
means that someone can access identical genetic resources from a
different provider and possibly claim intellectual property rights on
material including these genetic resources. Under the second
interpretation, one could argue that centers could invoke trustee rights
against subsequent recipients who fail to respect the open-access
condition. However, it is far from clear whether a trustee who holds
plants or seeds containing genetic resources, is enabled to take a direct
action against a subsequent recipient who claims IPRs in genetic
resources. Only an IPR that follows genetic resources (knowledge
content of the plant or seeds sample) can enable direct action.
The Agreement between the CGIAR centers and the FAO and their
Joint Statement represent but one stage of a continuing dynamic process^^^ in
implementing and adapting the CBD regime to the characteristics of the
agricultural sector. Among the next intermediary stages before the
adoption of the International Treaty, the adoption in 1998 of a Second
Joint Statement of FAO and the CGIAR Centres on the Agreement
SI'S Joint Statement of FAO and CGIAR Centers on the Agreement Placing CGIAR
Germplasm Collectionunder the Auspicesof the FAO (1994), paragraph 6.
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Placing CGIARGermplasm Collections under the Auspices of FAO '^^ ^ is
worthy of mention. This Second Joint Statement includes some
provisions regarding monitoring and enforcement of the terms of the
material transfer agreement. Under the Statement, CGIAR centers and
FAO agree to share responsibilities to monitor compliance with the
provisions of MTA and to take legalaction against possible infringers. In
1999, CGIAR centers also adopted the Guidelines for Germplasm
Acquisition Agreements in which the centers committed to respect the
access conditions set out in the CBD. The centers also claimed that they
would attempt to acquire Gennplastn without conditions which would restrictfuture
availability. In other words, centers want to apply their open-access
policies not only to genetic resources collected before the entry into
force of the CBD but also to newly acquired genetic resources.
Therefore, they attempt to negotiate access conditions with providing
countries that allow them to do so. In 2000, with the adoption of a
standard Material Transfer Agreement and Guidelines for the
Acquisition and transfer of these types of genetic resources, the policy of
open-access was then extended to non-plant genetic materials such as
Micro-Organisms, Animals and Aquatic and Marine Material.
5.4 The International Treaty
The Agreement between the CGIAR centers and the FAO and their
Joint Statement was a first step in a larger process. The main
achievement of the agricultural community consisted of the negotiation
of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture"" (the "International Treaty"). The agreement and theJoint
Statement concerned only a dozen of genetic resources holders —the
largest however -deciding unilaterally to place them in open-access
providing recipients do not claim property rights on the receive
resources. This time, the issue was the negotiation of a legally binding
international treaty where a large number of countries were acting
simultaneously as users and providers to negotiate reciprocal access to
each other's resources.
5^' The Second Joint Statement has also been published in the Booklet of CGIAR
Centre Policy Instruments, Guidelines and Statements on Genetic Resources,
Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Rights, Version II, SGRP, Rome 2003. The
Booklet is availableat http: / /sinjTer.c<nar.org/booklet.pdf
5™ International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, opened
for signature 3 November 2001, entered into force 29 June 2004. The official text is
availableat http://www.fap.org/ag/cgrfa/IU.htm
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Regarding its connection with the CBD, the International Treaty creates
a complementary regime and a sub-regime. It creates a complementary
regime in the sense that it rules over ex-situ collections of genetic
resources that are not regulated by the CBD. It is also a sub-regime in
the sense that it fits within the legal framework established by the CBD
and provides a detailed regime for a specific component of biodiversity,
and certain plant genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in
Annex I of the Treaty"'. If the general goal of Treatyis the attainment of
food security"^, its objectives are those of the CBD; the conservation
and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their
use'^ ^. However, although the Internationd Treaty fits into the legal
framework setded by the CBD, it creates a regime of access to genetic
resources and benefit sharing (ABS) with a very different logic.
The Treaty contains detailed provisions for the conservation and the
sustainable use of genetic resources. The centerpiece of the treaty,
however, is its "multilateral system for access and benefit sharing".
While I further describe the content of the Agreement and its
multilateral system, I wUl refer to some of the theoretical elements
presented in Part I.
In Part I, I first mentioned the possibility of protecting an entidement
with a liability rule rather than a property rule. Liability rules suppress the
need to obtain the consent of the holder while including a mechanism
for collective valuation. In so doing, in some circumstances liability rules
can reduce bargaining costs. Secondly, I observed that economic agents
may modify their entitiements by contract and may possibly create
collective rights organizations (CROs). CRO's and liability rules
complete each other; collective rights organizations can include
contractually created liability rules™ or they can manage liability rules
created by the government"^ Regarding transaction costs, collective
rights organizations can help reduce search costs, bargaining costs,
monitoring and enforcement costs. Thirdly, I noticed that in terms of
property regimes, liability rules and collective rights organizations could
create intermediary situations between the two extremes, i.e. exclusive
rights and the public domain. Finally, I examined whether these CROs
s" The treaty makes no distinction between genericresources held before the entry into
force of the CBD and the material acquired after.
572 Article 1
5" Article 1
5''* What Robert P. Merges calls "contracting into liability rule" see Robert P. Merges
(1996), "Contracting into LiabilityRules..at 1293
Like the CopyrightSocieties that manage statutory licenseson behalf of authors.
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fulfilled the conditions of resilience (the institutional design principles)
identified by Ostrom. I will now examine the International Treaty in light
of these elements.
5.4.1 Transaction Costs: Liability Rules and Collective Rights
Organizations
The International Treaty can be analyzed in light of a situation where
rights holders modify their entitlements by contract and create a
collective rights organization in order to reduce transaction costs. The
case of the International Treaty is a bit particular because it does not deal
with economic agents, contracts and a single government but rather with
sovereign states and treaties in the absence of an international
government. However, except for the absence of an international
government that can create or modify entidements, the process is not
very different. Consistent with the legal framework created by the CBD,
the contracting parties recognize their mutual sovereign rights over their
respective genetic resources but they use those sovereign rights to create
a multilateral system to facilitate access. In other words, they
contractually create a collective rights organization to reduce transaction
costs. Article 10.2 provides that in the exercise of their sovereign rights, the
Contracting Partiesagree to establish a multilateral system, which is efficient, effective,
and transparent, both to facilitate access to plant genetic resources for food and
agnculture, and to share, in a fair and equitable ivcg, the benefits arisingfrom the
utilis^ation ofthese resources, on a complementary and mutually reinforcing basis/ '^^
The multilateral system attempts to facilitate access by reducing different
kinds of transaction costs.
The multilateral system is useful in reducing search costs. In order to
facilitate the identification of an exchange partner, the participating states
agree to create an information system'^ ^ that encompasses catalogues,
inventories, and information including characterization, evaluation, and
utilization of theirgenetic resources '^®. Moreover, the multilateral system
suppresses the need to identify the country of origin, which according to
the CBD is the only country that can give its prior informed consent to
access its genetic resources"'. However, it must also be said that the
The penultimate recital of the Preamble contains a similar provision
5'' Article 17
578 Article 13.2 (a)
s'" Article 15 of the CBD dealing with access to genetic resources does not apply to ex-
situ collections acquired before its entry into force but it applies to ex-situ collections
acquired after. In the Treaty, the contracting parties use their national sovereignty to
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reduction of search costs is mainly due to the nature of ex-situ collections
of genetic resources where resources are classified and documented in
contrast to in-situ genetic resources that are obviously not classified and
sometimes even unlaiown.
As for the cost of monitoring the behavior of the parties and the cost
of enforcing the agreement, they only occur when an agreement takes
time to fulfiU. The multilateral system can lower monitoring costs in two
ways: either by suppressing the need to monitor the parties or by
creating a centralized and cheaper way to monitor them. The first
question is thus to identify what behaviors must be monitored. The
Treaty contains a provision stating that access shall be accorded [...] without
the need to track individual accessions However, this provision must be
carefully interpreted. To a certain extent, the use of material transfer
agreements implies that individual transfers are automatically registered.
Moreover, access is not provided without conditions. The two main
obligations of genetic resources recipients are: first, not to claim any
IPRs or others rights on the received genetic resources where they could
limit the facilitated access^®', and second, in case of commercialization of
a product incorporating the received genetic resources, the recipient
must either allow access to the product for research and breeding
purposes or pay compensation to the multilateral system®®^. Therefore,
providers wiU not need to track or monitor all subsequent transfers of
the provided genetic resources. Tracking the provenance of genetic
resources accessed from the multilateral system will only occur when the
recipient or any subsequent recipient claims rights to the material
received or where they develop a product incorporating the resources
accessed'®^. The second question regards knowing whether the
multilateral system includes a mechanism that lowers monitoring and
enforcement costs. The Treaty contains few elements on this issue.
agree to create a multilateral system and suppress the need to identify the country of
origin and the obligation to obtain his consent.
580 Article 12.3 (a)
58' Article 12.3(d); provides that "redpients shall not claim any intellectualproperty orother rights
that limits thefacilitated access to the plantgenetic resourcesforfood andagriculture, or their genetic
part orcomponents, in theform receivedfrom the multilateral gstem. There remains uncertainty
and disagreement on the exact meaning of the expression "in the form received". And
the degree of change beyond which genetic resources are no longer «in the form
received » and therefore are no longer subjected to the obligations definedin the treaty.
This lackof clarity has caused a series of developed to stress theirunderstanding of that
provision, andJapan preferred postponing its signature of the treaty.
582 Article 13.2 (d) (ii)
583 Gerald Moore & WitoldTymowski (2005), Explanatory Guide to the International Treaty
r...;,p.i04
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However, article 21 requires the governing body to set up effective
procedures and operational mechanisms to monitor compliance and
sanction non-compliance.^"''
Above aU, the multilateral system includes several elements capable of
reducing bargaining costs, i.e. the cost of reaching an agreement
between the provider and the recipient. The multilateral system replaces
bilateral (market) valuation by a mechanism of collective valuation more
efficient in situations of information asymmetries (information about the
threat values and the bargaining surplus is private) and suppresses the
need to obtain the consent of the provider. In other words it creates a
kind of liability rule. In addition, the multilateral system offers
economies of scale in the design of rules: as there are many redundancies
in contracts ruling exchanges of property rights (licenses), standard
contractual provisions allow parties to negotiate only a limited number
of issues such as the type and the quantity of genetic resources.
The multilateral systems determine the conditions of access and the
forms of benefit sharing as follows: parties agree to provide access for
free'"' but not without conditions. First, access must be reciprocal {Cf.
infra), the recipient maynot claim any IPRs''"'to genetic resources in the
form received, and he must leave the resources available to the
multilateral system.'®^ Therefore, as noted in article 13,a major benefit of
the multilateral system consists in accessing a large range of genetic
resources. In a situation of high interdependence on each other's genetic
resources (Cf. sub-section 5.1.1), all participating countries are winners
because they all receive access to more genetic resources than they
contribute. Second, the recipients must funnel back part of the benefits
derived from the use of received genetic resources when the following
circumstances are present: (1) the recipient develops a product derived
from the received genetic resources, (2), this derived product is itself a
plantgenetic resource for food and agriculture'"", (3) it commercializes it
The first draft of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement provides that the
Governing Body has the right to monitor the execution of this MTA and to initiate
dispute resolution procedure (article 5.2) and that the obtains an IPR on material
received, he must mention it to the governing body (article 7.4)
585 Article 12.3 (b). Actually providers may charge a minimal administrative fee but it
should not exceed the cost involved or constitute a hidden access fee.
Article 12.3 (d)
5®' Article 12.3 (g. To be precise, article 12.3(a) contains an additional condition:
recipients may only use the received resources for agricultural purposes {Cf. infra)
588 This requirement does not apply to the commercialization of a product that is not
itself plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. For instance, it would not apply
to pasta containing wheat produced by a new variety created by incorporating material
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and (4) the product is otherwise unavailable without restriction to others
for research and breeding. If the product is available without restriction
for research and breeding (either becausci it is not protected or it is
protected by UPOV plant breeders rights or by a patent in a country
where patent law provides a large research exception), the payment is
voluntary. However, the governing body may decide to make this
payment compulsory inboth situations^ '^.
Like other collective rights organizations examined in part one, the
multilateral system not only fixes the level of the contribution (collective
valuation) but it also collects the fund, manages them and organizes the
distribution among providers. The precise conditions in which the
recipient may have to funnel back part of their benefits and the level of
his contribution will be determined in a standard MTA to be negotiated
by the governing body '^°. As for the collection, management, and
distribution of funds, the Treaty asks the governing body to establish a
mechanism such as a trust account '^V To be complete, the Treaty also
mentions other forms of benefits sharing such as exchange of
information, access to and transfer of technology and capacity building,
though they are not direcdy related to access to genetic resources '^^ .
In addition, even if they are not strictiy speaking transaction costs, it is
worth mentioning that joining the multilateral system does not burden
participating countries with high implementation or administrative
costs. They only need to recognize the provisions of the Treaty in their
domestic law. Contrary to the CBD, there is no need to draft new
legislation and to createinstitutions to implementit.
obtained from the multilateral system). For more detail see Gerald Moore & Witold
Tymowski (2005): Explanatory Guide to the International Treaty (...), p. 110
585 Article 13.2 (d) (ii). The first draft of the standard MTA (see next footnote) keeps
the twooptions (voluntary or compulsory payment) opens (article 7.10 and 10.4).
590 Article 13.2 (d) (ii) and 12.4. A Contact Group for the Drafting of the Standard
Material TransferAgreement has beenset up. Hereafter, I make some references to the
first draft of the standard MTA but only in the foomotes because it is stillvery far from
an approved standard MTA. See Report of the Contact Group for the Drafting of the
Standard Material TransferAgreement Hammamet, Tunisia, 18-22 July 2005, available
at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/a^f/cOTfa/cmual /smralrepe.pdf
591 Article 19.3(f)
592 The firstdraft of the standardMTAdoes not providemore precisionon the sharing
of non-monetary benefit (article 7.12) except that it envisages as a possible option the
obligation do deposit in the multilateral system a sample of a plant genetic resources
developed byrecipient from resources from the system (article 7.11, option 1)
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5.4.2 Property Regime: a Limited Commons?
After having regarded the International Treaty as a combination of
liability rules and collective rights organizations used to reduce
transaction costs and facilitate exchanges of genetic resources, it is also
interesting to examine the Treaty in terms of property regimes and
observe whether it creates intermediary situations between the two
extremes of exclusive individual rights and the public domain. It is not
possible to give a perfecdy definitive answer because some provisions of
the Treaty are unclear and the contracting parties do not fully agree on
their meaning. Moreover, the Treaty leaves some options open to be
decided by the governing body.
Having acknowledged this imprecision, I argue that the multilateral
system creates a limited commons '^^ including some characteristics of
the public domain as well as some characteristics of the open-
content+ copyleft. A limited commons is defined by Carol Rose as
"property held as commons amongst the member of a group, but
exclusively vis-a-vis the outside world"®'"*. The notion of limited
commons is similar to the notions of shared access, res universitatis or
common property I presented in Part I. The four notions share the same
characteristics: a group within which access is shared, but access is not
granted to those that do not provide access to their genetic resources.
The group includes those who contribute, but excludes free-riders. In
the IPR context, the notion of limited commons acknowledges the
usefulness of property rights in intellectual achievement, but unlike
individual IPRs, they focus first on encouraging the group interactions
that foster creativity, and second, on policing the boundaries of
behaviors thatare disruptive to the creative group.®"
In order to describe a limited commons, I must identify the following
elements: the resources placed in the commons, the members or the
contributors, the internal access regime and the external access regime
which establish a connection between the contribution to the limited
commons and the conditions for accessing the limited commons .
593 por a similar argument see Laurence R. Heifer (2005) "Using Intellectual Property
Rights to Preserve the Global Genetic Commons: The International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture" in Keith Maskus and Jerome H.
Reichman (eds.) International Public Goods and Transfer of Technologf Under a Globalis^ed
Intellectual Proper^ Regime, Cambridge University Press
5'"' Carol M. Rose (1998), "The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales,EmissionTrades and Ecosystems, 83 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 129,p. 132
Ibidem
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As for the resources placed in the commons, the Treaty is clear. The
Multilateral system only concerns a limited number of plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I. These resources
however are probably the most valuable.
Regarding die identification of the members, the description is slighdy
more complicated. An international treaty creates the multilateral system;
therefore, the analysis must be done at the level of states as contracting
parties, and at the level of public or private organizations holding genetic
resources.
At the level of states, article 10 of the Treaty distinguishes between
relations among contracting parties and relations between contracting
parties and other states. Relations among members are ruled by the
multilateral system described above. Relations with non-members are
ruled by the CBD. There is no common external regime; users of genetic
resources must negotiate access with each state individually.
At the level of organizations providingor accessing genetic resources the
Multilateral System establishes two connections between the degree of
contributions to the limited commons and the conditions of access.
The first contribution such an organization can make consists of
providing other members with facilitated access to its collection. In
exchange, it will receive reciprocal access to other members' collections.
Genetic resources held by public sector organizations are included in the
system and those organizations have access to genetic resources held by
other participating institutions"^. CGIAR centers are also included in the
Multilateral System"^. Regarding private organizations holding plant
genetic resources '^^ , they are encouraged to include them in the
Multilateral System while the governing body must decide whether
organizations refusing to include their genetic resources can benefit from
the Multilateral System^" . This last provision is essential to determine
the nature of the property regime created by the International Treaty. If
some organizations can benefit from the Multilateral System,whether or
not they include their collection, the treaty looks like an agreement by
which some genetic resource holders agree to place them in open-access
5"" Article 11.2; to be precise the treaty mentions genetic resources that are under the
management and control of the contracting partiesand in the public domain.
597 Article 11.5




(or the public domain) just like the CGIAR centers in the agreement
mentioned before. In contrast, if facilitated access is only provided to
organizations that include their resources in the system, i.e. implying a
rule of reciprocity, then the treaty is reaUy creating a limited commons.
The same ardcle 11.4 also considers the possibility of other measures as [the
governing bo^] deems appropriate. Using this provision, the governing body
could draw a common external regime for non-pardcipating
organizations wandng to access genetic resources included in the
Multilateral System.
The second contribution consists in extending the limited commons by
including products derived from genetic resources accessed from the
Multilateral System. This is why, access is solely provided for agricultural
uses and chemical and pharmaceutical uses are explicitiy excluded. The
rationale of this exclusion lies in the fact that the pharmaceutical sector
has a long tradition of patenting and relying on exclusive property rights
running counter the idea of shared-access. Access to genetic resources
for chemical and pharmaceutical uses is ruled by the CBD. There is no
common external regime; pharmaceutical companies must negotiate
bilateral contracts with each state individually.As for the agricultural
sector, the treaty offers a choice to the recipient that uses the received
genetic resources to develop and commercialize a product that is a plant
genetic resources: either he makes the products available without
restriction for further research or plant breeding or he pays a share of
the benefits to the multilateral system. Thus, if recipients contribute to
enlarge the limited commons by including the new product, access is
free, if not theyhave to contribute bypaying a share of their benefits.'"'
Finally, the multilateral system is not only a limited commons; it also
includes some traits of open-content + copyleft. First, a recipient may
not claim IPRs or other rights that limit thefacilitated access to theplant genetic
resources for food and agriculture, or theirgenetic parts or components in theform
received^"^. Second, a recipient must require that the conditions of access
defined in the Treaty and the standard MTA apply to any subsequent
transfers to third parties.
In addition, Biodiverse countries were reluctant to abandon the bilateral mechanisms
for pharmaceutical uses as they still expect important benefits from it.
<>'>' Article 13.2(d) (ii)
602 Article 12.3(d)
Article 12.4. The first draft of the standard MTA provides that these subsequent
transfers must be accompanied by the signature of a new standard MTA (article 7.7)
and it adds that if a recipient who obtain a restrictive IPRs on material received and
transfers that IPR, he must transfer the benefit-sharing obligations (article 7.13)
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I must add an additional remaris on Farmer's Rights. The International
Treaty dedicates one article to Farmer's Rights, though these rights
remain a political concept without any real legal implications. One can
observe a growing separation between the notion of Farmer's Rights and
the issue of benefits sharing. Actually, this separationwas already present
but went unnoticed in the FAO Resolutions 4/89 and 5/89 {See Part II,
chapter J). The principal change lies in tiie Treaty negotiator's disregard of
the issue and effective transfer of the ,responsibility to formulate
Farmer's Rights to national governments. For the remainder, article 9 of
the Treaty only repeats provisions of Resolutions 4/89 and 5/89 and
article 8J of the CBD. Farmer's Rights appear to be a kind of broad
political concept encompassing different issues discussed in others
places: protection of traditional knowledge, farmers' privilege, and the
right to participate in the political process.
5.4.3 Institutional Design
After examining how the Multilateral System creates a limited commons
and attempts to reduce transaction costs, it might be worthwhile to
examine it in the light of the design principles identified by Elinor
Ostrom, i.e. essential elements or conditions that help to account for the
success of these institutions in sustaining the limited commons and
gaining enduring compliance to the rules in use.
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(a) Clearly defined boundaries (resources and members)
Resources included in the limited commons as weU as individuals who have
rights to access resources must be clearly defined.
(b) Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
(c) Collective choice arrangements
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying
the operational rules
(d) Monitoring
Monitors, who actively audit conditions of the resources placed in the limited
commons and appropriators' behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or
are the appropriators
(e) Graduated sanctions
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated
sanctions by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators,
or by both.
(f) Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
(g) Minimal recognition of right to organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by
external governmental authorities.
For CPRs/limited commons that are parts of larger systems
(h) Nested enterprises
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
Clearly, the International Treaty pays a lot of attention to the definition
of the limited commons boundaries. The treaty makes a series of
distinctions to define those boundaries: it distinguishes contracting
parties from other states; public from private organizations; private
organizations including their resources in the limited commons from
others; agricultural uses from pharmaceutical uses; recipients protecting
or not protecting derived products by patents or by plant breeders' rights
(criterion (a)). Moreover, those distinctions aim at ensuring some
congruence between access rules and contribution to the limited
commons (criterion (b)).
Regarding criterion fc). the answer is again complicated by the fact that
the Multilateral System was created by an international treaty and is now
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ruled bya governing body, which means that the collective decisions are
made bystates and not bymembers of the agricultural R&D community.
However, history of the regulation of genetic resources for food and
agriculmre shows that CGIAR, ASSINSEL and some others NGOs
representing the members of die agricultural R&D community have
been very influential in the redaction of the regulations to their sector. In
addition, a group of experts coming from this community has been
entrusted with the redaction of a draft of the standard Finally,
article 19 of the International Treaty provides that any organization
qualified in the field may have a representative within the governing
bodies, unless one-third of the contracting parties who are present
object.
An important issue is the enforcement of the rules of the Multilateral
System ^criteria fd^l and fe^V AsI explained before, one of the advantages
of the Multilateral System lies in the reduction of the need to monitor
and sanction violations of the rules. However, some provisions such as
restrictions in the claim of IPRs and requirements to share the benefits
need to be enforced. Thus far, the Treaty provides littie indications on
this issue. Article 21 requires the governing body to set up effective
procedures and operational mechanisms to monitor compliance and to
sanction non-compliance. It is thus too early to assess the enforcement
mechanism that should otherwise be a priority for the governing body.
However, one can already affirm that the design of an efficient
enforcement system will be an important test of the efficiency and the
robustoess of the Multilateral System.
Regarding the conflict resolution mechanisms (criterion fO). the Treaty
mentions the mechanisms usually used in international law such as
negotiations, bons offices or mediation, arbitration or submission of the
dispute to the International Court of Justice but nothing else. These
dispute settiement mechanisms are only accessible to states and imply
heavy procedures. Therefore, members of the agricultural R&D
community have no direct access to a rapid and low cost conflict
resolution mechanism.
As for the recognition of rights to organize (criterion (g)). the negotiators
of the CBD and the FAO Conference both resolved to ask the FAO
commission on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to
The draft Standard Material Transfer Agreement and the minutes of the two first
meetings of this "Contact Group for the Drafting of the Standard Material Transfer
Agreement" are available at the following address:
http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/docs.htm
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provide a forum to adapt the International Undertaking and address the
issue of access to ex situ collections not addressed by the CBD {Cf. section
5.3). The community of agricultural R&D seized this opportunity, first to
regulate access to CGIAR centers' collection, and then negotiate an
entire sub-regime for PGRFA. In addition, the CBD, the Multilateral
System and the CGIAR network are nested enterprises (or Russian
doUs). Appropriation, provision, enforcement, conflicts resolution,^"^ and
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested
enterprises. Moreover, possible further layers like regional networks of
genebanks or cooperation networks among breeders and research
institutions could be added.
5.4.4 Emergence of Collective Rights Organization
Collective rights organizations such as the Multilateral System can
enhance the welfare of their members by reducing transaction costs
and/or by formalizing social norms. However, it does not mean that
they will automatically emerge each time they could be useful. The
literature on the conditions of emergence of such coordination
mechanisms observes congruence between private institutions and the
existence of "communities". Could the existence of such communities
contribute to the explanation for the emergence of the Multilateral
System? As I mentioned in part one, in an effort to elaborate on this
notion of community, Elinor Ostrom lists a series of internal
characteristics of a group facing a collective action problem positively
related to the likelihood of starting to coordinate their actions:
'•"5 Enforcement and conflict resolution are however the weak points at each level.
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1. Most members share a common judgment that they will be harmed if
they do not adopt an alternative rule.
2. Most members will be affected in similar ways by the proposed rule
change.
3. Most members have a low discount rate. In others words, individuals
are more likely to start coordinating their actions if they highly value
the continuation of their common activity.
4. Members face relatively low information, transformation, and
enforcement costs. In other words, members of a group are more likely
to coordinate if the costs for the group of consideringa rule change, of
effectively changing die rules and of monitoring and sanctioning the
possible infringement of the rule are low.
5. Most members share generalized norms of reciprocity and thrust that
can be used as initial social capital.
6. The group is relatively smalland stable- (repeat interaction).
The first task in observing whether the negotiation of the International
Treaty respects the criteria identified by Ostrom is to identify the
relevantgroup or community. Once again, I am faced with the difficulty
that an international treaty creates the Multilateral System. Formally, the
negotiators are the Contracting Parties, i.e. a large number of states.
However, behind the formal negotiators, one can identify the
community of (publicand private) agricultural research. This community
includes two influential groups that have, largely contributed to the
drafting of the International Treaty either by publishing position papers
or counseling national negotiators or simply by attending the negotiation
meetings. Those two groups are on the one hand public sector
agricultural researchers, especially scientists working for the CGIAR
centers, and on the other hand traditional plant breeders represented by
ASSINSEL'^"^
"505 As mentioned in Part U, chapter 2, ASSINSEL, is an international association of
private-sector plant breeders. While membership includes all type of companies, the
majority of the members are small and medium sized enterprises that still tend to use
plant breeders' rights more often than they use patents. In 2002 ASSINSEL merged
with the International SeedTrade Federation (FIS).The new organization is now called
the International Seed Federation fISFl.
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Both groups played a leading role in the achievement of the first
equilibrium I identified earlier (Part II, Chapter 2). The CGIAR centers
were at the origin of the creation of a network of ex-situ collections in
open-access, while plant breeders and ASSINSEL were at the origin of
the creation of plant breeder rights that protect new plant varieties but
leave genetic resources in open-access through the so-called breeders'
exception. The two groups might have different or even conflicting
views and interests in some issues but they both agree that the regime
promoted by the CBD, leaning on national sovereignty and wide
patenting of genetic resources, could be very harmful for agricultural
R&D. As I mentioned above, CGIAR centers reacted to the adoption of
the CBD by negotiating an agreement with the FAO, placing their
coUection of genetic resources in open-access and forbidding recipients
to protect the accessed material in the form received. Plant Breeders and
ASSINSEL first reacted to the possibility of patenting genetic resources
by adapting the UPOV Convention in 1991 (Part II, Chapter 3).
Notably, in a document entitied "ASSINSEL Position on Maintenance of
and Access to Vlant Genetic '^ ssources for Food and Agriculture" adopted in
1996, plant breeders express their dissatisfaction with the CBD, which
contrary to its objectives renders access to genetic resources more
difficult. They then affirmed that the "best solution to improve or at least
maintain current level ofaccess to PGRFA in thenew era ofthe CBD is to establish
[...] a multilateral agreementfor [...] and ensuringfree access to PGRFA". Two
years later, ASSINSEL members agreed on another position paper
entitied "Position onAccess to Plant Genetic Resourcesfor Food and Agriculture
and the Equitable Sharing ofBenefits Arisingfrom their Use"''°^. Plant Breeders
reaffirmed their criticisms of the CBD and their desire to create a
multilateral system. Then, they added that the multilateral system should
include a Standard Material Transfer Agreement that should include the
following provisions. First, the recipient should not be allowed to claim
legal ownership nor apply for intellectual property protection for the
germplasm received per se. Thus, plant breeders agreed not only among
themselves but also with CGIAR centers that genetic resources may not
be appropriated under the form received. Second, they affirmed that
recipients may protect products derived from the received genetic
resources either by plant breeders' right or by patent. Third, they added
that in the event ofprotection throu^ patents, limitingfree access to the new genetic
resources, ASSINSEE members areprepared to study a sjistem in which the owners




of the patents would contribute to a fund established for collecting maintaining
evaluating and enhancing genetic resources.
Therefore, it can be said that the agricultural R&D community do meet
the First criteria identified by Ostrom: most members share a common
belief that their activities will be harmed if they do not adopt an
alternative rule. Regarding the second criteria that the proposed rule
change wiU affect most members in similar ways, the question must be
subdivided. All members of the Agricultural R&D community wiU
probably equally benefit from a multilateral system turning national
sovereignty into open-access. In contrast, theywiU not be affected in the
same way by limitations to IPR protections. CGIAR centers and public
sector researchers are littie or not interested in IPRs whereas plant
breeders are. That is probably why they took more time to agree on this
issue and draw the option either to increase the limited commons by
placing in open access products derived from received genetic resources,
or by contributing to a fund dedicated to conservation.
Concerning the third criteria, one can easily assert that most members of
the agricultural R&D community highly value the continuation of their
common activity as plant breeding and conservation are long term
activities; plant breeding companies, research organizations and CGIAR
centers are not planning to leave the sector. As for the fourth criteria, it
can be said that the creation of the Multilateral System has been
facilitated by organizations that provide members with information on
the potential impactof rule change and by the existence of places where
they can exchange views on those potential changes. The CGIAR and
ASSINSEL carry out studies for their members and enable them to
coordinate their views. Then, the FAO Commission Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture (CPGRFA) equally provides similar
surveys'^ "' and an institutional frameworis to negotiate rule change.
Regarding enforcement costs, as I said earlier, the Multilateral System
actually reduces the need to monitor recipients and to some extent could
provide a cheaper centralized enforcement mechanism.
Regarding Ostrom's Fifth and sixth criteria, I have already repeated
several times that the agricultural R&D community has long been ruled
by norms oF shared and reciprocal access and that public scientists and
plant breeders have developed extensive networks of cooperation.
Actually, members fear that an access and benefit-sharing regime based
Some of these "Background Study Papers" are available at the following address:
http:/ /w'u'w.fao.org/at^/cprfa/dor.s.htm
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on exclusive rights (national sovereignty and patent) threatens their
norms and their cooperative networks. The creation of the Multilateral
System and the explicit exclusion of the pharmaceutical sector is a means
to protect those norms and those cooperation networks.
In conclusion, it seems that the agricultural R&D community possesses
most of the internal characteristics identified by Ostrom as being
positivelyrelated to the likelihood of this community adopting a series of
incremental changes in the rules to improve their joint welfare. This
might help to explain why this community managed to change the ABS
rules for their sector, completely modifying the logic of the CBD and to
some extent recreating the preexisting regime.
***
In this chapter, I explained how the agricultural R&D community
created its own access and benefit system by turning the CBD regimes
based on exclusive rights and bilateral contracts into a multilateral system
of access and benefit sharing. It is too early to assess the efficiency of the
International Treaty because this multilateral system only entered into
force on 29 June 2004. Moreover, many details must still be settied by
the Governing Body, notably in the Standard Material Transfer
Agreement currendy in negotiation. However, an analysis of the Treaty
in light of a few bodies of theoretical literature seems to indicate that it
contains promising characteristics. I now turn to a broader conclusion
on the evolution of genetic resources property regimes.
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Conclusion and Future Developments
Synthesis
The objective of this second part was to give a better understanding of
the property regime for genetic resources and its evolution. To this end,
I reconstructed a history of this regime and used the theories identified
in part one as explanatory tools.
I started by introducing the notions of biodiversity and genetic resources
as knowledge goods. Then, I explained that we face two challenges:
favoring agricultural and pharmaceutical innovation on the one hand
(downstream), and conserving and ensuring access to genetic resources,
the sources of innovation, on the other hand (upstream). I characterize
conservation and innovation as knowledge production activities, i.e. two
public goods that can be provided either by public funding or by IPRs
and/or similar devices. In the second chapter of this section I identified
a first equilibrium that resorts to both IPRs to fund R&D, and to public
funding to ensure conservation and a complementary R&D effort. Some
coherence is found in the open access to genetic resources as a source of
innovation, however mainlyin favor of agricultural innovation and plant
breeders. In the third chapter I argued that this equilibrium has been
contested by two changes. Changes in conservation needs and
technological changes promote the adoption of exclusive rights both
upstream (national sovereignty) and downstream (patent) of the
innovation chain. These two changes prepare for the adoption of the
CBD, which in turn provides an outiine for a regime of access and
benefits based on exclusive rights (national sovereignty and patent) and
bilateral contracts. In the fourth chapter I described the CBD and the
process of implementation at the national level. Then, I assessed the first
decade of implementation. I argued that the regime setded by the CBD
has had limited success so far due to the unanticipated presence of high
transactions costs.
At the end of chapter four I described some existing or proposed
improvements of the ABS regime aiming at reducing transaction costs.
In chapter Five, I analyzed how the agricultural R&D community
estimated that the CBD regime did not fit its activities, which are
characterized by a process of collective innovation, nor did it fit its social
norms, which are characterized by shared-access and reciprocity. As a
result, the agricultural R&D community created its own regime that
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ultimately fits into the legal framework set up by the CBD, though it
completely modifies its logic. I then observed the extent to which the
solutions identified in the first part of this dissertation have been
employed to overcome transaction costs and maintain social norms. To
that end I first suggested that devices within the International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources can be analyzed in terms of liability rules and
collective rights organization. I then noted how the International Treaty
creates a limited commons, i.e. property held as a commons among the
members of a group but exclusively vis-a-vis the outside world, which is
modified by some elements of open access and open-content. Finally, I
used Elinor Ostrom's work to examine the resilience of the regime
created by the Treaty (design principles) and its process of emergence.
Future Developments
Today we have two regimes for access and benefit sharing (ABS):
the multilateral ABS regime set up by the International Treaty for agro-
biodiversity and a regime of exclusive rights and bilateral contracts
established by the CBD for the rest of biodiversity. It will be interesting
to compare the efficiency of the two systems.
It is too early to assess the efficiency of the multilateral system because
its implementation is too recent and because its Governing Body must
still design some important elements. However, the theoretical analysis I
have undertaken seems to indicate that it contains promising elements.
Regarding the CBD, neither providing countries nor users are fuUy
satisfied with its current state of implementation. In 2002, the World
Summit for Sustainable Development caUed for action to negotiate within
the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, bearing in mind the Bonn
Guidelines, an international regime topromote and safeguard thefair and equitable
sharing of benefits arising out ofthe utilisation ofgenetic resources.The CBD ad
hoc Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing is now in charge of
identifying the process, nature, scope, elements and modalities of an
international regime and provides advice to the Conference of the
Parties.
World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in September
2001, Vlan ofImplementation, Paragraph 44 (o)
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In its report to the eighth Conference of the Parties^", the Working
group considered the possibility of setting up the instruments I
mendoned in Chapter Four: disclosure of origin and certificate of
origin/source/legal provenance. It is impossible to anticipate the results
of the discussion but it seems that envisaged changes would not
dramatically modify the current logic: exclusive rights and bilateral
contracts. Despite the appellation of the international regime, envisaged
changes are seen to be more flanking measures to facilitate the
enforcement of bioprospecting contracts and ABS legislation rather than
an alternative regulationof genetic resource exchanges.
The coexistence of two regimes of access and benefit sharing and the
fact that the CBD regime is now under review calls not only for
comparative assessment but also for a closer look at the boundary
between these two regimes. Currentiy, the multilateral regime rules
access to a limited list of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
uses and benefit sharing. The CBD regime rules all other situations. One
can see two main justifications for such a boundary. The first one relates
to the distinctive characteristics of innovation in the agriculmral R&D
community. The second one concerns instimtional matters, the FAO has
a long tradition of dealing with genetic resources for food and
agriculture. These are valuable criteria; however, it might be worthwhile
to consider alternative distinctions.
A first distinction might be whether genetic resources are held in an ex-
situ collection, or at least if they are weU identified and easUy accessible,
or whether they are in situ, unidentified, and not immediately accessible.
Indeed, when resources are in an ex-situ collection or weUidentified and
easily accessible, the object of the contract is an immediate transfer of a
sample of genetic resources. By contrast, when genetic resources are in-
situ, unidentified and not immediately accessible, the object of the
contract is not an immediate transfer but the work of collecting,
identifying, and then transferring the resources. Regarding the first case,
I believe the multilateral system might be useful at reducing transaction
costs and facilitating those numerous, repeated and immediate transfers.
Regarding the second case, the multilateral system of facilitated access
offers littie interest. Those kinds of contract are more likely to be joint
CBD (2006) Report of the Eights Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31
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ventures or other kinds of long term contracts between the providing
country and the users.
A second distinction might be whether exchanges and capacities to
benefit from the exchanges are symmetrical or asymmetrical. The main
benefit of the limited commons (or shared access) created by the
multilateral system is facilitated access; each member has access to more
genetic resources than he provides. However, this sort of benefit sharing
is only valuable by those who have the skiUs to use genetic resources for
research purposes. The developing countries were very critical of the
asymmetry of research skills under the International Undertaking.
Therefore, a multilateral system might only attract members whose
contributions and capacities to share the benefits are symmetric unless it
includes rules of compensation for countries providing the system with
genetic resources without being able to enjoy its benefits.
If these suggestions have some accuracy, providers and users of genetic
resources are likely to contract their rights to tailor the ABS systems to
meet their specific needs. One can alreadyobserve the first steps of this
process. At least two technical communities are setting up regimes of
access and benefits sharing that comply with the provisions of the CBD,
though they implement it according to the specificities of their practices.
The European Consortium of Botanical Gardens has recendy created the
International Plant Exchange Network (IPEN). Collections of
microbiological resources are now setting up their own system of
management of access to and transfer of microbiological resources
(MOSAICS). These two emerging initiatives share some common
characteristics not only between them but also with the Multilateral
System created by the International Treaty or the Uniform Biological
Material Transfer Agreement analyzed in the first part of this
dissertation. Schematically, both include a common system of
identification of resources that might lower search costs, standard
material transfer agreements to reduce bargaining costs, and tracking
systems to lower monitoring costs. Last, they both create a system of
free and shared-access for research purposes. Therefore, one important
theme in the discussions on the regulation of access to genetic resources
and benefits could be to better understand when and how the law could
facilitate and regulate the emergence of these collective rights
organizations (or other forms of self-regulation).
For a thoughtful analyze of these complex contractual mechanisms see Padmashree
Gehl Sampath (2005), Kegulating Bioprospecting: Institutions for Drug Research, Access and
Benefit Sharing, Tokyo: United Nations University Press
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***
Two important issues havenot been dealt with in this Second Part. First,
it is now clear that neither the CBD nor the International Treaty wiU
generate enough benefit sharing to fund the conservation of biodiversity
that must be mainly carried out in poor developing countries. It is
worthwhile to get back to the first issue: the balance between what is
publicly funded and what is privately funded with the help of IPRs. It
seems well that upstream parts of the chain of innovation, either basic
research or conservation {Cf. chapters two ofpart one andpart two). The
conservation of biodiversity will be funded by the private sector as long
as a minimal rate of return can be expected. The public sector finances
conservation where the expected social benefit is high and the private
benefit low. For the most in situ conservation corresponds to this last
sitaation. I have already mentioned the important social benefit of
conservation; I just recall that after a few years of illusion it appears that
the expected private benefit from conservation (at least in situ
conservation) is low for different reasons. First, the economic value of
conservation is difficult to forecast and even to assess retrospectively. As
most biodiversity is littie known, the outcome of conservation is highly
uncertain. Second, the difficulty in establishing and defending property
rights in "raw" genetic resources (Cf. chapter 4) often impedes the
realization of economic rent. This means that we have to find other
sources of funding for conservation. It could also call into question the
idea that sustainable use can fund conservation and announce a renewed
emphasis on protected areas as the main way to conserve biodiversity.
Second, I have not mentioned the traditional knowledge of indigenous
and local communities, specifically with regards to the conservation and
use of genetic resources. There is a growing interest among genetic
resources users for accessing simultaneously associated traditional
knowledge. Access to traditional knowledge and benefit sharing can be
ruled either by national ABS legislation and bioprospecting contracts or








The objective of Part Three is to provide a better understanding of
traditional knowledge property regimes and their evolution. Over the last
decades, there has been a growing interest in the traditional knowledge
of indigenous and local communides. Paradoxically, despite this growing
interest, traditional knowledge is quickly eroding. This combination has
elicited a demand for protection for traditional knowledge. In this third
part, I analyze the ongoing discussions on the protection of traditional
knowledge and I identify some limits of the considered solutions. I then
suggest adopting a different perspective in order to explain the limits of
the solution, to identify interesting practical experiences in the protection
of TK, and to provide some guidance for designing effective institutional
mechanisms to protect TK.
To that end, I reconstruct a history of traditional knowledge property
regimes with the help of the theories I introduced in Part One. There are
important parallels with the historical account of the evolution of
intellectual property systems and the evolution of genetic resources
property regimes. However, there are two important differences with
the first two parts of this dissertation. First, the debate on TK protection
is recent and far from concluded. Time has not yet tested the efficiency
of considered solutions. Second, in this third part, I only deal with the
upstream side of the innovation chain. I have described the downstream
side of the innovation chain in Part Two; final users of TK and genetic
resources are the same: bio-industry. Here, the issue is to combine the
two functions of traditional knowledge; first, traditional knowledge
consists of practices and information useful and vital to the daily life of
TK holders; second, traditional knowledge has become in addition
valuable source of information for modern science.
In accordance with the perspective suggested above, I begin by
examining what were the content and the nature of the property regime
organizing traditional innovation before TK protection appeared in
international discussions. It is important to recognize that there does
exist some intellectual property protection in these communities. With
that in mind, I suggest that local and indigenous communities holding
TK can be analyzed as systems of innovation. I also suggest that
'traditional innovation" is organized by customary intellectual property
law that both creates forms of ownership over knowledge and regulates
exchanges of knowledge.
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In the third chapter I describe two changes that lead to a demand for
protection of traditional knowledge and for the consideration of
customary law. Downstream of the chain of innovation, scientists,
development agencies, and bio-industries show a growing interest for
TK. Paradoxically, on the upstream side .of the chain of innovation
(within communities), traditional knowledge is eroding.
In the fourth chapter I stress a few difficulties that must be taken into
account in researching the best means of conserving and further using
traditional knowledge. First, in view of the growing interest of outsiders
for TK, customary (informal) property regimes may no longer be
sufficient to regulate uses of TK. Second, the nature of TK and of its
mode of transmission hinders its conservation and its use by third
parties.
In the fifth chapter, I analyze the current attempts to protect traditional
knowledge and to define property tights. First, I recount the ongoing
discussions within the World Intellectual Property Organization and I
identify some limits of the considered solutions. Second, I examine
examples of practical experiences of protecting TK. Third, in accordance
with the perspective adopted in this dissertation, I suggest that any effort
to design property rights overTK should take into account the nature of
this knowledge, its usefulness and die incentive effect of such property
rights. This analysis and practical experience converge towards the
creation of TK databases as a useful instrument for protection.
In the sixth chapter, I observe the lack of progress in the ongoing
discussions on the possible role of customary law in the protection of
traditional knowledge. Then, I suggest adopting the same perspective I
adopted in the first two parts of this dissertation. As a result, the
discussion on customary law appears to be an issue of self-regulation. As
customary law governs protection inside the community, it therefore
appears that the issue is not so much the protection of TK inside the
community but rather how custom-based innovation systems can be
articulated within the existing framework of global intellectual property
law. I observe how some communities try to formalize and enforce their
customarylawwith a combination of property rights and contracts.
In the last chapter, I look at further developments that could help
protect traditional knowledge and foster its use.
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1. The Notion of Traditional Knowledge
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) calls for the respect,
preservation, maintenance and promotion of the wider application of
traditional knowledge (TI<). However, it contains no definition of
traditional knowledge. Article 8j only refers to "innovations andpractices of
indigenous and local comtnunities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use ofbiological diversi^'. Actually, there is neither
generally agreed definition of TK nor even a common term to designate
this kind of knowledge '^^ . Participants to the discussions on TK
protection use different expressions and definitions to designate
traditional knowledge according to the aspect of TK they want to
emphasize.
1.1 Traditionalinnovation
As I examine TK protection in relation to IPRs, I start with a definition
used by the secretariat of WIPO in the conduct of its fact-finding
missions on traditional knowledge. The term "traditional knowledge"
refer[s] to tradition-based literaty, artistic or scientific works;perfontjances; inventions;
scientific discoveries; designs; marks, names and symbols; undisclosed information; and
all other tradition-based innovations and creations resultingfrom intellectual activity
in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields. The secretariat adds that
"tradition-based" refers to knowledge systems, creations, innovations and cultural
expressions which: have generally been transmittedfromgeneration togeneration; are
generally regarded as pertaining to a particularpeople or its territory; and, are
constantly evolving in response to a changing environment. In this sense, TK is
identified by its mode of production and transmission.
The ongoing discussions on the protection of TK force us to revise the
often-made assumption that there is no creativity among indigenous and
local communities and more broadly in the third world"''. It this sense
"whatis "traditional" about traditional knowledge is notits antiquity, but the way it
is acquired and used. In other words, the social process of learning and sharing
knowledge, which is unique to each indigenous culture, lies at the vety heart of its
For a list various terms given to traditional knowledge see for instance WIPO (2002)
Traditional Knowledge —Operational Terms andDejimtions, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9, p. 18
Ruth L. Gana (now Ruth L. Okediji) (1995), "Has Creativity Died in the Third
World? Some Implications of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property", 24
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 109, hereafter Ruth L. Gana (1995)
"Has Creativity Died..
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"traditionality." Much ofthis knowledge is actually quite new, but it has a social
meaning, and legal character, entirely unlike the knowledge indigenouspeoples acquire
from settlers and industrialii^d societies."Traditional knowledge designates
one system of knowledge creation^"' that has been developed within
specific cultural groups, over a specific period of time, and within
specific environmental and social settings, like any other system of
knowledge.'^ " TK is embedded in specific worldviews. For instance, in
contrast to science, which has a strongly instrumental view about man's
relation to nature, traditional innovation emphasizes the symbiotic nature
of the relationship between humans and the namral world. TK holders
tend to view peoples, animal and plants and other elements of the
universe as interconnected through a network of relations and
obligations. '^®
1.2 The Holders ofTraditionalKnowledge
Traditional knowledge can also be identified and classified according to
its holders as it done in article 8J of the CBD calling for the protection
of local and indigenous communities' knowledge. The expressions "local
communities" and "indigenous peoples" are not synonymous.
The expressions "indigenous communities" or "indigenous peoples"
have been the subject of considerable discussion and study, however,
most analysts use the "Cobo's description" as a working definition. The
Cobo's description requires three elements: 1) precedence on a territory,
2) non-domination, and 3) an identity claim: "indigenous comtnunities, peoples
andnations are those which, having a historical continui^ with pre-invasion andpre-
'^5 Russel L. Barsh (1999), "Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity, in Indigenous
Peoples, Their Environments andTerritories", in D.A. Posey (ed.) Cultural and Spiritual
Values ofBiodiversity, IT Publications & UNEP, p. 73.SeealsoWIPO (2001) Report on
Fact Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowle<^e (1998-1999),
WIPO Publications No 768E
In the same sense, Indian scientists involved in the documentation of traditional
knowledge note that traditional knowledge systems include not only knowledge which
is traditional in the sense that it is transmitted from one generation to another but also
traditional way of knowing that may constandy be at the origin of innovations. P.
Vivekanandan et al. (2004) "ProtectingTraditional Knowledge of smaU, scattered and
disadvantaged grassroots innovators and traditional knowledge holders: A Honey Bee
perspective and Agenda for Policy and Institutional Change", Paper presented at a
UNCTAD-Commonwealth workshop, Geneva 4-6 February available at
http:/ / rO.unctad.org/trade_env/testl/ meerings/tic2.htm
International Council for Science (2002), Science, Traditional Knowledge and Sustainable
Development, ICSU Series on Science for Sustainable Development, No. 4, p. 9
< '^8 Ibidem, see alsoAnna Fienup-Riordan (1990) "OriginalEcologists? The Relationship
between Yup'ik Eskios and Animals" in A. Fienup-Riordan (ed.) Eskimo Essays,
London: Rugers UP
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colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinctfrom
other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, orpart of them. Thej
form atpresent non-dominant sectors ofsociety and aredetermined topreserve, develop
and transmit their ethnic identity, as a basis oftheir continued existence aspeoples, in
accordance with their own culturalpatterns, social institutions and legal systems.'*'''^
Indigenous peoples' struggle for the recognition of their rights has a long
and proper history''^ ''. Their demands concern a larger range of issues
than the protection of TK. Roughly speaking, their demands can be
summarized as a general struggle for self-determination, i.e. accession to
statehood or at least some form of larger autonomy. The fact that
indigenous communities hold an important proportion of TK has
influenced the discussions on TK protection, notably giving a very high
profile to the role of customary law (Cf ChapterSix).
If the notion of indigenous communities is defined and concerns mainly
peoples in the Americas and in Oceania*^ '^, in contrast, the term "local
community" is not stricdy defined and is used to refer to communities in
the rest of the world, notably in Africa and in Asia, which have
traditional ways of life and maintain live traditional knowledge
concerning biological resources. In this dissertation, I do not insist on
this division; to the contrary, I emphasize similarities between the two
categories of holders.
Last, for the sake of precision it must be said that TK is produced within
communities but it does not mean that the community coUectively owns
individual elements of TK. Local and indigenous communities hold TK
in the sense that they determine community and individual's rights to
knowledge. Within local and indigenous communities, customary law or
social norms rule the ownership of traditional knowledge. In this
dissertation, I do not distinguish between the expressions "social norms"
and "customary law". Both of these terms are defined by regular
behaviors in which people engage out of a sense of obligation.
Indigenous communities prefer the expression "customary law" because
they regard it as their legal system. Customs can become law if the
formal legal system gives them legal force. However, it is often not the
U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
(1983) Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations. Jose Martinez
Cobo, special rapporteur. U.N. Doc. E/C.N.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Addenda 1-4
<>20 See for example S. James Anaya (1996), Indigenous Peoples in International haiv, New
York - Oxford: Oxford University Press or Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff (1997), La
question despeoples autochtones, Bruxelles-Paris: Bruylant-L.G.D.J
Including European states' territories in these continents
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case, especially for intellectual property-related provisions of customary
law.
1.3 Sectors in TraditionalKnowledge
Local and indigenous communities are involved in biodiversity
management, conservadon and tradein genetic resources. Living in close
proximity to biodiversity, local communities have developed traditional
knowledge and management systems that are closely linked with the
natural resources over which they have long been stewards and
managers*^^^. Traditional knowledge may be useful in a large range of
sectors. Types of traditional knowledge include agricultural knowledge,
medical Imowledge, ecological knowledge and cultural knowledge.
Traditional agricultural knowledge may include the understanding of soil
composition and its use in agriculture (ethnopedology), the knowledge
and use of animal phenomena, especially in pest control (ethnozoology),
and the knowledge of forest management techniques, natural pest
repellant techniques, and other cultivation methods (ethnoagriculture
and agrofores try). Traditional ecological knowledge (or ethnoecology)
includes the understanding and cultivation of distinct ecosystems or
ecological zones and practices relevant for their conservation and
sustainable use.'^ ^^ Traditional medical knowledge designates knowledge
on the use of plants and animals in traditional medicine.'^ '^' Lastiy,
traditional cultural knowledge or folklore includes forms of music,
dance, song, handicrafts, designs, stories and artwork
Some elements of the following chapters may apply to all TK. However,
in this dissertation, I will not deal with the specific characteristics of
cultaral knowledge designated by WIPO as "traditional cultural
expressions" or "expressions of folklore"; rather, I focus on the portion
of traditional knowledge, sometimes referred as ethnobotanical
knowledge, that concerns uses and conservation of genetic resources.
"^22 Kerry Ten Kate and Sarah Laird (1999), The Commercial Use ofBiodiversity Earthscan,
London, p. 6 hereafterTen Kate et Laird (1999) The Commercial Use ofBiodiversity...
''23 Darrel A Posey (1985), "Indigenous management of tropical forest ecosystems: the
case of the KayapoIndians of the Brazilian Amazon". 3 AGROFORESTRY SYSTEMS 139-
158
The World Health Organization (WHO) has offered the following conceptualization
of traditional medicine: "Thesum totalofthe knowledge, skills andpractices based onthe theories,
belies and experiences, indigenous to different cultures, whether explicable or not, used in the
maintenance ofhealth aswell asin theprevention, diagnosis, improvement ortreatment ofphysical and
mental illnesses. WHO (2000) General Guidelinesfor Methodologies on Research and^.valuation of
TraditionalMedicine, Geneva: WHO/EDM/TRM/2000
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which can be useful information for agricultural and pharmaceutical
research and development (R&D) and for environmental conservation.'^ '^^
1.4 Traditional Knowledge as Information
In international discourse, it is not always perfecdy clear whether the
expression "traditional knowledge" designates only intangible elements
(knowledge or information) or both tangible and intangible components.
In that case, the tangible component of TK actually refers to genetic
resources. Indeed traditional knowledge can be embodied or
incorporated into genetic resources. When bio-industries want to access
genetic resources, they can use either genetic resources in their natural
state or genetic resources that have been "improved" by man. When
traditional farmers have improved genetic resources, it is considered that
that these genetic resources embody traditional knowledge. In this
dissertation, I look at both the tangible and intangible elements of
traditional knowledge. I deal with the tangible aspects of TK in the
second part, which is dedicated to genetic resources. In this third part, I
concentrate on the use and conservation of the intangible elements of
traditional knowledge (information).
1.5 The Two Functions ofTraditional Innovation
In the discussion on the protection of traditional knowledge, it is
important to understand the two functions played by traditional
innovation. First, traditional knowledge is useful and vital for traditional
knowledge holders themselves. The International Council for Science
observes: traditional knowledge provides the basis for local-level decision making
about many fundamental aspects of the day to day life: huntings fishings gathering,
agriculture and husbandly; preparation, conservation and distribution of food;
location, collection and storage of water; struggles against diseases and injury;
maintenance ofshelter; orientation and navigation on land and sea; management of
ecological relationsfor society andnature; adaptation to environmental -.social change;
Expressions of folidore and traditional cultural expressions have been the object of a
long work both at national and international level. In 1982, UNESCO and WIPO
adopted the WIPO/UNESCO Model Provisionsfor National Laws on suigeneris Protection of
Expressions ofFolklore against lllidt exploitation and other prejudicial actions. A large range of
countries have enacted legislation to protect their folklore. Last, the protection of
expressions of folklores and traditional cultural expressions is currentiy discussed in
WIPO. See WIPO (2006) The Protection oj Traditional CulturalExpressions1 Expressions of
Folklore: 'Revised Objectives and Principles, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4
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an so forth and so forth^^\ Regarding traditional medicinal knowledge, the
World Health Organization estimated that as many as eighty percent of
the world's population depend on traditional medicine for their primary
health care needs*^^^. Second, traditional knowledge is also an important
source of information for modern science. Traditional knowledge has
informed modern science in many areas, most notably in taxonomy,
medicine, agriculmre, natural resource management and conservation.
Bio-industries have turned some elements of TK into end products such
as seeds or medicines. Therefore, it can be said that traditional
innovation is both an autonomous innovation system and a source of
innovation (upstream of the innovation chain) for science and bio-
industries.
Internadonal Council for Science (2002), Science, Traditional Knowledge and Sustainable
Developrnem., ICSUSeries on Science for Sustainable Development, No. 4, p. 9
WHO, lUCN and WWF (1993), Guidelines on the Conservation of Medicinal Plants,
Gland, (Switzeriand): lUCN
259
2. A First Equilibrium: The Former Situation of
TK
For a decade or two, the protecdon of traditional knowledge (TK) has
been the subject of numerous discussions first among non-governmental
organizations, then among academics and now within intergovernmental
organizations. Before examining the solutions currendy discussed, I
believe it is useful to have a careful look at the early situations of
traditional knowledge before these discussions were launched. In this
chapter I pay special attention to the traditional property regime of TK
and the modes of TK transmission.
2.1 The Property Regime
Debates about international protection of inteUectual property, and more
precisely protection of TK, often erroneously assume that intellectual
property regulation does not exist within indigenous and local
communities. To fully understand TK protection it must be recognized
that there does exist some intellectual property protection within these
communities.''^ ^ TK holders repeatedly claim that they do not want
classical intellectual property laws but rather recognition of their
customary intellectual property law.
With this perspective, I surest that local and indigenous communities
be analyzed as systems of innovation whereby 'traditional innovation" is
organized by customary intellectual property law that (1) creates forms of
ownership to knowledge and (2) regulates exchanges of knowledge.
Therefore, it is worth examining the content and the nature of the
property regimes which organized traditional innovation before TK
protection entered into international discussions.
2.1.1 The Content of the Property Regime
Social norms or customary laws regulating traditional innovation are
difficult to document because the awareness that customary laws include
provisions on knowledge ownership (and not only a sharing ethos
opposed to any idea of appropriation) is recent. If the anthropological
literature and property rights scholarship contain plenty of descriptions
of community norms or customs that organize community based
^28 Ruth L. Gana (1995) "Has CreativityDied..."
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systems of property rights to land*^ '^, Cleveland and Murray observe that
there is unfortunately no comprehensive study of customary intellectual
property law available."" However, they add that ethnographic examples
make it clear that local and indigenous communities have notions of
intellectual property and that these rights might exist at the individual
level and/or group level based on residence, kinship, gender, or
ethnicity. Their assertion is confirmed by several reviews of the
anthropological literature"^ and the results of the Fact-Finding Missions
of WIPO"^ that idendfy several forms of intellectual property
reminiscent of copyright, trademark or patent. For instance, in Papua
New Guinea, the customary law of some communides provide for
certain forms of individual ownership over knowledge that is related to
healing practices, designs, songs, and dances which may be created and
owned by individuals who can use them or exchange them for
payment''^ ^. Similarly, customary private property can also be found in
other Melanesian communides"'' and other parts of the world, notably
the Shuar"^ the Miskito healers""^ and the Siona."l Lasdy , the Four
Directions Council, a Canadian indigenous peoples organization claims
See for instance CIEL, 2002, Whose Resources? Whose Common Goals? Towards a
New Paradigm of Environmental Justice and the National Interest in Indonesia. See
chapter one: "Community-Based Property Rights: A conceptual Note"
David A. Cleveland and Stephen C. Murray (1997) "The Worid's Crop Genetic
Resources and the Rights of Indigenous Farmers, 38 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 477,
at 483
Thomas Griffiths (1993) "Indigenous Knowledge and Intellectual Property: A
preliminary Review of the Anthropological Literature, unpublished paper, quoted by
Graham Dutfield (2000) "The Public and Private Domains, Intellectual Property Rights
in Traditional Knowledge", 21SCIENCE COMMUNICATION 274-295, and Paul Kuruk
(1999) "Protecting Folklore under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A
Reappraisal of the Tensions between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and
the United States, 48 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 769-849, Ruth L. Gana
(1995) "Has Creativity Died..."; see also Harold E. Driver (1962) Tie Indians ofNorth-
America, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,p. 221 who observes that allNative
American Groups recognized ownership rights in intangible property.
632 WIPO (2001) Report on Fact Finding Missions on Intelkctual Property and Traditional
Knowledge (1998-1999), WIPO Publications No 768E
J. L. Simet (2000) "Copyrighting Traditional Tolai Knowledge," in K. Whimp & B
Mark, Protection ofIntellectual, Biological culturalproper^ in Papua New Guinea, Asia Pacific
Press, pp. 62-80
""t Lamont Lindstrom (1990) Knowledge and Power in a South Pacific Society,
Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press
Janet W. Hendriks (1988), "Power and Knowledge: Discourse and Ideological
Transformation among the Shuar", 15 AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, 216-138
'•3'^ Philip A. Dennis (1988), "Herbal Medicines among the Miskito of Eastern
Nicaragua", 42 Economic Botany 16-28
E. Jean Langdon (1986), "Las classificaciones del Yaje dentro del Grupo Siona:
Ethnobotanica, Ethnoquimicae", 46 AMERICA INDIGENA 101
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that "Indigenous peoples possess their own locals-specific ^sterns ofjurisprudence
with respect to the classification ofdifferent types ofknowledge, proper proceduresfor
acquiring and sharing knowledge, and the rights and responsibilities which attach to
possessing knowledge, all of which are embedded uniquely in each culture and its
'•638
It is difficult to provide a detailed description of the customary-
intellectual property law provisions, because provisions change from one
community to another and because customary laws are not always
documented and easily accessible for outsiders. However, there do exist
some reviews of different customary intellectual property laws
identifying some common traits among those laws. Some of these
common traits differentiate customary intellectual property law from
intellectual property law but there are also some common characteristics.
Professor Okediji (at that time called Gana) identifies five common traits
of customary intellectual property law that differentiate themselves from
classical intellectual property law.^^^ A first difference is that the forms
of ownership in local and indigenous communities are different. They do
not put the same emphasis on the right to exclude others and the right to
dispose of the property as one desires. They identify "owners" of
elements of TK but this ownership is more like stewardship than
ownership, and often does not include a right to exclude others from
use. Furthermore, ownership rarely includes the right to transfer the
knowledge to outsiders. A second difference in the treatment of
intellectual property lies in the purpose of protection; motivation for
creativity is less central and intellectual property is also used to preserve
the integrity, sacredness and sanctity of some works. A third difference is
that the theories of creation are not the same. Less attention is given to
individual genius, and more recognition is given to the contribution of
the group, nature and even the god(s). A fourth difference is that
members of a community often jointly hold intellectual property
(individual intellectual property rights do, however, exist). And finally,
the organizing principles of these communities vary, and therefore they
have different ideas of what is the appropriate subject of private
ownership.
There is, however, as observed by Ruth Okediji, an important similarity
between customary intellectual property law and classical intellectual
Four Directions Council (1996) Vorests, indigenous peoples and biodiversi^. Contribution of
theFour Directions Council to theSecretariat oftheConvention onBiological Diversity, Lethbridge:
FDC.
Ruth L. Gana (1995) "Has Creativity Died...", pp. 132-136
262
property law: both aim, ultimately, to enhancepublic welfare by protecting thefruits
ofcreative effort '^*^.
It is difficult to draw general conclusions about a large numbers of
indigenous andlocal communities and their specific property regime, but
it is fairly safe to consider that these property regimes include two
elements. First, customary intellectual property laws differentiate insiders
(members of the community ruled by customary laws) from outsiders.
Second, customary laws or norms determine what knowledge all
members must share and what knowledge may be individually
appropriated. As an illustration, Matthias Leistner observes that "the
flexible combination ofindividual and collective elements in the development ofTK
leads to various model ofownership depending on the predominance ofeither collective
or individual contributions. Thus, the owning collective is not necessarily the whole
local cominuni^ but may also be a moiety, a clan, a phatry, a lineage, a society {or
sodality) ora single household. A.nd even individuals-for example shamans andjor
healers in certain Indian Tribes —can distinguish the?nselves in so?ne case as separate
• 5>641
creators or inventors.
2.1.2 Nature of the Regulation: Customary Law or Social
Norms
If there is some intellectaal property protection in these communities, it
is important to understand that the nature of this protection is quite
different from formal intellectaal property law. The nature of the rule is
different: protection is not ensured by formal law, but rather by
customary law or social norms.*^"*^ The origin of norms and customs is
also distinct, they are not created in a centralized or "top down" way by
the state, and rather they have a social or "bottom-up" origin defined by
two ingredients: a practice ("what people do") and a sense of obligation.
Norms and customs differ from law not only by their conditions of
emergence but also by their mechanism of enforcement. While violations
Ibidem, p. 136
Matthias Leistner (2004) "Traditional Knowledge" in Silke von Lewinski (ed.),
\ndigenoHS Heritage andIntellectual Property. Genetic Resource, Traditional knowledge andFolklore,
KIuwer'Latv International, p.57 (footnotes omitted).
In the following paragraphs I use the expressions "social norms" and "customary
law" as equivalent; both are defined by two elements: a regular behavior (1) in which
people engage out of a sense of obligation (2). The expression "customary law" may
suggest a claim for self-determination and it is used by indigenous peoples. In some
legal systems, customary law may also be given legal force. The expression "social
norms" is not related with self-determination and may be used in a larger range of
situations.
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of the law are monitored and punished by state actors, enforcement of
social norms (and customary law as long as it has not been given legal
force) is decentralized and ensured by private actors (peer supervision).
As to sanctions imposed on norms violators, they range from informal
gossip to exclusion from the group. Compliance with norms is insured
by non-legal sanctions but may also be facilitated by rewards.
2.1.3 Property Regime as Perceived by Outsiders
If there is some intellectual property protection within indigenous and
local communities that rules access and use of TK among members, the
status of TK is very different for outsiders. Indeed, from their point of
view TK seem to be in the public domain or in open-access for several
reasons. First, statutory intellectual property laws and other legal regimes
do not restrict the use of TK. Second, outsiders have no incentive to
respect customary law in the interest of the community because
community leaders have no jurisdiction on them and cannot impose
them customary sanctions ranging from censures to fines, to ostracism
or even expulsion from the community. Furthermore, outsiders usually
coUect TK and genetic resources simultaneously and until the of the
CBD's entry into force, genetic resources were in open access, which
contributed to the impression that TK could be freely accessed.
This situation is not too problematic as long as traditional innovation is
robust and contacts between communities and third parties remain
limited. There had traditionally been only a limited number of outsiders
accessing TK. These outsiders were typically a limited number of
scientists who for most were very interested in communities' traditional
ways and customs and tried to comply with them.
2.2Mode ofKnowledge Transmission
Indigenous and local communities are systems of innovation that
produce, use and conserve large quantities of knowledge. Like any
organization dealing with knowledge, they are faced with the challenge of
transmitting knowledge between members and to the next generations. It
is a difficult task because knowledge is a good that is difficult to precisely
identify, to describe and to transmit. An important proportion of
knowledge (know-how) is produced unconsciously in the course of the
action. The capacity to identify and document these elements of
knowledge is vital for any organization whether it be a traditional
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community or a modem firm. Communities holding TK face the same
options as any organization managing knowledge. The first strategy
consists in the systematic codification of knowledge so that it is
documented. In that case, it can be easily accessed and used by members
of the organization. Alternatively, they can adopt a strategy of
personalization in which knowledge is kept as loiow-how. This way it
remains bound to the person who developed it, and it is transmitted by
personal contacts among members within the organization. Dialogue
among individuals is preferred to documented knowledge. This strategy
entails important investment in the development of interpersonal
networks, and a culture of mobility and personal communication within
the organization. For that reason, it is essential that there are a high
degree of stability in the membership of the organization and a process
of training from one generation to another.''"'^
It is reasonable to affirm that thus far indigenous and local communities
holding TK have relied for the most on a strategy of personalization to
ensure the devolution of their knowledge: retaining knowledge through
oral transmission binds it to specificknowledgeholders such as shamans,
and if the next generation is to acquire and learn it, it must be done
through apprenticeship* '^*''.
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the situation of traditional
knowledge before the current discussions on its protection. The next
stage consists of identifying changes that are at the origin of the demand
of protection for TK.
Dominique Foray (2000), L'economie de la connaissance, Paris, La Decouverte, pp.
47, 54,95-96
On the importance of the completion of apprenticeship see for instance J.W.
Hendricks (1988), "Power and Knowledge: Discourse and Ideological Transformation
among the Shuar", 15 T^MERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 216
265
3. Two Changes and a Demand for the Protection
of TK
In the previous chapter, I described what has long been the situation for
traditional knowledge, its traditional property regime and its traditional
mode of transmission. In this chapter, I explain how this situation is
modified by two changes. Downstream of the chain of innovation,
scientists, development agencies and bio-industries show a growing
interest for TK. On the upstream side of the chain of innovation (within
communities), traditional knowledge is eroding. The combined effect of
these two changes has led to a demand for protection of traditional
knowledge.
3.1 Downstream: A Growing Interest ofOutsiders for TK
Traditional knowledge was long considered little more than unscientific
and superstitious practices of witch doctors or the slavish repetition of
outdated farming methods by unsophisticated peasants. Scientists have
long been confounded by holistic cosmologies that intertwine empirical,
ecological, social and spiritual elements. However, it is progressively
observed that practices that may first appear to be superstitious to the
outsider actually prove to be empirically sound ways of dealing with
environmental, farming, or health problems once knowledge about the
environment and the culture are acquired.
3.1.1 A Growing Interest for Traditional Knowledge®'*^
If examples of exchanges between science and traditional knowledge
have always existed, there has been a growing interest for traditional
knowledge during the last half century with the apparition of
"ethnoscience"^ a scientific approach to TK based on the work of
Harold Conklin. Harold ConkUn worked among the Hanuoo of the
Philippines in the 1950s. Ethnoscience or cognitive anthropology is the
study of people's perceptions of their surroundings as reflected in their
use of language. The taxonomies resulting from such analyses reveal
categories based on locally relevant criteria. Ethnoscience enables
scientists to appreciate the coherence of traditional knowledge systems,
their local precision and their adaptation to their local environment. This
''''5 This paragraph is largely inspired by die following document which is an excellent
synthesis of this issue, International Council for Science (2002), "Science, Traditional
Knowledge and Sustainable Development", ICSU SERIES ON SCIENCE FOR
Sustainable Development, No. 4
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field of study further gave birth to a series of related disciplines such as
ethnobotany, ethnopedology, ethnofores try, ethnoveterinary medicine,
and ethnoecology, which all focus on specific aspects of traditional
knowledge.
During the 1970s and 1980s, ethnobotany, the study of plantuses byTK
holders grew, and the interest for TK expanded beyond anthropology
with the added contribution from biological systematics, structural
linguistics, cognitive psychology and logic. There begun a general
realization that indigenous and local communities may be a potential
source of information for science. At first, the interest was mainly
academic and examined traditional knowledge it for its own sake.
As time went on, researchers working in multilateral or bilateral
agencies promoting sustainable development begun to understand the
usefulness of traditional knowledge for their programs on environmental
conservation and agricultural productivity. For examples in the late
1980s, environmental NGOs supported by development agencies and
private donators begun to develop programs for nature conservation
involving local communities and relying on their knowledge and
practices. In the agricultural field, the CGIAR worked increasingly
closely with local communities to promote their mutual interest in
sustainable agriculture. '^"'
Finally, there was a realization that traditional knowledge was an
important source of information for science and bio-industry (including
the pharmaceutical, agricultural, and cosmetic sectors). This led to
concern about bioprospection and the ownership of traditional
knowledge.
Bio-industries' interest in traditional knowledge received very large media
publicity following a few cases of TK appropriation. In each of these
cases, individual scientists or firms had had access to elements of
traditional knowledge and were granted a patent based on this TK
without informing or obtaining the permission of the TK holders. So far,
the number of these cases remains limited but the emotion they caused
and the publicity they received have affected the atmosphere of the
debate about TK protection, makingit very tense and polemical. That is
why, in the following paragraphs, I briefly describe the most famous
cases. In the Ayahuesca and the Quinoa cases, patents were granted on
plants, used for long by TK holders, the use for which they were
' Mac Chapin (2005) "Le defi indigene",75 LE COURRIER DELA Planete 33
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patented did not necessarily correspond to tlie traditional use. As for the
Turmeric and the Neem cases, it was the traditional use that was
patented.
3.1.2 A Few Well-Known Cases of Appropriation by Patents
Varieties of ayahuasca (also called yage) have been known and used for
centuries by shamans of indigenous tribes throughout the Amazon Basin
in religious and healing ceremonies to diagnose and treat illnesses, meet
with spirits, and divine the future. In 1986, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) issued Plant Patent 5,751 to Hawaiian botanist
Loren Miller for a purportedly new variety of ayahuasca {Banisteriopsis
caapi). Eight years later, the Amazonian Indians learned about the
existence of the patent. They were totally stunned to discover the
appropriation of their sacred plant that they had known and cultivated
since time immemorial. Prolonged exchanges between a coordination of
Amazonian indigenous organizations (COICA) and Loren Miller did not
convince the scientist to voluntarily renounce his patent. Consequentiy,
in 1999 the COICA and other organizations filed a challenge to the
patent on the grounds that the patented variety is naturally-occurring and
already in widespread medicinal use (the "prior art" exception to
patentability). The PTO agreed in an Office Action dated November 3,
1999 that the patent should never have been issued. However, in January
26, 2001 the PTO reversed its decision, thus terminating the examination
proceeding.'"''^
In April 1994, a United States patent (patent number 5,304,718) was
awarded to the University of Colorado for Cytoplasmic male Sterile
Quinoa, which is in fact a hybrid of varieties grown by Aymara
communities near Lake Titicaca, Peru. The Bolivian Indian quinoa
producers contested the patentability of their plant and successfully used
media pressure to convince the University of Colorado to let the patent
lapse. Four years later, the patentwas finally abandoned. '^'®
In 1995, two U.S. based Indians were granted U.S. Patent 5,401,504 on
the Use of Turmeric in Wound Healing. Most people in India greeted
the news with disbelief and surprise because turmeric has been
traditionally used in India for wound healing. The Centre for Scientific
and Industrial Research, an autonomous institution under the
See Glenn Wiser (2001) "U.S. Patent and Traden:iark Office reinstates Ayahuasca
Patent; Flawed Decision Declares Open Season on Resources of Indigenous Peoples",
CIEL
SeeJ.-A. Gari (1997) "The Role of Democracy in the Biodiversity Issue: The Case of
Quinoa", Center for Latin America Research and Documentation Papers, Amsterdam
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Department of Science and Technology in the Government of India,
decided to file for re-examination of the patent at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. After an extensive search, thirty-two
references were located, some of which were more than 100 years old,
and in the languages of Sanskrit, Urdu and Hindi. The USPTO revoked
the patent, stating that the claims made in the patent were obvious and
anticipated, and agreeing that the use of mrmeric was an old art of
healing wounds. '^"
The Neem tree (A^dirachta indicd) has been the subject of a
considerable number of patents, most of the patented inventions using
public domain traditional knowledge as a source. These patents aroused
considerable controversy, especially in India where most of the
traditional knowledge originates. Among these patents, one has been
successfully challenged. In 1990, the multinational agribusiness
corporation W.R. Grace of New York together with the United States
Department of Agriculture filed a European Patent application with the
European Patent Office (EPO) covering a method for controlling fungi
on plants with the aid of hydrophobic extracted neem oil. The 1994
grant of the patent was at the origin of a large international protest
campaign. In June 1995 the Green Group in the European Parliament,
Dr. Vandana Shiva on behalf of the (Indian) Research Foundation for
Science, Technology, and Natural Resource Policy, and the International
Federation of Organic AgricultureMovements, based in Germany filed a
legal opposition against the grant of this patent. The Opponents
submitted evidence to the EPO that the fungicidal effect of hydrophobic
extracts of neem seeds was known and used for cenmries on a broad
scale in India, both in Ayurvedic medicine to cure dermatological
diseases, and in traditional Indian agricultural practice to protect crops
from being destroyed by fungal infections. Since this traditional Indian
knowledge was in public use for centuries, it would seem that the patent
application in question lacked two basic statutory requirements for the
grant of a European patent, namely novelty and inventive step. In 2001,
the patent was revoked for lack of inventive step. In 2005, the appeal of
thepatent holder was dismissed.''®"
On the Turmeric case see A. Agarwal and S. Narain (1996) "Pirates in the Garden of
India", NEWSCIENTIST, October 26, pp. 14-15 or Graham Dutfield (1999), "Protecting
and Revitalising Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and
Community knowledge databases in India", 6 PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL
Property 103, p. 112
Linda BuUard (2005) Freeing the Free Tree: A Briefing Paperon theFirst legal defeat ofa
biopirag patent: The Neem case, Research Foundation for Science, Technology and
Ecology, New Delhi, India International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
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In these famous cases, three out of four patents were revoked. In each
case, TK holders (helped by NGOs or other organizations) were at the
origin of the revocation of the patents. It is difficult to estimate if there
are many other cases of TK patenting because it is very difficult for TK
holders to monitor use of their knowledge. Furthermore, to obtain the
revocation of a patent is a very long and cosdy process. It is important to
observe that in these cases, patents were revoked for patent law reasons:
these patents did not fulfill the novelty and/or inventive step
requirements. Patents offices had not taken into account the relevant
prior art and TK holders obtained the revocation by showing their prior
use of the inventions. These patents were not revoked by virtue of
customary law. Thus, they do not amount to recognition of any rights
TK holders may have to their knowledge.
3.1.3 Numerous Discreet Cases of Publication of TK by
Scientists, Placing it in the Public Domain
Aside from the limited cases where TK has been patented by third
parties, the principal means for TK leaking from communities lies in
academic publication. In a survey on the use of TK by third parties,
Russel Barsh''^ ' identifies only a limited number of patents derived
directiy from traditional knowledge. Among these patents, very few
patents are based on the applicant own field research; most patents with
traditional knowledge origin are inspired by data already placed in the
public domain through the publication of academic researchers. By
contrast, Barsh and others''^ ^ identify countiess books and academic
journal articles that disseminate detailed information on the identities
and traditional uses of hundreds of plants. In addition, a large proportion
of these authors are from developing or transition countries, which
should qualify the North-South tension in the discussions on TK
protection.
To some extent, publication of ethnobotanical knowledge may help to
validate and legitimize traditional knowledge systems. On the other hand,
publication of traditional knowledge without the prior informed consent
of its holders might infringe the rights of the latter. TK holders not only
The Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, available at
http://www.ifoam.org/press/press/pdfs/Briefing_Neem.pdf
'51 Russel L. Barsh (2001), "Who Steals Indigenous Knowledge", 95 Am. Soc'y Int'l L.
Proc. 153
'•52 See for instance William MiUiken (2002), "Peoples, Plants and Publishing" in Sarah
Laird (ed.), Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: EqmtablePartnerships in Practice, London:
Earthscan, p. 79
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complain about the appropriation of their knowledge by third parties
through IPRs, they also reject the application of notions such as public
domain or research exceptions, or the distinction between disclosed and
undisclosed knowledge to their traditional knowledge. Theyconsider that
these notions, which come from formal inteUecmal property law, conflict
with the provisions of their customary intellectual property law. Whether
elements of knowledge belong to individual members of the community
or to the whole community, it is rare that members (or afortiori outsiders)
have the right to use knowledge in a free and unconstrained manner. The
customary law of the community binds them.*"^^
3.2 Upstream: Erosion ofTraditional Knowledge
The state of traditional knowledge is somewhat paradoxical. While its
value increases as scientists show a growing interest for it as a source of
information for their research, TK is eroding and its existence is
threatened by a multitude of reasons.
A first series of threats concerns the economic and political conditions
of local and indigenous communities. The most important threat to
traditional knowledge might well be the rampant poverty of indigenous
and local communities. Pressures of poverty place great strain on the
communities' organization and their ability to maintain their way of
living. Poverty is also the reason whyindigenous peoples leave traditional
lands and move into urban centers. This has been identified as a major
obstacle to the transmission of TK: younger segments of the population
who should receive transmission of TK leave the communities to find
work elsewhere."'' A related threat to the preservation of traditional
knowledge lies in the lack of land security for indigenous and local
communities. The notions of collective rights to land and the nature of
the relationship of these communities with their land are not correctiy
addressed in modern forms of land ownership. In the past and to some
extent still today, alienation from traditional territories continues to
<553 Tulalip Tribes (2003) Statement bj the Tulalip Tribes ofWashington on Folklore, Indigenous
Knowledge, and the Public Domain, July 09 at the Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,
Fifth session, Geneva,July 5-17. Seealso ColinGolvan (1998), "Aboriginal Art and the
Public Domain" 9 JOURNAL OFLAW AND INFORMATION SCIENCE 122
CBD (2005) The Revised Phase One and Phase Two ofthe Composite Report on the Status and
Trends Regarding the Knowledge, Innovations and Practices ofIndigenous and Ijocal Communities
Relevant for the Conservation andSustainable Use ofBiological andSustainable Use ofBiological
Diversity: Executive Summary ad Recommendations, UNEP/CBD/WG8J/4/4, p. 22
hereafter CBD (2005) TheStatusand Trends ofTK...




occur. If some progress has been made recently in land security,
regularization of communities' ownership and titling processes have not
been completed in most countries.Lasdy, education policies are
viewed as both a major obstacle to TK retention and transmission and
simultaneously as a possible solution. The reason why education policies
were often an obstacle to TK transmission is that they were used to
assimilate indigenous children and alienate them from their communities.
However, today education systems with programs designed in
collaboration with local and indigenous communities incorporate
traditional knowledge and are regarded as a measure to possibly assist in
its use and its transmission'^^'^.
A second series of threats to traditional knowledge concerns the
degradation of the environment and the erosion of biodiversity. Because
TK holders live in close connection with their environment and have
developed knowledge specific to their immediate environment, they are
among the first victims of environmental degradation as TK is subject to
the same threats as biodiversity. TK is subject to the conversion
process, which turns natural uses of land into other uses that are more
immediately valuable in the modern economy. The survival of local and
traditional communities has been largely due to their relative geographic
and economic isolation in territories that were long regarded as
inaccessible or worthless. As a result they often live in undisturbed lands
that are reservoirs of biodiversity. However, nowadays these lands are
regarded as interesting places for the exploitation of natural resources
such as extractive industries, including logging or deforestation for
agriculture. When the communities are otherwise not simply removed
from their lands, these activities damage their environment''". Similarly,
traditional knowledge is also subject to the process of specialization in
agriculture. The modernization of agriculture, often referred to as the
"green revolution" {Cf. Part Two), conducted traditional farmers to
abandon thousands of traditional varieties in favor of a handful of
modern high-yield varieties. In addition, this modernization modified the
organization of land use and displaced millions of traditional farmers in
«55 IbMem, p. 17 and 20
<•5^ Ibidem, pp. 13-14, see also the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention
(No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries adopted on 27
June 1989 by the General Conference of the ILO at its seventy-sixth session, especially
part four.
Russel L. Barsh (1999) "The World's Indigenous Peoples", Paper submitted to
Calvert Group by First Nations Development Institute/First Peoples Worldwide
Available online at http://www.calvertgroup.com/investor/ind-sri-about-ip-policy-
barsh. html
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Asia and Latin America. Displacements and changes in land uses and
crop varieties have made important aspects of traditional knowledge
irrelevant for its holders. Lastly, biodiversity conservation policies have
had an ambiguous effect on traditional knowledge. While some
conservation programs try to lean on traditional knowledge and local
management of natural resources by indigenous and local
communities '^^ many conservation policies exclude these communities
from their considerations, preferring the creation of protected areas
whose access is prohibited and thereby alienating them from their
lands."'
J.JA Demandfor the Protection for TK
I have just explained that TK is the subject of two phenomena: on the
one hand there is a growing scientific interest for it; on the other hand it
is threatened by serious erosion. Observed form the standpoint of TK
holders or from the point of view of the international community, these
two trends suggest the creation or the recognition of intellectual property
rights to traditional knowledge.
First, as I have already explained in the previous parts of this
dissertation, the theory of property rights developed by Demsetz and
others '^", predicts that the creation and the enforcement of property
rights is primarily a function of changes in value. When the value of a
good rises, potential owners will attempt to convince governments or
courts to change property laws in order to aUow the capture of the new
value. The growing interest of scientists and later biodiversity
conservationists and bio-industry for traditional knowledge, gives TK
holders the impression that their knowledge is no longer worthless for
outsiders but rather a valuable resource. TK holders have begun to
realize the two functions of traditional innovation. Traditional
knowledge is not only useful and vital for the daily life of TK holders; it
is also a valuable source of information for science and bio-industry
Thomas O. McShane (2003), "The Devil in the Detail of Biodiversity
Conservation", 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1
Mac Chapin (2005) "Ledefi indigene", Le CoURRIER DE LA Pl^ETE, n° 75, p. 33,
and CBD (2005) TheStatusand Trends ofTK...
Harold Demsetz (1967), "Towards a Theory of Property Rights" 57 AMERICAN
Economic Review 347;Thrainn Eggertsson (1990) Economic Behavior and Institutions,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Douglas C. North (1990), Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Peiformance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Yoram Barzel (1997) The Economic Analysis ofProperty Vdghts, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
273
R&D. The prospect of appropriating a part of the rent provided by
biotechnological inventions incites TK holders to claim compensation
for the use of their knowledge and respect by users of their customary
rights on TK. This demand is strengthened by a feeling among TK
holders of an asymmetry in the treatment given by formal intellectual
property law to their knowledge as opposed to other forms of
knowledge. This includes bio-industries' knowledge, as bio-industry can
patent their knowledge whereas TK is deemed to be in the public
domain. As a result, TK holders have enounced a series of claims that
can be summarized as foUows '^^ ' TK holders would like:
1. to be identified as authors or inventors of their knowledge.
2. to be able to control access to their knowledge.
3. to be compensated for the use of their knowledge.
4. to preserve their cultural identity.
5. to preserve the organizational structure that enables the
continuous production, use and conservation of their knowledge.
These claims can be divided into two groups. The first group includes
the first three claims that are direcdy related to intellectual property
protection. The second set of claims includes the two last demands; they
are more loosely related to intellectual property though they concern the
conditions' that produce TK innovation. Often, TK holders, notably
indigenous peoples, use a different vocabulary and ask for the respect of
their customary law in a broader claim of self-determination. It is worth
looking at this second set of claims in order to account for the
conditions producing TK innovations.
The second phenomenon is discussed in light of the theory of property
rights developed by Ronald Coase. Coase predicts that problems of
externalities and public goods can be solved by the creation of property
rights. The conservation of traditional knowledge and its continuous
updates appears now to be a public good or at least as a source of
positive externalities*^^^. Traditional knowledge is not only useful for its
producers but also for the international community as it is a useful
source of information for bio-industry or an instrument for conservation
policies. If TK holders cannot capture the benefits of conserving and
Ruth L. Okediji (2002), "MakingRoom at the Table: The Protection of Indigenous
Knowledge at the Interstices of International Law, Human Rights and Intellectual
Property", in CILP, Lecture Series Pub., University of Toronto. Hereafter "Making
Room at the Table..."
<•^2 Later, I will qualify the public good characteristics of traditional knowledge {Cf.
chapters)
274
producing traditional knowledge they will under-invest in the
conservation of their knowledge and young generations will continue to
abandon traditional ways of life and traditional knowledge. One possible
solution lies in the creation of intellectual property rights enabling TK
holders to internalize the benefits of conservation.
There is, therefore, some convergence in favor of the creation of
property rights (or other instruments) to protect traditional knowledge.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which entered into force
in December 2003, calls for the protection of TK. This assertion of
protection for TK in article 8J, however, is more of a political concept
assigning objectives to states rather than a clear property right for TK.
Therefore, there is need for further (legal) action at international and/or
national levels to implement the intention behind article 8J.
Before examining current efforts to protect traditional knowledge, I
beUeve it is useful to highlight some difficulties that any attempt to
conserve TK and enhance its use will have to take into account.
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4. Difficulties in Protecting Traditional
Knowledge
In this chapter I would like to stress four issues that must be taken into
account in researching the best means to conserve and further use
traditional knowledge. The first two issues relate to the nature of
traditional knowledge and the fragility of its mode of transmission that
hinder both (1) the use of TK by outsiders and (2) its maintenance by its
holders. These issues concern the different levels of regulation of
traditional knowledge: local and international.
4.1 Difficulties in Transferring TK
TK holders and the international community examine the possibility of
designing and granting property rights to TK, not only to enable TK
holders to prevent third parties to access their knowledge but also to
enable them to transfer and exchange it for compensation. However, an
important difficulty comes from the nature of traditional knowledge: a
large part of TK fits into the definition of tacit knowledge, or can be
assimilated to tacit knowledge, which hinders its transfer.
Tacit knowledge refers to particular know-how or undeveloped ideas
that are best communicated through personal communications. Often
the holder is only pardy aware that he owns tacit knowledge. WeU-
known examples of tacit knowledge include where a rugby player has a
technique for scoring a try, but is only pardy aware of what he does and
is unable to describe it in a way that easily allows someone else to
reproduce his gestures.Actually, the same is true for much knowledge
involved in the innovation process, especially in the field of
biotechnology. Tacit knowledge is the opposite of codified knowledge.
Codification of knowledge is the process by which knowledge is
converted into a message that can be processed as information.
Codification liberates knowledge from its attachment to the person who
had incorporated the tacit knowledge. Codified knowledge is therefore
morelike a commodity '^^ '*.
P.A. Mangolte (1997), « La dynamique des connaissances tacites et atriculees : une
approche socio-cognitive», ECONOMIE APPLIQUEE, Tome L.2
Dominique Foray (2000), Ukonomie dela connaissame, Paris, La Decouverte, p. 48
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Part of TK consists of tacit knowledge. More broadly, an important part
of TK can be assimilated to tacit knowledge because it is very difficult to
transmit it outside the community of knowledge holders. Most of TK is
orally transmitted. It is often unsystemadcally conserved or conserved
with a classification that does not correspond to those used in modern
science. It is sometimes mixed with magic formula -often used as a
smoke screen meant to control the diffusion of knowledge. Finally, yet
importandy, it is often expressed in languages with a limited number of
speakers. Therefore, the actual or potential contribution of TK to bio-
industries R&D can reasonably be assimilated to tacit knowledge. The
tacit characterof TK is probablyone of the major obstacles to its further
use in R&D.
The tacit character of knowledge hinders a series of operations. The
exchange, the diffusion, and the learning of tacit knowledge require the
displacement and the voluntary demonstration of knowledge holders.
These operations are costly and difficult to implement. The storage and
the memorization of tacit knowledge are conditioned by the permanent
renewal of peoples holding this knowledge. Finally, the tacit character of
knowledge slows down the cumulativeness of innovation. The
identification of complementary pieces of knowledge and their holders is
limited by it being tacit and this impedes systematic identification and
classification.'^^^
4.2 Difficulties in Conserving and Transmitting TK
In addition to the difficulty of transferring and sharing traditional
knowledge with third parties, the existence of traditional knowledge is
also affected by its mode of transmission. In the previous chapter, I
explained that any organization dealing with large quantities of
knowledge might choose to combine two transmission strategies: a
strategy of codification or a strategy of personalization. So far,
indigenous and local communities holding TK have, for the most part,
relied on a strategy of personalization to ensure the transmission of their
knowledge. An important proportion of knowledge remains oral; it is
exchanged by interpersonal exchanges and transmitted to the next
generation by a long process of apprenticeship. The success of this
strategy of transmission depends on the stability in the membership of
the organization and the constantiy renewed training process.
''<'5 Ibidem, pp. 47 and 71
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The major problem is that for many communities this strategy of
transmission is in a deep crisis.'^ '^ '^ Without going too deep in to this issue,
it is observed that the poverty of indigenous and local communities and
destruction of their environment causes the younger generations to
move to urban centers. This hinders the transmission of TK because
youngerworking age sections of the population,who should be receiving
traditional knowledge, leave the communities. More broadly, as
modernization spreads over the world, young peoples seem unable to
recognize value in traditional ways and they do not perceive any potential
economic return from engaging in traditional activities. As an illustration.
Lee et al. report that "traditional leaders in Micronesia were concerned that [...]
over the last two generations a large percentage of traditions and skills specific to
Micronesia have not been passed on, and mil become extinct if an active program is
notput into place to keep them an active part oflocal life."''^ ^ Even the existence
of language is threatened. Nettle and Romaine point out that of the 6600
languages spoken today, fewer than nine percent, or 600 have enough
speakers to ensure their continuity into the next century. This loss of
language includes ninety percent of the 250 Aboriginal languages in
Australia near extinction with only eighteen having at least 500 speakers
each. They also note that no children are learning any of the 100 native
languages spoken in the state of California.'"''® Also, the devolution of TK
from one generation to the next is less and less effective.
4.3 Erosion ofCustomaryIPLaw
The erosion of the customary law is another difficulty in the protection
of traditional knowledge. Within communities, customary laws or social
As an illustration, in a description of a bioprospecting project, the authors write:
"The botanical knowledge ofthe Maroon people is rapidly disappearing asyoungpeople move away in
search ofwork and the population becomes more dependent on western medicine. In many ways, the
Suriname ICBGproject isa race against time torecord the hundreds ofyears ofmedicinat teaming that
is stored in the minds ofshamans, some ofwhom aremore than 80yearsold. [...] The importance of
these objectives was starkly reinforced when one oftheoriginal eight shamans toparticipate in theproject
died after working mtha collection teamfor only a week. With no written record ofhisknowledge and
no apprentice, this knowledge died with him" Marianne Guerin-McManus et al. (1998)
Bioprospecting in Practice: A Case Study ofthe Suriname ICBG Project andBenefits Sharing under
the Convention on Biological Diversity, Submission to the Executive Secretary of the
Convention on Biological Diversity available on the website of the Secretariat at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/case-studies/default.asp
R Lee, M.J. Balick, D.L. Ling, F. Sohl, B.J. Brosi, W. Raynor (2001), "Cultural
dynamism and change—an Example from the Federated States of Micronesia" 55
Economic Botany 9-13
668 ]3 JSIetde and S. Romaine (2000), Vanishing Voices: the Extinction of the World's
languages, Oxford: Oxford Press
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norms define informal property rights to elements of TK and the rules
of knowledge exchange. These laws and norms are essential to the
continuation of traditional innovation. The erosion of customary law is
notably due to the poor social and political conditions of traditional
communities and the degradation of their environment that affect their
organization. Also, the maintenance of informal regulation becomes
much more delicate when outsiders' interest for accessing traditional
knowledge grows or when the institutional environment —the CBD and
patent law - favors the appropriation of TK or research results. In this
light, norms and the institutional environment may become (partiy)
antagonist.
The difficulty can be divided into two issues. The first issue, which can
be referred as external defection, is to enforce social norms or
customary law against third parties. Indeed, non-members of a
community have no incentive to respect the norms and customs of the
community. Firms have no interest in complying with the norms of
science and renouncing to patent basic research. Firms also have no
interest in renouncing patented inventions derived from traditional
knowledge. Social norms and customs are sanctioned by informal
sanctions ranging from loss of reputation, to ostracismor even expulsion
from the community but these sanctions cannot be imposed or have
littie impact on non-members.
The second issue is the necessity to preserve capacity of a community to
organize innovation against internal defection. Indeed, the
effectiveness of social norms or customary law within communities
might be threatened^* '^. The CBD regime requiring exclusive rights may
create incentives that run counter to customary law. Outsiders' interest in
accessingTK and the possibility of selling access or even obtaining IPRs
changes the incentive structure that makes individuals comply with
customary law. Even if a member of a community strongly believes that
he should respect customary law, and that only the community
authorities are entitied to grant access to TK, the payoff to breach
customary law and negotiate personal compensation for divulgating TK
might be high enough to make him hesitate'^ ^". In addition, if a member
For illustration see Paul Kuruk (1999), "Protecting Folklore ..."
Following Douglas C. North, I assume that the trade-off between wealth and those
other values is a negatively sloped function. That is, where the price of expressing one's
values is low / high, theywill account much more/ less for human behavior. SeeNorth
(1991) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Verformance, Cambridge University
Press (see chapter 3 on behavioral assumptions). This situation could be also analyzed
as a prisoner dilemma.
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concludes that other members of the community could also be tempted
to breach customarylaw, he may be further induced to breach customary
law to be sure he secures the benefits.
4.4 The InternationalDimension
When discussing the best form of protection for traditional knowledge, it
is important to keep in mind the international dimension. Protecting
someone's invention or knowledge in foreign countries has always been
a delicate issue in all domains of intellectual property. It is even more
essential for TK because in many cases TK holders and potential users
are not in the same country.
If we assume that an IPR or some suigeneris right protects TK in the
country of origin, then we must ask what kind of protection can be
expected abroad by TK holders. In a brief analysis, one must distinguish
several scenarios which take different criteria into account: : first,
whether a similar right is available in the user's country; second, whether
TK is accessed in the country of origin or in the user's country; third,
one must be aware of the difference between property rights and
contractual rights.
• If there is no similar IPRs available in the user's country and if
the protected traditional knowledge is accessed in the user's
country, then use, copy or counterfeit of that TK are legal and
TK holders have no remedy.
• If there is no similar IPRs available in the user's country and if
protected TK is legally accessed in the country of origin (with
TK holders' consent) but the conditions of access are later
violated in the user's country, then TK holders only have a
contractual right against the co-contracting parties while they
have no right vis-a-vis third parties.
• If similar IPRs are available both in the countries of origin and in
the user's country (and if knowledge holders have been granted
rights in both countries), the situation is very different. Rights
holders have a property right, and they can enforce the right they
have been granted in the user's country against any infringer
whether co-contractor or third party. As an illustration, let us
consider a body of traditional knowledge that can be patented.
Patents are available in almost all countries. If TK holders have
been granted a patent in those countries, they can enforce their
patent against any infringer.
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• Theoretically, one could imagine a scenario where different
countries grant different kinds of rights on TK and where TK
holders apply for the protection available in each country.
However, it will be very costly and complicated to apply for
those IPRs and monitor the use of TK in the different countries.
How does intellectual property law take into account right holders' need
for international protection? First, it must be recalled that intellectual
property is essentially protected through rights recognized and exercised
under national laws. It is under national law that IPRs are legally
recognized. It is also at the national level that rights holders are entitied
to be granted a right and that they are given recognized legalpersonality.
It is under national legal mechanisms that IPR holders can take action
against infringement of their rights and seek remedies. Validity of any
IPR in one country is not dependent on its validity elsewhere. Finally,
contracts that affect IPRs are also concluded and enforced under
national laws.''^^
However, since the conclusion in the late nineteenth century of
multilateral treaties"^ like the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property in the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, international inteUecmal property law has
included some legal principles that allow non-discriminatory access to
the intellectualproperty systems for foreign rights holders. The principle
of national treatment requires a state to grant the same rights to foreign
rights holders that it grants to its nationals. Under the most favored
nation provision, any advantage granted by a state to the national of any
other country must be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
nationals of all member countries. Both these principles have an
equalizingor an assimilation effect but they do not in and of themselves
provide a harmonizing effect. Under the principle of reciprocity, state A
agrees to grant IPRs to citizens of state B if state B agreed to grant IPRS
to citizens of state A. This principle may sometimes be at the origin of
an international standard when there is a hegemonic actor, a
convergence of interest and a limited number of interested countries. As
an illustration, the US enacted sui generis legislation for integrated
See WIPO (2003) Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural "Expressions, and Genetic
Resources; The InternationalDimension, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/6
Actually, the international dimension of intellectual property was first faced in the
mid-nineteenth cenmry with a series of bilateral trade agreements including provisions
on intellectual property.
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circuits'^ ^^ and access to protection for foreign citizens was conditioned
by reciprocity. This convinced Japan and European countries to join the
US and negotiate the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Integrated Circuits. However, those conditions do not seem
to be present for TK protection. Last, the principle of mutual
recognition allows the recognition of another state's standards of
protection. It requires a state to recognize the standards of protection of
other states. However, states may be reluctant to commit themselves to
such principles for fear of the non-reciprocal effect. For instance, if
country A is providing strong TK protection and country B is providing
no protection, under a principle of mutual recognition rights holders of
country A could protect their TK in both countries and rights holders of
country B could protect their TK in neither of the two countries.
Therefore, mutual recognition requires some international standards of
protection."'*
These four principles on the recognition of foreign rights holders may
play an important role in the international protection of TK. However,
whether or not these principles apply, an effective protection regime
requires some international standards of protection. In the more recent
history of intellectual property, there has been a move towards
substantive minimum standards. Later revisions of the Paris and the
Bern Conventions and the WIPO Copyright Treaty include some
substantive standards that determine the rights and exceptions to rights
available under national legislation.
Last, the negotiation of an international treaty does not create in and of
itself binding law. Ratification can be low or very limited, like for the
Vienna Convention on the protection of Type Faces and the Geneva
Convention on the Recording of Scientific Discoveries, which failed to
enter into force for lack of ratification. Recentiy, the TRIPS Agreement
played a major role in generalizing the standards of protection of the
Paris and Bern Convention (and some new ones) to aU of the WTO
members.
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA) of 08/11/1984, Title 17 USC
(ch.9) §§ 901-914
'57't Peter Drahos (2004), "Towards an International Framework for the Protection of
Traditional Group Knowledge and Practice", UNCTAD-Commonwealth Secretariat
Woriishop on Elements of National sui Generis Systems for the Preservation, Protection
and Promotion of Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices and Options for
an international Framework, Geneva, 4-6 February
To be complete, international dimension of intellectual property may also include
other elements such as international notification and registration system, or
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If TK holders and the international community want to offer
international protection for traditional knowledge, they need to define
international standards of protection. This has two consequences for TK
protection. First, national legislation enacting sui generis rights'^ '^^ are very
valuable in testingnew instruments of protection and contributing to the
discussion, but they have a limited effect, as they do not apply outside
national territory. Second, there are two main options for TK holders to
obtain international protection: either they resort to an existing systemof
IPRs with international standards of protection or they promote the
adoption of new international standards (an international suigeneris right)
in a widely ratified international treaty.
***
In this chapter, I have emphasized four dimensions of TK protection
that should always be present in the search for protection mechanisms. I
will now examine how we could define property rights to encompass
traditional knowledge.
administrative cooperation on issues like classification and documentation standards, or
also collective management of IPRS.
For analyses of national policies and legislations on TK protection, see the
documents of the WIPO-IGC, notably WIPO (2003) Information onNational Experiences
with the Intellectual T'roperty Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/2, and WIPO (2003) Comparative Summary of Existing
National Sui Generis Measures and haws for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/4.
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5. Defining Property Rights on TK
In this chapter, keeping in mind the four issues stressed in Chapter Four,
I analyze the current attempts to protect traditional knowledge and to
define property rights. I start with a description of the ongoing
discussions within the World Intellectual Property Organization, I then
identify and explain some of the limits of the considered solutions. In
the second section I examine examples of practical experiences in the
protection of TK. In the third section I suggest a justification for the
protection of TK and look at how it could provide guidance on the
design of effective solutions. In the last section, I try to combine the
lesssons of practical experiences with theoretical justification in order to
analyze the contribution of databases to the protection of traditional
knowledge.
5.1 The Current Debate on Traditional Knowledge
Protection
At the national level, some states have enacted suigeneris legislation in an
attempt to implement article 8J."^ Some of these national laws contain
provisions for the creation of TK registries. These legislative provisions
could provide a model for an international regime. For now, however,
the effect of these national laws is limited by the fact that they only apply
within the territory of their respective state. Therefore, attention is
focused on the international discussions regarding a possible common
standard for protection of traditional knowledge.
5.1.1 International Discussions and the Notion of
Misappropriation
At the international level, the most dynamic forum on TK protection is
the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellecmal Property, Genetic
Resources, Traditional Kjiowledge and Folklore of the World Intellectaal
Property Organization (WIPO-IGC). This committee is in charge of
preparing guidelines, model laws and/or an international treaty on the
protection of TK. Through reading the WIPO-IGC documents with a
view towards the design of a protection regime, it appears that the
notion of "misappropriation" acts as an organizing principle and to some
extent a justification for the protection ofTK
See WIPO (2003) Comparative Summary of Existing National Sui Generis Measures
and Laws for the Protection of Traditional I<nowledgeWIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/4
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There appears to be a large consensus on the objectives of protection.
Preventing misappropriation involves both defensive protection, i.e.
preventing the acquisition of intellectual property rights over TK by
parties other than customary TK holders, and positive protection, i.e.
providing legal means to enable TK holders to restrain third parties from
unauthorized uses of protected material, and to empower TK holders to
negotiate for compensation if and when unauthorized acts occur. Thus,
the objectives of protection drafted by WIPO-IGC correspond to the
first set of claims of TK holders.
However, there is much less clarity and consensus on the design of the
protection mechanism. Document GRTKF/IG/8/5 of the WIPO-IGC,
entitled "'Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised objectives and Principled,
mentions broad rights but poorly defines them.
The "subject ofprotection" is definedin a comprehensive but vague manner.
Article 3 on the "General Scope of Subject Matter" provides a useful
definition of TK and states that protection should not be limited to any
technical field. Article 4 on the "Eligibility for Protection'' establishes the
traditional character of knowledge as the requirement for its protection.
Knowledge must come from a traditional context, be associated with a
traditional or indigenous community, and be part of the cultural identity
of this community. However, if the traditional character of knowledge is
to be selected as a criterion for protection, one must explain how to
verify that the conditions for protection are met, who wiU undertake the
verification, whether there wiU be an ex ante (like in the case of patents)
or an expostexamination duringwhichTK custodians willclaim that part
of their knowledge has been misappropriated, and whether there wiU be
a system to notify third parties which knowledge is protected (e.g. a
registration system). In addition, identifying knowledge by its traditional
character comes down to identifying the subject matter for protection by
its right-holding beneficiaries. This may lead to confusion between two
different questions, i.e. the requirements for protection and identification
of the rights holder. The problem is further complicated by the fact that
the next article identifies the beneficiaries of protection as TK holders.
As such, the definition appears to be somewhat circular: the subject of
protection is defined by its beneficiaries and the beneficiaries are
identified by the subject of protection and none of them is defined
independentiy."®
It could be argued that this is also the case in other sectors of intellectual property
law. For instance, in patent law, the object of protection is an invention and the
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Furthermore, beneficiaries are comprehensively but vaguely identified.
Article 5, "Beneficiaries ofProtection" identifies beneficiaries as the holders
of knowledge in accordance with the relationship described under Article
4 on the eligibility of protection. The relationship between peoples and
knowledge is essential in identifying beneficiaries of protection.
However, further precision is needed to make the system of protection
work. In addition, as I mentioned in the previous paragraph, there is a
problem of the circular definition between the provision on the eligibility
of protection and the provision on the beneficiaries of protection.
Regarding the content of protection itself, WIPO-IGC documents
mention a series of contract, tort and property rights but these rights
already exist and are poorly defined.
Article 1 mentions the possibility of protecting TK through contract law.
This has littie value as TK holders currently can and sometimes do
negotiate access to their TK by means of contract, usually in the broader
context of a bioprospecting contract. In addition, there are some serious
difficulties in contracting over TK subject matter. The first difficulty in
contracting over TK subject matter arises from the characteristics of
knowledge as an economic good (public good). It is difficult to control
access to knowledge in the absence of a property right. If TK holders do
not have the legal right to prevent third parties from accessing their
subject matter, the ability to contract is of littie use . Similarly, knowledge
is difficult to show to a potential buyer. A potential buyer may need to
see the knowledge to decide whether he wants to buy it. Once the
knowledge is seen, however, there is no incentive to buy it unless there is
a property right. The second obstacle derives from a limitation of
contract:, contracts only rule relations among contracting parties; they
usually have no effect on third parties. By contrast, property rights are
opposable against the world {erga omes). The third difficulty is inherent in
the nature of TK. For the most part, TK can be regarded as tacit
knowledge. Tacit knowledge is difficult to transfer, value, identify and
delineate which makes it very difficult to form the basis of a contract (Cy.
Chapter Four).
beneficiary of the right is the inventor. However, the situation is different in patent law.
Protection requirements identify what is eligible for protection. For each individual
patent, the patentee's claims identify the scope of protection; the examination process
decides whether the invention is protected or not and provides a kind of registration
and evidence of the right. Patent law therefore includes mechanisms to identify the
object of protection.
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Article 1 also envisages the use of tort law to protect TK. For the
purposes of illustration, this Article enumerates a long list of torts that
could be invoked by TK holders. The most notable are unjust
enrichment, public order and morality, and unfair competition. Once
again, these mechanisms for protection are already legally available. In
addition, protection by tort law depends on there being an unauthorized
use of knowledge that causes actual damage. The TK holder will only
receive protection (i.e. a remedy) if the use of the knowledge resulted in
an identifiable damage. Moreover, those torts are outlined in a vague
manner and as such it is difficult to foresee the level of protection
intended before going to court and obtaining a judgement. The tort of
unfair competition may be a bit more precisely drafted than the others,
but it is only relevant in a limited number of circumstances. In general,
unfair competition is a tort providing a remedy for the loss of market
share or commercial reputation in the sale of knowledge goods. There
are, however, variations in national understandings of unfair competition
law. TK holders may acquire goodwill as producers of medicinal
preparations, cosmetic products, or culmral products and they may
suffer harm to their commercial reputation or market share by
unauthorized uses of their TK. However, this hypothesis only concerns a
limited proportion of TK and may apply more to cultural products such
as craft or folklore.*^ '^ Therefore, it seems unlikely that unfair
competition law can provide strong protection toTKholders.'''*''
Article 1 also contains an reference to a property right by recalling the
principle according to which TK cannot be accessed by third parties
without the prior informed consent of its holders. However, there is no
more precision of this property right.
In total, I am afraid that misappropriation as currendy described in the
WIPO-IGC documents is merely a set of badly defined rights likely to
result in high transaction costs.
5.1.2 Limits of Misappropriation: Rights Poorly Defined and
High Transaction Costs
From the standpoint of a TK holder, misappropriation offers
comprehensive, affordable and easily accessible protection because there
'S''' Agnes Lucas-Schloetter (2004), "Folklore" (PartIII, Section 4) in Silke von Lewinski
(ed.), Indigenous Heritage andIntellectual Property -Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore, The Hague, London and New York; Kluwer Law International, p. 314
''80 In the circumstances in which TK could be protected by unfair competition, it might
be more interesting for TK holders to consider the protection offered by trademark
and geographical indication.
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is no requirement for protection. Unfortunately, it will be hard to
enforce such a vague right over such a vaguely defined subject matter. It
wiU be difficult to monitor all possible violations as they are likely to
occur simply because third parties do not know what is protected and
the identity of the right holder. Similarly, TK holders wanting to enforce
their rights will have to go to court in the country where TK is accessed.
It win be difficult and expensive for TK holders to provide evidence of
their rights and of their violation. Therefore, the protection offered by
misappropriation seems rather costly and inefficient; indeed it often
might not be economically worthwhile to enforce a right under this
claim.
From a potential user's point of view, there is the risk of very high
transaction costs. It may prove difficult to identify the TK rights holder
who has the authorization to give access to the TK in question. As it
stands, the rights of TK holders are uncertain and badly delineated. In
other words, potential users will face legal uncertainty that will act as a
disincentive to use TK.
In sum, misappropriation as described in WIPO-IGC documents neither
prevents the unauthorized use of TK, nor encourages its use when it is
the desire and goal of TK holders and users.
5.1.3 Limits of Rights-Based Justifications
One explanation for the difficulty involved in designing clear rights to
TK may come from the justification of those rights. The concept of
misappropriation does not only include the notion that TK holders
should have a right to be protected against acts which violate the
principles of equity and fairness, but it also contains, more or less
explicitiy, a justification for a protection regime for TK. Indeed, the
concept of misappropriation echoes academic and NGO literature that
justifies the need for a protection regime on the basis of natural, moral
or human rights (hereinafter "rights-based justifications").
Rights-based justifications for intellectual property are loosely derived
from the labor theory originating in the writings of John Locke, or the
personality theory inspired by the works of Kant and Hegel. According
to the labor theory, a person who labors upon resources that are "held in
common" has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her efforts —
and the state has a duty to respect and enforce that natural right. As facts
and concepts, the raw material of intellectual property, seem to be held
in common, the labor theory is widelythought to be especially applicable
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to the field of intellectual property.'^ "' As for the personality theory, it
suggests that private property rights are crucial to the satisfaction of
some fundamental human need. They should be created in the fashion
that best enables people to fulfill those needs. In that perspective,
intellectual property rights are justified as a protection against
appropriation or modification of artifacts regarded as a vessel for the
personality of authors, artists and inventors,*^®^ or in the case of TK, the
vessel for the cultural heritage of communities.
Similar arguments are also phrased in terms of human rights, notably
with a reference to article 27.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which provides that "everyone has the right to the protection of
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author".^®' Arguments based on
human rights, the labor theory or the personality theory are often mixed,
that is why they are sometimes collectively referred to as rights-based
theories as opposed to utilitarian justifications.
The numerous advocates of rights-based justifications observe that there
seems to be a growingconsensus that there is somethingwrong with the
use and appropriation of TK without prior permission and
compensation of TK. The strength of such justifications can be observed
in the fact that TK protection is now discussed in many international
forums, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is
considering the negotiation of an international agreement. However, if
rights-based justifications play an important role in convincing people of
the need for a protection regime, they do not lend themselves so easily to
designing the precise content of such a regime. These moral justifications
do not take into account the conditions of use of knowledge and the
effect of the protection regime on the production and diffusion of
knowledge. Therefore rights-based justifications are of limited help to
create effective, customized and transferable property rights. They do
not provide criteria that are sufficiently precise to identify the subject of
'8' William Fisher III (2001) "Theories of intellectual property", in Stephen Munzer
(ed.j, Neiv Essays in the l^gal and Political Theoty of Property, Cambridge Studies in
Philosophy and Law. See also Peter Drahos (1996), A Philosophj ofIntellectual Property,
Burlington: Ashgate
•582 Ibidem
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by the United
Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948
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protection, the form, the scope of protection, or the beneficiaries of the
rights. '^'^
The limits of misappropriation as a protection mechanism and as a
justification for such mechanisms suggest that there is a need to
complement article 8J of the CBD and misappropriation with rights that
are better defined and easier to trade. From that perspective it might be
worthwhile to complement the rights-based justification of TK
protection with a utilitarian justification. Utilitarian justifications are the
dominant justification for intellectual property, though they are curiously
absent from the debate on TK protection {Cf. section 5.3). I would
first, like to take a look at how TK holders currentiy attempt to protect
their knowledge.
5.2 How to Protect TK: The Lessons ofPractice
In this dissertation, I cannot look at all attempts to protect all categories
of TK. In the following paragraphs, I look at one practical attempt to
protect TK; the creation of databases or registers as a mechanism for the
protection of ethnobotanical TK.
5.2.1 TK Databases and Defensive Protection
Documentation of TK and the subsequent creation of databases hasbeen
done by academics for a long time^®^ and by some TK holders since the
mid 1980s. However, it is the patenting by corporations of inventions
derived from TK iC^f. section 3.2) that initiated a larger movement to
document and create TK databases as instruments for defensive
protection. TK holders realized that third parties could obtain patents
derived from their knowledge because TK was not sufficientiy taken into
account by patent offices when assessing the novelty, non-obviousness,
and inventiveness requirements for obtaining a patent. In practical terms,
patent offices reviewing prior art had difficulties in accessing TK that
was not widely known and often orally transmitted. In addition, under
American Patent law (not under European patent laws), prior art
Padmashree Gehl Sampath (2004), "Defining an Intellectual Property Right on
Traditional Medical Knowledge: A Process-oriented Perspective", 7 JOURNAL OF
World Intellectual Property, 711 hereafter Padmashree Gehl Sampath (2004),
"Defining an Intellectual Property Right..."
The Secretariat of WIPO has identified a large number of journals and databases
containing traditional knowledge data see WIPO (2002), Inventory ofTraditional KnowMge-
Kelated 'Periodicals, WIPO/GRTKF/3/5 and WIPO (2002) Inventory of Online Databases
Containing TraditionalKnowledge Documentation Data, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/6.
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includes inventions patented or described in a printed publication in
either the United States or a foreign country, and inventions known or
used by others in the United States. Unpublished or unpatented uses of
TK in a foreign country are not taken into account.'^ '' Last, experiences
from patentsaboutAyahuesca, Quinoa, Neem and turmeric demonstrate
that overturning a patent is extremely expensive and time-consuming. As
a result, documenting TK and compiling TK databases is a means to
make the information available to patent offices and to ensure its
inclusion in the prior art so as toprevent abusive patenting.®®"'" '^*®
The best-known example is the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library
(TKDL)*^®' that was created in India as a reaction to the Turmeric case.
TKDL is a joint project between the National Institute of Science
Communication and Information Resources, the department of Indian
System of Medicines and Homeopathy and the Ministry of Health and
Family welfare. The project was launched by a team gathering experts in
traditional Ayruvedic medicines, scientists and patent experts. The
project has compiled over 36,000 formulations of traditional Ayruvedic
medicines. The formulations have been translated into several languages
and classified under the international patent classification. The traditional
taxonomy (classification of living things) is linked to the Linnean
classification system used in modern science. In all, the TKDL supplies
extensive information in a format accepted in patent examinations with
sufficient details to evaluate prior art and to provide some security
35 use § 102
1^87 Manuel Ruiz Miiller (2002), The International Debate on Traditional Knowledge as
Prior Art in the Patent System: Issues and Options for Developing Countries, Geneva:
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) / South Centre, available at
www.ciel.org
Today, in the European Patent Office, "the searches [forprior art] regularly make use of
sources (databases, journals, textbooks, etc) thai relate specifically to TKandgenetic resources. The
search is either directed tosources thatspedfically relate to TK orgenetic resources or to more general
sources. Specific to TK is the gstematic internationalpatent classification (IPC) A6IK35/78 sqq.,
the database NAPRALERT accessed through STN, the Traditional Ecological Knowledge Prior
Art Databaseand the Chinese Herb Database available on theInternet Specificjournalspertaining
to TK that are available in-house in electronicform include butarenotlimited to:AustralianJournal
of Rural Health, Crop Protection, Chinese journal of Digestive Diseases, Health Promotion
International, Journal of Rural Studies, Tropical Medicine and International Health". WIPO
(2006) Virst Collation ofResponses to the Questionnaire on Recognition ofTraditional Knowledge
andGenetic Resources in the Patent System, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/INF/6, p. 168
689 TKDL has been described in several publications, notably in Merle Alexander et al
(2003), The role of Registers (& Databases in the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, a
Comparative Analysis, United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies.
Hereafter "Therole ofRegisters <& Databases..."
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against minor innovations that could otherwise be considered to be
novel.'^'''
Following the Indian example, other TK databases have been created
and placed in the public domain for defensive protection, notably in
China'^ '\ the United States," '^^ and Peru'^ ". More recentiy, the member-
states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation decided
to foUow the Indian experience and to set up a common traditional
knowledge digital library, notably for defensive purpose.
In addition to these databases created for defensive protection, a larger
movement of documentation of TK for positive protection is in
progress.
5.2.2 TK Databases and Positive Protection
The rationales for documentation and creation of databases go beyond
defensive protection.
Some communities resort to databases for their internal use: to preserve
their knowledge, and to facilitate its use within the community of TK
holders. As an illustration, the Inuit of the Nunavik region in Canada
have developed a series of databases on Inuit ecological and
environmental knowledge with the objective of applying it to resources
management, planning, environmental impact assessment and economic
development. '^^ Initially, the Inuit relied mainly on scientific knowledge
available outside their territories. But, they realized that this information
CBD (2005), Composite Report on the Status and Trends Regarding the Knowledge
and Practices of Indigenous and Local Communities. The Advantages and Limitations
of Registers, UNEP/CBD/WG8J/4/INF/9/, p. 17 hereafter CBD (2005) The
Advantages and Limitations of Registers (...)
"i" China Traditional Chinese Medicines Patent Database, for more information, see
doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/6
The Traditional Ecological Knowledge Prior Art Database, developed by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, available for consultation at
http://ip.aaas.org/tekindex.nsf
Law 27811 of 2 July 002 Established the Regime for the Protection of Collective
Knowledge of Indigenous People Related to Biodiversity. It provides for three types of
register: a notational public register for defensive protection and a national confidential
register and local registers for positive protection.
Business India (2004) "Digital Library for Traditional Knowledge in SAARC
region", New Delhi, 27 December and The Financial Express (2005) "SAARC to Set
Up Traditional Knowledge Digital Library", New Delhi, 3 January
'''5 S M. May and L. Brooke (1997) "Inuit Science:Numavik's Experience in Canada" in
lUCN Inter-Commission Task Force on Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples and
Sustainabili^: CaseandActions, p 353-361
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was insufficient and inadequate to address manyissues confronting their
societies. As a result they launched a research program that brings
together Inuit and non-Inuit researchers to set up these databases. The
objective has never been to make the database publicly available. It was
set up to inform their decision process or government decision process;
the data are considered to be confidential between the peoples of the
Nunavik Region and the government.'""
Others communities use databases to foster traditional innovation
and/or in their relations with third parties. They set up databases either
as an instrument for attracting potential users and negotiating
compensation for access, or as evidence of the existence of some rights
over knowledge. For instance, in India some initiatives like the People's
Biodiversity registers'"'^ , the Honey Bee Network''"* or the Farmers Right
Information System '^' initiated large movements of documentation
involving TK holders, students and teachers, grassroots functionaries
and rural youth.^"" The first effect of this documentation process has
been to arouse a new interest for this knowledge, notably among TK
holders, that tended to neglect and depreciate it. The first objective of
these initiative was thus to stop the erosion of TK and to conserve it. A
second objective was to create cross-fertilization among TK holders by
breaking borders among local communities in order to revitalize
traditional innovation. A third objective was to link TK holders with
modern science and firms interested by commercial use of traditional
knowledge. For that purpose, for each piece of knowledge the databases
identify the name of individuals or the community who contribute it.
The Honey Bee Network collaborates with the National Innovation
See MerleAlexanderetal. (2003), The role ofKegisters & Databases ..., pp. 14-16
Madhav Gadgil et al. (2000), "New Meanings for Old Knowledge: The People's
Biodiversity Registers Program", 10 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATION 1307, Gadgil, Madhav
(2000), "People's Biodiversity Registers: Lessons learnt" 2 ENVIRONMENT,
Development and SustAINABILITY 323 and Gadgil, Madhav et al. (2005), Veople's
Biodiversity Register: A Methodologf Manual Indian Institute ofScience - Centre for Ecological
Sciences / Agharkar Research Institute, Bangalore, Karnataka, India / Pune,
Maharashtra,India, available at ces.iisc.ernet.in/hpg/cesmg/pbrmanualnew.pdf
AnU K Gupta (2001) "Framework for rewarding indigenous knowledge in
developing countries: Value chain for grassroots innovations", Paper presented at
WTO Experts Committee, 3 September
See Farmers Rights Information System at hltp://vvww.mssrf.org
700 i^v Anuradha, Taneja, B, and Kothari, A. (2001), Experiences mth biodiversity polig-
making and community registers in India, IIED Biodiversity and Livelihoods Group. ABS
case study n°3, and G. Utkarsh (2002) "Documentation of Traditional Knowledge:
People's Biodiversity Registers (PBRs)", Foundation for Revitalization of Local Health
Traditions (FRLHT), India. Available at: http:/ /www.ictsd.org/dlogiie/2002-04-
19/Hrkarsh.pdf
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Foundation (NIF), established in 2000 by the Department of Science
and Technology of India, to promote database management, research
and development and IPR management. Further, the Gujarat Grassroots
Innovations Augmentation Network (GIAN), established in 1997 links
innovators with modern science and technology, market research, design
institutions and funding organizations. These organizations can mediate
and negotiate on behalf of TK holders with entrepreneurs and potential
investors. Last, these databases include a two-stage mechanism of prior
informed consent. In the first stage, a TK holder allows the NIF to place
his innovation in the database and to combine it with other innovations.
The second stage occurs when a potential commercial application of an
innovation is developed, the NIF propose a benefit-sharing agreement to
the knowledge holder and negotiate on his behalf with the potential user.
Among the existing databases, some are public, some are confidential
and some combine different levels of access for different categories of
uses and users.™' Some of these databases have been created by law and
set up by governmental institutions^"^, but most of them are the fruits of
collaboration between NGOs and TK holders themselves.™^
5.2.3 Critics and Unresolved Issues
Unfortunately, ongoing experimentations with the creation of TK
databases have been slowed down by criticisms and unresolved issues. A
first set of criticisms focuses on the notion of TK protection and the
public domain. It has been observed that there is a contradiction
between defensive and positive protection. Compiling TK in databases
available to the public may protect the knowledge from monopolistic
commercial exploitation but it does not prevent unauthorized uses of
TK.^""* Rather, it places TK in the public domain, which amounts to a
renunciation of rights over such knowledge.^"^ In otherwords, defensive
In the United States, The Tulalip Tribes are compiling their traditional knowledge
and they distinguish "Type A knowledge" reserved exclusively for members of the
tribes and "Type B knowledge" that they wish to make availableto die public at large.
See for instance the BIOZULA Database in Venezuela and Peruvian registers
described in WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/6 or in Merle vVlexander et al. (2003), The role of
Reg/J/OT <& Databases...
See Merle Alexander et al. (2003), Therole ofRegisters & Databases ...
Preston Hardison (2003) "Communication to Canadian Indigenous Information
Network" 4 August (on file with author) and Devinder Sharma (2002), "TK Digital
Library: Another Tool for Biopiracy?" 39 SOUTH BULLETIN 8, available at
ww\v.southcentre.org
Brendan Tobin (2004) "Towards an international Regime for Protection of
Traditional Knowledge: Reflections on the role of Intellectual Property Rights" paper
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protection is incompatible with positive protection. A related criticism
points out the absence of clear rights to TK databases and the
knowledge it contains7*"^
A second set of criticisms argues that placing TK in databases changes
the nature of the knowledge, freezes it and interrupts the process of
traditional innovation.™^
A third set of criticisms focuses on the relation between TK holders and
the database. A database does not providea right over the knowledge as
such to the benefit of TK holders. Furthermore, in cases where TK
holders do not themselves compile the TK database, the articulation of
rights between the TK holders, who have rights in theTK data, and the
database compilers, who have rights in the database containing the TK
data, is unclear.^"® In the same spirit, the creation of some databases
have been blamed for not taking into account customary law and local
context of innovation.
5.3 Why Protect TK: Utilitarianism as a Complementary
JustiGcation^"^
After explaining how TK holders attempt to protect their knowledge,
and before coming back to the criticisms and unresolved issues, it is
worth discussing the justifications behindTK protection. In the previous
section I explained what I believe are the limits of rights-based
justifications. In this section, I explain how a utilitarian approach —as I
have used in the first two parts of this dissertation - is useful to justify
TK protection and design a protection mechanism. Looking at the grant
of property rights from a utilitarian perspective is to regard property
rights as an instrument to obtain the greatest good for the greatest
number. In order to translate this ideal, most scholars use wealth
presented at the International Conference on "Bioethical Issues of Intellectual Property
in Biotechnology", Tokyo, Japan, 6-7 September available at
www.shef.ac.uk/ipgenethics/conference/papers/Tobin.pdf
Ibidem and CBD (2005) The Advantages andUmitations ofKegisters (...)
Graham Dutfield (1999) "Protecting and Revitalising..."
'OS MerieAlexanderetal. (2003), The role of"Registers & Databases..., p. 35
Thisanalysis of utilitarian arguments asa justification for the protection of TK relies
heavily on the similar analysis developed by Padmashree Gehl Sampath. However, we
reach very different conclusions. She suggests resorting to trade secretwhile I suggest
codifying TK andcreating databases. See Padmashree Gehl Sampath (2004), "Defining
an Intellectual Property Right ..."
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maximization as the criterion and economics as the methodology to
assess the effect of rights.
To consider a regime of protection for TK from a utilitarian perspective,
one must look at the consequences of the creation and the attribution of
property rights in terms of the increase of utility (incentive effect). When
used to explain how intellectual property laws or other forms of
knowledge control and exchange function, utilitarianism looks at the
nature of knowledge and its usefulness as the key criteria to identify the
object of protection and the beneficiaries. Rights are regarded as an
incentive to produce and/or disseminate the desired knowledge.
Therefore, a possible contribution of a utilitarian approach might be to
identify different types of knowledge, their respective usefulness, and the
effect that different protection mechanisms could have on the provision
and/or dissemination of different types of knowledge. '^" Because it takes
into account these elements, a utilitarian or goal-based approach is more
helpful to create effective, customized and transferable property rights
and to provide criteria precise enough to identify the object of
protection, the form, the scope of protection and the beneficiaries.
An additional advantage of a utilitarian justification of intellectual
property lies in the possible benefit from the lessons of knowledge
economics. Knowledge economics focuses on the conditions and the
costs of knowledge production and dissemination. It plays an important
part in the justification of intellectual property law whose main rationale
—in a utilitarian perspective —consists of creating the best conditions for
the production and the use of imowledge within society to further its
progress. Some recent evolutions in knowledge economics might be
particularlyrelevant to design accurate protection mechanisms for TK.
In this article, I cannot identify the useful characteristics of all categories
of TK. I focus on the useful characteristics of ethnobotanical knowledge,
which can be used for R&D in various bio-industries. It is likely that part
of the analysis could be relevant for other elements of TK such as
traditional environmental knowledge. In the following paragraphs, I use
This does not mean that there is no reason for a comprehensive international treaty
on TK protection or model legislations by which states set themselves general
objectives in termsof TK protection. However, the implementation of those objectives
will require different mechanisms for different forms of TK with different usefulness.
Actually, WIPO has already divided TK in two categories: traditional knowledge sensu
stricto and traditional cultural expressions because of the difference of nature and
usefulnessof these categoriesof knowledge, but further divisions might be necessary.
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TK to specifically designate ethnobotanical knowledge. According to
the proposed approach in the following paragraphs, I look at (1) the
usefulness of ethnobotanical knowledge, (2) its characteristics, and (3)
the incentive effects of intellectual property rights.
5.3.1 Contribution of Ethnobotanical Knowledge to Bio-
Industries' R&D
To understand the contribution of TK, one must first remember the
input provided by biodiversity in the R&D process in bio-industry {Cf.
Part Two, Chapter One). Bio-industry can be seen as defense efforts
against a hostile biological world that are perpetually eroding and must
be constandy renewed. The same forces that are operating against the
human domain are also at work against od:ier living organisms. Any life
form that survives has developed resistances that are successful in a
contested environment.^" It is for the retention of these existing
strategies of resistance that bio-industry collects plants or other
biological resources and screens them to identify pharmacologically
active compounds '^^ .
TK can provide a valuable contribution towards this collection of
screened plants. There are three strategies for collecting plants for
screening programs: random, taxonomic and ethnobotanical. Random
collecting is an attempt to sample as much taxonomic diversity as
possible. The taxonomic approach is a more guided approach to select
species for screening that belong to certain families or genuses that are
likely to contain certain classes of compounds. The ethnobotanical
approach consists of selecting the plants to be collected on the basis of
their uses in traditional medicine. Once the plants have been selected and
collected according to ethnobotanical knowledge, they can be randomly
screened. In that case, the contribution of ethnobotanical knowledge
Timothy M. Swanson (1996), "The Reliance of Northern Economies on Southern
Biodiversity: Biodiversity as Information", 17 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, p. 2
"^Natural product research is far from being the only source of novel active
compounds; it is rathera complement to the chemical synthesis of newdrugs. However
a study made in 1989 in the US estimated that, 25% of drugs' active ingredients were
extracted or derived from plants. Another study carried out in 1993 estimated that in
the US 57%of die prescriptions contained at least one majoractive compoundnow or
once derived after compounds derived from biodiversity. See Peter P. Principe (1989)
"The Economic Significance of Plants and Their Constituents as drug", in H. Wagner,
H. Hikino and N.R. Farnsworth (eds.) ECONOMIC AND MEDICINAL PLANT RESEARCH,
Volume3, pp. 1-17, Academic Press,London, U.K. and Grifo, F. T. and D. R. Downes
(1996), "Agreement to Collect Biodiversity for Pharmaceutical Resource: Major Issues
and Proposed Principles", in Brush, S. and D. Stibansky Valuing Ijocal Kttoivkdge,
Washington D.C.: Island Press
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consists of increasing the probabilit)' of identifying active compounds.
Ethnobotanical knowledge can provide an additional contribution when
scientists look at the uses of plants in traditional medicines and test their
effectiveness. '^^ Finally traditional modes of preparation can provide
further clues to active chemical compounds.^"'
The contribution of ethnobotanical knowledge to drug R&D is very
often mentioned and illustrated by examples but there are actually few
serious estimations of its value. However, some studies comparing the
random collection and ethnobotanical collection approaches have
observed a four-fold increase in the probability of drug discovery. '^^
Otherwise, many pharmacological or chemical studies report the use of
TK without estimating its value.'"" The value of TK is also attested to by
the existence of a series of related disciplines and journals dedicated to
its documentation (Cf. Chapter 2). Finally, it has been observed that
seventy-four percent of chemical compounds used in drugs today have
the same or related use in western medicine as they do in traditional
medical systems.'" It is therefore reasonable to state that TK has and
will continue to play a valuable role in drug R&D either in terms of
identification of plants for screening or as clues to their pharmaceutical
activity.''®
Furthermore, large chemical and pharmaceutical companies are used to
resorting to all sorts of collaborations with a large range of "knowledge
providers". Indeed, given the large array of discoveries in molecular
biology, genetics and related fields, biotechnology has become such a
diverse industry, in terms of its underlying science and discoveries that
not even the largest pharmaceutical companies have the internal
James S. Miller (1992), "The Discovery of Medicines and Forest Conservation" in,
Robert P. Adams and Janice E. Adams (eds.), Conservation ofPlant Genes. DMA hanking
and in vitro Biotechnolog, San Diego: Acad. Press, p. 123
Elaine Elisabethsky (1991), "Folklore, Tradition or Know-How?", CULTURAL
Survival Quarterly, Summer, pp.9-13
"5 See Michael Balick (1990), "Ethnobotany and the idenufication of Therapeutic
Agent from the Rainforest", Bioactive Compounds from Plants, Ciba Foundation
Symposium p. 26-28.
Liering and van den Berghe (1998). "Leads for Antivirals from Traditional
Medicines" in Prendergast et al.(eds.), Vlantfor Food and Medicine, The Royal Botanical
Gardens, Kew, pp.333-344, Labadie, R.P. et al. (1989) "An Ethnopharmacological
Approach to the Search for Immunomodulators of Plant Origin", 55 PLANTA Medica
339-348
N. R. Farnsworth (1988), "Screening Plants for New Medicines" in E. O. Wilson,
(ed.)Biodiversity, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, pp. 83-97
Elaine Elisabethsky (1991), "Folklore, Tradition or Know-How?", CULTURAL
Survival Quarterly, Summer, pp.9-13
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capacities to cover all the areas7" In this context, it seems that TK
holders willing to do so could work as "knowledge providers" for those
large chemical or pharmaceutical companies.
5.3.2 The Tacit Dimension ofTraditional Knowledge
Once one has identified the nature of the actual or potential contribution
of TK to the R&D of drugs or other bio-industries, one has to look
closer at the characteristics of this type of knowledge. TK includes
identification of plants, theiruse and possible recipes for their use.
As I explained in the previous chapter, TK fits into the definition of tacit
loiowledge or can be assimilated to tacit knowledge. The tacitness of TK
is probably one of the major obstacles to its further use in R&D. Both
the importance of ethnobotanical knowledge and the problem of
tacitness are well illustrated by the largest studyon the commercial use of
biodiversity. Kerry Ten Kate and Sarah Laird observe that close to half
of the companies they interviewed make use of TK. However, they
immediately add that eighty percent of all companies that use
ethnobotanical knowledge rely solely on academic literature and
databases as their primary source for this information.^^"
This has three implications. First, TK is rarely accessed as tacit
knowledge through field collection. Second, the knowledge used by bio-
industry is the part of TK that has been codified or translated in
academic journds or databases. Third, at present most of this
codification or translation of TK is carried out by academics with little
involvement of TK holders.
5.3.3 An Incentive to Codify
Once one has identified the possible contribution of TK to the R&D
process in the bio-industries, the next step is to identify property rights
that wiU have an appropriate incentive effect on the production and/or
the dissemination of TK. If one considers the theoretical evolution of
Walter W. Powell (2001), "Networks of Learning in Biotechnology; Opportunities
and Constraints Associatedwith Relational Contracting in Knowledge-Intensive Field",
in Rochelle Dreyfus, etal., Expeniding the Boundaries ofIntellectual Property, Innovation Poligi
for the Knowledge Society", Oxford University Press and Paul P. Saviotti (1998), "Industrial
Structure and the Dynamics of Knowledge Generation in Biotechnology" in Senker
and van Vliet (eds.), Biotechnology and Competitive Advantage; Europe Firms and the US
Challenge, Edward Elgar, pp. 19-44
™ KerryTen Kate and Sarah Laird (1999), The Commercial Use ofBiodiversity, Earthscan,
London, p. 62. See also Russel L. Barsh (2001), "Who Steals Indigenous Knowledge?"
95 American Society of International Law Proceedings, 153
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knowledge economics, it appears that there is not so much a need to
restrict access - as for most of TK, its tacit dimension already limits
access. There is rather a strong need for an incentive to reveal knowledge
and to provide mechanisms that favor trade of knowledge.
Under the classical economic understanding of innovation developed by
Arrow^ '^ and Nelson^^^, it is not clear that there is a justification to
protect TK through exclusive property rights. I briefly recall Arrow and
Nelson's few central points. First, from a firm standpoint, undertaking
R&D activities is regarded as an investment decision. Second, R&D can
be conceived of as an activity intended to produce information or
knowledge. Third, knowledge is a public good, i.e. a non-excludable and
non-rival good. As a non-excludable good, knowledge is likely to be
underprovided, from society's perspective, because the social return
from investment in R&D exceeds private retarn. By providing a legal
mechanism to exclude third parties from knowledge use, IPRs enable
knowledge producers to capture a greater part of the benefits of their
investment in knowledge production, therefore acting as incentive for
the production of knowledge. However, knowledge is also a non-rival
good, which means that it should be freely available. There is thus a
dilemma or a tradeoff between investment and access or, in other words,
between dynamic efficiency and static efficiency.
Under such an understanding of knowledge production and
dissemination, is there an economic reason to protect such Imowledge
and by what kind of protection mechanism? TK could itself be regarded
as R&D because it consists of knowledge that has resulted from a long
process of innovation by TK holders; some people want to acquireit and
TK holders want to protect it, it is therefore valuable knowledge.
Valuable knowledge is a public good, as such, there seems to be reasons
to protect TK by IPRs mechanisms. On the contrary, TK already exists,
so there is no need to create IPR incentives to produce it; it has been
created without such incentives. Moreover, TK is also a non-rival good,
which suggests that it should be open-access. In economic terms, there
appears to be no gain in dynamic efficiency that justifies losses from
static inefficiency, such as the under-utilization of knowledge induced by
IPRs. Therefore, there is no apparent economic or utilitarian argument
Kenneth J. Arrow (1962), « Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Inventions » in Richard R. Nelson (ed.) Tbe Rafe and Direction ofInventive Activity: Economic
andSocialFactors, Princeton University Press, Princeton
Richard R. Nelson (1959), «The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research »,
Journal of Poutical Economy, vol. 67
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to protectTK. That is probably why most proponents of TK protection
reject utilitarian justifications.
As suggested byPadmashree GehlSampath, one cannotstop the analysis
at this point. Indeed, both the increasing cumuladve and collective
dimensions of innovation/^^ especially in biotechnologies and the
increased awareness of the role of tacit knowledge, have led to some
changes in the economic theorizadon of innovation and/or knowledge
production that are relevant in our examination of the justification of
TK protection.^ '^* First, the collective and cumulative dimension of
innovation implies that access to previous inventions and preexisting
knowledge become important incentives to innovate whereas
transferring and exploiting preexisting knowledge is difficult and cosdy.
Second, it is important to realize that describing knowledge as a public
good only applies to codified knowledge.
Indeed, tacit knowledge does not qualify as a perfectiy non-exclusive
good. When knowledge is expressed through perfectiy codified
instructions tiiat enable an easy reproduction of knowledge, it is
uncontrollable or non-excludable.^^^ Actually, knowledge is often a mix
of codified instructions and tacit knowledge based on practical
experiences that can onlybe acquired in the specific laboratory where the
research has been undertaken. The tacit dimension of knowledge gives
some control to its owner because it can only be transmitted by
voluntary demonstration and apprenticeship. Therefore, tacit knowledge
has some excludability.^ '^^ As most TK consists of tacit knowledge, or
can be assimilated to tacit knowledge, it might be said that it is pardy
excludable and can only be accessed by a voluntary demonstration of
knowledge holders. When TK has been codified in academic databases
or journals, TK holders havealready willingly demonstrated it. However,
they may have been unaware of the consequences of this revelation. •
Several costs of knowledge also limit the benefit of non-rivalry. The
effect of non-rivalry, i.e. the capacityof knowledge to be used an infinite
number of times by an infinite number of persons, can be seriously
^23 See notably Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson (1990), « On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope », 90 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 839or Jerome H. Reichman
(2000), "Of Green Tulips and legal Kudzu: Repacking Rights in Subpatentable
Innovadon", 53 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW1743
™ Padmashree Gehl Sampath (2004), "Definingan Intellectual Property Right
p. 24
'25 Except obviously when it is codified with a secretcode.
Dominique Foray (2000), Ueconomie de la connaissance, pp 67-68
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limited by three categories of costs: the costs of codifying, transmitting,
and acquiring knowledge. This implies that the tacitness of knowledge
reduces the benefits of its non-rivalry. The cost of transmission includes
the cost of transferring knowledge including the cost of the medium.^^^
The costs of acquisition refer to the costs of training a large audience
that is able to understand and use the knowledge. Without those
investments, the value of non-rivalry is limited or void.^^® One can
therefore distinguish specific non-rival goods like esoteric or very up-to-
date knowledge from quasi-universal non-rival goods like the law of
gravity. The presence of those costs implies that TK cannot be used as
widely as its potential. In economic terms, one would say that TK is not
available for diffusion at marginal cost.^ '^ However, two categories of
costs have been reduced. The development of the information and
communication technologies, notably in TK-rich countries like India and
China, lowers the cost of transmission. Similarly, the development of
scientific disciplines like ethnobotany, ethnopharmacology, or economic
botany creates a new audience able to understand TK. Therefore, the
costs of codifying appear to be the main limit to the benefits of non-
rivalry.
Therefore, an important part of TK consists of tacit knowledge that does
not correspond to the notion of public good. There is not a need to
restrict access in order to provide an incentive to invest in the
production of TK. Rather, there is a need for an incentive to codify TK
so as to increase its transferabiUty and use.^^°
In addition, it is important to understand the relationship between
codification and intellectual propert}^ Codification is a condition for the
granting of an intellectual property right. A property right can only be
granted on well-identified and described pieces of knowledge.^ '^
Codification also provides an argument for the granting of IPRs. Indeed,
codification is a public good, or in other words, knowledge becomes a
™ Dominique Foray (2000), Ueconomie dela connaissance, pp. 69-70
™ Michel Gallon (1994), «Is Science a Public Good? Fifth Mullins Lecture", SCIENCE
Technology and Human Value, 19(4)
^ Padmashree Gehl Sampath (2003), "Defining an Intellectual Property Right on..."
A CBD report on TK registers and databases notes that "indigenous and local
communities had had some practical protection through the high transaction costs of
acquiring and using traditional knowledge that may be significantiy lowered with
[databases] and associated electronic data-mining techniques". See CBD (2005) The
Advantages and Limitations of Registers (...), p. 16
For example, in copyright law, protection is given to expressions but not ideas; and
in patent law, protection is given to described inventions but not know-how.
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public good when it is codified, as such there might be a need for
protection and incentives.
In conclusion, the lesson of this utilitarian approach is twofold. From
the perspective of lawmakers willing to promote the conservation, use,
and creation of TK, there seems to be a strong argument for incentives
to codify TK. The lesson of this utilitarian approach is not an argument
against the creation of property rights in TK, as it is called by article 8j
of the CBD, as it is enacted in some national legislation and as it is
discussed in WIPO-IGC. The lesson is that even if this property right
exists, the transferability and the use of ethnobotanical knowledge, at
least outside of the community, wiU remain very limited in the absence of
codification. This assertion is confirmed by the figures mentioned above:
eighty percent of firms using ethnobotanical knowledge use the TK
codified by academics. From the standpoint of TK holders, an important
choice must be made. If their priority is to maintain control over their
ethnobotanical knowledge in the absence of a clear possibility to obtain
intellectual property protection, the best option probably consists of
keeping their knowledge tacit. If they want open access to their
knowledge and obtain compensation for its use, they should consider
codifying their knowledge and search for relevant intellectual property
protection.
5.4 Theory and Practice: Codification andDatabases
The analysis of the justification for TK protection from a utilitarian
perspective supports those TK holders that have launched into creating
databases. Indeed, the material result of TK codification might be
academic journal articles or databases. As publication in academic
journals implies a total loss of control over published knowledge,
databases appear to be the best way to codifyTK. It is not sufficient to
give theoretical support to the creation of TK databases; first one must
examine whether there is a property right on databases that works as an
incentive to codify or whether it is necessary to envisage the creation of
new IPRs and then return to the criticisms of TK databases.
5.4.1 IPRs and Databases
Is there a right available or is it necessary to envisage the creation of a
new IPR? Countries interested in fostering codification of TK in their
territory could enact national legislation on the condition of access to
TK databases. National laws may not be the answer because they only
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extend as far as national borders. One of the benefits of digital databases
is their ability to increase the internadonal transferability of knowledge.
Therefore, it may be more effective to look for available internadonal
protection so that it may have an effect on the use of TK outside of
national borders. There is some logic to first lookingat rights available to
TK holders in the current state of the law and then at rights that require
some international action, such as the negotiation of a new international
treaty on TK protection. In this section, I limit myself to a brief
examination of the international protection currendy available for
databases.
In most countries databases are protectable under copyright and/or
through technological measures. In the European Union and some other
countries, databases may additionally qualify for protections under the sui
generis database right.
With regards to copyright, the conditions and scope of protection vary
among states. As to the conditions of protection, under the "inteUecmal
creation" approach to the originality standard that is taken by most civil
law jurisdictions and some common law countries, most notably the
United States, the author of a database must demonstrate a limited
modicum of creativity in the selection and arrangement of data. While
under the "sweat of the brow" approach, he must demonstrate
investment in time and/or money in the compilation of the database^^^.
Despite the differences in the conditions of protection, there is litde
doubt that a TK database would qualify for copyright protection in most
countries. Regarding the scope of protection, as it somehow depends
upon the conditions of protection, there are similar differences among
national legislations. In countries resorting to the "intellectual creation"
doctrine, it is very limited: it is the copying of the selection and/or
arrangement of data that constitotes infringement, not the copying of the
data. In countries following the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, the scope
of protection is broader but still limited: the copying of a substantial
proportion of the data infringes the copyright but not the copying of
small amounts of data.'^^
It is also possible to protect databases through a sui veneris database right
first enacted in the European Union and soon to be in force in close to
Mark J. Davison (2003), Tie 'Legal Protection of Database, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 13-21
Ibidem, pp. 26-27
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fifty states"\ The makers of a TK database should have no difficulty in
qualifying for protection. The conditions of protection are similar to
copyright under the "sweat of the brow" approach, in that in order to
qualify for the right the maker of the database must make a substantial
investment in obtaining, verifying, or presenting the contents of the
database. As for the scope of protection, it is sUghtiy different: if a
database qualifies for the sui generis right, database makers may prevent
the unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of substantial parts of
the database, and the repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-
utilization of insubstantial parts of the database's contents. The suigeneris
database right therefore provides stronger protection than copyright.
However, it is only in force in a limited number of countries and
protection is only available for nationals or residents of these
countries.^ '^ It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether
countries rich in TK should consider enacting similar legislation, as the
protection ofdatabases is amuch broader issue than TK databases '^''.
In addition to the twenty five member states of the European Union, the database
sui generic right exists or might exist in the foreseeable future in a series of other
European Countries, Turkey, Israel, South Africa, Mexico and some Latin-American
countries. SeeMarie J. Davison (2003), The hegalProtec/ion ofDatabase, p. 234
735 Nevertheless, even if countries rich in traditional knowledge do not wish to enact an
EU-like sm generis right on database, there might be a possibility to benefit from the
protection in countries where this right exists even thought the EU directive says the
opposite. After a very detailed comparison between tlie two forms of copyright
protection and the sui generis right, Professor Davison argues that except differences of
terminology, the sui generis right is not different from copyright. Such a difference
cannot mask the substantive reality that it is a form of copyright for databases. If his
analysis is right, the EU Member States havean obligation to accordnational treatment
to all nationals of states that are signatories to international agreements such as the
TRIPS agreement and the Copyright Treaty. Therefore, the maker of a TK database (or
the state from which they are nationals) could use this argumentation to claim the
protection of the EU sui generis right within the territory of the states in which it is in
vigor. See Mark J. Davison (2003), The 'Legal Vrotection ofDatabase, pp. 221-226.
72'' One can however mention the fact that three studies have been carried out for
WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and related right on this issue. One
concentrated on India and concluded that it should envisage the adoption of a
legislation protection unoriginal database. The three others look at Latin American or
developing countries andcountries in transition asa group and conclude that they have
no stronginterestin the adoption of suchlegislation. SeePhiroz Vandredala (2002), A
study on the impact ofprotection ofunoriginal databases on developing countries: Indian experiences,
WIPO/SCCR/7/5; Yale M. Braunstein (2002) Economic Impact of Database Protection in
Developing Countries and Countries in Transition, WIPO/SCCR/7/2; Sherif el Kassar
(2002), Study on the Protection ofUnoriginal Databases, WIPO/SCCR/7/3 and Thomas Rijs
(2002) Economic Impact of Database Protection in Developing Countries and Countries in
Transition, WIPO/ SCCR/7/4
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Last, it is possible to protect online databases by conditional access
systems that serve to control access to an information service^^^. Here, I
must introduce a theoretical distinction. The notion of property rights is
sUghdy different for lawyers and economists. Property rights in the
economic sense include not only legal property rights but also other
forms of control that produce the same effects of creating some degree
of exclusiveness and transferability."® While copyright and the sui generis
right provide control over copyingparts of a database, conditional access
systems provide complete control over access to a database. Under
conditional access systems a database owner can condition access to a
database through contractual licensing terms, which fix the conditions
and payment for use. Therefore, for on-line databases, conditional access
systems offer convenient protection for TK holders.
However, it might be worth combining legal and technological
protection because once access has been given to a user, copyright, or
the suigeneris right provide stronger protection against third parties. One
must recall the distinction between contract and legal property rights.
For the most, contracts only bind the contractingparties; they cannot be
opposed to third parties. By contrast, intellectual property rights can be
opposed to anyone. To illustrate, imagine A has some TK and makes it
available to B under certain conditions including an obligation not to
communicate the knowledge to third parties. In violation of the
contractual terms B makes the knowledge available to C. If A protects
his database with conditional access measures, he can sue B for breach
of contract but he has no direct action against C. By contrast, if A has an
intellectual property right, he can sue B for breach of contract and C for
infringement of its property right."' For this reason, TK holders might
combine technological measures and IPRs.
In sum, there already exist some forms of international protection for
databases that can provide incentives for the codification of TK. Some
Bernt Hugenholtz (1999), "Code as Code, Or the End of Intellectual Property as We
Know It", Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol.6,
No3 p. 308-318
™ Yoram Barzel (1997), The Economic Analysis ofProperty Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, (2"^ ed.), p. 3. The fact that technological measures may be a
susbtitute for legal property rights when copyrights legislation forbid their
circumvention. See notably the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty, articles 11 and 12, the text of the treaty is available at
http://u'u'w.wipo.int/documents/en/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm
This is the legal strategyused in open-software, see David Mc Gowan (2001) "The
Legal Implications of Open-Source Software", UNIVERSITY OFILLINOIS LAW REVIEW,
vol. 2001, p. 242 (Cf section 5.4)
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additional forms of protection may appearin the future as a result of the
discussions within WIPO on database protection that were interrupted
by the lacis of consensus within the United States on the best form of
protection.
5.4.2 Replies to Database Critics
Sceptics argue that the use of databases for defensive protection is
incompatible with positive protection because it would effectively place
TK in the public domain. This assertion confuses notions of patent law
and copyright law and deserves to be qualified. It is true that an
invention described in a text or a database can no longer be patented, as
it would lack novelty. In that sense, it can be said that it is placed in the
public domain. However, the description itself can still be protected by
copyright, the sui generis database right, or above all technological
measures. Therefore, TK described in databases can be taken into
account as prior art by patent offices even if access to the database is not
freely accessible. As an illustration, let us compare with a scientist who
makes a discovery and describes it in an online academic journal. This
discovery can no longer be patented as it would lack novelty. However,
the article is protected by copyright and access to the journal can be
limited by conditional access systems, i.e. only subscribers may access. In
practice, people pay high subscription fees to access descriptions of
valuable scientific information. There is no reason why peoples
interested in accessing valuableTK would not pay a fee to access a TK
database. In addition, access to the database could be conditioned not
only for the payment of a fee but also for an obligation not to share the
knowledge with third parties. Lastly, the European Patent Office (EPO)
and the makers of the Traditional Kjiowledge Digital Library (TKDL)
recendy concluded an agreement according to which the EPO will have
access to the TKDL while it wiU remain inaccessible to third parties. '^"'
This agreement is practically helpful but it should not give the
impression that similar agreements are a legal necessity to combine
defensive and positive protection.
Similarly, some TK holders complain about the notion of the public
domain. Either tiiey claim that the notion of public domain does not
exist in their customary law or they complain that their knowledge has
been placed in the public domain by third parties without their prior
710 Presenarion of a representative of the European Patent office at the S* session of
WIPO-IGC,June 2005
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consent '^" and they want protections for their knowledge that is in the
public domain. In that latter case, databases enable some control over
the use of knowledge in the public domain. A database made up of
pieces of knowledge in the public domain (either because they are
unprotected, no longer protected or unprotectible) can be protected by
intellectual property or by technological measures. '^'^ Obviously, the
person interested in accessing that knowledge can find another source
but he might prefer using the database that offers a large collection of
knowledge and a classification system. Facilitating access to knowledge is
the very raison d'etre of databases. In that case, the users might be ready
to accept the conditions of access as stipulated by the database maker.
Critics of databases also argue that codifying TK and placing it into
databases could be dangerous for traditional innovation because it would
fix knowledge in its current state and interrupt the innovation process.
This criticism may be legitimate but it is badly formulated. Modern
science mixes tacit and codified knowledge. Codification of new
discoveries is an important task and it cannot be argued that codification
freezes the innovation. To the contrary, some degree of codification is
necessary to share knowledge and further innovate.
This criticism highlights the question of the mode of transrnission of
TK. As I explained above, Indigenous and local communities holding
TK face the same options as any organization managing knowledge, they
have to choose between a strategy of codification and a strategy of
personalization. Thus far indigenous and local communities holding TK
have relied for the most part on a strategy of personalization to ensure
the devolution of their knowledge. Therefore indigenous and local
communities could consider replacing or complementing their strategy
of personalization through a strategy of codification. What is true is that
if we want to maintain the traditional innovation process, codification
must be carried out by or with TK holders, and their organization of
innovation must be taken into account. This will be the subject matter of
the second part of this essay.
See for example Tulalip Tribes of Washington (2003), "Statement on Folklore,
Indigenous Knowledge, and the Public Domain" at the fifth session of the WIPO-
IGC, July 09. in WIPO/GRTI<F/IC/6/14
''•'2 This is precisely why proponents of a strong public domain are very wary about
strong protection on database; see notably Jerome H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir
(2003) "A contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in A
Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment", 66 LAW AND
Contemporary Problems 315
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Furthermore, critics of databases rightlypoint out that there is a problem
of articulation between TK holders and the makers of a TK database
when TK holders themselves do no make the database.
What TK holders claim is a right to TK as such, not a right to a
database. Similarly, article 8J of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
as well as some national laws and discussions on misappropriation in
WIPO recognize or consider the possibility of a right to TK as such. In
contrast, a utilitarian approach suggests that codification might be a
practical means for effective protection of ethnobotanical knowledge
and that we should consider the possible incentives. In the current state
of the law, there exist some property rights to databases that could work
as an incentive to codify ethnobotanical knowledge. Those property
rights aregranted to the codifier, i.e. the person that makes the database.
Therefore, they encourage TK holders to codify their knowledge.
However, if the codification or creation of the database is not carried out
by TK holders themselves, the respective rights of TK holders and the
database maker must be respected. This not a problem specific to
ethnobotanical knowledge —it is present each time the maker of a
database wants to integrate protected material in its database. The
database maker and knowledge holders wiU have to negotiate the
conditions of integration of that knowledge in the database and a
formula to share the benefits. The situation is more complex with TK
because, in the current state of the law, the existence and the outline of a
right to TK remain unclear. However, TK holders can make up for the
weakness of their property right by the tacitness of their knowledge:
codification of their knowledge in a database is likely to require their
voluntary contribution. In addition, creating a TK database facilitates the
enforcement of their rights to their knowledge.
Whether TK holders or third parties create a TK database, there wiU be
organizational consequences. A TK database is most likely to include
pieces of knowledge belonging to several owners: several individuals, a
community, or multiple communities. The database maker may act as a
collective rights organization '^'^ . If a community of TK holders sets up
the database, they wiU manage the rights of the community and act as an
intermediary between the community's internal regime, which grants
property rights and rules governing knowledge exchanges within the
community, and the external regime, which setties the conditions upon
''■♦3 Merle Alexander et at. suggest a similar idea in using the term "trust", I prefer the
expression "collective right organization" as it does not always flts in the legal
definition of trust; See MerleAlexander etal. (2003), The role ofRegisters & Databases (...),
p. 36
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which the community agrees to grant access to third parties. If a third
party sets up the database, he will act as an intermediary between the
knowledge holders and the potential users.
Therefore, we cannot limit our attention to a limited understanding of
TK protection through databases or any other device. We must also
consider how these protection devices can enable communities to
articulate their internal regime, which organizes innovation within the
community, and an external regime, which organizes their relation to
third parties. This is the subject matter of the following pages.
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6. Taking into Account Customary Law to
Maintain Traditional Innovation
The claims of TK holders are not limited to the protection of their
knowledge but also include the respect of their customary law, or in
other words the preservation of their cultural identity and the
organizational structure that enables the continuous production, use and
conservation of their knowledge. Very often, TK holders argue that they
do not need intellectual property rights but rather need the recognition
of theircustomary rights/'*^
6.1 The Current Debate on the Role ofCustomaryLaw in
the Protection ofTK
Usually the demand for recognition of customary law is perceived as
deeply embedded in the larger claim of indigenous peoples for self-
determination. In this context, indigenous peoples may view the debate
on biodiversity and TK as an opportunity to have their voice heard. On
the other side of the table, governments, which have cold feet vis-a-vis
demands of self-determination, regard any claim for the respect of
customary law as a moral or political issue. Governments view the
debate on TK protection as only a "pretext" to bring the issue of self-
determination to the forefront.^'*^
The difficulty with these contentious views on the role of customary law
is that they are unlikely to result in a consensual solution. Moreover, they
provide littie guidance on the design of possible solutions. As a result,
except the insertion of a principle for the respect of customary law in
WIPO-IGC documents '^"^, and in decisions of the Conferences of the
See notably Four Directions Council (1996), Forests, indigenous peopks and biodiversi^.
Contribution of the Your Directions Council to the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Lethbridge: FDC or the The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual
Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples available at
hrrp?//aote.aroa.we)linpl-on.net.nz/iinp/mata.htm or see the minutes of the WIPO-
IGC, available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/
'"•s However, in some States, case law or statute law gives some recognition to
customary law
Document GRTKF/IC/8/5 of the WIPO-IGC, entided "Protection of Traditional
Knowledge: Revised objectives and Principled' a Principle (h) of respect for customary useand
transmission of traditional knowledge, which provides that "Customary use, practices and
norms shall be respected andgiven due account in the protection oftraditional knowledge, subjed to
national law andpolig. Protection bgond the traditional context should not conflict with customary
access to, and use and transmission of traditional knowledge, and should respect and bolster this
customaryframework. If so desired ly the traditional knowledge holders, protection shouldpromote the
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Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity^"*^, intergovernmental
discussions have so far made littie headwayon this issue.
Beyond these decisions, two possible solutions are usually envisaged for
the inclusion of customary law. A first proposal consists of the creation
of an international sui generis right inspired by the provisions of
customary law. A related proposition maintains that existing customary
law would provide sufficient protection, if only courts recognized it.
However, both proposals seem to be highly problematic.
It is difficult to comment on the proposal to create a sui generis right
based on customary law because there is no detailed proposal describing
what such a right could be. However, this proposal faces practical
problems, and above all it does not answer the right question. In
practical terms, I have already mentioned above the difficulty faced by
WIPO in its attempt to bmld a sui generis regime around the notion of
misappropriation. Moreover, the history of intellectual property law
reveals a proliferation of sui generis regimes, which rarely provide full
satisfaction. '^"' Most of all, it implies that the multitude of customary
use, development, exchange, transmission and dissemination of traditional knowledge bj the
communities concerned in accordance with their customary lams andpractices, taking into account the
diversity of national experiences. No innovative or modified use of traditional knowledge within the
communi^ which hasdeveloped and maintained that knowledge should be regarded as offensive use if
that communi^ identifies itselfivith that use oftheknowledge and anymodifications entailed by that
use." (My emphasis)
In the same document the deflnition of misappropriation includesan item 5 staring that
the application, interpretation and enforcement ofprotection against misappropriation of traditional
knowledge, including determination ofequitable sharing and distribution of benefits, should be mided.
as far as possible and appropriate, bv respect for the customary practices, norms, laws and
understandings of the holder of the knowledge, including the spiritual, sacred or ceremonial
characteristics ofthe traditional origin oftheknowledge. (Myemphasis)
In 2002, the Sixth Meeting of the COP (COP-6) adopted a decision on "Article 8 Q
and related provisions", inviting: "Parties and Governments, with the approval and involvement
of indigenous and local communities representatives, to develop and implement strategies toprotect
traditional knowledge, innovations andpractices based on a combination ofappropriate approaches,
respecting customary laws andpractices, including theuse ofexisting intellectualproperty mechanisms,
sui generis ^sterns, customary law, the use of contractual arrangements, registers of traditional
knowledge, and guidelines and codes of practiced Two years later, the COP-7, adopted
Decision VII/16 on the same issue "Article 8(j) and Elated Provisions". Section H ofthe
Decision was on the development of elements ofsui generis systemsfor theprotection of traditional
knowledge, innovations andpractices. Drawing onthework ofthe Working Group onArticle S(j), its
annex offered thefollowing list ofpotential elements, notably: "1) (...), 2) (...), 3) (...), 4)
Recognition ofelements ofcustomary lawrelevant to theconservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity with respect to: (i)customary riphts in indigenousI traditionalI local knowledge; (ii) customary
rights regarding biological resources; and (Hi) customary procedures governing access to and consent to
use traditional knowledge, biological andgenetic resources, 5.(...)". (Myemphasis)
Jerome H. Reichman (1994), "LegalHybrids..
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intellectual property laws have similar provisions, which is far from
certain. Therefore, this proposal will not help to articulate a diversity of
customary regimes within a single global legal regime. Any attempt to
design a sui generis right with a detailed international standard (one size
fits all) inspired by one of the customary regimes will have the same
rigidity as existing IPRs and will not be able to accommodate the
diversity of customary laws. On the contrary, if we create national
regimes or community-based legal regimes tailored to include customary
law, it points to the second proposal.
As for the protection of TK by customary law and application of
customary law by foreign jurisdictions, it presupposes several legal
conditions, and as well as facing practical difficulties and objections on
principle. As a first legal condition, the state hosting the community
must give legal force to the community's social norms or customary law.
The recognition of the customary lawis a long-term claim of indigenous
peoples and it might take a long time before all their host states
recognize it as part of their legal system. The second legal condition that
must be met is for states where TK is used; these states must have a
provision in their private international law referring to the law of the
state hosting the community, which in turn must refer to the customary
lawof that community. '^" If this condition is ever fulfilled, it may not be
before long. From a practical standpoint, considering customary law as a
system for protection of TK elicits a problem of clear identification of
the relevant customs and its precise content. It is unclear whether all
different customary laws contain precise provisions on the use of TK by
third parties. For a potential user, it would create a lot of legal
uncertainty because it would be difficult to identify whether an element
of TK is protected or not, what the exact limits of the protected
knowledge are, and the identity of the right holder. For TK holders, it
would be cosdy and difficult to go to a foreign court and bring evidence
of the content of customary law and its breach.
Lasdy, there is a more fundamental objection. If customary laws are to
be given legal force for ruling the relations among members of the
community, and possibly the behavior of third parties when they are in
the territory of the community, there is no clear reason why it should
apply to outsiders outside territory of the community. Law has territorial
Regarding intellectual property law, states tend to apply their legislation on their
territory and not the legislation of the state of origin of the protected material.
Application of the principle of mutual recognition may provide an exception, but it is
unlikely to be used in the absence of an international standard of protection (Cf. section
4.4)
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effect. In some circumstances, law applies to nationals outside national
jurisdictions. In principle, law does not apply to non-nationals outside of
national territory. The same is true for local, regionalor community law.
6.2A Change ofPerspective
In order to progress on this issue, it may be worth adopting a different
perspective. Let us divert one instant our attention from the tensions
between indigenous communities and their host states and recall that
local communities with no demand for self-determination also claim that
their knowledge is ruled by customary law or social norms that should be
respected by third parties.
Then, if we adopt the same standpoint as in the two first parts of this
dissertation, the discussion on customary law appears as an issue of self-
regulation. Indeed, customary law regulating traditional innovation
includes the constitutive elements of self-regulation: (1) some degree of
collective constraint, (2) other than that directiy emanating from
government, (3) to engender outcomes which would not be reached by
individual market behavior alone'^ ". In this perspective, rather than being
a distinct and marginal issue, the protection of TK appears emblematic
of a general challenge for intellectual propert}' law and scholarship:
recognizing the importance of different forms of self-regulation in the
organization of innovation. Professor Robert Merges observes, "Many
scholars —andparticularly legal scholars— have tended to have a state-centric, if not
legal-centric, view of appropriability. This "top-down" view must give way to a
different conception: one where bottom-up institutions of all kinds contribute
i?}tportantly to appropriability conditions. This view is in keeping with the recent trend
in law and economics scholarship toward a discussion ofsocial norms in conjunction
withformal law."
In this perspective, the comparison between traditional innovation and
science is particularly enlightening. In fact, both traditional innovation
and science can be seen as examples of what Professor Merges calls the
historical permanence of appropriability structures or informal
institutions that facilitate innovation by virtue of shared norms. These
appropriability institutions are bottom-up institutions in the sense that
'5°Julia Black (1996) "Constitutionalising Self-Regulation", 59 MODERN LAW REVIEW,
24-55
'5' Robert P. Merges (2004) "From Medieval Guilds to Open Software: Informal
norms, Appropriability Institutions, and InnovaUon", Conference on the Legal History
of Intellectual Property, University of Wisconsin Law School, November 13
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they are norms-based groups that develop their owninternal governance
structure. They rely on group norms as opposed to formal legal
enactments for the creation and enforcement of some form of IPRs.
According to Professor Merges, these appropriability institutions require
at least two things: (1) some way to differentiate insiders or members
from outsiders and (2) someshared norms determining what knowledge
must be shared by aU members and what knowledge can be individually
appropriated.
The point here is not to suggest any similarities in the provision of
customary law and the norms of science, as it has been suggested in
failed attempts to associate TK holders and academics in defense of the
public domain^". Rather, thepurpose of this comparison is to point out
that both science and traditional innovation are innovation systems ruled
by informal rules. The descriptions of social norms or customary laws
that regulate science and traditional innovation by sociologists of science
(Cf. part one, chapter 2) and anthropologists (CJ. part three, chapter 2) suggest
they include the two elements that Professor Merges identifies as
constitutive of this informal or appropriability institutions.
It is in this perspective that I begun the third part of this dissertation by
insisting on the fact that the issue is not (only) to conserve old
knowledge but to maintain systems of traditional innovation. Then, I
described the property regime of traditional knowledge that existed
before the launch of this debate on TK protection. Later in chapter 4, I
pointed to a risk of erosion of customary laws. This enables me to
identifythe real issuewithin the discussions on customary law.
6.3 The Real Issue: Articulating Customary Law and
Formal IPLaw
With that perspective, it appears that we do not have to deal with the
protection of TK inside the community. Customary law governs
protection inside the community, thus there is no need to accommodate
intellectual property for that task.^" Rather the question is how custom-
752 holders not only denounce vehemendy the use and appropriation of their
knowledge by private firms. They also criticize the documentation and publication of
theirknowledge by scientists and they reject the notion of public domain and research
exception as being outside of their customary law. See for instance Tulalip Tribes of
Washington (2003), Statement on Folklore, Indigenous Knowledge, and the Tublic Domain at the
fiftii sessionof the WIPO- IGC,July09, in WIPO/GRTKF/IC/e/M
Ruth L. Okediji (2002), "Making Room at the Table..
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based innovation systems can be articulated within the existing
framework of global intellectual property law.
Two reasons call for this articulation. One concerns the nature of
customary law and difficulties of enforcement; the other is due to the
important diversity among customary laws.
Regarding the nature of the regulation, customary laws of traditional
communities like other social norms differ from law by their mechanism
of enforcement. First, while violations of the law are monitored and
punished by state actors, enforcement of social norms and customs is
decentralized and carried out by private actors (peer supervision). This
means that customary law enforcement is subject to collective action
problems. Indeed, monitoring and punishment are public goods; they are
costiy to the punisher while the benefits are diffusely distributed among
all participants'^ ''. Second, non-legal sanctions and reward mechanisms
used to ensure compliance with customary law may not be sufficient.
In spite of these weaknesses, the regulation of traditional innovation by
social norms or customary law has long been successful. It was facilitated
by the relative isolation in which traditional communities have long lived;
only a limited number of well acquainted ethnoscientists were interested
in accessing their knowledge. The maintenance of informal regulations
has become much more delicate as outsiders' interest for accessing
traditional knowledge has grown and/or as the institutional environment
-the CBD and patent laws - favors the appropriation of TK by third
parties. These technological and legal changes can modify the incentives
to comply with the provisions of customary law or social norms and
induce members to disregard them (internal defection). As to third
parties, they are not subjected to customary law and may behave in
contradiction with the community's norms (external defection). In so
doing, they further reduce their effectiveness. {Cf. chapterfour). Therefore,
we need to find a mechanism enabling TK holders to obtain protection
for their knowledge against third parties in a way that helps them
strengthen internal compliance with customary law.
The second reason for regarding the issue of customary law as a problem
of articulation is the number of indigenous and local communities: each
'S"" Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons. The Evolution ofInstitutions for Colkctive
Action, Cambridge University Press, hereafter Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the
Commons (...), p. 45 or Francesco Parisi (1999) "Spontaneous Emergence of Law:
Customary Law" in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.) Engcbpedia ofLaw
Economics, http://encyclo.findlaw.com/
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community has its own specific customary law adapted to the local
context of innovation. The use of TK outside the community of origin
requires other forms of protection; however, no attempt to replace
customary law with a single piece of formal legislation will be able to
accommodate the diversity of customary laws. The only solution might
well be to find an institutional device to articulate customary laws to
formal intellectual property law.
I have already described two possible solution and their limits. There
might be an alternative, that could be called "contracting into customary
law" that would combine propertyrights, contractand possibly collective
rights organization.
6.4 A Possible Solution: Formalizing Customary Law in
Contracts
The main point is that TK holders need a property right that wiU be
internationally recognized. This right would acts as a hinge or mediating
mechanism between customary intellectual property law in force within
the community and global intellectual property law that apply to
relationships between the community and third parties. Once granted
this right, TK holders can write licenses that embody the provisions of
customary law and be in a position to enforce the provisions of
customary law either for breach of license or infringement of their
property right.
This solution has already been tested for other norms-based systems of
innovation that have had to organize their articulation within the legal
system of intellectual property.
In Part One, I explained that the norm of shared access regulating
exchanges of knowledge among American academic scientists has been
challenged by a series of legal changes allowing the patenting of basic
research and therefore creating a legal environment where defecting
members can appropriate or patent, their knowledge. To strengthen
adhesion to the norm deemed essential to innovation, the community of
academic biologists drafted a Uniform Biological Material Transfer
Agreement (UBMTA) that embodies the community norm. At first the
UBMTA had limited success because it was voluntary and there was no
property right to enforce it or any organization in charge of
enforcement. The results have been better since similar provisions have
been introduced within the guidelines of the American National Institute
of Health (the main fund provider for biomedical research) endowed
with a (limited) capacity to enforce the norm.
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The group of bilateral contracts between CGIAR centers and the FAO
and their joint statement regulating ownership and conditions of access
to their collection of genetic resources, and more recendy the new
international treaty on plant genetic resources are two attempts to
formalize social norms by a combination of property rights and contracts
(material transfer agreement) to preserve them in a changing institutional
environment (IP law and CBD). {Cf.part two, chapterjive)
The most complete example of such formalization is the well-known
community of open-source software. It started as an innovation system
regulated by a series of community norms that ruled what knowledge
had to be shared among all members and what could be individually
appropriated. The challenge is that this norms-based community is
located in a legal environment where its knowledge (source code) can be
appropriated by third parties or defecting members. The open-source
community faced the same double threat as a community of TK holders:
the vulnerability of their norms-based regime to both external and
internal opportunism. One of the solutions adopted has been to obtain
formal IPRs in order to draft and enforce licenses that allow third parties
to use, modify and redistribute the knowledge so long as they respect the
norms of the community embodied in the text of the license. If a user
violates the license, he can be sued for either breach of the license or
infringement of the copyright.^ '^ In addition, to facilitate enforcement,
rights are assigned to an organization representative of the community
(the Free Software Foundation) that is in charge of legally enforcing the
community norms.
I win now examine this proposal to formalize customary law in contracts
in relation to databases. I suggested in the above discussion that
databases might provide useful protection for TK. Once granted an
internationally recognized property right, or equivalent form of control,
TK holders are in a position to design and impose different regimes of
access according to the provisions of customary law.^" Access can be
given to different categories of knowledge, users (members vs.
outsiders), different uses, like patent office searches of the prior art,
research purpose, commercial use, etc.). Additionally, different levels of
access can be granted (fuU access for research or partial access for prior
755 pof more details see notably David McGowan (2001) "Legal Implications of Open-
source Software" University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 2001, Nol, pp. 241-304
'5'' Obviously TK holders willing to negotiate access to their Icnowledge against
compensation are submitted to the law of supply and demand, if they raise the
condition of access, demand is likely to go down
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art searches or samples to potential users, etc)7" This isnot at all a pure
theoretical suggestion; several communities, including the North
American Tulalip Indian tribes^^® and the Kaska Traditional Knowledge
network of British Columbia^^' as weUas the Indian databases mentioned
in chapter 5 now envisage it.
What would be the legal effect of customary law? The situation is slightly
more complicated because the best protection for databases consists of a
combination of technological measures (conditional access technology)
and/or a legal property rights (copyright and perhaps the E.U. s»/generis
right on databases). With conditional access technology, TK holders can
more or less perfectly control access to the database. Once access has
been granted, the use of the TK can be governed bylicenses that include
the provisions of customary law. Because licenses only rule relations
between co-contracting parties, TK holders may combine technological
measures with IPRs. In that case, third parties can be sued for
infringement {Cf. section 5.4.1).
'57 In the same sense the Asian Group notes that "tiered levels ofaccess authori^tion have
been identified as a possible meansfiir managing the intellectualproperty implications ofestablishing^
using and partially publishing databases and registries of TK and associated biological/genetic
resources". See WIPO (2002), Technical Proposals on Databases and Registries of
Traditional Knowledge and Biological/Genetic Resources,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/14, p. 11
'-••s "In the United States of America the Tulalip Tribes in Washington State are compiling a
database oftheir traditional environmental knowledge named "Sto^Base"."'' While compiling this
database, the tribes have distinguished between "Tjpe A knowledge", which thg wished to reserve
exclusivelyfor the members ofthe tribal communities, and 'Type B knoivledge", which the tribes wished
tomakeavailable to the public at large. Thesoftware which is being developed to operate thedatabase
is being programmed to restrict accessfor Type A knowledge in the StotyBase to communi^ members,
whereas Type B knowledge will be disclosed andmade available either tothegeneralpublic or topatent
examiners only. In distinguishing between Type A and Type B knowledge, intellectual proper^
considerations arebeing taken into account andin the technical structure ofthe database this distinction
will be reflected in the access privileges ofdifferent users. The accessprivileges arecomplex andarestill
being developed on the basis of discussions mthin the Tribes. However, the tribes have already
identified three "core principles" that should be borne in mind as TKfinds expanded use inpolig
making: tribes are sovereign; good lawfollows good practice; researchers shouldperform research in
utmost good faith and respect for tribal traditions." WIPO (2004) Update on Technical
Standards and Issues Concerning Recorded Or Registered Traditional Knowledge
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/7 page 319 .See also TulaHp Natural Resources. "Cultural
Stories" ICONS CD-ROM. 2002. See entry in the Inventory contained in Annex II
and Preston Hardison (2004) "Traditional Knowledge Studies and the Indigenous
Trust." Tulalip Tribes and the Indigenous Biodiversity Information Network (IBIN).
September 15, (on filewith the author).
™ CBD (2005), ...The Advantages andLimitations ofRegisters, p. 11
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Finally, the database maker (either a community or third party acting as a
collective rights organization managing the rights of different rights
holders) {Cf. section 5.4.2) could be in charge of legally enforcing the
customary law.
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Conclusion and Further Developments
Synthesis
In this third part, I have followed my comparative and theoretical
approach to reconstruct an historical account of the evolution of the
property regime. The objective was not to write a history of the
discussions on TK protection but rather to provide some clarity on the
notion and evolution of TK and the conditions in which it is produced,
used, conserved and exchanged.
From this analysis, it appears that the main issue consists of preserving
and combining two functions of traditional knowledge. Traditional
innovation is an autonomous system of innovation, in the sense that
traditional innovators mainly innovate for the use of the members of
their community, and the community rules that innovation. Traditional
innovation has additionally become an upstream source of innovation
for bio-industry. The challenge is to successfully combine these two
functions.
In Chapter Two I identified a first equilibrium where one can distinguish
the situation within communities and the outside. Within the
community, the appropriation and the exchange of TK is ruled by
customary law or social norms; the property regime of TK is a mix of
individual and common property. Vis-a-vis third parties (not subject to
customary law), TK appropriation and exchanges are unregulated; it
appears to be in open-access. This situation is not too problematic as
long as traditional innovation is fit and contacts between communities
and third parties remain limited.
In Chapter Three I suggested that this equilibrium has been disrupted by
a double change. The development of modern biotechnologies increases
the potential value of TK for third parties (bio-industry) whereas
simultaneously one observes an alarming erosion of traditional
knowledge.
In Chapter Four I identified several difficulties that hinder attempts to
combine the two functions of traditional innovation. First, it is difficult
to transfer because of the tacit dimension of TK. Second, TK is difficult
to conserve because of its tacit dimension (and because of lack of
funding). In addition, the capacity of communities to self-regulate
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traditional innovation is affected by the newpossibility for appropriating
rawTK or TK derived inventions which is an incentive to disregard the
community norms or customarylaw, thus encouraging internal defection
(appropriation and commercialization by community member) or
external defection (appropriation by third parties).
In Chapter Five I provided a brief account of the current international
negotiations on the definition of a possible intellectual property right for
TK and their limits. Then, I examined a possible solution that is
currently tested by some TK holders: the creation of TK databases and
the integration of customary law provisions in contracts organizing the
creation, the management and access to these databases. As for the
definition of intellectual property rights to TK, I suggested to adopt a
utilitarian approach looidng at the nature of TK and the possible effects
of the creation of property rights; it appears that the rationale for an
intellectual property right is not so much the need of an exclusion
mechanism but rather an incentive to codify knowledge in order to
facilitate its transmission. It is therefore an argument for the creation of
TK databases.
Regarding the coordination of knowledge and IPR exchanges, one
solution envisaged by TK holders is to rely on their capacity to self-
regulate and resort to coordination mechanisms more complex than the
market. Where a single community or several communities of TK
holders pool their knowledge into a database or a network of databases
they wiU obtain a property right to this database. Then, using this
property right and contract, they can set up an institutional arrangement
so as to formalize customary law into force within the communities and
reduce transaction costs. In so doing, they articulate their customary
property regime within a formal legal system. An additional characteristic
of this institutional arrangement is that it is likely to create or formalize a
form of intermediary property regime (common property).
What lessons can we draw from this work? In this third part, I have
argued that there are strong arguments in favor of the creation of TK
databases and I have observed that several groups of TK holders have
set up such databases. I have also stressed the importance of articulating
customary laws organizing traditional innovation within formal
international intellectual property law. I have suggested combining IPRs
and contracts embodying the provisions of customary law and have
observed that some communities envisage this possibility. It is now time
to return to the process of creating TK databases and the future
developments.
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Assessing the Ongoing Movement of Databases
Creations
In the late 1990s, an enthusiastic movement to create databases was
initiated in several parts of the worid; WIPO tried to bringits support by
documenting and sharing experiences, by setting up a common gateway
to access existing databases, by discussing the possibility of a common
classification system for TK, and by articulating witinin die international
patent classification. Unfortunately, ongoing experimentations with the
creation of TK databases have been slowed down by criticism. I believe
that a careful analysis can help to clear up these criticisms (Cf. section 5.4).
It is difficult to foresee whether it wiU be enough to overcome the
disagreement within the WIPO-IGC between proponents of databases
lead by Asian countries, and the critics who are NGOs and indigenous
communities mainly from South America. These critics are very cautious
about the use and commercialisation of their knowledge by third
parties.™
If one focuses on existing databases, it appears that their creation has
been a success in documenting the concerned traditional knowledge.
These databases have further helped to slow down the erosion of
traditional knowledge. Interestingly, attempts to commercialise TK
have not yet generated much success""'.
One reason might be the fragmentation among many different databases
without unique classification systems and technical standards. Several
initiatives have been taken to overcome these difficulties and create a
network of databases. Another reason for the limited success of attempts
to commercialize access to TK lies in the presence of high transaction
costs. Again, the creation of a network of databases might be a
convenient way to lower these transactions costs.
See the minutes of the World Intellectual Property Organization Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore. (However anycommunity of TK holders is free to set up its own database or
to pour its knowledge in an existing database without waiting the emergence of a
consensus within WIPO-IGQ
CBD (2005), The Advantages andLimitations ofRegisters (...)
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PracticalFutures Developments
Creating a Network of Databases...
Countries in favor of the creation of TK databases have taken some
initiadves to overcome the current fragmentation of databases.
First, at the fourth session of the WIPO-IGC in December 2002, the
Asian Group submitted a document entided "'Technical Proposals on
Databases and Re^stries of Traditional Knowledge and 'Biological!Genetic
Bjesources"'"'^ . The Asian Group recommends the use of multi-purpose
databases and registries, which serve both as defensive protection and as
positive legal protection of TK and associated genetic resources. Then,
the document highlights the need to adopt common technical standards
to facilitate the consultation of databases and their interoperability (thus
preparing their possible connection into a network of independent
databases). The document identifies three categories of needed
standards; (1) to facilitate the documenting of TK and consultation of
databases, database makers need content and resource identification standards
which specifyhow TK may best be described in the databases (including
standardized data structures, metadata and system of correlation between
vernacular names of local languages and science's name); (2) to enable
the interoperability of databases, they need technological standards-, (3) if
databases are protected by technological measures (conditional access
systems), TK holders might need security and transmission standards, which
specify how access to databases may be controlled and how data about
TK and associated biological/genetic resources may be securely
exchanged between databases and registries. The document contained a
draft for such data specification. Based on the draft, the Asian Group
proposed to develop an interregional consensus on the data
specification.^ '^
Second, without waiting for progressive discussions within the WIPO-
IGC, Indian makers of TK databases have decided to take the initiative
to create common classification and technical standards in order to
network Indian databases, and may later be extended to other countries
762 WIPO (2002), Technical Proposals on Databases and Registries ofTraditional Knowledge and
Biological!Genetic Resources. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/14
'"'3 At the fifth session the WIPO-IGC "supported theproposal..including the transmission of
it to the appropriate body within the Standing Committee on Injormation Technology (SCIT)."
However, for the WIPO-IGC efforts consist merelyin providing a forum for exchange
of information on the ongoing progress and experiences of local, national and regional
initiatives regarding recorded and registered TK.
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databases '^^ '*. The rationale for networking databases is two-fold: to
facilitate their consultation by patent offices for potential users while
maintaining their independence, which is deemed to be essential for the
involvement of communities and the maintenance of traditional
innovation.
Third, efforts are made to combine the need to create common
classifications for TK and the need to facilitate consultation of TK
databases bypatentoffices searching for evidence of priorart. A modern
system of TK classification, the Traditional Knowledge Resources
Classification (TKRC) has been created in India. TKRC identifies about
5,000 sub-groups of TK against one group in international patent
classification (IPG), i.e. AK61K35/78 related to medicinal plants. The
information is structured under section, class, sub-class, group and sub
group as per the International Patent Classification (IPC). It is organized
in this manner for the convenience of its use by the international patent
examiners. In turn, patent examiners have tried to integrate TK in the
International Patent Classification. As a first step, WIPO set up a Task
Force on Classification ofTraditional Knowledge which developed a new main
group for the IPC, designated A61K 36/00, with approximately 200
subgroups, in the field of medicinal preparations containing plants. This
first adaptation of the IPC has been approved and entered into force in
January 2006 more detailed classifications could be inserted after further
work.''^=
Acting as a Collective Rights Organization...
High transaction costs constitute an important hindrance in the
commercialisation of traditional knowledge. However, the creation of
databases and even more the creation of a network of databases might
be a convenient way to lower these transactions costs. This network of
databases would act as a collective rights organization (CRO) lowering
transaction costs. However, there would be an important difference with
other CROs that I examined in this dissertation. In other cases, members
of the CROs were in a symmetrical position: most members were both
providers and users in turn. Members had the same incentives to createa
Madhav Gadgil (2004) Report of the Workshop on Networking of Biodiversity
Databases held at the Centre for Ecological Sciences, during March 23"^ to 24'*'
available at http://wAis.ces.iisc.ernet.in/biodiversm'/Netw(^rk/network.htm
'"'S See WIPO (2003), Defensive 'Protection Measures ^fating to Intellectual Property, Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge: An Update, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/8 and WIPO
(2004), Development ofClassification Tookfor Traditional Knowledge, WIPO/ IPC/CE/34/8
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CRO that facilitated exchanges between themselves; they could even
consider creating a zone of shared access among them. By contrast, this
CRO would only gather one party: TK holders. In this sense, the
network of databases could be compared with copyright collectives,
which reduce search costs by offering a single "ticket office", lower
bargaining costs by proposing standard licences and centralize
monitoring and enforcement. Indian makers of TK databases are
currently considering this possibility at the national level.^*^^
Search costs designate the costs of locatingan exchange partner, that is
to say identifying a person who wants to sell what you want to buy or
buy what you want to sell. Today, high search costs hinder access to and
use of traditional knowledge. Traditional knowledge is not a standard
good with well-identified characteristics and well-known sellers. The use
of traditional knowledge to identifyinterestinggenetic resources in hope
of developing a commercial product gives unpredictable results. In
addition, TK holders know litde of the needs of potential users and TK
users dispose of litde information on who has what to sale. Reducing the
costs or searching relevant information is precisely the purpose of
databases. However, the scattering of TK in many different databases
without unique classification systems and technical standards hinders this
reduction of search costs. The creation of a network of TK databases
consultable through a single gateway where TK is well documented and
arranged under a common classification, with a cadastre identifying
precisely who holds what knowledge and what property rights might
reduce, drastically search costs.'"
Monitoring and Enforcement costs include the costs of monitoring
behaviors and sanctioning infringements of property rights as well as
They consider that negotiation, maintenance and enforcement of rights should be
ensured by a single organization. This organization would interact with the knowledge
holders, either individuals or communities through the medium of Memoranda of
Agreements (MOA). Such MOAs would take place of the generally recommended PIC
(Prior Informed Consent), since the PIC is a one-way transaction and does not
incorporate an element of reciprocal responsibility on part of the agency receiving the
information. The organization would interact with users through standard information
transfer agreements. See Madhav Gadgil (2004) Report of the Workshop on
Networking of Biodiversity Databases held at the Centre for Ecological Sciences,
during March ZS"' to 24* available at
htrp://wgbis.ces.iisc.ernet.in/biodiversit\'/Network/network.htm
To some extent the creation of databases can be compared to the creation of ex situ
collections of genetic resources with the advantages of good classification system and
easy access. The possibility to create a network of independent TK databases enables to
combine the advantage of ex situ conservation (classification, facilitated use) and the
advantage of in situconservation (ongoing evolution)
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breaches of contract. Monitoring the use of TK is difficult because it
involves tracking the use of some information through the R&D chain.
In many situations, identifying whether or not some TK is at the origin
of a commercial product is a very delicate task. Then, once an invention
is made and commercialized, it is costly for TK holders to verify the
extent of the commercial success, which implies knowing the level of
sales and aU the costs that contribute to developing and selling the
products. The creation of a database and even more tine creation of a
network of databases can reduce the costs of monitoring uses of TK and
enforcing property rights and contracts if it includes the designation of
someone^^** in charge of these functions. First, members canbenefit from
economies of scale if monitoring and enforcement involve fixed costs
that can be shared. Second, specialization enables the designated
enforcer to perform this task more efficientiy.
Bargaining costs designate the costs of reaching an agreement. Among
many others {Cf. infra), the number of involved parties may be an
important source of bargaining costs. Companies interested in using
traditional knowledge may want to consult aU the available TK on a
precise group of plants rather than aU the knowledge of a certain
community. Therefore, they will need to negotiate access with a large
number of communities with different conditions of access, which might
be a costly process in comparison to the value of the concerned TK.
TK holders setting up a network of databases could consider drafting
standard licenses. It could offer economies of scale in the design of rules;
as there are many redundancies in contracts ruling exchanges of property
rights (licenses), mandatory or optional standard contractual provisions
allowparties to negotiate only a limited number of issues. However, two
qualifications must be made. First, drafting standard contracts might run
counter to tine objective of respecting the diversity of customary laws.
TK holders may have to make a trade-off between these two objectives.
One possible solution might be to draft a series of standard licences
covering the main situations: different types of knowledge, different
categories of users and different types of uses. Then, according to their
customary law, TK holders could designate what knowledge is accessible
under what licence. Second, those standard contracts would in fact be
standard offers drafted only by one party: TK providers. TK users still
need to accept them.
768 por instance, in the project mentioned above of creating a network of Indian
databases they plan to entrust a single organization (probably the National Innovation
Foundation) with the negotiation,maintenanceand enforcement of rights.
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The difficulty is tinat indigenous and local communities have to cope
with imperfect information. They have little information on the potential
uses of their knowledge, on the costs of R&D, and on possible
alternative sources of information. In addition, they do not know
whether the disclosure will, amongst other things, be treated in a way
that is consistent with their cultural values and goals. They face the
possibility that they wiU conclude ex post that their integration into
biodiversity commerce was not worth the resulting changes to their
traditional social world.^ '^ As a result, TK holders might be tempted to
impose a host of mandatory conditions on parties wishing to make use
of their traditional knowledge. It is open to question, however, whether
this would serve the interests of industry or those of the indigenous and
local communities. If the conditions prove too onerous, companies wiU
not invest in utilising traditional knowledge. This is precisely what
happened with ABS legislation implementing the CBD that I described
in Part Two. This result would be inefficient.^^"
Run by Both Providers and Users?
To dealwith this issue, a further stage might be useful. It is in that spirit,
that Professor Peter Drahos has suggested the creation of a "global
biocoUecting society" run by both users and providers.^^' This bio-
coUecting society could negotiate standard contracts acceptable for both
parties. As I mentioned earlier, this sort of collective rights organization
gathering both providers and users can also include collective valuation
mechanisms that are more efficient than bilateral (market) valuation
when there are important information asymmetries (information about
the threat values and the bargaining surplus is private). Collective
valuation by a CRO can also be more efficient than legislative or judicial
liability rules: valuation is more customized because members have more
expertise than legislators and judges; valuation is more responsive
because valuation rules can be modified much more quickly than
Peter Drahos (2000), "IndigenousKnowledge, Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: is
a Global Bio-Collecting Society the Answer?", 22 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL
Property Review, 245-250
™ Ibidem
'''' Ibidem. Note that the proposal of Peter Drahos was not connected with the creation
of a network of TK databases. The difference is important. As I mentioned above,
firms rarely access TK directiy. Most often, they use codification of TK made by
academics. If TK holders undertake to codify themselves their knowledgeand to create
databases, then diere might be more direct contact between TK holders and firms
interested in using their knowledge.
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legisladon. This bio-collecting society may also be useful to overcome
cultural differences or the lack of trust that complicates the search for
mutually agreed upon terms"^. Last, this bio-coUecting society could
includealternative dispute resolution mechanisms that might increase the
level of trust among the parties and lower enforcement costs. The idea
would be that the bio-coUecting society would stimulate a process of
self-regulation amongst companies and TKholders/^^
To sum up, it seems that the creation of a network of interconnected
databases with common classification systems and common technical
standards could facilitate access to traditional knowledge and benefit
sharing. As an additional step, the network of databases could act as a
collective rights organization acting on behalf of TK holders based on
the model of copyright collectives to reduce transaction costs. A third
stage might be the creation of processes of self-regulation amongst TK
holders and users including a mechanism of collective valuation and the
negotiationof standard contracts acceptable by both parties.
These mechanisms could enhance the welfare of both TK holders and
users by reducingtransaction costs. However, it does not mean that they
will automatically emerge. TK holders and users are far from being a
communitywith internal characteristics identified by Elinor Ostrom and
others as favourable to the emergence of collective rights organizations
and/or other forms of self-regulation. Beyond, their attempts to create
new property rights, WIPO and other intergovernmental organizations
dealing with traditional knowledge protection might consider how they
could facilitate the emergence of such mechanis
''2 For some testimonies on the "environment of suspicion", see Rex Dalton (2004),
"Bioprospects...", p. 598 or Ten Kate and Laird (1999), The Commercial Use of
Biodiversity, p. 296
773 Peter Drahos (2000), "Indigenous Knowledge, ..."
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General Conclusion
In view of the utility and the erosion of biodiversity and traditional
knowledge, the new property regime initiated by the Convention on
Biological Diversity aims at conserving and providing access to these
inputs of innovation so as to ensure innovation in bio-industries for
today and tomorrow.
The objectives of this dissertation were: (i) the identification and
description of the solutions that have been tested or discussed; (ii) an
assessment of whether these solutions fulfill (or are likely to fulfill) the
objectives and an identification of their limits (iii) an explanation of the
causes of these limits, (iv) and suggestions for possible solutions.
To fulfill these objectives, I adopted a comparative and theoretical
approach and I examined whether the discussions on genetic resources
and traditional knowledge were examples of broader phenomena that
have already been observed and theorized. Because the solution
considered by the Convention on. Biological Diversity consists of
granting exclusive rights as an incentive to conserve pieces of useful
information (biodiversity and traditional knowledge), I turned to the
branch of law that typically regulates the production and use of
knowledge, i.e. intellectual property law.
Accordingly, in the first part of this dissertation, I use the work of a
group of law and economics scholars to reconstruct an historical account
of the evolution of the intellectual property system and the evolution of
its underlying economic theories. The function of the first part is
twofold. First, it provides me with a theoretical framework to look at
genetic resources and traditional knowledge issues. Second, it highlights
important analogies between the evolution of the system of intellectual
property, the property regime of genetic resources and the discussions
on traditional knowledge; the three parts of the dissertation are written
like three parallel histories.
Very schematically, this comparative and theoretical approach highlights
the following common issues, common engines of change, and common
institutional solutions.
The first common issue concerns the provision of public goods. Because
knowledge is a public good, the market alone wiU not provide sufficient
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quantities of it. Tlie difficulty comes from two characteristics of public
goods -non exclusiveness and non-rivalry— that call for contradictory
measures. Non-exclusiveness calls for the creation of an exclusionary
mechanism to internalize the benefits of the provision of public goods,
whereas non-rivalry suggests that knowledge should be freely available.
These contradictory characteristics create the knowledge dilemma that is
often resolved by a two-part balance. The first part of the balance
consists of identifying the best mix of two solutions to produce
knowledge: the creation of temporary exclusive rights to knowledge or
public financing of knowledge production. Kjiowledge production can
be seen as an innovation chain. Classically, public provision is used for
the first stages of the chain, the upstream part; while IPRs are used for
the last stages of the chain, the downstream part. The second part of the
balance concerns the definition of intellectual property rights: the
conditions for protection must identify intellectual achievement for
which the benefits of the incentive effect produced by IPRs will exceed
the costs (society is prevented from practicing the invention and using it
as an input to future discoveries without permission from the inventor).
However, this two-part balance is provisional and could be disrupted by
a series of changes. Changes are pardy due to the evolution of the
technological context that modifies the costs and benefits of creatingand
enforcingproperty rights. They mayalso come from amendments within
the innovation and conservation policies. Those changes may elicit new
issues both for economic agent and scholars.
A second issue common to the three parts becomes as important as the
provision of public goods: the need to coordinate exchanges of
knowledgeand property rights. The first solution for the coordination of
knowledge and IPRs exchanges consists of relying on the market.
However, due to important transaction costs, it quickly becomes clear
that the market alone may not always ensure an efficient coordination of
knowledge and IPR exchanges. One possible solution is to resort to
government intervention to overcome transaction failure. This possibility
can be examined in light of the entitiement theory initiated by Calabresi
and Melamed. Another solution, in certain circumstances, involves
economic agents setting up instimtional arrangements that reduce
transactions costs and facilitate exchanges; a careful observation reveals
the presence of a multitade of scenarios involvingself-regulation that are
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articulated with the formal legal system. These self-regulatory
experiences can be examined in lightof newinstitutional economics^ '^*.
Hopefully, this dissertadon offers a valuable contribution to the
discussions on biodiversity and traditional knowledge. The primary and
general contribution is to offer some clarity to an oft confused topic. A
secondary contribution is to provide some guidance to the ongoing
discussions.
Regarding the definition of property rights, especially on traditional
knowledge, this dissertation suggests a reasoning to design well-defined
property rights. It suggests a detailed solution for at least a part of TK
(ethnobotanical knowledge), and supports TK holders that are
undertaking valuable experiences by setting up databases to protect
traditional knowledge.
This dissertation highlights the growing importance of a major issue: the
coordination of exchanges of knowledge and the role of transaction
costs in intellectual property regimes in general and in particular in the
property regimes of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. In a
context of collective and cumulative innovation, one has to consider not
only the relationship between the producer and the consumer, but also
the relationship between the producer and its competitor, and the
relationship between owners of complementarypieces of knowledge that
must be combined to develop a final product. Highlighting this new
issue helps to examine the role of the state (law) in the reduction of
transaction costs either by designing the most efficient property right or
by solving individual transaction failures by ad hoc intervention
(compulsory licenses). Above aU, it helps to capture the importance of
forms of self-regulation through which economic agents might modify
their rights in order to adapt to the specificities of their technological
context. These self-regulatory mechanisms may reduce transaction costs
as between the parties, and create new forms of property regimes, aside
from the usual opposition between the public domain and individual
private property.
I believe that if participants and observers of the discussions on genetic
resources and traditional knowledge were more aware of this new issue,
they would consider more effective solutions. In addition, they would
Note that if the new-institutional economics has recently been integrated in IPR
scholarship to examine experiences of self-regulation, in the broader literature on
governance there are other theoretical models to analyze institutional mechanisms to
frame the market.
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take note of practical experiences in which economic agents try to create
or adapt property regimes tailored to the characteristics of their activities.
These practical experiences areworth looking at for three reasons. First,
practical experiences can be valuable sources of inspiration for
international law makers. Second, if international negotiators want to
anticipate the fumre effects of the regime they are negotiating, they
should be aware of how economic agents are likely to modify the rights
theyare granted. Third, efficient solutions to foster the conservation, use
and exchange of genetic resources and traditional knowledge are likely to
be situations that articulate law and forms of self-regulation.
This dissertation also calls for futare work. Intellectual property
scholarship has made important progress in relaxing its legal or state-
centric view of appropriability and its illusionary belief in the efficiency
of the only market-like form of decentralization. Further, Intellectual
property scholarship has made progress in observing that self-regulation
may make an important contribution to defining property regimes and
regulating exchanges of knowledge. This work should be continued by
further integrating lessons of the literature on self-regulation and "co-
regulation" into intellectual property scholarship, and simultaneously
documenting emerging experiences in the field of intellectual property,
genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge.
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